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ABSTRACT

This Dissertation presents a study of Australia's involvement in the negotiation
and early interpretation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an
instrument which remains the most important global nuclear arms control
measure in international law. Using data from recently released Australian
government documents, the study analyses the process by which Australia was
transformed from an ambivalent nuclear sceptic within the Western alliance,
into a steadfast global campaigner against the spread of nuclear weapons. It
concludes that Australia's urgent search during 1967 and 1968 for coherence in
its policy on nuclear weapons acquisition, largely played out within sections of
the Australian bureaucracy and political leadership, was not only the catalyst for
that transformation, but also an important step in Australia's search for "middle
power" status in both a regional and wider sense.
The study uses an interdisciplinary theoretical model which asserts the
complementary nature of international law and international relations theory in
explanations of relations between states. That model proposes that each
discipline is capable of enhancing the insights of the other, in order to account more closely in concert than each does individually - for the rule-following
behaviour of nation-states.
Beginning in Chapter One with a critique of the NPT and the regime of
institutions and understandings which surround it, the study moves, in Chapter
Two, to a review of the domestic and international context in which Australia's
nuclear weapons policy debate was conducted, while introducing the elements
of division within the Australian federal bureaucracy which largely prosecuted
that debate.
Chapters Three and Four analyse the debate in detail, concluding that
its inconclusive result induced Australia's refusal to agree to America's request
for immediate accession to the NPT. This, in tum, resulted in Australia
exercising, through its recalcitrance, disproportionate influence over the US on
the interpretation of the terms of the treaty.
Chapter Five moves analysis to the international arena, and the forum
of the United Nations General Assembly, in which Australia finally found the

iv

limit of America's willingness to accommodate the concerns of a small but
significant Western ally located in a region of strategic importance.
Chapter Six examines the process by which Australia's influence over
the US on the interpretation of the terms of

th~

NPT was translated into

guidance to other nuclear threshold states through the Western alliance. It also
examines the level of influence exerted by Australia through its bilateral
discussions with other states over the terms of the treaty. It concludes that
Australia, mainly through the former process, could claim a significant role in
the formulation of the world's most important multilateral nuclear convention
through its insistence on interpretative clarity.
Finally, the study draws general conclusions on the significance of
Australia's nuclear weapons debate for its aspirations to "middle power" status.
It concludes that its indisputable leadership role, after 1972, in global nuclear
disarmament efforts of many kinds, is an example of that status. Its most
important theoretical conclusion concerns the demonstrated utility of an
interdisciplinary model for the study of relations between states.
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Introduction

Summary of the Study
On 6 August 1945, United States President Harry S. Truman announced the
detonation of a new type of bomb over Hiroshima, Japan, which had yielded a
blast-power more than one thousand times greater than that of its most destructive
predecessor. 1 That event, together with the detonation of a similar bomb over
Nagasaki three days later, resulted in combined civilian casualties of over 118,000
dead, with approximately 95,000 injured. 2 The survivors of these nuclear explosions,
and many of their descendants, continue to suffer the medical and genetic effects of
exposure to large doses of ionising radiation.
Despite the inhumanity of these devices, the international community of
states did not immediately renounce nuclear weapons as an illegitimate means of
waging war. Between 1945 and 1955, as the power of individual nuclear bombs
grew by a factor of approximately one thousand, the global stock of weapons
exceeded even that rate of growth. The result was that, by the mid nineteen fifties,
the potential power of the world's nuclear weapons had multiplied more than one
million times. 3
Since the first nuclear decade, concern about the spread of nuclear weapons
around the world has been an integral part of the international political and strategic
landscape. Perceptions about the consequences of the threat or use of nuclear
1

Disarmament negotiations and treaties 1946-1971: Keesing's Research Report 7. (1972). New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons. At p.l. The force of the Hiroshima atomic bomb was estimated to be
equivalent to the blast-power often thousand tons of conventional TNT high explosive. Campbell, C.
(1984). Nuclear facts: A guide to nuclear weapons systems and strategy. Feltham: Hamlyn. At p.48.
Other effects include heat and ionising radiation, experienced both immediately (from the explosion),
and via the later atmospheric fallout of radioactive particles. The largest previous high-explosive aerial
bomb, used by Britain against high-value targets in Germany during the Second World War, contained
ten tons of high explosive.
2

3

Ibid. (1972). At p. 36.

Arms control: Readings from the Scientific American. (1973). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. At
Preface.

xvm
weapons for global political stability, and ultimately for the survival of the human
race, have been the enduring leitmotif of post-World War II international relations.
The two nuclear explosions over Japan, together with the adoption in 1945 of the
United Nations Charter,4 have combined, in seminally important ways, to shape the
course of world history up to the present day.
The development of deliverable nuclear weapons permanently altered the
nature of security relations between states. During the half-century which has now
elapsed, states' perceptions both of the range of alternative sovereign actions
available to them in their international relationships, and of the relevance and utility
of international law on the use of force, have been modified in ways which reflect
the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons.
It is possible to argue, in a general sense, that the regimes, institutions,

regional groupings, and political, economic and military alliances which
characterise international relations at the beginning of the third millennium owe
more, in terms of their current morphology and potential to effect change, to the fear
of nuclear weapons proliferation than to any other single factor. 5

.

The possession by states of nuclear weapons (or a reliance on the nuclear
protection of other states) will inevitably influence the international legal and
political directions of the decision-makers of any state, and in ways which may not
be capable of reliable prediction. The proliferation of nuclear weapons around the
world carries with it, therefore, the threat of greatly magnified levels of political
instability between nation-states, leading in some circumstances to possible
confrontation or armed conflict.
When the strategic arms available in such circumstances include readily
deliverable nuclear weapons, the urgent need for their control and eventual

destruction must lie beyond reasonable doubt.

4

5

Signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945. Entered into force on 24 October 1945. See Appendix 1.

A sense of the reach and depth of change alluded to here can be gained from a comparison. of this
discussion with that of Zolo, who (within the context of an imputed shift in the central precepts of
democratic theory) argues that the level of complexity of modem political economies necessitates a
paradigmatic change to notions of democratic representation which acknowledges the evolutionary
risks of the growing "information revolution." encountered by those societies. Zolo, D. (1992).
Democracy and complexity: A realist approach. Cambridge: Polity Press. At p. ix.
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The history of nuclear arms control began shortly after the introduction in 1945 of
nuclear weapons into the arsenal of the United States. Many early initiatives, such as
the constitution of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission,6 proved
ineffective in the face of the deep and growing anim"':ls evident between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Thus, impasse was compounded by umealistic attempts
to create enforcement regimes based on municipal legal models, and initiatives
which sought from states greater abrogation of sovereignty than many were, at that
point, willing to concede. 7
Greater progress came with the constitution of the United Nations
Disarmament Commission in 1952, and of the International Atomic Energy Agency
at Vienna in 1957. 8 Two years later, United Nations General Assembly Resolution
1380 (XIV) -the so-called "Irish Resolution" -marked the beginning of many years
of initiatives at New York and Geneva which aimed at achieving an end to the
multiplication and ever-expanding reach of nuclear weapons. 9
The development of permanent arms control institutions continued in 1961
with the creation of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the
predecessor of the present United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) at
Geneva. 10 The CD, though not a formal UN body, remains the only multilateral
disarmament negotiating forum within the United Nations system.
It is the Conference on Disarmament, in its original form, which provided

the forum for the negotiation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This
6

The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was created by Resolution 1 (I) of the United
Nations General Assembly on 24 January 1946, and was dissolved by the Assembly on 11 January
1952, having achieved none of its objectives after two years of stalemate. Dahlitz, J. (1983). Nuclear
arms controls with effective international agreements. Melbourne: McPhee Gribble. At p.11.
7

Ibid. At pp. 11, 12.

8

Ibid. At pp. 13, 14.

9

The resolution called for a study by the short-lived Ten Nation Disarmament Committee (a
forerunner of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva) into the feasibility of an
international agreement in which nuclear weapon states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons to
other Powers, and non-nuclear weapon states agreed not manufacture them. Federation of American
Scientists. (2001). Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] chronology [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.fas.org/nuke/controVnpt/chron.htm .
10

Loc cit. At Note 8.

XX

Treaty still represents the high point m international co-operation aimed at
controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, 187 member states of the United Nations
having acceded to its terms by early 2000. 11 In the continuing absence of a Nuclear
Weapons Convention completely prohibiting nuclear ~eapons, the NPT remains the
most widely accepted and durable instrument limiting their scope.

Through the United Nations Organisation, Australia (whose Permanent Mission was
the first to be accredited to the UN at New York) has a long record of involvement
in multilateral arms control negotiations. 12
Recent Australian participation in international arms control efforts reached
its zenith at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPTREC), held at New York from

17 April to 12 May 1995. The Australian Delegation to the Conference (which
extended, indefinitely, the operation of the NPT) has reported Australia's "active
role in all negotiating subsidiary bodies" established by the Conference, while the
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted

by the Conference incorporated "many Australian ideas and Australian language. " 13
Australia's contribution to the 1995 Conference underlines its long-term
participation in many aspects of international nuclear arms control efforts. Two
other important contributions, from many, have been this country's work in
negotiations leading to the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga (also known as the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), 14 and the prospective Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), opened for signature on 24 September 1996, but not yet in force. 15
11

79 UNTS 161; 21 UST 483; llAS 6839. Hereafter usually termed "NPT."

12

All aspects of Australia's participation in multilateral arms control negotiations must be understood
in the context of this country's obligations as a minor member of the Western defence alliance, and
particularly in terms of the rights and obligations created by the ANZUS Treaty with the United States
and New Zealand. ATS 1952 No.2; UNTS 131 p. 38; NZTS 1952 No.7; llAS 2493.
13

Report of the Australian delegation to the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, New York, 17 April to 12 May 1995. (1995). Canberra:
Department ofForeign Affairs and Trade. At paragraphs 9, 17, and p. 62. The language of the Report
cited here should be viewed within the context of the non-proliferation objectives of its corporate
author.
14

24 JIM 1440; NZTS 1986, No. 7. Signed 6 August 1985; Instrument of Ratification deposited 11
December 1986. The text of the Treaty is reproduced in: The United Nations and nuclear

XXI

More generally, Australia remains an active member of the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) referred to above, and of the United Nations Disarmament
Commission. 16
At the same time, it should be noted, as Wilson has pointed out, that
Australia exhibits an ambivalent attitude towards nuclear energy. With around 30
per cent of the world's economically extractable uranium reserves, and with no
domestic requirement for nuclear energy in electrical power production, uranium
exports are "reluctantly condoned ... under strict [International Atomic Energy
Agency] safeguards. " 17
The strong and consistent commitment by Australian Governments smce
1973 to nuclear non-proliferation principles (notwithstanding continuing uranium
exports) contrasts with the equivocal attitude of their predecessors, during the
nineteen fifties and sixties, to nuclear policy development generally, and in
particular to the question whether Australia should acquire an independent nuclear
deterrent force.
non-proliferation: Blue Book Series (Vol. III). (1995). New York: United Nations Department of
Public Information. At p. 138 et seq. CD633 and Corr. 1. Australim1 Treaty List: Multilateral Treaty
List [on-line]. Available WWW: http://www.austlii.edu.au/aulother/dfat/treaty_list/multilist/1985.html
15

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1998a). United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty chronology during the Clinton Administration [on-line].
Available www: http://www.acda.gov/ctbtpage/ctbchron.htm. Having signed the treaty on 24
September 1996, Australia was the fifteenth state to ratify the CTBT, on 9 July 1998. It was also
seventh on the list of 44 nuclear-capable states whose ratification is required in order to bring the
CTBT into force. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999). Australia and the United Nations:
areas of particular Australian interest and contribution [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.dfat.gov.au/un/aus_un5.html . Australia signed the Treaty of Rarotonga on 6 August
1985, and deposited its instrument of ratification on 11 December 1986.
16

Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. (1986). Disarmament
and arms control in the nuclear age. Canberra: AGPS. At Chapter 9, paragraphs 29- 33. The United
Nations Disarmament Commission, which was originally established in 1952, and reconstituted in 1978
by the First United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, considers and makes
recommendations on disarmament issues pursuant to General Assembly Resolutions and
recommendations. It is responsible directly to the UN General Assembly and Security Council, unlike
the many UN Specialised Agencies (such as the World Health Organisation, and the Food and
Agriculture Organisation) which report to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social
Council.
17

Wilson, M. (1995). The nuclear future: Asia and Australia and the 1995 Conference on
Non-Proliferation: Australia: Asia Papers, No. 74. Brisbane: Griffiths University, Centre for the
Study of Australia-Asia Relations. Chapter. lll: "Australian interests, policies and future directions",
p.37 et seq.
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A study recently published in Australia by Dr. Wayne Reynolds surveys what
was, he concludes, an on-going attempt by successive Australian governments, from
Curtin to Gorton, to acquire nuclear weapons. Reynolds asserts that Australia's
quest was assisted by its participation in Britain's ow.n nuclear weapons programme
until 1957, and thereafter continued independently, although under a US nuclear
umbrella. 18
Policy ambivalence has also been evident in Australia's approach to nuclear
policy development in regard to the mining and processing of natural uranium ores,
and the large-scale generation of electrical energy using nuclear technology.
From an organisational or bureaucratic perspective, one explanation for the
imputable lack of early nuclear policy coherence may stem from the absence of any
centralised control and co-ordination function exercised by a single government
instrumentality. Instead, independent factors (such as the predominance of
influential individuals and entrenched institutional bias) tended to produce
uncoordinated reactions across a range of interested agents, each with its own
agenda. 19
It is a central assertion of this study that Australia, as an active member of the

international community, is able with confidence and legitimacy to exercise its
international legal personality in order to effect change and development in the law
which it accepts, and which it seeks to strengthen?0
18

Reynolds, W. (2000). Australia's bidfor the atomic bomb. Carlton: Melbourne University Press.
See especially Chapter 9: The End ofEmpire Defence.
For a second, less discursive, article-length examination of Australia's search for nuclear weapons,
see: Hymans, J. E. C. (2000). Isotopes and identity: Australia and the nuclear weapons option, 1949 1999. The Nonproliferation Review, (Spring 2000), 1-23.

19

Carr, M. (1979). Australia and the nuclear question. A survey of government attitudes 1945 to
1975. Unpublished master's thesis, University ofNew South Wales, Sydney. At p. vii.
20

Australia's status as a state with international personality is established generally by the terms of
Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. 165 LNTS 9; USTS 881;
4 Malloy 4807; 28 AJIL, Supp., 75 (1934). Article 1 stipulates that a state should have: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government and (d) a capacity to enter into relations
with other states. Here, the final qualification is significant, in that the "capacity to enter into relations
with other states" refers to independence as understood in the Separate Opinion of Judge Anzilotti in
the Austro-German Customs Union Case: Advisory Opinion, P.C.I.J. Reports, Series AlB, No. 41
(1931). Independence is there understood as independence in law from the authority of any other state,
which in turn provides the capacity in law to conduct relations with any other state. Harris, D. J.
(1991) Cases and materials on international law (3rd rev. ed.). London: Sweet & MaxwelL At pp.
102-107.
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It follows that Australia will, ceteris paribus, use its legal personality to

effect changes in international law which it believes to be beneficial, in a general
sense, to the society of states - and thus to be in its national interest to pursue.
Alternatively, it will endeavour to achieve legal

deve~opments

which it believes are

in its own national interest, and will attempt to convince other states of their wider
utility. 21
One articulation of these maxims, made at the time of the negotiations
leading to the NPT, was contained in the Ministerial Statement to the House of
Representatives by the Minister for External Affairs, (then Mr.) Paul Hasluck, on 26
March 1968. In that Statement he said:

We are conscious of the great world issues of power and their interaction with
issues of regional security. We recognise the special responsibilities of the great
powers, as the [C]harter of the United Nations does, but we also insist on a proper
role being accorded to the middle and small powers, which for their part have
responsibilities to discharge and rights to be protected. Australia plays its part in
collective defence against aggression (emphasis added). 22

Australia uses a range of bilateral and multilateral negotiating fora, both within and
outside the United Nations institutional system, to pursue and protect its own
interests, and those of the global society of states. As it does so, it acknowledges the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of its fellow community
members. Thus, the extent to which Australia's own interests in nuclear
non-proliferation coincided with, or appeared to be in conflict with, those of other
states (not least the United States) during international negotiation of the NPT,
forms a fundamental component of this study.
21

Senator Gareth Evans, former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, has alluded to the
issues involved in the political corollary of these questions thus:
.... we do not pause as often as we should to scrutinize just how, from our perspective, the
world is changing; nor do we consider, as often or as carefully as we should, how our foreign
policy might seek not only to react to, but to influence, those changes.

Evans, G. (1989b). Australian foreign policy: Priorities in a changing world: The Roy Milne
Lecture; 1989. Backgrounder, 654, Al-A28. At Al. It is noted here that the legal and political aspects
of all kinds of international rules affecting states will be acknowledged in the study through its
explicitly interdisciplinary focus.
22

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Hansard House of Representatives 58, 26 March 1968.
Canberra: Commonwealth Government Parliamentary Office. At p. 446.

XXIV

Australia's geography and security alliances have dictated for it a role which,
to some extent, lies on the periphery of world events. As a stable, liberal,
constitutional democracy, and as a long-standing Western ally of the United States
on the Pacific Rim, Australia has, despite its relatively modest economic and
military potential, often regarded itself as sufficiently important to influence events
within its own region.
Conversely, at the global level, Australia has often seen itself as small
enough economically, politically and diplomatically to be able, to some extent, to
run its own race. At the same time, it has been regarded by other states as
sufficiently significant, geo-politically and economically, to matter in the councils of
the northern democracies. 23
The confluence of these trends gives Australia the potential to enhance, in a
co-ordinated way, its reputation as a good "world citizen", concerned to enhance
global prospects for peace and disarmament.
Framed in this context, Australia's part in the story of UN and Western
efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons can be understood from three distinct
perspectives: its defence and security alliance with the United States, its regional
and wider status in the international community, and its own reluctance permanently
to renounce the option of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent.
The convergence of Australia's interests in these aspects of its national and
international life was the vehicle through which, as the study will assert, it came to
exert substantial influence over a United States Government which was anxious to
engineer a credible multilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaty before the genie of
nuclear proliferation had finally escaped.
While Australia continued to rely on the protections which the ANZUS
treaty provided, it harboured a politically significant group of politicians,
bureaucrats, senior defence personnel and nuclear scientists who were anxious that
Australia should not bow to the wishes of the United States on halting nuclear
23

Makinda, S.M. (1996/97) Why "good citizen" Australia lost the global power play. Current Affairs
Bulletin, 73 (4), pp. 22- 26. This article examines Australia's unsuccessful campaign in October 1996
for a two-year seat at the United Nations Security Council, arguing that short-term inconsistency in
foreign policy development by Australia (in relation to East Timor and the Middle East) was
instrumental in excluding success. The article nevertheless addresses Australia's aspirations to global
significance, especially in the councils of the United Nations. At pp. 22, 23.
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proliferation. The structure and agenda ofthis so-called "bomb lobby" coalition will
form an important part of the argument of the study in regard to the process by
which Australia developed its final nuclear policy position as a response to the
negotiation of the NPT.
As the United States sought Australia's clear support for the NPT during
early 1968, the "bomb lobby" coalition stiffened its resistance against a proposal
which it saw as unnecessary, a threat to Australia's sovereignty and national
interests, and (above all) avoidable.

Statement of Purpose
Until recently, attempts to interpret and analyse the actions of the Gorton
Liberal/Country Party Coalition Government towards national nuclear policy
development have been hampered by the 30 year embargo on release of archived
federal government documents. Since January 1998, however, the majority of the
most important primary material covering the evolution of nuclear policy planning
and development within the central federal bureaucracy and its agencies has been
accessible from the Australian National Archives.
Now, clear evidence exists in the public domain of the course of events
surrounding the Gorton Government's attempts, especially during the first half of
1968, to deal with the conflicting needs of a confused and inconsistent domestic
nuclear policy position, and an insistent United States Government seeking
Australia's urgent and unequivocal support for the NPT.
In this context, it is clear that Prime Minister Gorton himself did not view

Australia's renunciation of nuclear weaponry, and its support of the new treaty, as
inevitable. Speaking on 1 January 1999, as archived material for the 1969 calendar
year was released by the Australian National Archives, he alluded briefly to his own
interest in the potential of nuclear technology in Australia as a guarantee of both
energy and national defence:
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We were interested in [nuclear technology] because it could provide electricity to
everybody and it could, if you decided later on, it could make an atomic bomb. 24

Given the dearth of primary evidence in the public domain, it

IS

not

surprising that the earlier works of scholars attempting to explain and interpret the
development of Australia's nuclear policies during this period were unable, for
example, to discern the significant level of influence exerted by Australia on its
American ally over the interpretations to be placed by the US on the terms of the
NPT. Indeed, the only directly relevant contemporaneous reference to Australia's
negotiating position during early 1968 appears to be a passing reference in the
Government's own compendium of current international affairs, Current Notes on
International Affairs. 25

Nor is it surprising that the broader work of scholars on the international
negotiation and implementation of the NPT has nothing to say about the part played
by Australia's resistance against those components of the treaty which, it claimed,
threatened its sovereignty and national interests. For example, the most
comprehensive work on the negotiation and implementation of the NPT, Shaker's
exhaustive three-volume study of 1980,26 is silent on Australia's role, while earlier
and later general works, such as Epstein's monograph on the NPT negotiations
between 1958 and 1968,27 are similarly devoid of reference to the importance of
Australia's views to US negotiators.
While the recent release of archived government documents has begun to
stimulate new interest in Australia's nuclear history, none of the studies so far
completed has focused on the conundrum of Australia's influence over the United
States through its resistance against the US over unacceptable elements of the NPT.

24

Clark, P. (1999, January 1). Sir John very much alive and unfazed. The Sydney Morning Herald, pp.
1, 6. At p.6.

25

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons. (1968, June). Current Notes on International
Affairs 39, 234-240.
26

Shaker, M. I. (1980). The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: Origin and implementation 19591979 (Vols. I, II, & III). London: Oceana.

27

Epstein, W. (1976). The last chance: Nuclear proliferation and arms control. New York: The Free
Press. At Chapter 5.
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The significance of this omission is clear from the fact that the treaty remains the
most important single component of the regime of global nuclear arms control.
Recent works by Hymans,28 Walsh29 and Reynolds 30 are concerned primarily
with only one side of the Australian nuclear policy equation: the question whether to
acquire nationally-controlled nuclear weapons. They leave largely umesolved the
issues inherent in the reciprocal alternative position: a decision not to acquire them,
combined with adherence to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Since the latter decision was eventually made, and formed the basis for
Australia's close involvement in global nuclear affairs over many years, it is clearly
important to understand the process by which Australia was transformed from a
nuclear sceptic into a strong campaigner against global nuclear proliferation.
The purpose of this study is, therefore, to analyse the data newly available to
scholars on the role played by Australia in the genesis and early evolution of the
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in order to gain insights into this country's
involvement as a middle-ranking, though influential, state in multilateral arms
control treaty negotiations, and particularly in bilateral arms control negotiations
with the United States. 31
The study is interdisciplinary in nature. It uses an analytical strategy which
recognises that both public international law and the theoretical foundations of
international relations scholarship can contribute to enhanced understanding of
global policies for effective nuclear arms control. 32
28

Hymans, J. E .C. (2000). Isotopes and identity: Australia and the nuclear weapons option, 19491999. The Nonproliferation Review (Spring, 2000), 1-23.

29

Walsh, J. (1997). Surprise down under: The secret history of Australia's nuclear ambitions. The
Nonproliferation Review [on-line]. Available WWW: http: ://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/walsh51.htm
30

Op. cit. At Note 18.

31

Those records containing relevant data, which are held by the Australian National Archives, are
released annually for general scrutiny following the expiration of thirty years from the date of their
creation. Thus, those relating to the final negotiations (during 1968, and involving Australia) which led
to the signing of the NPT were released from embargo on 1 January 1999. Most archival material used
in the study originated in the Department of External Affairs and the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission. Exhaustive searches at the Australian National Archives have failed to reveal any
relevant material directly attributable to the Department of Defence, its agencies, or the Australian
Defence Force.
32

The interdisciplinary context of the study is discussed in greater detail below.
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Using the archival material noted above, the analysis will enable new
conclusions to be drawn about Australian sources of legal and political influence
modulating the development of international law on the use of force by states, and in
particular international law relevant to nuclear pr!Jliferation. It will also allow
conclusions to be drawn about the ability of Australia, and similar middle-ranking
states, to influence the negotiating position of more powerful allied states on
questions of global significance by exercising firm resistance based on national
interests.
Both sets of conclusions have significance as models for the development of
bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control relations between states, and for the
development of legitimate mechanisms for the evolution of the international law of
arms control and disarmament. By arguing that states of moderate size and strength
can demonstrate important influence (in the arena of arms control) over far stronger
states, and over the course of international legal development, the study will show
that it is open for such states to take a more active role in the negotiation of
multilateral agreements aimed at controlling armaments of all kinds.

Structure of the Study
The study comprises an Introduction and seven Chapters which trace the course of
Australia's journey from nuclear ambivalence, based on an uncoordinated and
incoherent national nuclear policy position, towards strong and unequivocal support
for the principles of nuclear non-proliferation.
Together with an examination of the purpose, structure and methodology of
the study, and a review of relevant literature, the Introduction provides an overview
of the inter-disciplinary nature of the thesis. It considers the alternative theoretical
frameworks provided by international relations theory and international law, while
noting the deficiencies inherent in each. It goes on to detail the advantages and
significance of a theoretical foundation for the study which combines these two
apparently mutually exclusive disciplinary frameworks, presenting them as
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complementary perspectives on the same problem - the threat or use of force by
states in the United Nations era.
Chapter One then introduces the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty/ 3
the negotiation of which is the focus ofthe study's analysis of Australia's role in the
development of a global regime prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It
addresses the treaty's structure, aims, potential effectiveness, deficiencies, and
ability - as conventional international law - to influence the evolution of other
nuclear disarmament agreements.
On the latter · point, the chapter traces the development of the nuclear
non-proliferation "regime" of bilateral and multilateral understandings, accepted
practices, agreements, treaties and institutions which support and reinforce the
legitimacy and durability of this most fundamental of global bargains.
Chapter Two turns to Australia's contribution to the global nuclear
non-proliferation debate as progress towards the conclusion of NPT negotiations
accelerated during the early months of 1968. First, it establishes the broad context of
the national nuclear policy development process through an examination of the
factional struggle within and outside government for policy dominance. In doing so,
it surveys a range of domestic and external factors (such as the feasibility of building
large-scale nuclear power generating stations, and the strength of Australia's
security alliance with America) which generated and sustained the nuclear policy
debate.
Second, it reviews the range of responses to the new treaty which were
available to Australia. It does so through analysis of the record of dialogue which
developed between the Australian and United States Governments over acceptable
interpretations of a range of issues raised both by the black-letter terms of the NPT,
and by their application and operation.
Chapter Three further develops the theme of Australia's search for policy
coherence by examining closely the interests, agendas, biases and global
perspectives of the two predominant representatives on each side of the debate.
Thus, the non-proliferation advocacy of senior officers within the Commonwealth
Department of External Affairs (DBA) is contrasted with the opposing institutional
33

The treaty will be referred to, throughout the study, as either the "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty"
or using the abbreviation "NPT".
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views of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), led by its Chairman,
Sir Philip Baxter. The policy position of the Department of External Affairs,
developed through its dialogue with US counterparts on the status of multilateral
NPT negotiations at Geneva, is presented as a key ele~ent in the eventual success of
Australia's non-proliferation advocates.
Chapter Four examines the processes by which Australia's confused nuclear
policy position was resolved in light of the urgent need to present a clear and
sustainable national position on nuclear proliferation to its major ally, the United
States, as well as to the Western Alliance, and at the United Nations General
Assembly.
A centrally important theme in this context is the process by which Australia,
in attempting to synthesise a politically sustainable nuclear policy position, was able
to exercise disproportionate influence over the United States on the interpretation of
the terms of the NPT. By comparing the aims and concerns of Australia's
consolidated nuclear policy with the final position of the United States on NPT
interpretation, the chapter demonstrates the degree to which Australia, in pursuing
its own national interests, impelled America to concede ground over the
interpretation and operation of the treaty.
Chapter Five turns to the arena of the United Nations General Assembly in
its review and analysis of the final stages of the negotiation and institution of the
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty- its endorsement in the principal forum of
the UN. The chapter argues that the limits of Australia's ability, as a middle power,
to influence outcomes in multilateral arms control agreements was reached as the
United States drew a line under its efforts to accommodate Australia's concerns, and
thus bring its oldest Pacific ally into line with its own nuclear non-proliferation
policy.
The NPT would become a reality, with or without Australia's participation.
The chapter argues, nevertheless, that despite its early failure to sign and ratify the
treaty, Australia had been influential over the ways in which both nuclear and
near-nuclear states approached the question of their own adherence to it.
Chapter Six continues to look beyond Australia's relationship with the
United States by examining more closely evidence of the extent to which other
states were guided or influenced in their own decisions on the NPT by Australia's
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actions, both indirectly (through the US) and in bilateral diplomacy. It concludes
that, as far as its bilateral relations on the NPT were concerned, there is little strong
evidence to show that Australia contributed in decisive ways to the actions of those
states with which it held discussions on matters of mutual interest. Nevertheless,
those discussions formed a starting point for Australia's growing activism in support
of global anti-proliferation efforts, a policy direction which it has sustained into the
new century.
Finally, Chapter Seven presents the central conclusions of the study. The
most important conclusion is that Australia demonstrated, in the process of its
transformation from ambivalent nuclear sceptic to anti-nuclear weapon activist, that
a middle-ranking power could claim a place as an influential agent in the evolution
of the most vital component of the international law of arms control - the 1968
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Theoretical Foundations of the Study
The study is grounded on two fundamental and complementary theoretical bases.
First, from an historiographical perspective, it builds a coherent analysis of
documentary evidence through its acknowledgment that, at least in the sphere of
nuclear policy development in Australia, decisions and actions have been primarily
the result of a synthesis of the agency of institutions of government, and of
individuals within them. The convergence of the legal and political elements of
governance in such an important area of national policy, in which both information
and decision-making powers were tightly controlled by a small number of senior
bureaucrats and government ministers, demands that this foreshortened view of
history should prevail.
Thus, the study takes on the character of history constructed from above, in
which legitimate government fiat was unchallenged in its creation of universally
acknowledged outcomes and realities. Indeed, Australia's interest in the
implications of the NPT was barely acknowledged in popular or political debate.
Although alternatives to a governmental/bureaucratic nuclear historiography exist
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(such as one based on the role of broad social movements and special interest
groups) the evidence presented in this study is not capable of testing their
legitimacy.
The second conceptual foundation for the

t~eoretical

structure supporting

this study is an interdisciplinary synthesis of international law on the threat or use of
force, and the work of post-World War II international relations theorists. 34 Neither
discipline alone can adequately account for, nor elaborate, the range of observed
behaviour in relations between states in the international system. Thus, the decisions
and actions of Australia in respect of the processes of negotiation of the NPT, and
later, cannot be fully explained merely in terms of the institution of international
law, important as it undoubtedly was in those processes. 35
Similarly, Australia's response to initiatives based on a globally perceived
need for mechanisms aimed at slowing or halting the spread of nuclear weapons
cannot be fully understood solely from any realist political perspective which
discounts international law structures and principles, or banishes them from the field
on grounds of irrelevance. 36 In fact, both perspectives informed the processes of
34

Slaughter, A-M., Tulumello, A S., & Wood, S. (1998). International law and international relations
theory: A new generation of scholarship. 92 AJIL 367, at 367-369, 384. Slaughter-Burley, A (1993).
International law and international relations: A dual agenda. 87 AJIL 205, at 205-213. These authors
provide a comprehensive chronology and evaluation of the evolution of international relations theory,
and its intellectual estrangement in the twentieth century from international law theory and praxis.
These articles cover the period from the idealism of the early years following World War I to the
current enthusiasm for creating a joint discipline and research agenda based on the convergence of its
constituent disciplines around the "basic proposition: that actors, identities, interests and social
structures are culturally and historically contingent products of interaction on the basis of shared
norms." At 384.
35

The NPT is, of course, an international treaty instrument which legally binds its adherents under the
terms of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [1155 UN T.S. 331]. The latter may be
regarded as constitutive of the customary law on treaties, and thereby attracts the status ofjus cogens.
Thus, Australia had carefully to take into account its legal obligations under the NPT, should it decide
to accede to its terms.
36

The crude realism ofHans J. Morgenthau (which continues to attract adherents- cf Mearsheimer, J.
J. (1990). Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security, 15 (1),
5 - 56) was challenged in 1959 by Kenneth Walz in his work Man, the state and war. There, Walz
developed a critique of realism which pointed out its failure to take account of systemic explanations
of state behaviour which rely on "structure," as distinct from a system which was nothing more than
the sum of motives and actions ofthe actors within it. Supra. Note 34, (1993), at 217.
More specifically, Walz used a trichotomy to illustrate his argument: His "first-image" explanation of
international outcomes focuses on human nature itself, his "second-image" on the internal structures of
the state, and his "third-image" on the international structural environment. Powell, R. (1994).
Anarchy in international relations theory: The neorealist-neoliberal debate. International Organization,
48 (2), 313-344. At 315.
Walz' Structural Realism stands in sharp contrast to the various legal responses to realism, many of
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decision and action in this instance, as they do in most cases in which states weigh
preferences, and take actions which have consequences beyond their national
borders? 7

What, then, are the important components of the international system of states
within which Australia operated in 1968, and how have those components evolved
since that time? First, it must be acknowledged unequivocally that international law
continues to count within the international relations of states. Specifically,
international law matters to states themselves, and to the national, international and
supranational organisations and institutions (and the individuals within them) which
work across national boundaries.
States demonstrate that this is so by attending to the law's customs and
conventions, and to its principles and structures, thereby acknowledging their
legitimacy and abiding by the constraints which international law imposes on their
preferences and actions. So much is readily evident from the range and complexity
of bilateral and multilateral treaties and other instruments which, as they have grown
exponentially since 1945 (and increasingly since the 1970s) have characterised the
international legal landscape. 38
Franck has suggested that it is legitimacy itself which is capable of
explaining states' adherence to international law rules, an effect which is often
postulated in respect of obedience to rules in domestic law systems. 39 More
which sought to reconfigure international law, and its relationship with international politics, in order
to define a link between legal doctrines and policy choices. Supra. At Note 14, p. 209.
37

This statement of fundamental principle is not intended to take into account the responsibilities of
states in respect of the wide range of international human rights and environmental law, and of the
humanitarian laws of war, which are often seised by events and consequences wholly within the
boundaries of a state.
38

An indication of the extent of this corpus of public international law may be gained from the fact that
Australia, an active middle-power participant in international affairs, has now acceded to
approximately one thousand international treaty instruments, the majority of which post-date 1945.
Australia: Department of Defence: Australian Treaty Series. (1974). Canberra: A.G.P.S.
The range of public international law now goes far beyond traditional concerns with inter-state
immunity, comity and non-intervention. Its arena has grown to encompass such areas as the
conservation ofbiosphere resources, atmospheric change, commerce and communications.
39

His definition oflegitimacy is:
.... a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a
pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed
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specifically, he contends that "[the] indicators of rule-legitimacy in the community
of states are: determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence", and that
the degree of the presence of these factors will determine the extent to which a state
will avoid or ignore the rule, and its maker, in pursuit_ of its short-term self-interest. 40
Thus, a rule will be followed by agents who clearly perceive its meaning,
acknowledge its authenticity, accept it as comprehensible within the rule-system it
inhabits, and believe that it will be adhered to by those others who perceive
themselves to be obligated by it.
Franck goes on to identify the categories of "the legitimacy factor" variously
m terms of a Weberian process of legitimation, of a procedural-substantive
perspective on the legitimacy of rules, and of a definition based on outcomes,
defensible in terms of equality, fairness, justice and freedom. 41
Other philosophers of law have also addressed the question of the sufficiency
of coercive power in compliance with rules, and it is perhaps not coincidental that
many identify circumstances and characteristics beyond the threat or use of force.
Recurrent themes in their work are notions of justice, fairness, consistency and
integrity, which they see as necessary for the evolution of legitimacy. 42
It is clear, then, that rules which are defensible in terms of legitimate

procedures, processes or outcomes, within any society, are equally able, as Franck
contends, to create a system of habitually obeyed law. 43 The nature of relationships
in which rules are validated will vary widely among the vast range of possible
interactions between the many structures of a community (such as components of its
legal, constitutional, governmental and social identities). Thus "legitimacy theory
believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance
with generally accepted principles of right process.

Franck, T. M. (1990). The power of legitimacy among nations. New York: O.U.P. At p. 24.
40

Ibid. At p. 49.

41

Jbid. At pp. 17, 18. Cf Hart, H. L. A. (1994). The concept of law (rev. ed.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
42

Prominent among them is Ronald Dworkin, who has developed a theory of coherence as an
explanation for the compelling nature of rules. Dworkin, R. (1986). Law's empire. Cambridge, MA.:
Belknap Press. At pp. 176-244.

43

Supra. At Note 39.
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has many mansions",44 both within the municipal law of states, and the international
law which those states obey.
This brief discussion helps to support the hypothesis that there is a range of
social and psychological explanations of observed c_ompliance behaviour of states
with the strictures of international law. Whatever compels their compliance, states
continue to demonstrate the importance which they attach to the law, and their
willingness, most of the time, to obey it. The degree to which states actually comply
with international law is a matter of fact, to be established empirically through
available evidence. The procedural and substantive reasons which impel their
compliance is a matter of analysis of that evidence.

The second major component of the international system is an identifiable structure
or matrix, comprising institutions, regimes, organisations, understandings and
agreements of many kinds, which facilitates and enriches the system of relations
between states. These structures may be formal or informal, constituted by
governments or by other agents, and may operate within states themselves or at a
trans-national or supranational level.
Nevertheless, the fact that individual nation-states continue to be the primary
focus for their own analysis of evolution and change within that system,
notwithstanding the. growing importance of institutions in the inter-state arena,
ensures that states will continue to be of fundamental importance to it. 45 As the
ultimate focus of the action of most agents in the international arena, including
those whose aim is towards outcomes which transcend the state, nation-states
continue to occupy the primary position in any analysis of international
relationships.
It is generally acknowledged, by both international lawyers and theorists of

international relations, that the range and scope of international institutional
44

/bid. Atp.l9.

45

As will become apparent below, the study acknowledges the necessity to include in this account of
international structures and relationships the growing importance and influence of all kinds of
organisations and institutions, which may or may not lie within the province and purview of the
nation-states. Such entities range from the United Nations Organisation itself to the vast number of
operationally-specific multilateral and bilateral governmental and non-governmental bodies of many
types and sizes.
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structures has grown at an exponential rate since the end of the Second World War,
and that formal institutions continue to proliferate as global inter-connection
evolves. 46
A more contestable claim is made by those i_nternational relations theorists
who perceive a range of informal regimes, agreements and understandings which
either underpin formal agreements such as treaties and protocols, or stand alone as
the best available compromise position when formal agreements prove impossible. 47
Nevertheless, regardless of what characterises international institutions, their
presence as vitally important conduits, moderators and legitimators of action, and as
repositories of information, standards, and compliance strategies for states is now
beyond dispute.

The third attribute of the international system which this study acknowledges as
fundamentally important to its analysis (and one which was evident in 1968) is the
growing speed, complexity, scope and density of inter-state connectivity,
communications and relationships in both the governmental and non-governmental
arenas. There can be little doubt that the development of communications media and
transportation technologies of all kinds has altered the functional aspects of relations
between states in several significant respects.

46

The international lawyer Kenneth W. Abbott, and the political scientist Duncan Snidal have
addressed the question why states use formal international organisations by investigating their
properties, and the functions they perform. They refer to examples of international organisations which
are small (the secretariat of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organisation), large (the European
Union), specialised (the World Health Organisation) and innovative (the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia). They assert that states use international organisations "to create social orderings
appropriate to their pursuit of shared goals: producing collective goods, collaborating in prisoner's
dilemma settings, solving coordination problems .... ". They agree with Schermers and Blokker that:
'"It is impossible to imagine contemporary international life' without formal international
organisations." Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal organizations. The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42 (1), 3-32.
47

A seminal work on informal issue regimes is Keohane's 1984 analysis After Hegemony, which
describes a functional analysis of regimes which enlists states' rational egoism as the reason for their
success. Since they reduce the "transaction costs" of decisions consistent with the regime's principles,
enhance order and legitimacy, foster linkage among issue areas, and improve the quality of available
information, states are willing to accept their utility. Other advantages, according to Keohane, include
reduced incentives to cheat, enhanced reputations for states, "benchrnarked" standards of behaviour,
and monitoring of compliance with promised action. Slaughter-Burley, A. (1993). International law
and international relations theory: A dual agenda. 87 A.J.l.L. 205-239. At 218, 219.
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First, it has engendered a rapid increase in the rate of change within all
trans-national issue areas, or activities. 48 The rate at which financial, political,
social, economic and strategic functions, transactions and ideas are now
disseminated across state boundaries dictates that the time available between action
and reaction, as data are gathered, assimilated, prepared and analysed, is
correspondingly reduced. 49
This means, in tum, that the time available for response to emergent crises is
far shorter than in any previous era (and certainly so when compared to thirty years
ago). As a result, the processes of decision making must be modified accordingly. 5°
Thus, the ability of states to react with certainty to rapidly changing circumstances
will be increasingly dependent on their success in modifying the processes by which
they take timely decisions and actions which have consequences beyond their
borders.
In these circumstances, the notion of the unitary and undifferentiated state,

which is a fundamental precept of the Law of Nations, must increasingly be
modified in favour of the explicit recognition of non-state actors in the international
sphere. Agents such as individual and aggregated knowledge specialists who act
across state boundaries, regional and sub-regional cross-boundary interest groups,
and nationally and trans-nationally constituted organisations all weaken the
sovereignty of states, and their ability to take effective decisions and actions. 51
48

The speed with which some economies in East Asia collapsed during the late 1990s was both
unexpected, and in excess of most projected economic threat scenarios offered by global economists.
Press conference of Michael Mussa, Economic Counsellor and Director, Research Department,
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 30 September 1998 [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/tr/1998/TR980930.HTM. At p. 1.

49Jnfra.
~ubbard, C. (1999). Nuclear proliferation: Does the past inform the future? Unpublished
manuscript. Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia.
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It is appropriate here to acknowledge that, within the modem international system, no state can
claim level of sovereignty enjoyed by polities (especially in Europe) until the century leading up to the
Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which laid down in treaty and customary law form the modem Western
system of sovereign nation states.
Slaughter has claimed that:
The state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts.
These parts - courts, regulatory agencies, executives and even legislatures - are networking
with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitute a new,
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The final meta-theoretical aspect of this study, which must be elaborated in order to
explain its analytical strategy, is the concept of liberalism within international
theory. At its most fundamental conceptual level, international liberalism is
concerned with

trans~national

relations between individuals, and between

individuals and the state. 52 The extent to which a state can be regarded as "liberal"
will be determined by the degree to which it demonstrates "juridical equality,
constitutional

protections

of

individual

rights,

representative

republican

governments, and market economies based on private property rights. " 53
In the expressly international sense, the identity of liberal states is shaped in

contrast with the record of aggression which their non-liberal counterparts have
established over centuries. Liberal states, as Immanuel Kant long ago noted, need
not make war on each other. 54 More specifically, the character of liberalism in the
international domain exhibits a number of facets which, together, are able to
explain, in large degree, the success of a regime of international rules in ordering
peaceful relations between states.
Given that most individuals, and the governments which comprise them, are
interested in progressive improvements in their circumstances, and that peace,
prosperity, justice and freedom are the most fundamental precursors of more
differentiated progress in outcomes,S 5 it may be asserted that liberalism is capable of
transgovemmental order. Today's international problems - terrorism, organised crime,
environmental degradation, money laundering, bank failure, and securities fraud - created and
sustain these relations (emphasis added).

Slaughter, A. (1997). The real new world order. Foreign Affairs, 76 (5), 183-197. At 184.
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Burley, A. (1992). Law among liberal states: Liberal internationalism and the act of state doctrine.
Columbia Law Review, 92 (8), 1907-1997. At 1909.
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Ibid. In the case of Australia, political liberalism has preceded the establishment of republican
government. The referendum on the establishment of an Australian republic, held in November 1999,
did not fulfil the third of Burley's four criteria. Furthermore, Australia still lacks a
constitutionally-enshrined Bill of Rights for the protection of individual rights.
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/bid. Kant, I. (1932). Perpetual Peace. New York: Columbia University Press. Liberal states have,
of course, a long history of belligerent behaviour directed against a wide range of non-liberal and
totalitarian states.
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Zacher, M. W., & Matthew, R. A. (1995). Liberal international theory: Common threads, divergent
strands. In C. W. Kegley Gr.) (Ed.), Controversies in international relations theory: Realism and the
neo/iberal challenge. (pp. 107-150). New York: St. Martin's Press. At p. 109.
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producing this result. The liberal ethos, which looks to gradualism, reason, diversity,
optimism, individualism, egalitarianism and universalism, also has faith in the
potential of all social and political arrangements for improvement. 56 Again, it does
not seek unattainable perfection, but an

internationa~

balance of interests which is

negotiated under non-coercive conditions, and results in high levels of cooperation
between states, to the mutual benefit and enhanced freedoms of the individuals
within them. 57
With these goals in mind, liberal states demonstrate their willingness and
ability to cooperate in the international sphere to the extent that they display the
components of liberalism noted above. In order to do so, they acknowledge the
primacy of universal rules and norms of behaviour which are essential for ordered,
non-coercive coexistence in the absence of a sovereign.
It is not centrally important to states that a rule they will follow is generally
or explicitly described as law, or as «a law". Certainly, many such rules are
described as law, and derive a measure of their legitimacy from that description.
Others could not be unequivocally described as "legal" rules, but may nevertheless
generate within a state a perceived obligation to be bound by them (perhaps on
grounds of comity, reciprocity, coherence or validity). 58
The ambivalence evident here is derived from the duality inherent in the
nature of relations between states; their engagement with both law and politics in
the international arena, which in turn has generated the modem scholarly disciplines
of International Law and International Relations. The nature of the two disciplines,
and the evolution of an interdisciplinary focus better able (than either one of them)
to approach the actual shape and dynamics of the international system will be
addressed below.

51

/bid. At p.llO.
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Supra. At Note 39. An example of such non-legal rules is so-called "soft law", an early example of
which was the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 1972 [UN Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 7
Corr. 1 (1972)]. Its aims, although not binding on states in a legal sense, nevertheless formed the basis
for the ensuing expansion and consolidation of international environmental law.
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The Relationship Between International Law and International
Politics
The relationship between public international law and international politics, 59 which
forms a crucial aspect of the interdisciplinary framework of the study, can be
understood from three distinct perspectives, or conceptual levels. At the primary
level, they are, at base, two sides of the same coin. In other words, at least in respect
of international law on the use of force by states, the legal is the political, and vice
versa. 60 It must be emphasised here that such a maxim does not seek, in any way, to

privilege one domain over the other, but, rather, asserts the disciplinary duality
inherent in any consideration of the use of force by states.
Secondly, it is possible to a,rgue, in the United Nations era of positive
international law (extant largely in the form of multilateral conventional
instruments) that the world of independent, self-interested nation-states generates
and exercises a voluntary rule of law which regulates relations between them. 61 This
form of international law, which in many cases codifies existing customary law
(such as the humanitarian laws of war) suffers from the significant disability that its
capacity to provide benefits for individual persons is, in most cases, filtered through
59

The terms "international politics" and "international relations" are interchangeable in this study.

60

0ne recent attempt to bring together the dichotomy created by the divergent world views of the
political scientist and the international lawyer is Keohane's attempt to describe the "causal pathways
and ... common nodes" which link the " 'instrumentalist' and the 'normative' 'optics' " or
perspectives. He characterises the former as focusing on interests as the primary engine of state action,
and the latter as a reliance on the "legitimacy" of international law, which is related to the process by
which law is created, its consistency with accepted general norms, and its perceived fairness or
specificity.
The "causal pathways and common nodes" which connect the two are taken by Keohane to
be (a) the interests of policy elites, (b) the concern of policy-makers for reputation, and (c) the role of
institutions within the modem state. By conflating the instrumentalist political ethic ("optic") with the .
normative legal one, he calls for a productive interdisciplinary synthesis, rather than narrow
compartmentalism. Keohane, R. (1997). International relations and international law: Two optics.
Harvard International Law Journal, 38 (2), 487-499.
61

The wide and growing literature focusing on the role of international law in explanations of the
nature of international society, and of international security, has been addressed by Makinda in an
article which emphases the importance of Hedley Bull's earlier work, The Anarchical Society, in
defining the functions of realism and pluralism in the development of global order and justice.
Makinda, S. (1997). Hedley Bull and post-Cold War security. In G. Crowder, H. Manning, D. S.
Mathieson, A. Parkin, & L. Seabrook (Eds.), Australasian Political Studies 1997: Proceedings of the
1997 APSA Conference, Volume 2 (pp. 653-668). Adelaide: Flinders University, Department of
Politics.
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the veil of state personality and responsibility. The outcome is an increasing
tendency for conflict, at law, between the interests of nation-states, and those of
individuals. 62
Finally, in terms of the focus of this study, th~ concept of "aggression" plays
a pivotal role in modulating the conceptual relationship between international law
and international politics in any analysis of the lawfulness of nuclear deterrence
policies, and of the possession of nuclear weapons themselves. 63 The 1968 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty stands as an attempt to limit the extent and consequences

of aggression, which, as Walzer states, "is the name we give to the crime of war,"64
and which Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations proscribes. 65
Since the consequences of aggression are the denial of communal and
individual political (and other human) rights, the NPT can be regarded as both a
legal and a political document, which mandates action by imposing rules and
imparting legal and political penalties for non-compliance on all nation-states. As a
result, those who debate the continuing utility of the NPT will inevitably be
influenced by their own view of the importance to states of crude national interest66
as against the normative value (to states themselves, and to individuals) of the legal
regime established by the UN Charter.
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Douglas Roche, a former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, has commented that the erosion
of morality as a foundation for human solidarity, together with the re-emergence of narrow
nationalisms fortified by adversarial systems of international relations (rooted in a concept of absolute
national sovereignty) have combined to overturn the vision of a "world community of people." Roche,
D. (1988). Opening address. In M. Cohen & M. E. Gouin (Eds.), Lawyers and the nuclear debate (pp.
11 - 14). Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. At p. 13.
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/bid. Cohen, M. Introduction. At p. 5.
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Walzer, M. (1977) Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations. New York;
Basic Books. At p. 51.
65

66

See Appendix 1.
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The Interdisciplinary Perspective
The central interdisciplinary idea, which links the international lawyer with those
who develop theories on inter-state relations (and which is also of primary analytical
significance for this study) is the notion of international rules. At its most basic
conceptual level, the ordering of the affairs of the international system is
accomplished through the legitimated development and application of prescribed
norms ofbehaviour within whose parameters agents are to pursue their interests and
attain their ends. 67
Thus, the nation-states are guided in their relationships by a broad range of
rules and norms of behaviour which are, in most instances, widely accepted among
them as representing a minimum standard or benchmark beyond which, for those
who breach them, appropriate and coordinated consequences may be expected to
flow. 68
The Law of Nations - the modem state-based institution of public
international law - traces its origins back to the customs and practices, over many
centuries, of European sovereign princes and polities. Before the advent of the
discipline of international relations following the end of World War I, relations
between states had, to a large extent, been moderated through the customs and
practices of international law. The international institutions through which state
decision and action flowed were, effectively, legal institutions, rather than ordered
regimes or agreements underpinned by undifferentiated political pragmatism or
realism. 69 Thus, for example, the customary law rules of occupation, reprisal and
just war, and the limited and subsidiary rule-sets of international organisations
67

Kratochwil, F. V. (1989). Rules, norms, and decisions: On the conditions of practical and legal
reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. At
pp. 10, 11.
68

The economic sanctions imposed by the UN on Iraq following the end of the Second Gulf War in
1991 is only one highly visible example of the coordinated action of states against a recalcitrant.
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Scupin, H. (1992). History of the Law of Nations 1815 to World War I. In R. Bernhardt (Ed.),
Encyclopedia of public international law (pp. 767-793). Amsterdam: Elsevier. One of the most
effective ways in which the international law ofEurope was embedded further afield was the use of the
legal institutions of diplomatic missions (for example, the protection of diplomatic representatives) and
the law of reprisal, in order to compel states to abide by the international law which they had decided
to adopt, and later found inconvenient. At p. 774.
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(whose capacities and obligations were constituted by treaty),70 although often
impelled by political imperative, nonetheless inhabited a legal domain. In effect, the
legal and political dimensions of international relations were indistinguishable.
The beginning of a focus by scholars on international relations in the
aftermath of the first global conflict, and especially on its pacific Wilsonian
idealism (the essence of which was embodied in the failed League ofNations), did
nothing to bring together the two strands of scholarship, both of which were directed
primarily at explanations and ordering of state behaviour. In effect, the
"legalist/moralist" political traditions of liberal states were simply not appropriate,
in the minds of realist international political thinkers, within a milieu in which
self-interest, power and anarchy were the primary functional elements. 71 The
intellectual founders of post-Second World War realist international relations
theory, Hans J. Morgenthau and George Kennan, were not willing, in the shadow of
the second global conflict, to concede that a domestic or municipal conception of
"law" had any place in the world of power. 72
From that time, and notwithstanding the efforts of some legal scholars73 to
respond to the "realist challenge,"74 and the corresponding endeavours of
international relations theorists to elaborate the crude realism ofMorgenthau and his
10

/bid. At pp. 779-781. Many international organisations instituted during the nineteenth century had
technical or humanitarian cooperative aims. The need to coordinate transport and communication
arrangements between states was central to this development, as was the growing humanitarian
idealism which followed the 1864 Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded
in Armies in the Field (the first Geneva Red Cross Convention). 18 Martens Nouveau Receuil, (ser. 1)
607, 129 Canso/. T.S. 361. Entered into force 22 June 1865.
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72

Morgenthau, H. J. (1973) Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace (4th rev. ed.).
New York: Alfred A Knopf; Kennan, G. (1984). American diplomacy, 1900-1950 (rev. ed.).
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Morgenthau cites the de-centralisation of the legislative,
adjudicative and enforcement functions of international law as the reason for its imprecision, and hence
its ineffectiveness, while Kennan rejects the legalist-moralist approach to international relations
because of its central role in imbuing war (as the primary means of international law enforcement) with
moral legitimacy. Beck, R. J., Arend, A C. & Vander Lugt, R. D. (1996). International rules:
Approaches from international law and international relations. Oxford: OUP. At pp. 95-98.
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Supra. At Note 34, The legal response: Reconceptualising law and politics. At pp. 209-214.
Slaughter-Burley characterises the legal response as a direct reaction to the realism ofthe period from
the early post war years until the beginning of the nineteen nineties.
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followers, the two disciplines have largely followed separate evolutionary paths.
There is only limited evidence of any substantial interdisciplinary trajectory, at least
until the final decade of the twentieth century. 75 The two paths of scholarship had
largely refused to acknowledge each other's legitimacy and epistemological
coherence. This mutual intellectual blindness was fostered and reinforced by the
bipolar Cold War world of nuclear confrontation, and tensions between the
developed and developing world which often denied to international law a
legitimate role in controversial arenas. 76
The result was that, until the early years of the 1990s, the two disciplines
merely talked past each other, lacking sufficient common ground on which to build
bridges of insight between them. 77 As they did so, however, a number of points of
potential confluence were evident. On one hand, the lawyers had not lost sight of the
fact that international law which lacks coercive effect could - and, in fact, often did
- structure international political processes and outcomes. 78
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Supra. At Note 34, "The political response: Refining and modifYing realism." At pp. 214-220.
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Ratner, S. R. (1998). International law: The trials of global norms. Foreign Policy (Spring), 65-80.
At 66. Ratner refers to the examples of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and to the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea to illustrate this point. [UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/122; 21 liM 1261].
The United States became increasingly uninterested in the disarmament work of the United Nations
General Assembly, and wary of the moral pressure its pronouncements could engender, after control
of the majority within it passed from the West to the growing group of new states formed on the
dissolution of the European colonial empires.
Thus, in 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union combined in the (then) 18-member
Disarmament Committee in Geneva (which incorporated eight non-aligned states) to deny to the
Assembly a detailed Report of the Committee's deliberations. In this way, they avoided any possibility
of a General Assembly Resolution strongly critical of its efforts and achievements. Fischer, G. (1971).
The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. (D. Willey, Trans.). London: Europa. At pp. 39-43.
77

Abbott, K. W. (1989). Modem international relations theory: A prospectus for international lawyers.
Yale Journal of International Law (14), 355-409. At 337. This article marks the first recent attempt
overtly to bring together the international lawyers and international relations theorists by suggesting
that their epistemological positions were not incommensurable. Specifically, and as a Professor of
Law, Abbott suggested that the "analytical approaches, insights and techniques of modem IR theory ...
can readily be applied to a variety of legal norms and institutions." He also noted the "immense
reservoir of information about legal rules and institutions [which IL can offer to modern IR scholars],
the raw material for the growth and application of theory." At pp. 339-340.
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It was the belief of the fifty-one states at the 1945 San Francisco Conference that positive
international law was essential to the future security of the world that provided the fundamental
impetus behind their agreement to constitute a United Nations Charter open to all "peace-loving
states." UN Charter, Article 4 (1). See Appendix I.
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International relations theorists, in tum, themselves acknowledged that
politics is, in fact, conditioned by law. As Keohane has noted:
Law does not necessarily determine behaviour, but politics is conditioned by law and
by legal institutions. Political choices on issues .such as compliance with
commitments cannot be understood without legal analysis, cast, however, within the
positive theoretical and methodological orientation of the social sciences. 79

Concessions such as this, by a prominent international relations theorist in 1992, are
indicative of the growing realisation that much beneficial interdisciplinary
scholarship may flow from greater levels of recognition between the two intellectual
paradigms.
In this spirit, both sides of the debate have begun to acknowledge the

converse generality: that international law does not inhabit a legal realm in which its
structure and precepts are immune from the processes of relations between states,
but that it can be, and indeed is, conditioned and elaborated through the political
process. They have begun to recognise that international law is not immutable, or
condemned to abide by the customary and conventional practices established and
reified in times characterised by political, social and strategic realities far removed
from the present day.
Thus, as the rate of global social and political change, in the domestic,
trans-national and supra-national spheres, has continued to accelerate, the urgent
need to renovate public international law in the face of its imminent irrelevance has
been perceived and accepted by some international legal scholars and practitioners. 80
In summary, it is clear that practitioners and theoreticians of both
international law and international relations are increasingly willing to acknowledge
79

Keohane, R. 0. (1992). Compliance with international commitments: Politics within a framework of
law. Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (pp.
176-180). Washington, D.C.: A.S.IL. At p. 180.
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<Eyffinger, A (1996). The International Court of Justice 1946-1996. The Hague: Kluwer Law
International. He points out that the literature of international law has been transformed by the
increasing focus on fields of law which had their genesis only in the post Second World War period,
and largely from the nineteen sixties onward. Here, environmental law, the laws of space, human rights
law and the law of development are examples of the changing face of public international law.
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international law and its codification" (as the General Assembly of the United Nations was encouraged
to do at its 1945 San Francisco Conference), the International Law Commission, has been excessively
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the benefits which closer cooperation can create. Each has the opportunity to
"challenge, supplement or develop the ideas and techniques of [the other] on
questions of common concern .... ". 81

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the disciplines of international law
and politics have begun to approach each other on the basis that they are both
addressing essentially similar realities. Nor is it surprising that they nominate the
phenomenon of rule-following behaviour by state and non-state actors as the bridge
which links them, or that the two sides of the debate have chosen different approach
routes to the interdisciplinary goal. 82
For the practitioners of international law, that route has involved a process in
which a range of international lawyers have reconceptualised international law by
moving it closer to politics and policy, and by moving away from rules towards
processes, thereby increasing the range of functions which law is seen as

performing. Instead of merely providing "triggers for sanctions," a process-based
international law could, they suggest, act to provide "communication, reassurance,
monitoring and routinization. " 83
To this list must be added its existential legitimising effect. The distinction
of international rules as rules of law bestows on them a cachet which is not available
to non-law rules - even those which have been created, procedurally and
81
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Supra. At Note 34 (1993), p. 209, 210-214. The most important early exponents of this conception
of international jurisprudence have been Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell who, in 1943, founded
the New Haven school of policy-directed law which sought to politicise the process by which law is
developed. By turning critique of the law towards a positivist social scientific approach, they sought to
reinvent international lawyers as public policy specialists who were far better equipped than their
forebears to develop international law for the enhancement of world order and security, and of human
dignity. Lasswell. H. D., & McDougal, M. S. (1943). Legal education and public policy: Professional
training in the public interest. 52 Yale Law Journa/203.
The New Haven approach has been elaborated by emphasising an autonomous "systemic" or "World
Order" orientation of law which acknowledged its function both as a source of law rules, and an
existential international code of conduct framed to meet the real needs of international society.
A corollary to the process-based orientation, and a pragmatic alternative, was to ascertain
empirically the ways in which international law and legal institutions have, in fact, influenced
international outcomes. This involved establishing evidence of causal relationships between the
incentives and disincentives of international law in particular circumstances, and the decisions which
states make. This perspective is significant in respect of Au,stralia's behaviour in relation to the
negotiation of the NPT.
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substantively, by a process which is widely acknowledged as legitimate. In the latter
category, the "soft law" status of many international instruments, which are not
legally binding on states, nevertheless may impact on international relations, and
subsequently on international law itself. 84
This move within the international law academy towards recognition of the
importance of the

international

political process

may be

regarded as

acknowledgment that the institutions and conventions of international law - its
customary law, treaty instruments and accepted principles of law - are, in fact,
closely related to the concept of "institutions" used by analysts of international
relations.
From this perspective, international law can be seen as encompassing many
elements of the institutionalist position favoured by many international relations
theorists. That position focuses on the rules in international life which moderate
specific issue areas, on the organisations which oversee them, and on the
"knowledge communities" which they create. 85 The enhanced certainty and
credibility which international institutions can bring to an issue area (and not least to
international nuclear anti-proliferation efforts) help states achieve collective gains
through transparent negotiations and reiteration of problem-solving over many
years. 86

On the international relations side, the route to interdisciplinary thinking has been
one in which scholars have sought to explain, in a functional way, how international
legal institutions work. One approach has been to examine, from an "iterative"
perspective, a justification of the law of treaties (and of specific treaties) which
holds that they should be designed to encourage repeated interactions between
84

An example of"soft law" is the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
1975 (the Helsinki Declaration). [14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975)].
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states, and that such a perspective can be generated from the insights of
institutionalists working within the international relations discipline. 87
A second method, which omits the focus of the first on iteration, has been to
consider the extent to which arms control treaties pr<?niote cooperative interactions
between states, including a range of "dynamic obligations" which are reflected in
reciprocal arrangements and understandings - of which the Cold War relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union is cited as an obvious example. 88
Finally, some international relations scholars have focused on the reasons
that impel states to act through "formal" institutions, such as the legally constituted
International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Trade Organisation. They
conclude that centralisation and independence are key characteristics of
international organisations which impel states to take them seriously. 89
Here, then, are three examples of scholarship, from within both the
international law and international relations academies, which have as their aim an
enhanced understanding of the operational functions of international law
instruments- exactly how they work in a state-centric international system. Notably,
all three include within their analyses various arms control and disarmament treaties
(for example, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the various SALT and
START Agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union) as illustrative
of their theses.
The outcome of this dual analytical effort, which the preceding discussion
has addressed only in general terms, has been a convergence of the basic precepts
and assumptions which each discipline has, until very recently, reserved for its own
domain. 90 That convergence still has many miles to travel. There is no immediate
87
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Smith, E. M. (1991). Understanding dynamic obligations: Arms control agreements. 64 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1549. At 1551.
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prospect of a joint discipline of "international governance", although the most
productive points of contact have been made around the notion of international
institutions and the rule-sets they administer. 91 Perhaps the clearest expression of the
interdisciplinary perspective in inter-state relations is _slaughter's aphorism of 1993:

In the end, law informed by politics is the best guarantee of politics informed by
law. 92

Potential for Theoretical Advance
The need for scholarship which is able to bridge the disciplinary and conceptual
divide separating international law .and international relations theory has been
canvassed above. Within that rubric, enquiry into the propensity of states to act
through international organisations, and the functional development of international
nuclear proliferation law stand out as areas of research offering some prospect of
successfully advancing understanding of the structures and dynamics of
international affairs.

States and International Organisations

One important area of collaborative research which is already yielding results, and
to which the study lends empirical support, is investigation into the ways in which
states interact with formal international organisations, and the factors which impel
them to do so. Both international lawyers and international relations theorists are
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Another important focus of on-going scholarship is the influence of domestic factors on state
behaviour in relation to international rules. This includes work by Slaughter to open the "black box"
model of state behaviour through a "Liberal Agenda" which assumes individuals and private groups to
be the principal political actors, all governments as minimally representative of at least some segment
of society (whose interests are reflected in state policy), and that states' behaviour is conditioned by
the nature and configuration of their preferences. Beck, R. J. (1996). International law and
international relations: The prospects for interdisciplinary collaboration. In R. J. Beck, A C. Arend, &
R. D. Vander Lugt (Eds. ), International tules: Approaches from international law and international
relations (pp. 3-30). New York: Oxford University Press. At pp. 12, 13.
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now addressing the specific features of formally constituted international
organisations (and the penumbra of informal agreements and understandings which
often surround them) which allow them to respond effectively to international
challenges or, alternatively, to restrict their utility. 93 For example, Abbott and Snidal,
using a combined rationalist/constructivist approach, focus on the active functions
of international organisations, and especially their centralising purpose and
independent status. 94
From a more expressly international legal perspective, but using elements of
international relations theory, Abbott has examined the role of information
production and verification in the design of a range of arms control treaties,
including the NPT. 95
In the present study, the International Atomic Energy Agency, charged with
the verification of compliance with the provisions of the NPT by States Parties,
stands out as an example of an international organisation which discharges its
statutory obligations in the context of a range of informal understandings that infuse
the entire domain of nuclear proliferation and disarmament.
The data used to analyse Australia's role in the development of the NPT
reveal the ways in which a state, with limited relevant experience to guide it,
engaged an international organisation with a global mandate over the crucial
question of the spread of nuclear weapons around the world.
The problems and concerns which Australia expressed, both publicly and
privately, about the effectiveness and operational shortcomings of the IAEA are
evidence of its perception of the Agency's organisational deficiencies. To that
extent, the study adds to the sum of information available to scholars and others
engaged in the design, commissioning and evaluation of international security
organisations which are intended to perform regulatory or verification functions. 96
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Its focus on circumstances now over thirty years old provides an opportunity
to reassess the degree of progress achieved by organisational designers (especially
international lawyers and international negotiators) in enhancing levels of functional
efficiency within international organisations in the .arms control arena, and their
relevance to emergent political challenges. 97

Nuclear Proliferation Law

While study of the dynamics of relations between states and international
organisations is an overtly interdisciplinary project equally amenable to a growing
number of international lawyers and theorists of international organisations, the
development of nuclear proliferation law, as law, is more closely allied to the work
of the international lawyer. By maintaining the rate and scope of development in this
area of the international law on security (and more specifically on arms control and
disarmament) international law scholars and practitioners will contribute in large
measure to its continuing relevance and strength.
This study is relevant to the development of international law on arins
control and disarmament by providing evidence of the successful negotiating
strategy used to conclude the terms of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The NPT was negotiated in large part by the two Cold War superpowers.
Although the national interests of the United States and the Soviet Union coincided,
in this instance, with those of almost all other states, the negotiation of the terms of
the NPT was not undertaken in a universal international forum. 98 Instead (in
the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and On Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention). Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (2001). [on-line]. Available WWW: http://www.opcw.nl/.
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consultation with the its NATO allies) negotiation remained at a private, bilateral
level between the US and the Soviet Union, and at a secondary, adjunctive level in
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. 99 Nevertheless, the
documentary evidence used in the study indicates tha~ the United States was willing
to consult with Australia, in some detail, on the text of the draft treaty as it
developed.
The United States expressed its readiness to acknowledge Australia's status
as a stable and influential "middle power" on the international stage, and ipso facto
the significance of its policy towards the Treaty. An accommodation of divergent
national interests, even as between allies, was the result. 100 America was ready,
pragmatically, to concede that Australia's concurrence with its interpretation of the
terms of this most important of multilateral treaties was likely to have a marked
effect on the willingness of other middle-level developed states (and, importantly,
developing states around the world) to accede to them.
This indicates that further research may prove useful in testing the widely
held view that the middle-level powers have been largely unable to influence the
course of world events since 1945, especially in relation to global security
concems. 101 That view has held that states with a "middle-power" status were
limited - by their established political alliances, or through their cultural or religious
allegiances- in the nature and strength of their influence over the Great Powers. 102

Secretary-General of the United Nations.
99

The United States and the Soviet Union submitted identical draft treaty texts to the ENDC on 24
August 1967, which were subsequently revised twice at that forum, and once more in the UN General
Assembly. The final form of the treaty text was approved by the Assembly on 12 June 1968. Epstein,
W. (1976). The last chance: Nuclear proliferation and arms control. New York: The Free Press. At
pp. 70-86.
100

As this study will reveal, the United States' desire to see the NPT successfully concluded and
adopted was the impulsion behind its surprising degree of consultation over its terms with a
moderately important ally in the South West Pacific region.
101

This observation is made in the context of the ability of individual states to bring both diplomatic
and legal pressure to bear on the most economically and militarily powerful post-war states: the United
States, the former Soviet Union, Russia, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom, France, Japan,
[West] Germany and Italy. Over the past decade, international organisations such as NATO and the
European Union may be added to this list.

102Ibid.

liii
The conclusions drawn by this study indicate that other factors, in specific
circumstances, may combine to propel middle-ranking states to a position of
influence beyond what their economic, military and geopolitical circumstances
might suggest.
To the extent that this is so, such states are able to modulate (and moderate)
negotiations between their more powerful counterparts, whether within the ambit of
the United Nations, or externally. This may have significant consequences for the
development of nuclear proliferation law, in which the ultimate goal is a universal
Nuclear Weapons Convention (similar to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention)
which completely eliminates these devices.

Methodology
The study begins by identifying its purpose, as outlined above. Its goal is to analyse
the evidence described below to enable new conclusions to be drawn about
Australian sources of legal and political influence modulating the development of
international law on nuclear proliferation. In order to do so, it establishes two broad,
interrelated research goals, rather than a single general hypothesis, in the belief that
this methodology provides the study with the flexibility required for its analysis of a
complex matrix of interdependent factual situations and causal relationships.
On one hand, the study focuses on Australia's role in the genesis and early
evolution of the NPT. At the same time, it seeks to place that role within the wider
context of the influence of middle powers allies of the United States in globally
significant arms control negotiations.
It should be noted that the study's research goal concerning the ability of
middle-ranking states to modify the outcome of bilateral and multilateral
negotiations aimed at developing international nuclear proliferation law demands
the use (unavoidable in this methodology) of inductive reasoning to derive its
conclusions.
The study collects documentary evidence on the period of negotiation of the
1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which was generated by Australian
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Ministers of the · Crown, their representatives, and Australian Government
departments and agencies. The most significant departments are the Departments of
External Affairs, Prime Minister and Cabinet, and National Development, while the
most important government agency is the Australian J\tomic Energy Commission.
The evidence mostly takes the form of archived documents which record the
deliberations of the Australian Government in the context of the formulation of
national policy concerning accession to the Treaty, and the alternative strategy of
developing an independent nuclear strike force as a deterrent against external
aggression. It includes, inter alia, a wide range of discussion, analysis and position
papers, Submissions to Cabinet, technical assessments, diplomatic cables and
Cabinet Decisions.
Documents generated by Australian diplomatic missions abroad record, in
detail, the extent of consultations which occurred between Australian diplomatic

-
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representatives and their counterparts from the United States, the United Kingdom
and other states, as well as international institutions such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. All
documents are in the public domain, having been declassified in 1998 under the
terms of the Australian federal "thirty-year rule" on the release of government
material for public scrutiny under the direction and control of the Australian
National Archives.
These documents form, almost exclusively, the primary material used in this
study, which relies on their strongly authenticated provenance in the absence of
corroboration from the interview of individuals, or the government records of other
relevant states.
Analysis of the collected data will proceed having regard for the theoretical
and meta-theoretical considerations discussed above, in order to develop a coherent,
consistent and reasoned argument which is based firmly on the evidence contained
in the materials to hand.
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Review of Literature

The general literature relevant to this study is divided between the literature on the
negotiation of the NPT and that on the international law of nuclear proliferation.
That relevant to the process of negotiation between states which led to the NPT may
be characterised as fragmented and sparse, while the literature on the international
law of nuclear proliferation is more extensive and cohesive.

In terms of the processes and events which led to the Treaty's formulation and
initiation,· the most comprehensive treatment is that contained in the three volume
study by Shaker, 103 whose work provides, in Volume I, an exhaustive chronology of
the foundation and course of negotiations undertaken during the drafting of the
Treaty. Notably, however, it takes little account of the involvement of America's
non-NATO allies.
Shaker's study forms the basis from which the present research will move
forward as it clarifies Australia's part in the NPT negotiating process. Using a
framework which focuses principally on the various institutions of the United
Nations Organisation, such as the General Assembly and the former Eighteen Nation
Committee on Disarmament, Shaker traces the public (i.e. UN-modulated) path of
negotiations between 1961 and 1968, rather than that of inter-governmental
discussions. His reliance on United Nations documents, with limited reference to
secondary analytical literature

and government

(especially United

States

Government) primary source material, leaves room for re-formulation of this section
of an important work to include data on the United States' relevant negotiations
with Australia over the NPT.
While Shaker provides a valuable compendium on the UN-based
negotiations, the general literature on the negotiation of the Treaty is enhanced by a
secondary component which may be described as more discursive, speculative and
analytical. An early example, which claims to present controversial facts without
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bias, is Mastny's Disarmament and nuclear tests 1964-69, 104 which follows a
chronology of annual events between 1964 and 1969 relevant to nuclear
disarmament as he assesses the rate of progress in negotiating arms control and
nuclear non-proliferation measures. The work's utility lies in its amalgamation of
political aspects of those events with their purely UN-grounded or international law
dimensions, rather than its alleged value-neutrality.
A further useful analysis of the negotiation process, written from the
perspective of the international lawyer, is that contained in Singh and McWhinney's
Nuclear weapons and contemporary international law, 105 an authoritative work of

much wider scope in the area of nuclear weapons and contemporary international
law. The authors, of whom the first is a former President of the International Court
of Justice, provide a worthwhile counter-point to the generally positive tenor of texts
dealing with the Treaty negotiations, taking a less than optimistic view of the
juridical effects of the security guarantees made by nuclear weapons states to
non-nuclear States Parties. 106 Part of this work's value lies in the fact that its original
1959 edition was heavily revised by McWhinney in 1989 to reflect the many
changes discernible in the legal status of nuclear weapons over the thirty year period
leading up to the end of the Cold War.
A complementary text, part of a wider work on nuclear proliferation and
arms control, is Epstein's The last chance: Nuclear proliferation and arms control, a
study of the NPT negotiations in the decade from 1958 to 1968. 107 He introduces the
origins and earliest directions, from 1958, of bilateral diplomacy and UN General
Assembly discussions which eventually resulted in General Assembly Resolutions,
and in the Treaty itself. To that extent, it completes the temporal scope of the
negotiation process, while emphasising the perception, expressed by states such as
Brazil and India, of its fundamentally discriminatory nature.
104
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These works are a representative sample of the book and monograph-based
literature on the NPT negotiation process. As stated above, this part of the general
literature is fragmented, having no readily discernible structure, or an obvious rise in
the sophistication of its analysis, which can be broadly characterised as descriptive
and speculative.
This judgment is supported by the few articles which address the negotiation
process systematically, although these tend to be more forthright in their stated
positions than the longer works. One example is Dougherty's article, "The Treaty
and the Nonnuclear States", published in 1967,108 in which he examines the
dilemmas faced by nuclear-capable states such as Argentina, Brazil and Sweden in
deciding whether to join or remain outside the NPT regime. The thrust of
Dougherty's argument is that those

sta~es

(and many others) saw little alternative to

accepting entrenched discrimination almost as a fait accompli.
Erlich's 1970 article on the NPT and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, 109
although now substantially irrelevant, 110 adds to this realism by pointing out that the
initial draft of the Treaty, submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States,
contained no commitment to limiting their own nuclear weapons. 111
Another contemporaneous attempt to analyse the process by which the NPT
was negotiated, and one which is useful in view of its comprehensiveness, analytical
rigour, and reliance on US Government documentary sources, is Firmage's 1969
article "The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons". 112 Its most
significant contribution, and one which indirectly underpins the middle-power
108
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theme of the present research, is its assertion of the striking degree of collaboration
between the United States and its European NATO allies throughout the negotiation
process. 113
The above describes the extent and nature of the general literature relevant to
the negotiation of the terms of the NPT, from both an international law and
political/diplomatic perspective. The general absence of data on, and analysis of, the
involvement of United States allies (including Australia) is the lacuna which the
present research will eliminate.

The literature covering the international law of nuclear proliferation is extensive. As
a well-developed component of customary law through the practices of states, and of
conventional law through multilateral treaties, its broad structure and developmental
pathways are comprehensively described in any volume covering the broad sweep of
international law. 114 However, a more extensive and focused secondary literature
exists which places the international law of nuclear proliferation within the context
either of the wider "Law of Disarmament," or of the narrower arena of nuclear arms
control per se.
An early example of the former set, useful as a comparative base for later

works, is Gotlieb's 1965 book, Disarmament and International Law, 115 written from
a Canadian perspective on nuclear disarmament law extant during the early stages of
negotiations leading to the NPT. It presents a valuable insight into the relevant
international legal framework of disarmament, as perceived from within a
middle-ranking Western power with significant constitutional, political and
international similarities to Australia.
The 1986 Report of the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Defence, Disarmament and Arms Control in the Nuclear Age 116
113
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(which took expert evidence from a wide range of senior actors in the nuclear
disarmament domain) provides a more recent and comprehensive appreciation of the
scope of issues surrounding arms control generally, and includes within its analysis
many proliferation issues of concern to Australia. Its

~ntroductory

comments on the

dearth of Australian published material on the "nuclear debate" is significant for the
present study, while its most directly relevant recommendation urges the
strengthening of the NPT regime.
The Report is complemented and enhanced by Dahlitz and Dicke's edited
Proceedings of the 1991 Geneva Symposium on the International Law of Arms
Control and Disarmament, 117 which purports to be the result of the first gathering of

its type, and is undoubtedly important in view of the expertise of its participants.
The reported contributions of academic lawyers, international legal practitioners,
bilateral and multilateral negotiators, and UN-based specialists make this volume a
valuable source of data and analysis relevant to the present research. Significant
contributions address the practical problems of multilateral arms control treaties, 118
problems of arms control treaty interpretation, 119 and the process of achieving
effective arms controllaw. 120
A further component of the secondary literature on disarmament law, written
in a more "legalistic," less discursive style, is Lysen's 1990 work, The Law of
Disarmament. 121 This study is useful in its attempt to discriminate in a careful, yet

straightforward, way between the public international law of disarmament
(including its non-proliferation component) and its political or technical aspects. It
does so by placing the relevant agreements within the boundaries of law, an
important exercise for an ever-changing area of international law.
Defence. (1986). Disarmament and arms control in the nuclear age. Canberra: AGPS.
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In terms of the literature on the international law of non-proliferation written
explicitly in the context of nuclear arms control, an important interdisciplinary study
is Dahlitz' 1983 work, Nuclear Arms Control with Effective International
Agreements. 122 Its value lies in its focus on international systems for the creation,

implementation, observance, verification and enforcement of nuclear arms control
agreements, as well as the general principles of international conflict resolution.
Singh and McWhinney's 1989 study, Nuclear weapons and contemporary
international law is of more general relevance in terms of its authoritative and

comprehensive analysis of many aspects of international law as it relates to nuclear
weapons. As such, it can be considered the most significant general reference source
in this part of the literature (not least since it must be regarded as a subsidiary source
of that law). 123
Of similar professional stature, and thus significant for the purely
international legal component of this study, is Cohen and Gouin's edited
Proceedings of the I987 Canadian Conference on Nuclear Weapons and the Law:
Lawyers and the Nuclear Debate. 124 Those participating, ranging from senior

international lawyers (Greenwood, Rostow) and nuclear physicists (Teller) to arms
control bureaucrats and representatives of international anti-nuclear NGOs,
addressed the practical difficulties faced by lawyers working within the international
law of nuclear weapons. To that extent, this volume is a usefully pragmatic
expansion beyond theoretical analysis to the experience of the present-day
practitioner and negotiator.
Meyrowitz' 1990 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: The Relevance of
International Law is a dense analysis of the legal status of nuclear weapons 125 {now
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partially resolved by the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Case in the International Court of
Justice). 126 It provides one of the clearest expressions in the recent literature of the
view that international law is capable of exerting decisive inhibiting influence over
the threat or use of these devices. By extension, it is a useful marker for the present
research in the arena of the development of nuclear non-proliferation law and
policy.
The above illustrates the range of literature on the international law of
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons relevant to the present research, in terms of its
grounding in the law as it has developed, and as it currently exists.

The review of the literature on Australian nuclear policy between 1945 and the
present will be divided between that which addresses the broad sweep of issues and
events within Australian nuclear policy, and that with most direct relevance to the
present proposal.
The literature on Australia's nuclear policy from 1945 to 1998 is neither
extensive nor internally coherent. Few large works address the range of issues
arising during the past fifty years within either Australia's domestic nuclear policy
agenda, or its relevant international legal and political relationships, at least in an
organic or comprehensive way. Rather, the literature consists primarily of highly
focused analyses, in the form of journal articles and monographs, of specific sectors
of the nuclear policy agenda, or of those issues perceived as carrying most
significance over particular periods.
In the former category, the earliest attempt by the academy to describe

Australia's nuclear policy agenda is Millar's 1967 monograph Australia's defence
policies 1945-1965. 121 Almost as an afterthought, Millar alludes- in general terms-

to Australia's willingness to allow British tests of nuclear devices on its territory,
while eschewing a nuclear capability of its own on the basis of American assurances
of nuclear protection.
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A more useful early work, which purports to be the first coherent treatment
of the technical and political aspects of Australian nuclear weapons acquisition, is
Bellany's 1972 book Australia in the Nuclear Age. 128 Its main significance lies in
the fact that its author saw such acquisition as a credible option for Australia at that
time.
A further advance is represented by the edited proceedings of a conference
held in 1974 at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National
University: The strategic nuclear balance: An Australian perspective. Here,
Desmond Ball surveys the implications for Australia of changes to the United
States' nuclear strategic doctrine known as the "counter-force" or Schlesinger
doctrine. He concludes that the implications of this development involve the
increased vulnerability of US military facilities in Australia to nuclear attack. 129 In
the same volume, which marks a significant advance over previous work in the
depth and sophistication of its analysis, Hedley Bull advocates the founding of
Australia's security strategy on broadly-based arms control arrangements and
practices. 130
From a more populist perspective, Walsh and Munster attempted in 1980 to
publish Documents on Australian defence and foreign policy 1968-1975, 131 using
then-secret and embargoed government documents. Their action resulted in a High
Court injunction ordering the volume's destruction after publication. That work, and
the authors' 1982 review of the earlier work, Secrets ofstate, 132 are relevant to the
present research for their use of core departmental documents. More specifically,
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Walsh and Munster's earlier volume was the first analysis touching on Australian
nuclear policy which was able to draw conclusions about the tension between
political decision-makers and their advisers within the bureaucracy.
In the same period, Camilleri's 1980 study J!-ustralian-American relations:

The web of dependence is helpful in tracing the dynamics of this country's relations
with the United States at that time, and especially for his thesis on the putative lack
of any credible Australian foreign policy. 133
As a complement to Camilleri's general analysis, Redner and Redner's 1983
work Anatomy of the world: The impact of the atom on Australia and the world

134

follows the so-called "military-industrial complex" analysis of the Australia I US
relationship, together with what they perceive to be Australia's unthinking foreign
policy, and vulnerability to nuclear attack at the end of the Fraser Government era.
Falk's 1983 work Taking Australia off the map, written by a physicist and
historian of science, is important for its dispassionate analysis of the practical
consequences of Australia's nuclear policies, viewed from the perspective of what
he calls the "Second Cold War". 135
The works ofFalk and the Redners are complemented by Cawte's 1992 book

Atomic Australia 1944-1990, which is the only substantial work on Australia's
postwar uranium and nuclear energy policies. 136 As it traces the rise and fall of
Australian governments' hopes of economic expansion based on abundant nuclear
energy, its challenge to allegedly misconceptions about their political and economic
naivety provides a backdrop to decisions of governments, in relation to the NPT, in
the years leading up to 1968. However, Cawte fails to relate the questi9n of
133
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Australia's uranium export policy, and aspirations of developing a nuclear power
industry, to its nuclear non-proliferation credentials. Her failure to resolve these
apparently incommensurate positions is a significant omission in terms of the
present study.
Finally, a significant and more recent development m this part of the
literature is Reynolds' 2000 book Australia's bid for the atomic bomb. 137 Based on a
wide range of international primary sources, and on recently released Australian
archival material, the work traces Australia's search for an independent nuclear
deterrent between 1943 and 1968. Its value lies in its reliance on extensive archival
research, and in its focus on the primary reason behind Australia's reluctance to
sign the NPT when called on to do so by America.

The above large works are complemented, especially in the period from the late
1960s onward, by small academic monographs, journal articles and working
papers, 138 as well as Australian Government reports, pamphlets, background journal
articles and submissions to Parliamentary Committees. 139 As stated above, they
cover a wide range of issues with relevance to Australian nuclear policy, many of
which are addressed by the larger works noted above, although government policy
publications, such as Current Notes on International Affairs,

140

and the later

equivalents Australian Foreign Affairs Record and Insight are in the latter
(size-limited) category.
One of the most significant early statements of Australian government
nuclear policy is that reported in Current Notes in March, 1968, in which the
government emphasised Australia's insistence on recognition of its middle-ranking
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power status in relations with the United States. 141 Twenty years later, a similar
statement asserted, without qualification, that a nation of Australia's capacity must
acknowledge that "our impact on events outside our national territory will rarely be
decisive." 142
In the category of recent large articles on Australia's attempts to acquire
nuclear weapons in the post-war and Cold War periods, two works stand alone. Both
appeared in the US journal "The Nonproliferation Review". Walsh's 1997 article
"Surprise down under: The secret history of Australia's nuclear ambitions" 143 was
ground-breaking in that it was the first modern attempt to encapsulate the history of
Australia's nuclear weapons aspirations. Hymans' 2000 article "Isotopes and
identity: Australia and the nuclear weapons option, 1949-1999" contends that the
history of Australia's nuclear weapons policy is one of misperceptions of security
threats, based on variations in the construction of nationalist sentiments over time. 144

The literature specific to Australia's policies in the domain of nuclear
non-proliferation follows the patterns set above, that is, a dearth of comprehensive
analysis, yet with many short, narrowly focused reviews. Again, these take the form
of journal articles, monographs, working papers, and (in the case of government
publications) policy statements. In addition, the longer works on Australian nuclear
policy, cited above, incorporate some attempt to review the role of this country
within the NPT regime.
There appear to be few works directly relevant to the proposed research, in
terms of Australia's role in the evolution of the NPT, and only passing reference in
contemporaneous government publications to Australia's international stance (and
then only in United Nations fora). Thus, Australia's negotiating position during
141
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debate on the NPT at the 22nd Session of the General Assembly in May, 1968 was
briefly set out in Current Notes on International Affairs. 145 In essence, and with
significance for the proposed research, Australia supported the Treaty at the UN, but
with the caveat that, as a non-nuclear power, the Treaty would not have the effect of
denying it access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 146

=---Finally, an important template for the analytical strategy of the study is provided by
Meyrowitz' 1990 study: Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: The Relevance of
International Law. 147 Meyrowitz grounds consideration of a contemporary

international law issue (the question of the legality, per se, of nuclear weapons) on
the political development of a system of legal order and rule designed to lessen the
consequences of war. The work's value lies in its assertion that the rule of
international law can be sufficiently enhanced as to be capable of forming a viable
alternative to a realist vision of international anarchy and power modulation
between states ..

In summary, the Review of Literature has shown that significant deficiencies exist in
the literature on the negotiation and early operation of the NPT, and in the literature
relevant to Australia's role in those processes. The same is true for the range of
issues on Australian nuclear policy since 1945.
Furthermore, there is a paucity of works on the international political
processes between the United States and its non-NATO allies surrounding the
negotiation of the NPT prior to 1968. The research aims to remedy this situation, at
least in respect of US-Australia negotiations, and their implications in international
law.
More generally, the Australian literature lacks a sense of balance between
the contributions of the academy, NGO and government sources. The Strategic and
145

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1968, June). Current Notes on

Intemational Affairs 39, 234-240.
146

147

Ibid. At 236.

Meyrowitz, E. L. (1990). Prohibition of nuclear weapons: The relevance of intemational law.
Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers.
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Defence Studies Centre in the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian
National University, established in 1966 with federal government support, remains
one of the few academic body in Australia specialising in strategic analysis. Its
Working Paper Series of monographs forms the majm:ity of Australian literature of
relevance to the present study.
General works on international law in an Australian context are rare, the
only recent work of substance being Reicher's volume of cases and materials,
statutes and treaties. 148
In this situation, and with new data now .becoming available at the

Australian National Archives on Australia's role in the development of the NPT, the

opportunity exists to extend the current literature in a substantial and significant
way.

Two studies have been identified which have relevance for the study. Both address
aspects of Australia's nuclear policy development process in response to the advent
oftheNPT:

•

Carr's 1979 Masters dissertation: Australia and the Nuclear Question
1945-1975. 149

•

Tooth's 1987 Honours thesis: Australia and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty 1968-1972. 150

148

Reicher, H. (Ed.). (1995). Australian international law: Cases and materials. North Ryde, NSW:
LBC Information Services.
149

Carr, M. (1979). Australia and the Nuclear Question 1945-1975. Unpublished Masters
dissertation, University of New South Wales, Sydney. This work is a chronological account of
Australia's involvement in nuclear issues in the period 1945-1975, including, in Chapter 4, a general
examination of Australia and the NPT. This work has not benefited from access to the documents
analysed in the study.
150
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Conclusion
This Introduction has presented a summary of the context, purpose, structure,
theoretical foundations and methodology of the study, together with a review of
relevant literature. In doing so, it has provided a framework around which ~he study
will build its analysis of evidence, in order to show how Australia was able to exert
influence, beyond reasonable expectations, over a United States Government which
was anxious to conclude a global nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was the result of American (and
Soviet) efforts, and the treaty continues as the keystone of the entire nuclear arms
control regime. Its central place in the study's arguments concerning the ability of
middle-powers such as Australia to haye their voice heard requires, in Chapter One,
an analysis of the structure, aims, deficiencies and potential effectiveness of the
NPT as nuclear international law.

1

CHAPTER ONE
THE 1968 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY1

Introduction: The Nature of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty
Within the framework of public international law as it has developed in the United
Nations era, the emerging international law of Arms Control and Disarmament has,
since the early nineteen sixties,2 been engaged in a process in which its form and
substance have gained increasing coherence, durability and strength. 3 As discussed
in the Introduction, the NPT has, since_ its opening for signature on 1 July 1968 (and
entry into force on 5 March 1970) formed an increasingly important component of
that process, as it gained growing support from States Parties which viewed it as an
acceptable compromis modulating relations between states with and without access
to nuclear technology.
The Treaty has shaped and developed the fundamental characteristics of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime, with which both international legal practitioners

1

The full text of the NPT is provided at Appendix II. [7 LL.M. 809; 1973 Aust. T.S 3].

2

The first multilateral treaty aimed solely at aspects of nuclear arms control was the Treaty Banning
Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (the Partial Test Ban Treaty) of 5
August 1963. [43 UNTS 480].
3

Dahlitz, J. (1991). Introduction. In J. Dahlitz & D. Dicke (Eds.), The international law of arms
control and disarmament (pp. 1-14). New York: United Nations Publishing Board. In contrast, Miljan
Komatina (who in 1991 held the post of Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva) expressed, in the same volume, a less sanguine view about the past achievements of arms
control and disarmament law in meeting its primary aims. He advocated more directly organic links
with other areas of international law - such as human rights and humanitarian law - as one means of
enhancing outcomes for international arms control and disarmament law. At pp. 29-34. This work
publishes the Proceedings of the Symposium on the International Law of Arms Control and
Disarmament held at Geneva from 28 February to 2 March 1991, which brought together a range of
senior practitioners and commentators on international law.
The compromise which resulted in the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, but without any
alteration, has also been described as evidence of the faltering strength of the NPT and its surrounding
regime. A four-step program to nuclear disarmament. (1996). The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 52
(2), 52-54. At 55.
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and other international scholars became increasingly familiar after 1989, as the Cold
War subsided. 4 That regime has been described as:

.... an integrated network oftreaties and other standard-setting arrangements which
provide a comprehensive framework for the behaviour of states, and international
organizations and other actors, in the nuclear area. The regime includes measures
that seek to remove the demand for nuclear weapons and measures that seek to
restrict the supply of nuclear weapons and their related components and materials. 5

In effect, the non-proliferation regime forms a global environment within which the

international legal obligations of States Parties, established by the NPT treaty
instrument, find their interpretation, application and force.
While the mechanisms which have created and authenticated this regime
have been the subject of much dispute among international relations scholars, there
is no doubt that the result has been the steady evolution of a matrix of "dynamic
obligations" between states which extends far beyond the expectations of the
Treaty's negotiators. 6 The conventional instrument of international law at its core
continues to provide the steadying psychological elements of continuity, legitimacy
4

The questions surrounding the relationship between international regimes (understood as the rules
guiding cooperative practices in international relations) and international law have recently been
addressed by Robert Keohane in an important article. In it, he quotes Slaughter-Burley as
characterising the work of political scientists on regimes as "reinventing international law in
rational-choice language" or, alternatively, as claiming that rules structure politics. He stresses the
dichotomy of interpretation evident among observers of state behaviour, distinguishing between an
"instrumentalist optic" - namely the discounted impact which shared norms and their interpretation are
imputed, by some, to have on state policies - and a "normative optic" which emphasises the
importance of persuasion on the basis of norms in contemporary world politics. Keohane, R. 0.
(1997). International relations and international law: Two optics. Harvard International Law Journal,
38 (2), 487-502, at 488ff.
5

Simpson, J. & Howlett, D. (1994). The NPT Renewal Conference. International Security, 19 (1),
41-71. At 43, 44. These authors refer, on the demand side, to measures such as the NPT itself, the
IAEA safeguards system, full nuclear disarmament, and an international non-proliferation norm. On
the supply side of the nuclear equation, they cite nuclear export controls (such as that established by
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of nuclear materials exporting countries) and restrictions on the
dissemination of advanced nuclear weapon technology.
6

For contrasting analyses of the mechanisms which create and cohere regimes of agreements and
understandings surrounding multilateral treaty instruments, and the practical application of their terms,
cf Setear, J. K. (1996). An iterative perspective on treaties: A synthesis of international relations
theory and international law. 37 Harv. lnt 'I. L. J 139; and Smith, E. M. (1991). Understanding
dynamic obligations: Arms control agreements. 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1549.
For an analysis of the roles of trust, and of "shaming" in the behaviour of states in compliance with
international norms, regimes and regulations, see: Rengger, N. (1997). The ethics of trust in world
politics. International Affairs, 73 (3), 469-487.
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and assurance without which the principles of nuclear non-proliferation it enunciates
would be swiftly lost.
The period of over forty years which has elapsed since the earliest moves
began in the five member London Subcommittee of the United Nations
Disarmament Commission towards negotiating a partial nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation plan has seen significant legal, geopolitical and social change, and
redefinition, on a global scale. 7 The extent and rate of that change has, in turn,
exerted its influence on the status and structure of international law generally, and,
more specifically, on the expectations placed on it by both individuals and states.
From a perspective far wider than nuclear disarmament itself, international Arms
Control and Disarmament law is a vivid exemplar of this trend.
The urgent need felt by states in many parts of the world for economic,
social and political reconstruction in the immediate postwar years induced
competition between ideological and political alliances which reified swiftly into
the armed camps of West and East, and into the mutual animus manifest, in varying
degree, during the Cold War era. Despite this, efforts aimed both at general
disarmament, and the regulation of armaments, began in 1946 at multilateral and
bilateral governmental levels, at the United Nations, and in many non-governmental
fora. 8
In the nuclear arena, they have continued unabated since that time, and many

arms control negotiations have acknowledged over the past thirty years the cardinal
7

This first structured, multilateral step along the nuclear non-proliferation road was taken on 29
August 1957. The "package" proposal submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
and Canada called for a fissionable materials production "cutoff'', transfer of such materials from
weapons stocks to peaceful uses, a nuclear weapons test ban, safeguards against surprise attack, a ban
on the transfer or acceptance between states of nuclear weapons (except for defensive purposes), as
well as conventional disarmament measures. The proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union.
International negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1969).
Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At pp. ix, 3. This volume
provides an extensive and authoritative historical review of the public international negotiations
leading to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). See also: Keesing's research report:
Disarmament: Negotiations and treaties 1946-1971. (1972). New York: Charles Scnbner's Sons. At
pp. 137-168.
8

The Charter of the United Nations itself refers, in Articles 11 (1) and 26, to the questions of
disarmament and the regulation of armaments. See Appendix ll of this thesis. Resolution I (I) of the
First Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 24 January 1946 is the earliest example of
regular General Assembly resolutions addressing questions of non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, arms control and disarmament. Dahlitz, J. (1983). Nuclear arms control with effective
international agreements. Melbourne: McPhee Gribble. At p.ll.
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value and central role of the NPT regtme as both a moderating influence over
potential nuclear proliferators, and the keystone of global arms control. 9

The Aims of the NPT
The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 at Washington, London and
Moscow. It entered into force on 5 March 1970, following the deposit of the fortieth
instrument of ratification with the three Depository Governments - the United
States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (each of which had themselves
ratified the Treaty). 10 To date, 187 states have acceded to its termsY
Its importance as an arms control and disarmament measure is surpassed
only by the long-sought but (so far) unobtainable goal of a multilateral Nuclear
Weapons Convention constructed along the lines of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Conventions banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of
these other forms of massively destructive weapons.
Its primary objective was - and is - to establish in international law an
express prohibition against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by all States Parties
which had not yet crossed the nuclear weapon threshold. Thus, Article IX of the
Treaty created a class of nuclear weapon states defined as those which "[had]
9

Michael Reiss has produced a series of country case studies in which he analyses the processes and
mechanisms by which some states, such as South Africa, Brazil and Ukraine, have decided to
discontinue or freeze their nuclear weapons programmes. Although many factors influencing policy
decisions are evident across states, he nevertheless makes the point, in Chapter 1, that long-held
assumptions about the inevitability of global nuclear proliferation may be challenged in the context of
rapidly changing geopolitical realities. Reiss, M. (1995). Bridled ambition: Why countries constrain
their nuclear capabilities. Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
It is important to distinguish between arms control and disarmament. The former has been defined
as "restraint exercised upon armaments policy, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their
character, deployment, or use"; the latter as "the reduction or abolition of armaments". Ball, D., &
Mack, A (1987). Preface. In D. Ball & A Mack (Eds.), The future of arms control (pp. xi-xiii).
Rushcutters Bay: Australian National University Press. At p. xi.
10

The United Nations and nuclear non-proliferation: Blue Book series (Vol. Ill). (1995). New York:
Department of Public Information, United Nations. At p. 6, paragraph 13. These arrangements are in
accordance with Article IX, Paragraphs 2 and 3, of the NPT.
11

Downer, A (2000). NPT Review Conference: Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs [on-line].
Available WWW: http://www.dfat.gov.aulmedia/speeches/foreign/00425_ npt.html .
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manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device
prior to 1 January, 1967."12 It thereby distinguished a class of non-nuclear weapon
states: those which, as Parties to the Treaty, were not permitted to gain and maintain
sovereign control over nuclear explosive devices of arw type.
From a more extensive perspective, the Treaty's aims were generated by, and
were reflective of, the relational dynamics inherent in the global geopolitical,
security, and international law regimes which had developed during the twenty-three
years since the end of the Second World War. 13 One of the turning points in that
process was UN Resolution 2028 (XX), formulated by the First (Disarmament and
International Security) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, and
passed by the Assembly in plenary session on 23 November 1965.
The five principles it established formed the guiding doctrine under which
the terms of the NPT were negotiated, and were themselves the result of seven years
of discussions in the First Committee of the Assembly, in the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and in United Nations Disarmament
Commission debates. 14 The principles on which an international treaty to prevent
nuclear weapon proliferation should be based were:
12

Article IX, Paragraph 3 (emphasis added).

13

Makinda provides a thorough critique of the contribution of Hedley Bull's conception of the broad
scope of "security" (from a Realist perspective which encompasses the rights and responsibilities of
both states and individuals) to an understanding of the development of traditional international security.
beyond state territorial integrity and political independence, towards "collective security" which
focused mainly on the needs, rights and duties of individuals. The importance of Bull's ideas lies in
their emphasis on the political complexities of each state's strategy for securing its own political
independence. Another theme ofBull's work, according to Makinda, is the ability of the UN to deal
with common threats to international order- as the UN-endorsed NPT sought to do. Makinda, S.
(1997). Hedley Bull and post-Cold War security. In G. Crowder, H. Manning, D.S. Mathieson, A
Parkin, & L. Seabrook (Eds.), Australasian Political Studies 1997: Proceedings of the 1997 ARSA
Conference, Volume 2 (pp. 653-668). Adelaide: Flinders University Department of Politics. At pp. 659
et seq.
14

Many studies trace the evolution of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, from their inception up to the
entry into force of the NPT in 1970. The most comprehensive work is Shaker's 1980 three volume
study of the origin and implementation of the NPT during the period 1959-1979.
The earliest United Nations-based moves came from proposals by the Irish Delegation to the United
Nations in the years 1958 to 1961. These proposals sought a Resolution in the UN General Assembly
calling for the "prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons" and an "international
agreement" prohibiting "control" of nuclear weapons to any state not already in possession of them
(and prohibiting manufacture of nuclear weapons by those states). The UNGA adopted Resolution
1380 (XIV) on 20 November 1959, encompassing the spirit of the Irish proposals, and recognising,
for the first time at the highest level of the United Nations, the danger inherent in any form of nuclear
weapons proliferation. Shaker, M. (1980). The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: Origin and
implementation 1959-1979 (Volume 1). London: Oceana. At pp. 24-33.
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•

Avoidance of any loopholes which might allow a nuclear or non-nuclear Power
to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.

•

Embodiment of an acceptable balance of mutual o1Jligations and responsibilities
between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.

• Incorporation of moves towards general and complete disarmament, with
emphasis upon nuclear disarmament.

•

Agreement on acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of
the treaty.

•

Avoidance of provisions adverse to the establishment of regional treaties aimed
at eradicating nuclear weapons from defined territories. 15

The Resolution requested the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva
to submit a report on the results of its work on a non-proliferation treaty to the
Assembly at an early date. It is this UN General Assembly Resolution which formed
the substantive impulse behind negotiations both within the ENDC itself, and
between the eventual co-sponsors of the NPT, the United States and the Soviet
Union.
By late 1964, the five Permanent Members of the Security Council of the
United Nations had each become self-declared nuclear weapon states. 16 One year
previously, when announcing that agreement had been reached on the terms of the
1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty/ 1 US President John F. Kennedy presented a vision of
the future in which efforts to curtail nuclear proliferation had failed. He said:
15

Infra. At Note 18, p. 240.

16

From 1946 to 1971, the Chinese seat at the United Nations Security Council was occupied by the
Republic of China (Taiwan). Taiwan was then replaced by the People's Republic of China. The PRC
had detonated an atomic device at Lop Nor, Sinkiang Province on 16 October, 1964. It became the
fifth declared nuclear weapon state after the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and
France. Supra, at Note 5. At pp. 22, 23.
17

Known formally as the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and under Water [480 UNTS 43].
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I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear
weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries 'large and small, stable and
unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would
be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security and no chance of effective
disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war and an
increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what would
otherwise be local conflicts. 18

President Kennedy's VISIOn IS one of the clearest, most succinct and prescient
articulations of the primary rationale of the NPT at its inception some five years
later.

The Provisions of the NPT : A ~ritique 19
What, then, were the substantive provisions of, the NPT text presented to the UN
General Assembly on 12 June 1968, and to what extent did they reflect recognition
of the five principles developed in Resolution 2028 (X:X)?20
First, the provisions of Article I, and the reciprocal provisions of Article II
appear capable of interpretation which acts contrary to the first principle of
Resolution 2028 (XX). Nuclear weapon states retain the ability under the terms of
Article I to place nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear weapon states so
long as they retain control and ownership over them.
While nuclear weapon states may not, under Article I, transfer nuclear
explosive devices, or control over them, to non-nuclear weapon states, and may not

18

Fisher, A S. (1970). Global dimensions. In B. Boskey & M. Willrich (Eds.), Nuclear proliferation:
Prospects for control. New York: University Press of Cambridge, Mass. At p.3.
19

20

The text of the Treaty is provided at Appendix ll.

1bid. On that date the General Assembly voted by 95 to 4, with 21 abstentions to "commend" the
Treaty. Although the four dissenters were minor states, the abstainers included France, and "threshold
states" such as Brazil and India, reflecting some measure of the misgiving these (at that time) potential
nuclear weapon states felt about the collaboration of the United States and the Soviet Union in
resolving the final text of the treaty. It may be noted that this study has, as a primary aim, the
modification of this simple analysis by the introduction of elements of influence exerted by
middle-ranking states such as Australia.
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"assist, encourage or induce" such states to manufacture or otherwise acqmre
nuclear devices, they are able to retain them in their own arsenals within the borders
of non-nuclear states. In this way, de facto proliferation of nuclear weapons can be
achieved without breaching the terms of the most important provision of the NPT the obligation which nuclear weapon states undertake under Article I to refrain from
transferring nuclear weapons or control over them to any recipient whatsoever. 21
From the non-nuclear states' point of view, their reciprocal obligation under
Article II of the Treaty not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons does not
restrict their ability to accept defensive placement of nuclear weapons, within their
own national boundaries, while under the control of any nuclear weapon state ally. 22
The importance of this deficiency becomes clear from the example of the
positioning of nuclear weapons by the United States on the territory of non-nuclear
weapon states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The degree to which states
such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy exercise "control" over United States
nuclear weapons within their borders is a crucial determinant of America's
compliance with the terms of Article I of the NPT. 23
Second, Article III directly addresses the fourth principle ofResolution 2028
(XX), which seeks "acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness
of the treaty." By establishing the obligation of non-nuclear weapon states to accept
safeguards, imposed by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), against
the diversion of peaceful nuclear energy technology to weapons manufacture, it
establishes a transparent process of verification of compliance with the terms of the
Treaty. 24 While Article III is a vital means of providing assurance for each State
21

For the terms of Articles I and II of the NPT, see Appendix II.

23

Willrich, M. (1969). Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for nuclear arms control.
Charlottesville, VA: The Michie Company. At pp. 67-98.
Singh and McWhinney have suggested that the omission from the NPT of a prohibition against
nuclear weapons transfers between alliance members is the result of the United States' renunciation of
the proposed European Multilateral Force (MLF) arrangements during 1966 and 1967. This, they
suggest, resulted in the absence of any Soviet objection to the establishment of a framework of shared
responsibility for nuclear planning and decision-making within NATO, manifested in its Nuclear
Defence Affairs Committee established in December 1966. Singh, N., & McWhinney, E. (1989).
Nuclear weapons and contemporary international law (rev. ed.). Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
24

Article III also provides, in paragraph 2, for the safeguard of nuclear materials and equipment
transferred to non-nuclear weapon states for peaceful purposes by any State Party. Paragraph 3
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Party that all others are, in fact, complying with their treaty obligations, this
potentially universal confidence-building measure is moderated by the fact that there
is no concomitant obligation on the nuclear weapon states to submit their own
nuclear activities to IAEA scrutiny. 25
Third, Articles IV and V can be regarded as directed towards the second
guiding principle, that of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and
obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. By advocating the
greatest possible sharing of peaceful nuclear benefits through exchange of
equipment, materials and information, and through. the (now redundant and
discredited) notion of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions, the treaty seeks
the greatest degree of reciprocity obtainable in an overtly discriminatory multilateral
agreement. 26
Fourth, and most controversially in the history of the Treaty, Article VI
attempts to address the third principle of "general and complete disarmament and,
more particularly, nuclear disarmament." Its call for pursuit of"negotiations in good
provides for the avoidance of interference with the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
while paragraph 4 provides for the early conclusion of bilateral safeguard agreements between States
Parties and the IAEA in accordance with its Statute (at Appendix ll).
25

The United States, nevertheless, declared in 1967 that its nuclear sites which are not of vital
national interest would be subject to inspection under the terms of the IAEA Statute. International
negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1969). Washington, DC:
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At p. 177.
The US has taken some steps towards bring its nuclear regulations into line with IAEA practices in
respect of the physical protection of nuclear materials. In 1978 its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act made
adequate physical protection a condition of nuclear export licenses and agreements for cooperation.
Nuclear arms control: Background and issues. (1985). Washington, D.C.: Committee on International
Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences. At p. 250.
26

The security guarantees which were made by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union to non-nuclear weapon states which are Party to the NPT, and the parallel Declarations
appended to Security Council Resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 were also made in the spirit of the
principle of mutual responsibility. They were reinforced by positive and negative Security Declarations
made by (then) all five declared nuclear weapon states at the conclusion of the 1995 New York
Conference on the Indefinite Extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. These states will,
according to their Declaration:
(a)" .... provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear
weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an
act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons are used" [UN. Docs.
S/1995/261-265], and
(b) " .... will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on [the
United States], its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it
has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear weapon State in association
or alliance with a nuclear weapon State" [U.N. Doc. A/50/153 (1995)].
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faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date," and to nuclear disarmament combined with "a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control" has been widely
regarded by non-nuclear weapon states as lacking

~redibility,

both during and

following the Cold War period. 27 The NPT has been far more successful in limiting
so-called "horizontal" proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons to previously
non-nuclear weapon states) than it has in limiting the "vertical" proliferation evident
in the nuclear overkill capacity of the declared nuclear weapon states. This
continues to be the case at the beginning of the new century_28
Fifth, Article VII expressly acknowledges the final principle of UN General
Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX). Using language similar to that used in the
Resolution, it avoids any possible interference with the ability of groups of states to
conclude regional agreements which totally ban nuclear weapons from their
collective territories. The negotiation of the three regional "nuclear-free zone"
treaties is evidence of the success of this Article_29

27

0ne example of such sentiment is the observation by Feld that "The breakdown of nuclear arms
control negotiations is generally taken as prima facie evidence of the failure of the superpowers to live
up to their end of[their Article VI] obligation .... " Feld, B. (1984). Public opinion and arms control. In
J. Rotblat & S. Hellman (Eds.), Nuclear strategy and world security: Annals of Pugwash 1984 (pp.
343-347). Houndmills: Macmillan. At p. 346.
In a general sense, much progress in nuclear arms reduction efforts has accompanied the end of the
Cold War, although the nuclear weapon reduction targets set by the START II Treaty between the
United States and (now) Russia is limited by the capacity of each to destroy nuclear warheads
(estimated at between 1,500 and 2,000 each year). It has been estimated that those target levels will
not be reached until 2010 at the earliest, seven years after the treaty is expected to come into force.
Clements, K. P. (1994/95). Imagining a world without nuclear weapons: Moving beyond the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Current Affairs Bulletin, (1994-1995), 4-10. At p. 7.
28

In 1984, at the height of the United States Reagan Administration's military spending-based
challenge to the Soviet Union, the United States and the Soviet Union were estimated to have a
combined nuclear arsenal with explosive power equal to four tonnes of TNT for each inhabitant of the
Earth. Ahmad, I. (1984). Impact of the global arms race on prospects for development. In J. Rotblat &
S. Hellman (Eds.), Nuclear strategy and world security: Annals of Pugwash 1984 (pp. 328-340).
Houndmills: Macmillan. At p. 328.
29

The three regional treaties which have now been concluded, establishing nuclear-free zones in wide
regional areas, are: the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco [634 UNTS 231] (Latin America and the Caribbean);
the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga [24 JIM 1440 (1986)] (the South Pacific); and the 1996 Treaty of
Pelindaba [Opened for signature on 11 April 1996 at Cairo, Egypt: UN Doc. AIRES/50/78 (1995)]
(Africa).
Several proposals have been made in recent years, under the aegis of the United Nations, calling for
nuclear free zones to be established in the Middle East and South Asia. Goldblat, J. (1994). Arms
control: A guide to negotiations and agreements. London: Sage. At pp. 157, 158.
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Sixth, the amendment and review procedures of the NPT (contained in
Article VITI) is an attempt to introduce a measure of flexibility into the operation of
the Treaty through explicit mechanisms for revising its terms. In so doing, it seeks to
sustain the Treaty's effectiveness, while ensuring

i~s

continued acceptability and

"workability" through rigorous voting requirements - as expressed in the fourth
principle incorporated in UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX) noted above. It may be
observed, however, that no amendment to the treaty has ever been successfully
proposed or accepted. 30
Finally, it can be argued that Article X again creates a structural loop-hole
for States Parties seeking to avoid its strictures. The ability of states to withdraw
from the Treaty pursuant to the express provisions of Article X (with only three
months notice, and on the basis of"extraordinary events ... [which have] jeopardized
[its] supreme interests") is not a feature calculated to encourage the durability of
continued accessionY However, the objective customary rule in international law
rebus sic stantibus ("things remaining as they are") conditions the continuing

adherence of States Parties to all treaties. Thus, a fundamental change of
circumstances surrounding the operation of a treaty is sufficient grounds, m
customary law, for a State Party to withdraw at any time. To this extent, the
withdrawal provisions of Article X may be considered redundant. 32
30

Article VITI requires any amendment to be approved by a majority of States Parties, that majority to
include all five declared nuclear weapon states, and those states which, on the date the amendment is
circulated, are members of the Board of Governors ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency.
31

The success of an NPT devoid of such an "escape" clause, when compared to the actual treaty, is
open to conjecture. Many states may not have been prepared to accede to the NPT without the
assurance of renunciation afforded by Article X. In practice, the threat of withdrawal may result in the
application of extreme political and economic pressures by other States Parties on the recalcitrant
state. The decision of the Democratic People's Republic ofKorea (North Korea) to withdraw from the
NPT, given to the UN Security Council on 12 March 1993, resulted in severe political and economic
pressures being placed on it, both unilaterally by the United States, and in the fora of the UN. The
result was the Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea of 21 October 1994, in which
North Korea stated that it would remain a Party to the NPT, and allow implementation of its
safeguards agreement, negotiated with the IAEA under the terms of the Treaty. 1996 Inventory of
international nonproliferation organizations and regimes (1996). Monterey, CA: Center for
Nonproliferation
Studies.
[on-line].
Available
WWW:
http://cns.miis.edu/cns/inventory96/globalorg.htrnl .
32

The customary rule on treaty withdrawal was codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties which, although it does not have retroactive effect (pursuant to Article 4 of the Convention)
nevertheless serves to strongly reinforce and advance the customary international law on treaties, of
which the rule rebus sic stantibus forms a part [1155 UNTS 331; 8 JIM 619 (1969)].
I
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From a more general perspective, two important and unavoidable structural
weaknesses for non-proliferation efforts combine to undermine the prima facie
effectiveness of the NPT which, in retrospect, has succeeded in its aims far better
than their presence suggests.
First, the possession by any state of peacefully-directed nuclear technology
(primarily for large-scale electrical power generation) immediately confers on it a
latent capacity covertly to redirect a portion of its nuclear power programme
towards weapons manufacture. Such a capability is a direct challenge to any
pragmatic expectation of an effective treaty, a principle which was seen by
Resolution 2028 as a fundamental prerequisite to successful conclusion of the NPT.
A state's success in this endeavour will depend on a number of factors, such
as its economic, financial and industrial capacity, and the availability to it of all
necessary components of the nuclear fuel cycle. Nevertheless, once acquired,
nuclear technology and expertise cannot readily or easily be removed or eradicated.
In these circumstances, the only substantial barrier preventing conversion of nuclear
power generating technology into weapons of war, as Article III of the NPT seeks to
do, is a state's obligations under its agreements with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA)_33
The ability of the IAEA, the pnmary independent nuclear regulatory
authority within the United Nations system, successfully to discharge its safeguard
responsibilities under the NPT is, of course, dependent on the cooperation of all
subject states. With limited inspection resources, and no specifically coercive
function, the Agency's regulatory success has been mixed. Although a programme to
33

Article ill, Paragraph 4 of the NPT requires States Parties to the NPT to conclude agreements,
either individually or together with other states, with the IAEA in accordance with its Statute (1957,
IAEA, Vienna). Article ill of the Statute of the IAEA establishes the agency's main functions thus:

(a) Assist research, development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
(b) Make provision for relevant materials, services, equipment and facilities, with due consideration
for the needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world.
(c) Foster the exchange of scientific and technical information and to encourage the training of
experts in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.
(d) Administer safeguards designed to ensure that relevant materials, equipment and information are
not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.
(e) Establish standard of safety for the protection of health and the minimisation of danger to life and
property.
See Appendix ill. Goldblat, J. (1994). Arms control: A guide to negotiations and agreements.
London: Sage. At p. 33.
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strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of full-scope safeguards is now in place,
the IAEA' s most prominent failure has been its inability even to detect Iraq's
large-scale nuclear weapons development programme in the period leading up to the
1991 GulfWar. 34
Second, the NPT does nothing to prohibit a state from developing the
capacity to produce and stockpile the fissionable materials needed for nuclear
weapons from its own resources, as a by-product of its own, indigenously developed
nuclear power generation industry or covert military nuclear programme. Having
accumulated stocks of plutonium or enriched uranium without outside assistance
and given notice of withdrawal pursuant to Article X, paragraph 1 of the treaty, such
a non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty (notwithstanding the political and
economic consequences of its actions) need never be more than three months away
from legal and credible nuclear weapon status. 35

In summary, the NPT can be characterised as only partially successful in meeting

the principles laid down in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2028
(XX). While it establishes a framework of mutual responsibilities and obligations, it
does so on a discriminatory basis. Then, having established the primacy of nuclear

34

The programme, known as "Programme 93 + 2" was instituted by the Board of Governors of the
IAEA in its June, 1993 session. 1996 inventory of international nonproliferation organizations and
regimes. (1996). Monterey Center for nonproliferation studies. [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://cns.miis.edu/cns/inventory96/globalorg.html .
Although Iraq accepted IAEA inspection of its declared nuclear sites prior to the war, the Agency's
systems and procedures failed to reveal the existence of a large and advanced covert nuclear weapons
programme. Western allied intelligence and surveillance resources fared no better. Rathjens, G.
(1998). Nuclear proliferation following the NPT extension. In RG.C. Thomas (Ed.), The nuclear
non-proliferation regime: Prospects for the 21st century. (pp. 25-40). Houndmills: Macmillan. At p.
29.
35

/bid. At pp. 26, 27. The ability of states to gather the technical capacity and fissionable materials
necessary to assemble nuclear devices, without actually producing them, was less widespread in 1968
than it is today. Uranium highly enriched in its fissionable isotope U235, and metallic plutonium are the
key nuclear fuel materials used for constructing explosive nuclear devices. Japan is one example of a
state which has acquired significant stocks of high-grade plutonium beyond its requirements for energy
generation. Its large-scale imports of re-processed spent reactor fuel contain sufficient fissionable
material (grading between 60% and 80% Pu239) to be usable in explosive devices, and they can be
readily purified, if necessary, to even higher grades. This has led to speculation about Japan's possible
preparation for nuclear weapons production, which it could accomplish, from a technical point of
view, within a short time frame. Imai, R. (1998). Japan's nuclear policy: Reflections on the immediate
past, prognosis for the 21st century. In RG.C. Thomas (Ed .. ), The m1clear non-proliferation regime:
Prospects for the 21st century (pp. 181-206). Houndmills: Macmillan. At pp. 194-198.
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weapon states, it confers on them the ability legally to position and control nuclear
weapons on the territory of non-nuclear allies.
Moreover, its efficacy is, in too large part, dependent on the good faith of
States Parties to its terms (as, of course, is the case for _all conventional international
law instruments). Nevertheless, over-dependence on good faith in matters of nuclear
weapons proliferation is an extremely dangerous path, especially as more states (and
even sub-state and non-state actors) gather the expertise necessary for independent
nuclear weapons development.
Again, while the NPT contains provision for review and amendment, the five
yearly Review Conferences established under Article VIII, paragraph 3, and the
1995 Review and Extension Conference foreshadowed in Article X, paragraph 2,
have not resulted in amendments of any kind. 36
Finally, the goal of total and rapid nuclear disarmament (to be completed
through a Nuclear Weapon Convention similar to the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention?7 called for in Article VI has manifestly failed to be achieved.

In general terms, however - and notwithstanding its deficiencies - the NPT
still carries the attribute and cachet of durability. With the burden of a text
unchanged over thirty-three years of rapid change, it continues as the most important
international law instrument (and as the progenitor of a political regime of
understandings and accommodations) now available to the international community
to enhance its anti-proliferation efforts. Its most important single virtue is the fact
that no alternative universal, and demonstrably sustainable mechanism exists, or is
likely to be developed, in the foreseeable future.

36

The need for amendments to the NPT in light of the many diverse and fundamental geopolitical and
technological changes which have occurred since 1968 is discussed below.

37

1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. [Misc. 21 (1993) Cm. 2331; 32 JLM800].
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The NPT and the Role of Perceptions
Since 1968, both the provisions of the Treaty itself, and the broad and profound
changes evident in the institutions and structures of. inter-state relationships, have
exerted significant influence over perceptions of its aims and objectives, its
successes and failures, and the need for amendments to its provisions.
Two contrasting models have been proposed as alternative methods of arms
control treaty evolution. 38 This dichotomy characterises as "explicit" the influence
of the terms of the Treaty itself on expectations

h~ld

for it by states and other

international legal persons (such as inter-governmental and non-governmental
organisations like the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute).
By contrast, "implicit" methods of treaty evolution emphasise interpretations
of the instrument by States Parties, based on their own understanding of its terms,
and their development of subsequent practice based on changing national interests. 39
The provisions of the NPT which fit the former category are those provisions which:
(a) Call for an early cessation of the nuclear arms race, and negotiation of a general
and complete disarmament treaty under strict and effective international control
(Article VI).
(b) Require the holding of Review and Extension Conferences (Articles VIII,
paragraph 3 and X, paragraph 2).
(c) Specify an arrangement for amendments to the Treaty (Article VIII, paragraphs 1
and 2).
(d) Specify the terms under which any State Party may withdraw from the Treaty
(Article X, paragraph 1). 40
38

0p. cit. At Note 3. Ipsen, K.: Symposium Paper: Explicit methods of arms control treaty evolution.
At pp. 76 ff.
39

/bid.

40

/bid.
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Each exerts "explicit" influence on the ways in which perceptions of the Treaty's
aims have developed since its inception. As both substantive and procedural rules,
they state

th~

methods by which peaceful change may be effected within the legal

order they inhabit. 41 By creating an operative

fra~ework

for the NPT, these

provisions lay out for States Parties the ways in which they can expect to contribute
to its incremental change and development, as deficiencies and shortcomings
become apparent.
They also provide assurance to the non-nuclear weapon states, and especially
to the many of them which were not allied to major power blocs (or possessed little
influence over the major Powers) that change was possible in the face of opposition
from the five declared nuclear weapon states.
These arrangements, though they may have been incontrovertible and
indispensable in 1968, later became more questionable in light of subsequent
experience of their operation. They were increasingly seen as tending more to
constrain, rather than promote, the aims of the Treaty. 42
Thus, the provisions of Article VI are now viewed less as a firm commitment
by the nuclear weapon states to all other States Parties, and more as a concession
whose deliverance continues as a distant normative element of the non-proliferation
regime. Again, experience with the Review and Extension Conference requirements
of Articles VIII and X has redefmed their purposes, and expectations for their
achievements, in ways differing significantly from those originally envisaged.
It is this more "implicit" mode of evolution which has come to dominate the

practical operation of the NPT, and to have driven the development of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime which surrounds it. Moreover, it has complemented the
emphasis placed by States Parties on the interpretation of the terms of a multilateral
treaty which was to prove impossible to formally amend.
41

The relationship between procedural and substantive rules in a system of rules (or laws) is addressed
by Hart, who criticises the international system for its emphasis on substantive "primary" rules, to the
detriment of "secondary" procedural rules which allow a law to be modified through subsequent
legislation and the decisions of courts. Hart, H.L.A. (1961). The concept of law. Oxford: OUP. At p.
209.
42

/bid The refusal of States Parties to the NPT to allow the People's Democratic Republic of Korea
to withdraw from the treaty pursuant to Article X ( 1) is one example of the evolution of an explicit
provision from de jure substance to de facto irrelevance. At Note 31. A second is the fact that the
restrictive and complex amendment provisions of Article VITI (1) and (2) have never been used.
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Three distinct phases, at least in respect of global geopolitical evolution, can be
identified as discrete components in an understanding of the development of
expectations surrounding the operation of the NPT. 43 These are:
•

The era of "Detente" in East-West relations from the mid-1960s to the
mid-1970s, distinguished by pragmatic political accommodation, and by a
degree of diplomatic compromise.

•

The so-called "Second Cold War" period of the Reagan Presidency during the
1980s, characterised by neo-realist considerations of national interest, and
burgeoning defence spending.

•

The post-Cold-War decade of rapid change from 1989. 44

Each period has seen a broad re-evaluation of the role of international law in the
field of arms control, and in particular of one of its core conventional components,
the NPT. This is not to suggest, however, that the fundamental precepts and
practices of international law (such as the maxim pacta sunt servanda, and the
principles of state sovereignty and immunity) are in some way contingent on the
tenets of Realpolitik. Rather, it is to contend that, especially in those areas of
international concern which are not "regulat[ed] by adequate and predictable
rules,"45 such as international security, peace and war, wide consensus among the
43

The expectations placed on the operation of the NPT, and the ways in which they have altered over
time, is the central variable in any analysis of the development of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
It may be noted that the total number of nuclear warheads in the possession of all nuclear powers
rose from 6,737 in 1968 to 31,718 in 1990, at the conclusion of the Cold War. This is a crude, yet
indisputable measure of the limited effectiveness of the NPT as an instrument in international law.
Paul, T.V. (1998). The NPT and power transitions in the international system. In R.G.C. Thomas
(Ed.), The nuclear non-proliferation regime: Prospects for the 21st century (pp. 56-74). Houndmills:
Macmillan. At p. 58.
44

Sanders provides an overview of the development of the relations of the United States and the
Soviet Union in regard to nuclear proliferation "from open hostility through grudging interaction to
active cooperation." Sanders, B. (1990). The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
and the relations between the superpowers. In M.P. Fry, N. P. Keatinge, & J. Rotblat (Eds.), Nuclear
non-proliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (pp. 80-90). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Clements broadly analyses the nature of nuclear non-proliferation, from a global perspective, at the
mid-point of the nineteen-nineties. Op. cit. At Note 27.

45

Dahlitz, J. (1983). Nuclear arms control with effective international agreements. Melbourne:
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society of states about the relevance and efficacy of aspects of international law and
its application to problems will always be difficult. 46
That this is so becomes more easily understood in view of the particular
nature of arms control treaties, namely their

invocatio~

of limitations on the right of

states to arm themselves, and thus the ability of such treaties to "strike at the very
existence of states. "47

"Detente"

Examining more closely the periodisation proposed above, the early "Detente"
period of operation of the NPT corresponds to that referred to by Akashi as "the
'productive period' "between 1967 and 1974, when a number of multilateral and
bilateral arms control Agreements and Treaties were negotiated. 48
The NPT can be viewed as a component of the increasing scope and focus of
arms control measures which characterises this period. In particular, the European
McPhee Gribble. At Chapter 5, p. 90.
46

Ibid. At pp 90, 99. Dahlitz points to the dichotomy evident in the "adequate" response of
international law to less controversial areas of international concern (such as maritime law, civil
aviation, diplomatic law, communications, and commercial transactions) when compared to its
performance in respect of"international security, peace and war."

47

Lysen, G. (1990). The international regulation of armaments: The law of disarmament. Uppsala:
Iustus Forlag. At p. 145.
48

Supra. At Note 3. Yosushi Akashi, in 1991 the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs, referred, in his Address to the Formal Plenary Session of the Symposium, to
agreements which were focused on:
(a) Preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other mass destruction capabilities which did
not yet exist, and
(b) Preventing the deployment of mass destruction weapons where they had not yet been deployed ..
Atp.17.
Among the most significant arms control measures during this period (extended back to 1963) are:
(i) The 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water [480 UNTS 43].
(ii) The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation ofAnti-Ballistic Missile Systems [944 UNTS 13].
(iii) The 1972 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction [1015 UNTS 163].
(iv) The 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement.
For an early, yet pessimistic, appreciation of the ability of the NPT to discourage nuclear
proliferation see: Quester, G. H. (1973). The politics of nuclear proliferation. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
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nuclear accord between the United States and the Soviet Union, founded on the
bargain of American sovereign control over NATO-based nuclear weapons (offered
in exchange for Soviet acquiescence to NATO nuclear planning) ultimately made
the negotiation of the NPT possible. 49 It also answered_the long-standing calls made
by many smaller and non-aligned states for a commitment by the nuclear weapons
states - in effect, the United States and the Soviet Union - to curbs on proliferation,
and ensured the support of the allies of both Superpowers for a multilateral
non-proliferation treaty. 50
Here, then, was the early period of optimism; a_time during which the relief
felt towards a non-proliferation treaty finally concluded overshadowed, for most
states, their disquiet at having renounced, in international law, any resort to nuclear
weapons in defence of their political independence, territorial integrity, and,
ultimately, their very existence. 51
Nevertheless, they now convened the 1968 Conference of Non-Nuclear
Weapon States, almost immediately following the opening for signature of the NPT.

Through this mechanism, the group of ninety-six state participants attempted to
satisfy their concerns about the implementation of its terms. 52
4

~addock suggests that US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William Foster had, in
early 1964, identified the NATO proposal for a "Multilateral Force" (MLF) as the most significant
obstacle to a US/USSR accord on nuclear proliferation. The MLF was to be a force of nuclear
missile-armed naval vessels, stationed in the North Atlantic ocean and manned by crews drawn from
all the NATO states. This was unacceptable to the Soviet Union on the ground that it would constitute
proliferation of control over nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. Its demise cleared the
way for the eventual negotiation of the NPT. Maddock, S. J. (1997). The nth country conundrum: The
American and Soviet quest for nuclear nonproliferation 1945-1970. (Doctoral Dissertation, The
University of Connecticut). Dissertation Abstracts International, 58, 06A At Chapter X, especially
pp. 424-445.
5

~pstein, W. (1976). The last chance: Nuclear proliferation and arms control. New York: The Free
Press. At p. 121. This work is a precursor of many later attempts, during the 1980s, to analyse the
declining influence of the NPT during that decade, together with the dangers inherent in the
burgeoning nuclear confrontation between the two Superpowers.
51

The corollary of this compromise was the widespread call for specific security assurances from the
nuclear weapon states, answered by the three co-sponsors of the NPT through Resolution 255 of the
UN Security Council, following its opening for signature [UN Doc. S/RES/255 (1968)].
52

The Conference had its origins in UN General Assembly Resolution 2153 (XXI) of 17 November
1966, calling for a Conference of non-nuclear states to consider, well before the conclusion of the text
of the NPT, the questions of the security of non-nuclear states, nuclear proliferation, and the peaceful
use of nuclear explosives. It convened at Geneva, Switzerland, from 29 August to 28 September,
1968.
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Conference Resolutions ranged widely over a complexity of issues
surrounding the strength of security assurances by nuclear weapon states, eventual
nuclear disarmament, nuclear safeguard arrangements, and the peaceful use of
nuclear energy. 53 In this way, the majority of future no:p.-riuclear States Parties made
plain to the nuclear weapon states their views on the deficiencies they perceived as
inherent in the Treaty. In practice, however, this strong beginning did not lead to a
shift towards greater balance between the two sides of the nuclear divide.
The failure of the General Assembly to implement Conference decisions in
its aftermath reflected both a fragmentation of views among the non-nuclear states,
and a fundamental lack of interest by the nuclear powers in matters of security
assurances and nuclear disarmament. 54 As a result, and in conjunction with the
continuing interest of some developed, non-nuclear weapon states in nuclear
armaments, the early enthusiasm for the NPT as global saviour, and complacency
about its more obvious deficiencies, was quickly lost. Among such states were
Australia, Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany, each having been capable
since the early 1960s, both financially and technically, of developing nuclear
weapons within a short period of time. 55
The 1974 "peaceful" explosion of a nuclear device by India was also the
source of a growing focus on the efforts of countries such as Pakistan to obtain
allegedly commercial nuclear fuel processing plants which were later revealed as
intended for nuclear explosive programmes. 56

53

Supra. At Note 47, pp. 126-134.

54

Ibid..

55

Meyer, S. M. (1984). The dynamics of nuclear proliferation. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press. At p. 41. Other "threshold" states able, in 1968, to produce nuclear weapons within five years,
included Italy, India and Japan and Switzerland. See Table 1, Chapter Six.
56

Ibid. At pp. 15, 16. One reaction was the formation in 197 5 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (also
known as the London Suppliers Group) of nuclear material exporting states. The 30-member group
has as its goal the export of nuclear materials only under appropriate safeguards, physical protection
and non-proliferaton conditions, and the restriction of sensitive exports (such as nuclear trigger
devices) which are likely to enhance the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
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The "Second Cold War"

The first important change in fundamental perceptions about the NPT began during
_. the early years of the so-called "Second Cold War" .period of the Reagan -Bush
Administrations from 1981 to 1993. The decline of hopes for the NPT as a dynamic
bulwark against nuclear proliferation, held by many states, was confirmed and given
_

form in the rising nuclear tensions evident between the United States, the Soviet
Union, and their respective allies. 57 The result was a deep and sustained crisis for
non-proliferation policy on both sides of the ideological divide, and severe atrophy
of legitimate expectations of its ability to limit the spread of nuclear technology
applied to weapons development. 58
Although an effective NPT

~-

•··

~emained

an essential part of the strategic

planning of both Superpowers, cooperation between them to limit the abilities and
aspirations of potential regional nuclear states (such as North Korea and Iraq)
declined, even though this carried with it the risk of destabilising their deterrent
structure.
The most senous consequence of this development was an increasing
propensity for some states to look to the future by laying the technological
foundations for the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the missiles with
which to deliver them. This move was accompanied by the emergence of so-called
"opaque" nuclear proliferation, or covert, unacknowledged but substantial progress
towards (and achievement of) nuclear weapons acquisition.
As Thayer points out, a state which does not clearly violate its obligations
under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and regime avoids offending against an
international political norm. It is therefore unlikely to be held to account in the
absence of incontrovertible evidence of its violation. 59 Iraq faced the Desert Storm

51

0p. cit. At Note 43.

58

Davydov, V. (1990). The US-USSR relationship and its likely impact on nuclear proliferation. In M.
P. Fry, N. P. Keatinge, & J. Rotblat (Eds.), Nuclear non-proliferation and the Non-proliferation
Treaty (pp. 91-94). At pp. 92, 93. Berlin: Springer- Verlag.
59

0p. cit. At Note 44. B.A. Thayer, The causes of nuclear proliferation and the utility of the
non-proliferation regime (pp. 75-129). At pp. 105, 106.
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operations of a disparate Coalition of states in 1991 as a result of its ground invasion
of the sovereign state of Kuwait, and not as a reaction to its nuclear ambitions.
Nor was covert nuclear proliferation limited in the nineteen eighties to the
Iraqi case. India, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea_ and Israel all either acquired
nuclear weapons clandestinely during the so-called "Second Cold War" period
under review, or were preparing to do so. Since then, only South Africa, as its
apartheid policies unravelled, has renounced and destroyed the six devices it

acknowledged having built. 60
In general terms, the period can be characterised as one in which the NPT
was widely perceived to be in a state of stagnation. The majority of states, while not
harbouring nuclear ambitions of their own, looked to one or other Superpower for
nuclear protection, either as an ally, or through the security assurances made by
them to States Parties to the NPT. Their faith in a stable and secure future was
largely based on the stability of the nuclear deterrence postures of the United States
and the Soviet Union, which they expected to endure for many years. It would not be
secured solely through the effective operation of a multilateral nuclear weapons
bargain, however legitimate it may be in international law.
Meanwhile, a small minority of states, such as South Africa, Israel, India and
Pakistan, continued on their path to independent nuclear status outside the nuclear
non-proliferation regime. 61 Both groups were to be affected, as were all states and
actors within the nuclear non-proliferation regime, by the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and the period of power transition in the international system which that
event initiated.

The Post Cold War Period

The period of over twelve years which has now elapsed smce the sudden
disintegration of the Soviet Union as a political unit within the society of states
cannot be analysed merely as an extension beyond its two predecessors, at least in
60

Loc. cit. At Note 35, pp. 196, 197.

61

0p. cit. At Note 43. Merlini, C. (1990). The US-USSR relationship and its likely impact on nuclear
proliferation. (pp. 95-118). At pp. 106, 107.
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respect of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Rather, it must be regarded as the
beginning of a new era in the development of global nuclear non-proliferation
efforts, in terms both of the NPT in its present form, and alternative evolutionary
paths - either through amendments to the terms. of the Treaty, or regime
development outside the scope ofblack-letter international law.
Towards the mid-point of the period, the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference, held in New York in April and May of that year, agreed to extend the
NPT, unchanged and indefinitely, while retaining the continuity of five-yearly
Review Conferences. 62 Notwithstanding attempts by some states to make
completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and fissile material
"Cut-Off' Treaty conditions for renewal of the NPT, its indefinite extension was a
watershed for nuclear non-proliferation. 63 In simple terms, the regime surrounding
the Treaty had, by 1995, gained sufficient authority and support that states, whatever
their individual circumstances, were not prepared to take a leap into the dark by
allowing the NPT to dissolve.
The risks inherent in a world without the keystone of a nuclear
non-proliferation treaty were, in the end, seen as too high. Nevertheless, the paradox
of unlimited extension of an outdated and fundamentally flawed multilateral nuclear
treaty, in a world of rapid and unpredictable nuclear change, is one which awaits
further study. From a practical diplomatic point of view, its extension may have
been the only possible outcome.
In these circumstances, the future of the NPT must be subject to doubt on the
grounds that effective arms control treaties which are not capable of amendment to
address changing political realities, or are in a form which is not readily amenable to
authoritative or timely interpretation and adjudication, may become useless. 64
62

The Conference decided to make the five-yearly reviews automatic, starting with the year 2000,
instead of relying on a resolution of each Review Conference to mandate its successor, as was
previously the case. Preparatory Conferences are to be held in each of the three years preceding the
five-yearly Review Conferences, effectively establishing an almost continuous review process.
Cirincione, J. (1999). A new beginning for the NPT. Disarmament Diplomacy, 13 [on-line]. Available:
www: http://www.acronym.org.uk/13npt.htm .
63

New realities: Disarmament, peace-building and global security. (1993). New York: UN Office for
Disarmament Affairs, Disarmament Information Programme. At p. 209.
64

Dahlitz has addressed the problems of the legal adjudication of disputes in the International Court of
Justice. She concludes that grave problems exist for the Court's endeavours in matters involving
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The Status of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is an idea, a standard, and an aspiration. It is
both a matrix of international law instruments and a political accommodation, both
an indispensable international reality and (in the eyes of some) a flawed and
dangerous security gamble. 65 As discussed in the

Introduct~on

to this Chapter, it

works to create norms of behaviour for all agents in the nuclear field, whether they
are engaged in the generation of electricity, or the fabrication of explosive devices;
in safeguarding the peaceful application of nuclear. technology from diversion
towards war, or in exporting material and expertise equally efficient in either
endeavour.
The regime cannot confidently be ignored by any state, non-governmental
organisation (NGO), or inter-governmental organisation (IGO). Nor can individuals
and institutions with nuclear influence and decision-making powers inside the
so-called "black box" of the state66 afford to disregard the global consequences of
actions which offend its principles and benchmarks, many of which have been
gradually accumulated over a period of thirty years and more. From this perspective,
nuclear anns control. Important among these are the "cumbersome" nature of international judicial
machinery, the haphazard nature of decisions needed to activate the process, and the unavoidable fact
that the Court lacks sufficient authority to make decisions in the anns control arena which states will
readily accept. Dahlitz, J. (1983). Nuclear arms control with effective international agreements.
Melbourne: McPhee Gribble. At p. 112.
65

0ne of the most strident critics of the NPT and its regime has been K. Subramanyam, who has
characterised them thus:
.... measure[s] to legitimize the nuclear arsenals of the five nuclear weapon powers, to license
further unlimited proliferation quantitatively, qualitatively and spatially and give them
hegemony over the development of nuclear technology in the developing world.

Infra. At Note 73 (1982).
66

The term "black box" is used here to connote the international law principle which ascribes opacity
and equality to states which have fulfilled the formal requirements of statehood, as acknowledged by
Article 2, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter: "The Organization is based on the principle of
sovereign equality of all its members." There is much evidence, however, that this principle is eroding,
in the face of considerable resistance from states, at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The
principle catalyst has been identified by Slaughter as "global governance," in which the pre-eminence
of the state is being to some degree undermined by supra-state, sub-state, and non-state actors. The
result, she asserts, is "cooperative problem-solving," which results in a network of linkages between,
for example, Microsoft, the Roman Catholic Church, and Amnesty International, as well as, to take
another example, the European Union, the United Nations, and Catalonia. Slaughter, A.M. (1997).
TherealNewWorldOrder.ForeignA.ffairs, 76(5), 183-197. At 183,184.
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the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation regime
are functionally indistinguishable, being - for all practical and analytical purposes two sides of the same coin.
Those who have objected to the treaty and regime most often point to the
obvious and indisputable fact that it entrenches discrimination between states; the
privileges of the nuclear weapon "haves", all with permanent member status at the
UN Security Council (with veto powers) are distinguished from all nuclear "have
nots," without veto powers, or a legal nuclear weapon option. Conversely, the states
which champion the treaty and its regime are united in their conviction that, in the
end, the world had no realistic alternative to a bargain in which easier and cheaper
access to nuclear technology must be balanced against strict enforcement of the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 67
While the latter proposition had considerable merit during the Cold War
decades, when the pre-eminent global security imperative was the stable yet
confrontational relationship between the two nuclear superpowers, it has less
credibility at the beginning of the new millennium.

Post Cold War Change
Two events have combined to change the nature of the nuclear non-proliferation
regime in fundamental and permanent ways. These are the end of the Cold War in
1989, as the Soviet Union collapsed, and the perceived need- in the period leading
up to 1995 -to extend the NPT indefinitely. 68 In addition, the environmental social
movement has exerted substantial secondary influence over the nuclear sphere, both
civil and military.
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Pilat, J.F., & Nakhleh, C.W. (1998). A treaty reborn? The NPT after extension. In R.G.C. Thomas
(Ed.), The nuclear non-proliferation regime: Prospects for the 21st century. (pp. 41-55). At pp.
42-45.
68

The possibility of indefinite extension is addressed in Article X, paragraph 2 of the NPT, which
mandates a Conference, twenty-five years after its entry into force, to decide - by a majority of the
States Parties - whether the Treaty will be continue in force indefinitely, or be extended for an
additional period, or periods. Refer to Appendix IT.
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First, the global geopolitical environment was subject to sudden and
irreversible disruption when the Soviet Union failed as a discrete and coherent
political unit. Global stability has been replaced by regional instability,
overwhelming power and influence (exercised primarily by the US and USSR) by
growing indecision and the declining economic, military and diplomatic influence of
the USSR
More specifically, agreement between America and Russia on the need to
restrict the spread of nuclear weapons has been supplanted by uncertainty about the
future role (if any) of nuclear weapons in warfare. As the two strongest nuclear
weapon states reduce their nuclear arsenals, their global influence may erode, to
eventually be replaced by the superpower aspirations of states such as India and
China. 69
No less significantly, global confrontation has been replaced by
regionally-based conflict (with or without a nuclear component), while the
technology and expertise needed to construct both sophisticated and crude nuclear
weapons is ever more widely distributed. 70
Each of these changes has impacted on perceptions of the continuing
adequacy of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as the single defensive
international structure designed to hold back the spread of nuclear weapons into
unstable and politically transitional regions of the world.
The many nuclear arms control and disarmament treaties and agreements
which form the legal identity of the regime - from the early "Exchange of Letters"
on principles for disarmament negotiations between the USA and the USSR of 1961
(the McCloy - Zorin StatementY 1 to on-going negotiations in the Conference on
69

The new nuclear status of India following its three overt nuclear weapons tests during May, 1998
has delivered to it widespread acknowledgment around the world of its putative, if not embryonic,
nuclear superpower status. MacKinnon, I. (1999, May 11) Nuclear glow on Buddha's face. The
Australian, p.9.
10

0p. Cit. At Note 67, pp. 44, 45. The ability of developing states to construct unsophisticated,
though operational, nuclear devices is more widespread as a result of the end of the Cold War, as is
the possibility of theft by individuals and criminal organisations, especially from Russia, and other
peripheral components of the former Soviet Union. Search for 'suitcase' N-bombs. (1997, December
3). The West Australian, p.l.
71

UN Doc. A/RES/1722 (XVI), 20 December 1961.
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Disarmament for a fissile material "Cut-Off' Treaty72 - are each affected in different
ways by the pace of change. At some point, therefore, the changing relationships
between the operation of the various treaties may begin to reduce the ability of the
regime, as a regime, to react effectively to rapidly evolving non-proliferation
emergencies. Thus, for example, increased emphasis on halting the production of
weapons-grade fissile material in developed states could result in insufficient
attention to the horizontal proliferation of weapons technology in less technically
advanced countries.

The second primary influence on the regime during the past decade, which has led
some scholars to refer to it as a "new regime," was its indefinite extension in 1995.
In the years leading up to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, held in New

York from 17 April to 12 May of that year, growing disquiet over the prospects for
renewing the NPT led to a widespread re-evaluation of its importance for the world.
Many governments, international organisations and scholars began to think
about the consequences for nuclear proliferation of allowing the NPT to lapse, and
about mechanisms which might replace it. The result was a wide consensus of alarm
at the possibility of the dissolution of the central pillar of nuclear non-proliferation,
whatever its faults, and the effects of that outcome on other major arms control
regimes. 73
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The Acronym Institute (1999). Continuing stalemate at the CD [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.acronym.org. uk/index.htm .
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Clements, K. P. (1994-1995). Imagining a world without nuclear weapons. Current Affairs Bulletin,
Dec. 1994/ Jan. 1995). 4-10. At 2, 3.
Cf Simpson, J., & Howlett, D. (1994). The NPT renewal conference: Stumbling toward 1995.
International Security, 19 (1), 41-69. Also: Dunn, L. (1990). The collapse of the NPT- What if?. In
J.F. Pilat & R.F. Pendley (Eds.), Beyond 1995: The future of the NPTregime (pp. 27-40) New York:
Plenum; Millar, C. (1995). Non-proliferation Treaty extension a major goal. Insight, 4 (5), 5, 6, 16;
Wilson, M. (1995). Australian interests, policies and future directions. In The nuclear future: Asian
and Australia and the 1995 Conference on Non-Proliferation: Australia- Asia Papers No. 74. (pp.
37-44). Brisbane: Griffith University Faculty of Asian and International Studies, Centre for the Study
of Australia-Asia Relations.
The many discrete deliberative and negotiating bodies within the UN arms control system are
discussed by Goldblat. They are not limited to nuclear disarmament, but address the full range of
conventional armaments, together with other weapons of mass destruction (e.g. chemical and
biological/toxin agents). Goldblat, J. (1982). Agreements for arms control: A critical survey. London:
Taylor & Francis (S.I.P.R.I.).
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Without a successor treaty negotiated on a non-discriminatory basis (or any
prospect of one which included the declared nuclear_ weapon states) the choice for
most States Parties to the NPT became clear. Extend the treaty, .either finitely or
indefinitely, changed or unchanged - or face an uncertain and unstable security
future of the kind confronting the Indian sub-continent.
In the context of growing regional instabilities following the breakdown of

Cold War security structures, the urgency of the need for NPT extension overcame
the resistance of many states seeking redress for their grievances over its perceived
inequities.

The interest shown by many states in nuclear power generation, which peaked
following the quadrupling of the cost <?f crude oil on world markets in 1974, is now
declining as environmental concerns and alternative energy sources become more
apparent. 74
The growing recognition around the world of environmental concerns of all
kinds, from global climate change to biodiversity, from resource depletion to toxin
pollution of food sources, has exerted a powerful influence over the long-term
credibility and sustainability of nuclear power generation. It has also highlighted its
high cost when compared to less controversial (non-polluting and renewable)
technologies, such as those using solar, wind, tidal, hydraulic and geo-thermal
energy sources. 75
Thus, the risks associated with diversion of civilian nuclear technologies to
weapons manufacture will increasingly become less contestable as viable long-tern
74

/bid. The release of large amounts of ionizing radiation from the Chemobyl nuclear power
generating station in the Ukraine, following an explosion in April, 1986, is the best known recent
catalyst for this movement.
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The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has produced an extensive report on
the issues surrounding the continued importance of nuclear power generation in the twenty-first
century. It identifies the accelerating decline of operational nuclear power plants around the world,
especially in the first decade of the new millennium, as an essential element in the engagement of
global energy policies with the economic and environmental trade-offs between nuclear energy and
greenhouse gas-emitting fossil fuels. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
(1998). Nuclear energy in the OECD: Towards an integrated approach: Report by the High Level
Advisory Group on the future of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency to the Secretary-General of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Chapter 3 - Strategic directions and
priorities
of
NEA
actions
[on-line].
Available
WWW:
http://www. oecd. orglsge/documents/nuclearagency .htm .
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alternatives to nuclear power technology become available. They will be replaced by
the less controllable risks inherent in a covert international trade in weapons-grade
fissile material and other weapons technologies. Here, the possibility of credible
threats from irresponsible national leaders, and eve.n criminal organisations and
individuals (who will not be deterred from using nuclear weapons) cannot be
discounted.

The result of the changes discussed above has been a transformation in the character
and future direction of the nuclear non-proliferation problem. States may no longer
usefully be classified as nuclear or non-nuclear weapon states. Rather, in a world in
which every state is able to acquire nuclear explosives, the following classification
is of greater analytical use:

•

States without nuclear weapons, or interest in them.

•

States without nuclear weapons, but with an acknowledged interest in them.

•

States with nuclear weapons, but without an obvious need for them.

•

States with nuclear weapons solely for deterrence against attack.

•

States with nuclear weapons for aggressive use. 76

Using this classification, control over nuclear proliferation through collective
security measures (under the aegis of an effective United Nations organisation)
becomes easier and more effective.
On both the supply and demand sides, those proliferating states, when
identified by their place in this schema, would be less able to disguise their
intentions or actions in the face of UN anti-proliferation efforts. They would also
tend to come under increasing scrutiny from states whose suspicion of covert
proliferation activities would be more readily confirmed by a better financed
International Atomic Energy Agency. The case of Iraq's covert nuclear weapons
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This taxonomy has been suggested, in part, by Rathjens in the context of the need for a "broad
reconsideration" of nuclear proliferation in the opening years of the new millennium. Rathjens, G.
(1998). Nuclear proliferation following the NPT extension. In R.G.C. Thomas (Ed.), The nuclear
non-proliferation regime: Prospects for the 21st century. (pp. 25-40). Houndmills: Macmillan. At pp.
32, 33.
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programme, mentioned above, may, m these circumstances, have followed a
different course.

In summary, three principal roles can be distinguished for the current regime of

non-proliferation: as a legal barrier against nuclear proliferation, as the
manifestation of a norm of non-proliferation, and as a means to build confidence in
non-proliferation through verification of adherence to its provisions. 77 In this way,
the regime demonstrates its universal nature through the complexity of its identity:
as law, as a psychological vector, and as a practical control mechanism.
Formally speaking, it is a legitimate component of conventional (and
customary) public international law on the use of force by states. As an international
arid multilateral security instrument, it creates reciprocal and binding commitments
in law which are subject to interpretation and adjudication in international tribunals,
and which carry the full force of formal obligation in the international sphere.
Second, through support over time by the majority of states, during which
they have expressed their sustained commitment to its provisions at five-yearly
Review Conferences, the regime has created and embodied a norm of nuclear
non-proliferation. In doing so, it has established a so-called "firebreak" between
conventional and nuclear weapons whose breach would entail an illegitimate
contravention of standards of behaviour acceptable to the great majority of
nation-states. 78
States have come to view nuclear weapons as qualitatively distinct from
conventional weapons (and even from chemical and biological weapons). The sheer
power of these devices, and their demonstrated effects on people and property, was
able to construct in the minds of nuclear decision-makers a psychological barrier and perhaps a moral barrier - against their threat or use.
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Scheinman, L. (1990). Does the NPT matter? In J.F. Pilat & R.E. Pendley (Eds.), Beyond 1995: The
future of the NPTregime. (pp. 53-63). New York: Plenum. At p. 55-58.
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Ibid. It is only since the nuclear explosions conducted by Pakistan and India in May 1998 (or
possibly since India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion of 1974) that the taboo against overt breach of the
nuclear "firebreak" has begun to break down. Having commenced, this process may gather pace in the
first decade of the new century.
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Third, since the regime calls for, and applies, comprehensive and transparent
safeguard measures through the work of the

Internat~onal

Atomic Energy Agency,

the Agency is the primary source of mutual confidence in each State Party that all
others are unable covertly to circumvent their legal commitments not to build
nuclear weapons of war. 79 It incorporates, therefore, practical measures which
contribute, in material ways, to restricting the spread of nuclear aggression.
Using these criteria, the regime of nuclear non-proliferation can be
identified, and its central roles described. The widest expression of its mission,
however, remains its place within the wider arms control and disarmament
environment.

Influence on Disarmament Law
As proposed in the Introduction to this Chapter, the two most important aspects of
that mission are its influence on expectations of outcomes for the international law
of arms control and disarmament, and on the structure and status of international
law on the use of force. It is through those relationships that the nuclear
non-proliferation regime exerts its effect on the policies of nation-states.
On the question of the influence of the regime on aspects of the international
law of arms control, its most significant effect may be that it recognises explicitly
that nuclear weapons are legal. By discriminating between nuclear and non-nuclear
weapon states, and by protecting the nuclear status of nuclear weapon states, the
NPT makes plain its intention to include nuclear weapons within the range of
weapons which may be legally used (subject always, of course, to the customary,
conventional and United Nations rules of war).
The force of that intention has been considerably reduced, however, by the
1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons
Case. 80 In that Judgment, the Court concluded, inter alia, that the threat or use of
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35 I.L.M 809 (1996).
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nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international
humanitarian law,81 and that "[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and
bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control". 82
It can be noted that the Court delivered its opinion in spite of argument led

by the United States and the United Kingdom which expressly pointed to the
discriminatory nature of the Treaty as proof of the legality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons. 83 Nevertheless, the continuing central status of the NPT in nuclear
disarmament law and practice confers on it a considerable negative effect over the
ability of other disarmament and arms control laws to work effectively to curb the
use of increasingly efficient high-technology weapons available to the armed forces
of modem developed states.
It may be argued that the core of that influence lies in the fact that the NPT

and its regime has done little, in terms of Article VI, to progress the cause of general
disarmament of the worst of all weapons. Nor has it halted the steady diffusion
around the world of the technology and expertise of nuclear war. As such, therefore,
it is unable to show a clear lead in the development of international law directed at
· the general prohibition of new classes of weapons.
While acknowledging the thrust of this argument, some progress has been
made in the prohibition of weapons widely accepted as prohibited in international
humanitarian law. The recently amended Protocol II on Prohibition or Restriction
on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and other Devices annexed to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which
may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects is an

example of this trend. 84
81

/bid. Paragraph 105 (2) E of the Court's Dispositif Judgment held on the casting vote of the
President of the Courl
82

Ibid. Paragraph 105 (2) F of the Court's Dispositif Judgment held unanimously.
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Hubbard, C. (1997). A critique of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996. Unpublished honours thesis, Edith
Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia. Chapter III: Argument and evidence led by states.
84

Concluded at Geneva, 3 May 1996. Entered into force 3 December 1998. [ATS 17; 35 JIM 1433;
Cm 3581]. Humanitarian law, and the "Hague" rules on the conduct ofwar, have been consolidated in
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions [75 UNTS 3] and their Protocols I and II [1125 UNTS 3 and 1125
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Thus, the influence of the nuclear non-proliferation regime on disarmament,
and on arms control law generally, is mixed. There is no doubt that the NPT itself
has been a qualified success in terms of its explicit aims, and as an example of the
use of international law to limit the excesses of the cdme of war. However, its
deficiencies as a disarmament instrument should be regarded as an incentive for the
society of states to devise better disarmament mechanisms, both in law and
international political relations, aimed at fulfilling the general disarmament
aspirations contained in Article VI.
As an instrument of international law, and in the context of its limitations, it
has advanced the cause of advocates of the law as a practical, self-enforcing rule-set
regulating the use of force between states. Their argument concerning the proven
ability of an example of conventional, black-letter international law to halt the
aggressive use of nuclear weapons after their initial deployment by the US against
Japan is less convincing than the NPT's work in sustaining and advancing
international law for individuals.
The evolution of instruments reflecting concern for the protection of basic
human rights in war - which began at Solferino, and with the first Geneva
Convention of 1864 - has continued through the 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 85 and in many, more recent, treaties.
By the degree of its success in nuclear non-proliferation, the NPT and its

regime has underpinned the consensus of most states that there are methods of
waging war which constitute crimes against humanity. The 1996 Advisory Opinion
of the International Court of Justice in the "Nuclear Weapons Case" has supported
that contention.

UNTS 609 respectively]. The customary law rule on the legality of weapons of war is encapsulated in
Article 22 of the Regulations on Land Warfare annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 [UKTS 9
(1910), Cd. 5030]:
The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.
85

78 UNTS 277.
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Australia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Although the study will address below, and in greater detail, Australia's role in the
negotiation and implementation of the NPT, it is useful here to introduce the context
of its involvement in nuclear matters, and the pattern of its nuclear policy
development from the nineteen fifties to the present day.
As will become evident later in the study, Australia has often been regarded,
by both local and international commentators, as exhibiting an ambivalent (and at
times contradictory) attitude towards nuclear affairs. Since the early nineteen fifties,
the three broad strands of Australia's nuclear policy - its political, economic and
security-based dimensions - have been subject to opposing pressures which compete
for attention, and result in an impression.ofimpaired or absent policy coherence. 86
As a component of the Western Alliance, a treaty ally of the United States
from 1951,87 and a member (at that time) of an important regional security
agreement, the Southeast Asia Collective Security Defense Treaty - SEATO,
Australia has been concerned to accommodate the wishes of its "great and powerful
friends" for support in their attempts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.
At the same time, it has allowed Britain to test nuclear weapons on its
territory, thereby directly assisting the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons only
seven years after their aggressive use over Japan. 88
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Findlay divides the facets of Australian foreign policy in its widest dimension between "political,
security and economic". The study uses this trichotomy as the most useful first-level distinction for
analysis of the components of Australia's nuclear policies. Findlay, T. (1991). Working paper no. 107:
The making of a moral ornament: Australian disarmament and arms control policy 1921-1991.
Canberra: Australian National University, Peace Research Centre. At p. 1.
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The Australian, New Zealand, United States collective security treaty (the ANZUS Treaty) was
signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951.
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The short and long term effects of atomic detonations on the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
were well known to the US, British and Australian governments in the early nineteen fifties through
the work, in Japan, of the US Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission and the British Commonwealth
Occupation Forces (BCOF). Yamazaki, J.N. (1998). The realities of nuclear war: Memories of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In R.G.C. Thomas (Ed.), The nuclear non-proliferation regime: Prospects
for the 21st century (pp. 333 - 350). Houndmills: Macmillan. At pp. 334, 335.
Britain conducted nuclear tests at several sites within Australia from 1952. Walsh, J. (1997).
Surprise down under: The secret history of Australia's nuclear ambitions. The Nonproliferation
Review, 5 (1) [on-line]. Available WWW: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/walsh51.htm. At p. 3.
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Further, Australia has recently been revealed as a persistent, and ultimately
frustrated, prospective purchaser of nuclear weapons from Britain in the period 1956
to 1963- weapons which it intended to keep fully under its national controP9 Again,
from 1964 to 1972, almost until its ratification of .the NPT in January 1973,
Australia took serious steps to secure an option to develop nuclear weapons, using
indigenous resources, within a time frame estimated, in 1968, at between seven and
ten years. 90
Australia signed the NPT on 27 February 1970, but withheld ratification until
January 1973, following the installation in 1972. of the Australian Labor
Government led by Prime Minister E. G. Whitlam. 91
In this context, the advent of a nuclear-armed China in 1964, the accelerating
withdrawal of British forces from the .region, and the later disengagement of the
United States from Vietnam had all combined to increase anxiety about Australia's
strategic security position.
A major component of its nuclear weapons planning was the 1969 proposal
for the construction of a 500 MW nuclear power generation reactor on
Commonwealth territory at Jervis Bay, NSW. Such an installation would be vital in
supplying suitable fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons manufacture.
Construction of the installation was deferred in August, 1971 by the McMahon
Liberal/ Country Party Coalition Government following the removal from office of
the former Coalition Prime Minister, John Gorton (a nuclear advocate) and never
revived. Its fate was sealed by the election of E. G. Whitlam's Labor Government in
1972. 92
A further dimension of Australia's nuclear policy throughout the post-war
period has been its uranium export industry. With a resource estimated at around 30
89

/bid. (1997). At pp. 2-12. See also: Reynolds, W. (2000). Australia's bid for the atomic bomb.
Carlton South: Melbourne University Press.
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Australian Archives Document A 1838/346: TS 919/10/5 Pt. 4. (March, 1968). Practicability of
Australian Independent Capability. Department of External Affairs. At p. 212.
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Carr, M. (1979). Australia and the nuclear question: A survey of government attitudes, 1945 to
1975. Unpublished Masters thesis, University ofNew South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales. At pp.
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per cent of the world's reserves of readily extractable uranium ore, Australia, it
appears, has been unable to ignore the substantial

econo~ic

benefits available from

mining, milling and exporting uranium. From 1944, when the British government
asked Prime Minister Curtin to initiate uranium prospe_cting in South Australia with an option on any uranium produced - to the present large-scale mining, milling
and exporting operations, Australia has been an important source of uranium
feedstock for both civilian and military nuclear programmes worldwide. 93
Although exports of uranium oxide ("yellow-cake") are regulated through
Australia's bilateral safeguards agreements with client states, as well as through
Australia's IAEA safeguards obligations, periodic doubts have been expressed about
the strength ofthe non-proliferation security they afford. 94
Finally, Australia has, from 1972,_ been a consistent and active proponent of
nuclear disarmament and arms control in many international fora. Australia has been
able, within specific limits, to influence the course of arms control and nuclear
non-proliferation to a degree far greater than its world position would suggest,
having begun its conversion from nuclear aspirant to non-proliferation activist
during the NPT negotiation phase. 95

Conclusion
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and its penumbra of understandings,
agreements and arms control treaties, is the single most important component of
international law on nuclear arms control. It forms the central pillar which supports
93

/bid. At pp. 17, 18.
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The high point, in recent years, of Australia's nuclear activism was the publication of the Report of
the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in August 1996. A group of 17
distinguished persons with vast experience and expertise in the field of nuclear arms control, the
Commission presented a pragmatic programme of incremental steps designed to result in phased
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around the world. Canberra Commission on the Elimination ofNuclear Weapons (1996). Report of the
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and reinforces a range of subsidiary, but vital, treaties, agreements and
understandings in this most significant and difficult area of law, where national
interests and policies usually intersect only with caution and suspicion.
As the consternation expressed by many states. in the period leading up to
indefinite extension in 1995 indicates, a great majority of the international
community of states was not prepared to take the risks they saw as inherent in
allowing the NPT to collapse. In their view, its demise would have grave
consequences for the very notion of nuclear non-proliferation as a global norm.
Furthermore, such an outcome would undermine the International Atomic Energy
Agency's verification work, and would destabilise international security. 96
At the same time, many States Parties reinforced their preference for
supporting the nuclear status quo by

~efusing

to agree to any changes aimed at

enhancing the Treaty's efficiency and force. As discussed above, a number of its
fundamental characteristics have hindered, rather than assisted, its work. 97
Nevertheless, the NPT remains in force, with enhanced mechanisms which allow for
automatic, rather than ad hoc, Review Conferences. 98
Australia's involvement in the negotiation of the NPT, which forms a
substantial part if this study, and its subsequent efforts to enhance nuclear arms
control in all its aspects, underlines the vital importance of this Treaty to the small
and middle powers as well as the nuclear weapon states. It is to Australia's specific
concerns that the study now turns.
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CHAPTER TWO

AUSTRALIA AND THE NPT: POLICY AMBIVALENCE
Introduction
In 1975, almost three years after Australia had ratified the 1968 Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty, one of its most trenchant critics, Sir Philip Baxter, 1 asserted that
"the concept that all decisions of government should be the subject of public debate ...
is a dangerous heresy. "2 As the former head of the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission, and a central figure in the Australian nuclear debate, Sir Philip was
expressing a fundamental belief held by fellow supporters of a "nuclear Australia": that
nuclear affairs were matters for governments and their expert advisers alone, and
should not be open for popular debate and decision.
Baxter went on to maintain that only a small proportion of the population (and
few among their elected representatives) were capable of understanding the issues
involved in nuclear affairs. 3 As a result, nuclear decision-making which affected
national security, energy policy, international relations, and national defence must be
left to governments. 4
Baxter's views are representative of others both within and outside Australian
government circles - such as nuclear advocates at the Department of Defence and
influential Australian academics 5 - whose resistance to global nuclear non-proliferation
1

For a summary critique of Baxter's nuclear advocacy, see: Martin, B. (1980). Nuclear Knights.
Dickson, ACT: Rupert Public Interest Movement Inc. At pp. 41-68.
2

Baxter. J.P. (1975). Some comments on Ann Mozley Moyal's 'The Australian Atomic Energy
Commission: A case study in Australian science and government.' Search, 6 (11-12), pp. 456-458. At p.
458.
3

Ibid.

4

Ibid.

5

Walsh, J. (1997). Surprise down under: The secret history of Australia's nuclear ambitions. The
Nonproliferation Review, 5 (1). See especially "The Indigenous Capacity Stage" (1964-1972). Hymans
notes the pro-proliferation views of Australian political scientist A L Bums who, in September 1964,
promoted a simple "nuclear transfer" of nuclear weapons from the United Kingdom (as reported in 1966
by A. Clunies Ross and P. King in their study, Australia and Nuclear Weapons: the Case for a NonNuclear Southeast Asia). This echoed a similar discussion between Prime Ministers Menzies and
Macmillan in 1961 in which Menzies sought a British obligation to supply Australia with nuclear
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efforts influenced Australia's initial reaction to the NPT. Those pro-nuclear views
within government were also of vital significance in the outcome of American efforts to
convince Australia to accede to the treaty as a reliable supporter of the Western
alliance.

Australia was a concerned observer and participant in the processes of international
debate, negotiation and decision which resulted in the opening for signature of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 1 July 1968. Australia also played a substantial
role, primarily during the period immediately preceding that event, in establishing the
broad outlines of the Treaty's later interpretation. 6 It did so, initially, through its
bilateral relations with the United States, and later through its participation in the
evolution of the global "regime" of understandings, trade-offs and accepted practices
which now underpins its operation.
It should be noted, however, that Australia's role at this time was necessarily

limited to the "explicit" process of treaty evolution outlined in Chapter One. The more
"implicit" mode of evolution (such as the development of interpretations of the treaty
by States Parties based on their own understanding of its terms) did not begin until the
Treaty, having entered into force on 5 March 1970 and been established as a
multilateral international instrument, began to demonstrate its limitations. The most
serious example of the Treaty's practical limitations was the refusal of the nuclear
weapon states to take meaningful steps to limit the nuclear arms race, as required under
Article VI.
This chapter will trace the outline and general structure of Australia's early
contribution to the debate on the spread of nuclear weapons. In doing so, it will discuss
the struggle for nuclear policy dominance within key elements of the Australian
bureaucracy and elsewhere. That struggle represented - and to some degree created the unmistakable ambivalence Australia displayed (especially during the negotiation
and establishment of the NPT, and in the United Nations General Assembly) to a world
increasingly convinced of the need to curb the global proliferation of these devices.
weapons, if ever necessary for its defence, in exchange for Australia's support for Macmillan's advocacy
of a global nuclear test ban treaty. Hymans, J.E.C. (2000). Isotopes and identity: Australia and the
nuclear weapons option, 1949-1999. Nuclear Nonproliferation Review (Spring), pp. 5, 8.
6

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1999). Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
[on-line]. Available WWW: http://www.acda.gov/treaties/npt/.htm.
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Having established the broad context of Australia's nuclear policy development,
and its actions at relevant United Nations forums, the chapter will consider the range of
responses available to Australia on the terms of the Final Draft of the proposed NPT, as
it emerged from US I Soviet negotiations at Geneva. during 1967 and 1968. This
discussion will entail analysis of a range of political, social and economic influences,
both within and outside government, and at home and abroad, on Australia's nuclear
policy debate. Prominent among them will be the influence of certain individuals (such
as the Prime Minister, John Gorton, and the Minister for External Affairs, Paul
Hasluck) on its outcome, as well as the effects of popular and academic debate, and the
influence of the international market for uranium.
It will also involve the introduction of one of the central themes of the study:
the dialogue between the Australian Department of External Affairs (DEA) and the
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on the evolution and
interpretation of the terms of the NPT. It will be argued, in subsequent chapters, that
this dialogue reflected both US determination to have all its allies accede to the treaty
(not merely the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation states) and the policy outcomes of
an increasingly coherent Australian nuclear debate.
One of the early results of these internal and external tensions within the nuclear
proliferation debate was the refusal in July 1968 of the Australian Government, led by
Prime Minister John Gorton, to immediately sign and ratify the newly opened NPT with or without reservations or agreed interpretations - as the United States Johnson
Administration had urged. Gorton's antipathy towards the NPT was obvious in his
remarks to the British High Commissioner to Canberra, Charles Johnstone, as reported
by Johnstone to London in August 1968. Johnstone reported Gorton as stating that
Australia would not sign the NPT, or that, if it did so, it would not ratify it. Gorton
therefore held the personal belief that it would be "stupid" to sign the treaty without any
intention of ratifying it. Any pressure, however intense, from either the US or the
United Kingdom would not change the position of the Australian government on these
points. 7
That resistance to the NPT, unwelcome as it was in Washington, had been
rehearsed earlier that year by the Department of External Affairs through diplomatic
channels, and had forced the United States to try to address Australia's concerns about
7

Op. cit. At Note 5 (2000), p. 10.
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the terms of the treaty. In doing so, the Americans found themselves obliged to develop
their own interpretations of the treaty's provisions beyond what they had already agreed
with their closest ally, the United Kingdom, and their Soviet rival. Washington was
compelled to find explanations and meanings for elements of the treaty text which,
against its expectations, appeared necessary to satisfy an important non-nuclear
Western ally of long-standing located in a region then of vital interest to the United
States. 8
America initially failed to convince Australia that it should sign and ratify the
NPT. By its recalcitrance Australia- the only Western ally actively to resist the treaty
after its opening for signature - acted as an evolutionary catalyst. Through its steadfast
refusal to be coerced into acquiescence on the terms of a nuclear non-proliferation pact
whose obligations seemed to threaten its national interests, Australia contributed to the
early evolution of the regime ofnon-pr~liferation which now surrounds the NPT. 9

The Australian Nuclear Policy Debate
The contest for nuclear policy dominance, which intensified during 1967 and 1968
between elements of the Australian federal bureaucracy, was a microcosm of the wider
nuclear policy debate within Australia. In practical terms, that contest was a test of
strength between two opposed factions within the Australian bureaucracy. One, led by
the Australian Atomic Energy Commission and its Chairman, Sir Philip Baxter,
together with senior officers in the Department of Defence and armed forces,
maintained that Australia should either acquire nuclear weapons, or develop an ability
to manufacture them indigenously within a short time, should the need arise.
Notwithstanding the insistent urgings of the United States, Australia should, in their
view, have nothing to do with a nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
8

The general level of importance which US President Johnson attached to America's alliance
relationship with Australia at this time is clear from the prominence he accorded to the visit of Prime
Minister Gorton to Washington from 28 May to 3 June 1968. It has been suggested, however, that this
was also a reaction to Washington's failure in late March 1968 to brief Gorton on its decision to deescalate the bombing of North Vietnam, together with concern over the Australian Prime Minister's
"semi-public attitude towards Australia's future defence position in South-East Asia". Ramsey, A. (1968,
May 2). The red carpet treatment. The Australian, p.2.
9

Supra. At Note 6.
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Baxter, who dominated the Australian Atomic Energy Commission from the
time of his appointment in September 1956 until his resignation in 1973, was
implacably opposed to Australian ratification of the NPT. One assessment, cited by
Carr, makes the following observation:
He saw himself, and by extension the Commission, as the central and sole source of
policy proposals for nuclear developments in Australia, and as the Government's
10
fountainhead of atomic knowledge and ideas.

The opposing faction, led by senior officers in the Department of External Affairs, 11 of
which the most influential was First Assistant Secretary M.R. Booker, was convinced
that Australia's future security should not be tied to nuclear weapons as a deterrent
against attack.

12

In May 1967 Prime Minister Holt and the Cabinet's Defence Committee had
commissioned a report from the Joint Planning Committee of the Department of
Defence on the possibility of "an independent nuclear capability by manufacture ... as
· well as possible arrangements with our allies." One reason given for the request was
that Australia was likely to be asked to "subscribe to a non-proliferation treaty".
The JPC report, delivered in February 1968, concluded that "[Australia] has no
requirement for an independent . . . nuclear capability." Balancing this support for
DEA's position was the opposition of the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Sir
Henry Bland, to Australian signature of the NPT which became apparent as DEA
prepared for negotiations on the new treaty with the United States ACDA negotiating
team during April1968. 13
10

Moyle, cited in Carr, M. (1979). Australia and the nuclear question: A survey of government attitudes,
1945 to 1975. Unpublished Masters thesis, University ofNew South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales.
At p. 85.
11

Hereafter usually referred to in the text as "DEA".

12

Booker's study of Australian foreign affairs policy deficiencies from 1939 to 1975 makes the point that
the views of Australian nuclear advocates stemmed from a lack of flexibility and realism in their
assessment of Australia's foreign policy options over the postwar period. He himself considered that,
should a nuclear war break out, ".... the only course for Australia would be to try to stay out of it
[through] not [being] a worthwhile nuclear target .... ".Booker, M. (1976). The last domino: Aspects of
Australia's foreign relations. Sydney: Collins. At pp. 9, 230.
13

Document A 1838/346: TS919/10/5, Pt. 4 [8] (7 March 1968). Rationale of the NPT. Canberra:
Australian Archives. At p. 5. The meeting, held between DEA and ACDA in Canberra on 18 April1968,
was the pivotal point of negotiation between Australia and the US on the acceptbility of the new NPT to
Australia. It will be evaluated in Chapter Four. Walsh, J. (1997). Surprise down under: The secret history
of Australia's nuclear ambitions. The Nonproliferation Review, 5 (1). [on-line]. Available: WWW:
http:/I ens .miis .edu/pubs/npr/walsh51.htm At p. 15.
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Nevertheless, the anti-proliferation advocates at DEA and the Department of
Defence maintained their belief that Australia's best hope for long-term strategic
security rested with the growing world-wide support for a treaty aimed at denying
nuclear weapons to any state not yet in possession of them. 14
As will be discussed later in the study, the DEA's policy success over its nuclear
advocate opponents resulted in Australia exerting substantial influence over the ways in
which the NPT came to be interpreted by the rest of the world. The ability of its senior
anti-nuclear officers, ultimately, to prevail over Prime Minister Gorton and other
nuclear champions within Cabinet, such as Minister for Defence Allen Fairhall, is a
clear measure of the scale of their achievement.
The Treaty advocates at the Department of External Affairs were careful, however,
to take account of the misgivings voiced by their nuclear opponents on several aspects
of the Draft NPT. By doing so, they were able to reduce the potential level of resistance
to the Treaty from the academic community, the general public, sections of the
bureaucracy, the uranium mining industry, and state electricity generating authorities,
as it gained international acceptance.
By questioning the United States on its interpretation of certain components of
the Draft Treaty which it had recently negotiated with the Soviet Union at Geneva
(especially the meaning of the term "manufacture" in Articles I and II, and supposed
concerns from Australian uranium miners about industrial espionage by International
Atomic Energy Agency inspectors) Australia gained significant international nuclear
influence through the benefits of an increasingly coherent and sophisticated internal
policy debate. Its stance was, effectively, neither complete agreement nor outright
rejection.
Although Australia did not sign the NPT until1970, and only ratified it in 1973,
the ascendancy of the NPT advocates within DEA gave it - and Australia - the policy
coherence necessary in order to apply the pressure it exerted when seeking
interpretative clarity from the United States on these and other aspects of the Draft
Treaty. The substantive negotiations were held in Canberra on 18 April 1968 between
officers of several Australian Government Departments and a negotiating mission from

14

Evidence of the ways in which individuals (and larger groups) on both sides of the debate formulated
their policy positions on the Draft NPT, and on the outcome of the controversy as reflected in Cabinet
Decisions, will be taken from documents held at the Australian Archives, Canberra.
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the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 15 Believing that the United
States was determined to obtain acceptance of the Draft NPT from every Western ally,
and not only its NATO partners, Australia, in the form of the DEA, played a hard
political game, indicating to Washington that the U:nited States must do more for
Australia than it had hitherto intended.
In this way, Australia left open to the United States the opportunity to negotiate
acceptable interpretations of those Articles about which Australia had concerns.
Diplomatic and Departmental communications between Australia and the United States
in the period leading up to those negotiations had led to soundly-based confidence
within DEA that the Americans would take up that opportunity. 16
On the other hand, had the nuclear weapons advocates from outside the
diplomatic community gained nuclear policy dominance over DEA during 1968,
Australia's subsequent refusal to consider signing or ratifying a fundamentally
unacceptable treaty would have resulted in severe repercussions. Not the least of these
would have been a rapid loss of strategic support from its American ally, and attrition
of its standing at the United Nations.

It is now clear, from documents recently released under the Australian Archives thirtyyear embargo rules, that the Department of External Affairs was receiving detailed
information on progress being made in negotiations at the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) at Geneva between the United States and the Soviet
Union on the full Draft Text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 17
It is equally clear, from other DEA records now in the public domain, that this
intelligence was not being transmitted by its senior officers through Minister Hasluck
to the Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Defence, Trade and Industry or

15

Document A 1838/346: TS 919/10/5 Pt. 7. Canberra: Australian Archives.

16

The evidence for this assertion is in the form of diplomatic cables between DEA in Canberra and
Australia's overseas posts, together with DEA analysis of their content. Those posts include Embassies in
Washington and London, the Consulate-General in Geneva and the Mission to the United Nations in
New York.
17

Document A 1838/346: TS 919/10/5 Pt.l. Dated 18 April 1967. Canberra: Australian Archives.
Marked "Secret and Guatd". The member states of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee are
listed at Table 2, Chapter Six.

45

National Development, or indeed to the Cabinet itself. 18 There is no obvious
explanation for this omission, although one possible n~ason is the concerns which may
have been harboured by senior DEA officers such as First Secretary Malcolm Booker
over the uses to which this intelligence might have been put by the nuclear advocates,
in order to reinforce their position.
The Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Defence, Trade and Industry
and National Development were each under the ministerial or bureaucratic direction of
individuals who were strongly opposed to a moratorium on the acquisition of nuclear
weapons. Detailed and updated briefings on the precise state of development of the
Draft Treaty text during 1967 and 1968 would certainly have enhanced the preparations
ofthese elements ofso-called "bomb lobby" in defence oftheirnuclear advocacy.
In any event, as early as 18 April 1967, four months before the superpowers
tabled an initial Draft Text at Geneva, DEA was aware of those of its substantive
elements not disputed by the Soviet Union, of changes proposed by the United States
and its NATO allies, and of those changes which the United States was considering
proposing but had not yet adopted. 19
Armed with this privileged information, DEA was in a position of considerable
strength when compared with its nuclear advocate opponents. It maintained that
position throughout the Geneva negotiating process through consistent and
authoritative briefings by officers of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) to diplomatic officers attached to Australia's Washington Embassy,
and to its Geneva Consulate-General. 20

18

For example, see Cabinet Submission No. 47 of 4 April 1968 by the Minister for Trade and Industry,
John McEwen and the Minister for National Development, David Fairbairn, headed: "Non-Proliferation Safeguards" [on-line]. The concerns it expresses on safeguards matters suggests that its ministerial
authors were not aware of DEA's on-going contact with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
on
negotiations
on
the
NPT
at
Geneva.
Available
WWW:
http://www.naa.gov.au/COLLECT/cabpaper/Cabinet68/images/Decision 119 1.htrn
19

The most important point of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States in this context
was the terms of Article III concerning the application of nuclear materials diversion safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Article III was the last article to be successfully negotiated, not
appearing in a Draft Text until 18 January 1968 at the Thirteenth Session of the ENDC at Geneva. Its
delay represented the only significant gap in DEA's intelligence on the NPT's terms, and thus check its
ability to develop a credible argument in its favour. International negotiations on the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1969). United states Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At
p. 98.
20

The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was the primary U.S. agency charged with
undertaking the negotiating process at Geneva with the Soviet Union. Several of its officers, headed by
Director William C. Foster, represented the United States at the Geneva negotiating table. International

46

As DEA's semor bureaucrats watched the treaty's text develop, they were
increasingly well placed - partly as devil's advocates_- to develop the full range of
credible Australian (as opposed to strictly DEA-based) objections to its terms. As will
be discussed below, Australia's putative determination not to accept without question
the negotiated terms of the NPT, nor their initial American interpretation, eventually
resulted in the visit to Canberra of a high level negotiating team from America's Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. 21
The willingness of Washington to despatch such a mission, whose primary aim
was to convince Australia of the potential effectiveness of the treaty, is itself cogent
evidence of the importance which the United States Government attached to Australia's
accession to the NPT.

The central struggle for policy dominance within sections of the Australian bureaucracy
did not, of course, occur in a political, social or economic vacuum. In varying degree,
the policy positions of the major political parties, and the relative political strength of
senior Australian government figures, to be discussed below, both exercised influence
over final policy outcomes.
Again, intellectual discourse, public opinion and popular debate on the NPT and
other nuclear questions (such as nuclear testing), together with the economic
importance and political influence of the State electricity generating authorities and the
uranium mining industry, further combined to mould the context in which Australian
nuclear non-proliferation policy evolved.
In addition, Australia's alliance relationship with the United States under the
ANZUS Treaty, and its anxieties about the level of accession to the NPT by other
nuclear weapon and "threshold" states were the predominant external factors
modulating the direction of nuclear policy evolution. Each of these elements will be
analysed in terms of its part in providing the background against which Australian
negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1969). Washington, DC:
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At p. 47 et seq.
One example of the strength of liaison between Australian and American diplomats on NPT
negotiation issues is the detailed summary of ENDC negotiations contained in Inward Cable 889 of 1
March 1968 from the Australian Embassy, Washington to DEA, Canberra. The Cable begins "Stillman
(ACDA) today gave us the following information on the present position with respect to the draft nonproliferation treaty". Document A 1838/346: 719/10/6 Pt. 3. Canberra: Australian Archives.
21

Document A 1838/346: TS 919/10/5 Pt. 7. "Notes for use by Australian officers". Canberra: Australian
Archives.
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Government decisions on the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty were taken. It is
sufficient here to note the extent of specifically political influence bearing on those
decisions.

The single most prominent example of political influence on the bureaucratic policy
debate was the nuclear advocacy of Prime Minister John Gorton, whose Ministries
spanned the period during which Australia finalised its nuclear weapons policy in light
of the nascent NPT. 22 Gorton may ultimately be assessed as an atypical Australian
political leader in his willingness to maintain policy positions in opposition to the thrust
of popular and specialist opinion? 3 Certainly, it was only after his political demise,
early in 1971, that the prospect of Australian nuclear power for energy and defence
finally lost most of its credibility.
An important example of this tendency, in the civil nuclear field, is the history
of the proposed nuclear power generating station on Commonwealth territory at Jervis
Bay, N.S.W. Announced by Gorton in October 1969, the project was deferred by Prime
Minister McMahon in 1971 following Gorton's removal from office on 10 March 1971.
In the first half of 1972 it was deferred indefinitely on economic grounds, and the

defeat of the Liberal I Country Party Coalition Government by E.G. Whitlam's Labor
Party Opposition, in December of that year, spelt its demise? 4
Another example of individual influence on the bureaucratic debate is the
surprisingly limited part played in nuclear policy formulation by the Minister for
External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, who appears to have contributed little beyond his
formal role as a member of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee of Cabinet. 25
22

Gorton became Prime Minister of Australia on 10 January 1968 following the disappearance and
presumed death of his predecessor, Harold Holt, in the surf at Cheviot Beach, Victoria, on 19 December
1967. Gorton relinquished the post on 10 March 1971.
23

For example, see: Fricke, G. (1990). Profiles of power: The Prime Ministers of Australia. Femtree
Gully: Houghton Miflin Australia. At pp. 191 - 201: "John Gorton: Enigmatic Senator". Fricke alludes to
" .... the Gorton experiment of dictatorial rule .... " and to charges of "inconsistency, eccentricity and
dogmatism". At p. 201.
24

Carr, M. (1979). Australia and the nuclear question: A survey of government attitudes, 1945 to 1975.
Unpublished Masters thesis, University of New South Wales. Sydney: New South Wales. At pp. 146161.
25

Porter, in a political biography of Hasluck, has suggested that he was a political realist in matters of
foreign affairs who inherited a clearly articulated direction in Australian external affairs policy, and as a
result was content to follow that line. He could not, therefore, be regarded as an architect of Australian
foreign policy. Porter also portrays Hasluck's conception of global strategic affairs as somewhat nai've in
its reliance on a simple "great power" relationship model. He was, in addition, unable, Porter asserts, to
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The documentary record of policy development on the terms of the Draft NPT by
officers of the Department of External Affairs is almol?t completely devoid of policy
contributions from its Minister. As a result, nuclear policy formulation within DEA
enjoyed a greater measure of freedom and flexibility than many other Ministers of the
period would have allowed. 26
Hasluck was particularly suspiciOus of any attempts by officers in his
Department to influence his thinking on specific issues. His rigid approach to
government processes and conventions led him to resist changes to policy, emanating
from his Department, which did not accord with his own views?7 There is no evidence,
however, that this resistance occurred in respect of nuclear non-proliferation policy.
Nevertheless, his reported insistence that policy decisions must be dealt with through
formal written communication with his Department, rather than in personal contacts,
supports the view that Hasluck did not contribute in significant ways to the process of
nuclear policy development. 28
A third political factor- and one in need of explanation - is the muted public
debate on Australia's response to the Draft NPT. Carr's assertion that" [t]here was no
agitated public debate on the NPT" 29 is supported by the dearth of informed or detailed
develop a relationship of trust with his Department, largely as a result of his fear of being 'captured' by
his own bureaucrats. Porter, R. (1993). Paul Hasluck: A political biography. Nedlands: University of
Western Australia Press. At Chapter 10. This assessment is supported by Woodard and Beaumont's 1998
essay on Hasluck's relationship with the senior officers of the Department of External Affairs: Woodard,
G., & Beaumont, J. (1998a). Paul Hasluck and the bureaucracy: The Department of External Affairs. In
T. Stannage, K. Saunders & R. Nile (Eds.), Paul Hasluck in Australian history (pp. 143-151). St. Lucia:
University of Queensland Press.
Porter also quotes M.R. Booker who, in 1968, was a First Assistant Secretary in the Department of
External Affairs, as criticising Hasluck for his policy conservatism, his refusal to engage his
Departmental advisers on policy development, and his insistence on decision-making based on
exchanges of formal submissions. Op. cit. At Chapter 9: Defence and External Affairs: 'The realities of
power'. At p. 275.
26

One possible explanation for this apparent lack of involvement in the non-proliferation question by
Hasluck may lie in a comment by Eric Walsh (1969, February 22) The Nation, p.7:
Mr Hasluck, in his five years as foreign minister, had an almost total pre-occupation with
China and Vietnam in our own region.

Cited in: Woodard, G., & Beaumont, J. (1998b). Paul Hasluck as Minister for Foreign Affairs: Towards a
reappraisal. Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs, 52 (1), pp. 63-75. Atp. 64.
27

Supra. At Note 25 (1993), pp. 275,276.

28

Ibid.

29

Op. cit. At Note 10, p. 141. There is more evidence of popular debate on the question of signing the
NPT after its opening for signature on 1 July 1968, when Australia's opportunity for direct influence on
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discussion and analysis in the popular press and academic literature, and an absence of
evidence of organised special interest group resistance. 30 As this chapter will show,
each of these factors contributes to the context in which the process of nuclear policy
formulation developed within the Australian bureaucracy in response to the NPT
negotiations.

At the most general level of analysis, the policy planners within DEA were faced with a
stark choice. Put simply, they had to weigh the desirability of Australia's support for the
proposed multilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaty against the alternative course of
action- the. nuclear weapons option.
All policy participants within government accepted without question the need to
observe strict security protocols in thei~ consideration of issues of fundamental national
interest. 31 That requirement, reinforced by the draconian secrecy provisions and
penalties of the Atomic Energy Act (Cth) 1953, was a major element in the success of
the claim of senior officers within DEA, a small, closed group of policy specialists, for
policy dominance - and ultimately policy ownership - in nuclear non-proliferation
affairs. It also contributed to the limited degree to which they had to take account of the
domestic political, economic and social (essentially non-specialist) effects of their
policy positions, a shortcoming that is clear from the documentary evidence of their
deliberations.

The Nuclear Weapons Option.
The nuclear weapons option is a thread which runs through the history of Australia's
engagement with nuclear policy from the early post-war years following initiation of
its initial interpretation had passed, than in the period leading up to that date. Prime Minister Gorton
spurred the debate in his speech of 9 October 1969, which initiated the Coalition's re-election campaign.
In it, he asserted that, in the absence of major changes, Australia would not sign the NPT. Five months
later, his Government signed the Treaty. Op. cit. At Note 7, p.16.
30

One example from the Australian mass communications media of the lack of informed public debate
on nuclear non-proliferation is provided by a review of The Australian newspaper. In the two months
leading up to the opening for signature of the NPT on 1 July 1968, fewer than ten references, of any
kind, to the treaty appear - of which none can reasonably be described as a thorough analysis of its
implications for Australia. By contrast, the war in Vietnam figures prominently in each issue.
31

The documentary evidence held by the Australian Archives in Canberra, and used in the study, carries
security classifications ranging from "Umestricted" to "Secret and Guard".
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prospecting for uranium ores in the Northern Territory until Australia's ratification of
the NPT on 29 January 1973. At various times duri11:g that period, influential figures
within scientific and government circles favoured, advocated and sought the acquisition
of a credible and independent Australian nuclear deterrent. In short, they wanted "the
Bomb".
While the details of their position are elaborated later in this chapter, it is
necessary here to establish the general characteristics of their position. The choice
faced by all industrially advanced states in the nuclear era has been precisely that which
exercised the minds of nuclear policy planners within DBA during 1967 and 1968.
Should Australia make every effort to acquire nuclear weapons (or the ability to
manufacture them quickly) in the shortest possible time, or should it decide not to
acquire them?
The first option has, for states, been accompanied by political and strategic
judgments about the effect of acquisition on existing alliances and regional balances of
power, and the actual deterrent effect of nuclear weapons against nuclear and nonnuclear threats. For Australia, the strategic judgment was clearly outlined in a DBA
policy position paper on the "rationale" behind the NPT, dated March 1968:
The question is often asked whether, when the moment of crisis arrives, a major
nuclear power would risk retaliation on itself by coming to the aid of a nonnuclear power under threat from another nuclear power. Would the United
States, for example, risk San Francisco for Sydney? 32

It notes further, with respect to threats to Australia's strategic interests in South East

Asia and Papua!New Guinea, that:
Activity at [the level of subversion, infiltration, insurgency and "confrontation"]
is below the nuclear threshold and cannot be deterred by a nuclear capability. 33

Implicit in both options (at least until the advent of the NPT in 1968) has been a
judgment about the relative merits of questionable security enhancement versus further
nuclear proliferation. The same paper comments:

32

Document A 1838/346: TS 919/10/5, Pt. 4. Canberra: Australian Archives. At pp. 5, 6. Top Secret
A us teo.
33

Ibid. At p. 5.
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In respect of no established nuclear power nor any power of advanced nuclear
development could Australia expect to establish a credible deterrent. 34

Before addressing the option of nuclear abstinence, it is necessary to review
Australia's actions in regard to the nuclear weapon alternative. This will help to build a
balanced picture of the process of Australia's nuclear policy consolidation (and the
eventual renunciation of the nuclear weapons option) by establishing the limits of the
debate on both sides of the question.
Until comparatively recently, the extent of Australia's interest in acqumng
deliverable nuclear weapons in the period from 1956 to 1972 has not been well known
or understood. 35 Nor has the ambiguity displayed by Australia in its nuclear policy
pronouncements over the twenty years between the inception in 1952 of British nuclear
testingin Australia, and this country's ratification of the NPT in 1973. 36 That position is
now changing.
Walsh has asserted that Australia secretly attempted to acquire nuclear weapons
(and the means to deliver them) either through procurement from the United States and
the United Kingdom, or by developing an indigenous manufacturing capacity, over the
entire period from 1956 to 1972. 37 That claim is supported by new evidence which
shows that elements within the Australian government continued seriously to consider
the desirability of an independent nuclear deterrent force even as Western, Soviet and
non-aligned support for a global non-proliferation treaty hardened during the 1960s.
One example is a study by the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) of the
Department of Defence which, in February 1968, concluded an examination of the
extent to which Australia could rely on United States protection in various
circumstances, together with the credibility of an Australian nuclear capacity. 38 The
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study incorporated a contribution from DEA on the benefits of signing the NPT, and
the JPC's conclusion - perhaps surprising in a Department of Defence strategic policy
document - was that "Australia should be prepared to sign such a treaty". 39 That
outcome augured well for DEA's eventual policy predominance, although, in reaching
its conclusion, the Defence Department was prepared carefully to consider the
feasibility and strategic effects of an independent nuclear capability.

While support for the principles of nuclear non-proliferation began to grow at the
United Nations during the early 1960s (in the form of repeated General Assembly
Resolutions calling for a global agreement) the earliest public indication that Australia
intended to keep its nuclear options open is contained in a letter dated 15 March 1962
from Minister for External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, to the Acting Secretary-General
of the United Nations. 40
The Acting Secretary-General had sought the v1ews of the Australian
Government on the conditions under which Australia, a country "not possessing nuclear
weapons", might agree to refrain from "manufacturing or acquiring ... [nuclear]
weapons and ... refuse to receive in the future nuclear weapons on [its territory] on
behalf of other countries." 41
In reply, Barwick acknowledged the dangers inherent in nuclear proliferation,

quoting Prime Minister Menzies to that effect in a speech to the House of
Representatives on 19 September 1957. Nevertheless, he went on to assert "the right of
nuclear powers [to station] their nuclear weapons wherever military necessity
requires. "42 Barwick then stated clearly that "Australia cannot undertake that in no
circumstances will Australian forces in the future be armed with nuclear weapons"
(emphasis added), justifying that stance largely in terms of "the emergence in the area

39

Supra. At Note 13, p.15.

40

Document A 1838/346 TS 919/10/5 Pt. 1. Canberra: Australian Archives. UN Document UNGA
20/Item 28. Annex. The request of the Acting Secretary-General was made in response to UNGA
Resolution 1664 (XVI) of 4 December 1961.
41

42

Ibid.

Ibid. Menzies had stated, in part, that "There is advantage for the world in having nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in the hands of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and in no
other."

53

of East Asia and the Western Pacific of a military force of great dimensions and some
ambition."
It appears, from the language used at this point, that Barwick was referring here

to the emerging (non-nuclear) military strength of tl)e People's Republic of China.
Barwick also justified Australia's refusal to guarantee non-acquisition of nuclear
weapons on the grounds that any non-proliferation treaty not encompassing the (then)
nuclear powers - the US, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France - was
doomed to failure, and that nations must be at liberty to seek their own security in
accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 43
These sentiments are echoed by evidence which has recently emerged from
those Australian Departments with either an interest in peaceful nuclear energy
development or concern over perceived Australian military weakness. 44 The most
forceful display of resistance to the proposed NPT came from the Australian Atomic
Energy Commission (AAEC), an instrumentality of the Department of National
Development. The AAEC line was followed, not surprisingly, by elements within the
defence establishment, most notably the Royal Australian Air Force and senior military
and bureaucratic figures within the Department of Defence, 45 and by elements within
the Department of Supply. This group constituted, by the late 1960s, what became
known in Australian government circles as a "bomb lobby" group; an unofficial policy
support structure behind Barwick's earlier, publicly expressed position. 46
In the public domain, its members included Prime Minister Gorton and his
Minister for Social Security, W.C. Wentworth, and several right-wing Liberal Party
ministers and backbenchers, consistently supported by the Democratic Labor Party. 47
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The essential elements of the bomb lobby's case are contained in two letters
written by one of its senior members, Minister for National Development, David
Fairbairn, to the Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck and Prime Minister John
Gorton, on 16 May 1967 and 16 February 1968 respectively. 48 Concerned over earlier
negotiations 49 between the United States and the Soviet Union on a non-proliferation
agreement at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva, Fairbairn drew
Hasluck's attention to the "profound and unfortunate implications" of Australian
accession to a non-proliferation treaty which was, he stated somewhat ambiguously, "in
anyway acceptable to the U.S.A."
His prima facie concern, as Minister for National Development, was for the
prospects for development of nuclear power generation capacity, and its associated
technology, in Australia. As signatory to the proposed treaty, Australia would, to its
detriment, come under an international regime of "supervision and control" over its
nuclear activities, defined by Fairbairn as " ... the mining and treatment of uranium and
thorium ores, fuel fabrication, reactors (construction and operation) and fuel
•
II 50
processmg
....

Since it is accepted universally (and implied by the terms of Article III of the
NPT) that the fission technology necessary for both nuclear power generation and
nuclear weapons manufacture are functionally indistinguishable, Fairbairn's omission
of nuclear weapons from his list of Australia's nuclear activities does not exclude
possible weapons manufacture from his argument. 51 Nor does Australia's lack, at that
time, of a power or production reactor capable of producing fissile material, since none
is needed to enrich its natural uranium reserves to produce a supply of weapons-grade
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material with enhanced levels of the fissile isotope of uranium, U-235. 52 On the latter
point, in 1967 Fairbairn had announced a decision to quarantine half of Australia's
future uranium ore discoveries from export, as part of a policy to ensure sufficient
future stocks of uranium (as he later informed the Hous_e of Representatives) "for use in
atomic weapons as well as for power generation". 53
In his later letter to Prime Minister Gorton, Fairbairn struck a more urgent note.
With the increasing certainty of the presentation of a draft of the new treaty to the
General Assembly at an early date, he cautioned his new Leader to "move slowly in
this matter and delay for a considerable.time signing the Treaty, or perhaps not ... sign
it at all .... ". (emphasis added) 54 Reiterating his earlier themes, Fairbairn referred to

the likelihood that a wide range of Australian mining operations, as well as work on
uranium enrichment then being undertaken by the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission, would come under the direction and control of the International Atomic
Energy Commission's Inspectorate of Safeguards. 55
Such an outcome would, in Fairbairn's view, seriously compromise Australia's
prospects for nuclear energy production - and, by implication, weapons development by opening all its relevant laboratories and production facilities to the scrutiny of
I.A.E.A. inspectors, some of whose security credentials could not be guaranteed. While
not explicitly stating that such an outcome would jeopardise Australia's ability to
acquire nuclear weapons, Fairbairn noted that " .... this would appear to negate the longstanding policy of the Commonwealth of not surrendering its nuclear options".

(emphasis added) 56
Here the "bomb lobby" case rested. Its opportunity to prevail came when two of
its members were represented on the senior level Working Group, comprising
representatives from five government Departments, which reported to the Defence
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Committee on the implications of the NPT on 18 March 1968. 57 The Working Group's
central recommendation to Cabinet would demonstrate the failure of the hard-line
nuclear advocates (especially those at the Australian Atomic Energy Commission) to
carry their views. Paragraph 90 of the Working Group's report recommended that
Australia should:

Indicat[e] a willingness to sign the Treaty subject to understandings, qualifications
and possible amendments. 58

The Department of Supply and the Australian Atomic Energy Commission
(AAEC) were called on to include in the Report an annex on the expected costs of a
nuclear weapons programme. They suggested that a programme sufficient to produce
30 low-yield nuclear fission weapons per annum could be expected to cost an initial
$A144 million (in same year dollars), with on-going annual costs of $A13 million for
plutonium production. Alternatively, ten thermonuclear devices (hydrogen bombs) of
far greater power could be produced for around $A184 million. In both cases, delivery
systems were not considered. 59
While they made no comment on the economic effects for Australia of such a
cost burden, the Department of Supply and the AAEC noted that "weapons
manufacture is no longer beyond the economic, technical and industrial capacity ofthe
smaller advanced countries". 60

These, then, were the essential components of the "bomb lobby" argument by early
1968. They can be summarised as a combination of deep concern over Australia's
medium-to-long term strategic security position, suspicion over the terms of the NPT
affecting Australia's nuclear options (in both energy production and defence) and,
finally, a conviction that Australia's accession to such a treaty was both dangerous and
avoidable.
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The Nuclear Abstinence Option
The alternative course for Australian nuclear policy, a decision to renounce nuclear
weapons and work for their extinction, is as durable a thread running through
Australia's nuclear policy as is the nuclear weapon option. It is the second component
of its nuclear ambiguity, but one far more consistently and clearly on public display at
the United Nations and other international fora than at home. Its presence is a clear
indication of the strength of concerns over nuclear proliferation which have existed in
Australia over the entire nuclear era, notwithstanding the persistence of nuclear
advocates in the "bomb lobby".
One early example is the strong support shown by the post-war Chifley Labor
administrations, from July 1945 to

D~cember

1949, for international nuclear control

measures. Chifley's Minister for External Affairs, Dr. H.V. Evatt, had vigorously
championed the United States' ill-fated 1946 "Baruch Plan" for international control of
nuclear energy while Chairman of the short-lived United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission. 61
Nor was early anti-nuclear idealism confined to the Australian Labor Party. In
1957, the Liberal/Country Party Coalition government led by Robert Menzies had
supported the so-called "Irish Resolution" at the United Nations, the first of many
annual General Assembly Resolutions calling for an international agreement to stem
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 62
Another early and important example of its concern for the implications of
global nuclear proliferation was the active role played by Australia in the preparation of
the Draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from 1953 to 26
October 1956, when the Statute was opened for signature. 63 Australia's association with
the IAEA's nuclear safeguards work extends from the 1956 Conference on the Draft
61
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Statute to the present day, and includes involvement m the development of the
enhanced safeguards system called for in Article III of the NPT. As the most
technologically advanced state in the so-called "Oceania" region, Australia has been a
member state on the Board of Governors of the Agency continuously from 1957, and
has also provided expert personnel as Safeguards Inspectors.

64

Furthermore, by 1964 Prime Minister Menzies felt able to respond to an
Indonesian claim that Australia was developing nuclear weapons by asserting in the
House ofRepresentatives that:

.. .Indonesia, like Australia, is a signatory to the partial nuclear test ban treaty and is
therefore, with us, involved in a state of affairs in which ... we do not want to see
65
the spread of atomic weapons beyond those countries in which they now exist.

From the perspective of a dispassionate observer, these early nuclear policy
positions are, prima facie, those of a Western constitutional liberal democracy whose
government is accountable to its people. They reflect a deep concern for the
implications of a global nuclear future in which many states possess nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, a more suspicious or informed observer might be forgiven for
viewing them with scepticism.

These examples of public Australian government endorsement of nuclear nonproliferation principles surely led their many advocates around the world (including the
United States Government) to expect that Australia would continue in the same vein
during the negotiations on the terms of the NPT. Negotiations had, after all, begun in
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva as early as February, 1964, as
Prime Minister Menzies sought to placate Indonesian nuclear fears. 66 Such expectation
appeared to be confirmed by two separate statements made in October 1965 and
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November 1966 in the First Committee of the General Assembly by the leader of the
Australian Delegation, Sir James Plimsoll. On both oqcasions, Plimsoll emphasised the
importance and urgency of measures to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons. 67
Certainly, by 26 March 1968- as United States-negotiators at Geneva continued
to provide Australian diplomats with regular updates on progress being made with the
Russians on the terms of the NPT - the United States Government would have been
encouraged to hear the External Affairs Minister, Paul Hasluck, state in the House of
Representatives:

The Australian Government has consistently seen the dangers inherent in the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and in the increase in the number of nations
possessing such weapons. We therefore fully share the hope that effective measures
will be found to prevent such further spread of nuclear weapons. We also share the
hope that this proposed treaty may be~ome such an effective measure. 68

Here, however, Australia•s ambivalent policy on nuclear weapons acquisition
was clearly evident. As noted above, former Minister for External Affairs Barwick,
when called on in 1962 to clarify Australia•s nuclear weapons policy by the Acting
Secretary-General of the United Nations, had refused to eliminate the possibility that
Australia might in the future acquire nuclear weapons. 69 That policy position had never
been explicitly repudiated in a public forum.
As a result, those officers in the United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency with responsibility during 1967 and 1968 for dealing with Australian concerns
over the NPT could be forgiven, in the light of Hasluck•s March 1968 statement, for
accusing Australia of prevarication, if not dissembling, when, on 1 July 1968, it refused
to sign the Treaty.

The Domestic Policy Context
As noted above, the debate on the NPT within the Australian bureaucracy was coloured
and informed by a range of external influences, both domestic and international. On the
67
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domestic political scene, the AustralianLabor Party, led from 8 February 1967 by E.G.
Whitlam, provided an increasingly sceptical and inteUectually rigorous critique of the
Coalition government's incoherent nuclear policy positions.
The ALP had overseen the early post-war search in Australia for uranium
deposits as part of Australia's contribution to the defence of the Western Alliance. 70 Out
of government from 1949 until Whitlam's victory in the Federal election of 5 December
1972, the Australian Labor Party had progressively modified its nuclear policy
platform. 71 The keystone of its policy was made clear by the instruction from its 241h
Commonwealth Conference in 1961 to the Federal parliamentary Labor Party to work
towards "high level political talks aimed at the effective prevention of the use of
nuclear devices by any nation, whether for peace or war".
However, while the ALP had supported the notion of a nuclear-free zone in the
Southern Hemisphere as early as 1963, its non-proliferation credentials were not helped
by Whitlam's attempt, in the Roy Milne Memorial Lecture of 1963, to clarify ALP
policy on the issue when he said:

Only if [a nuclear-free zone conference] could agree to a watertight arrangement
would Australia agree not to manufacture, acquire or receive nuclear weapons. 72

In fact, only in August 1969 did the alternative Australian government make its
position on the NPT clear. In the House of Representatives, Whitlam called for
signature of the treaty on the basis of its promised benefits for Australia's nuclear
power generation plans, while emphasising that Australia should not attempt to
influence other states in the region to sign. 73
The only other political party with strong views on nuclear matters, the small
but electorally significant Democratic Labor Party, continued its unequivocal
commitment to an independent Australian nuclear deterrent. Its animus towards the
Australian Labor Party, and its ability to decide the passage of the Government's
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legislative programme in the Senate, gave the DLP special significance in the political
calculations of both Coalition Parties. 74

Popular Debate

The desultory nature of the Australian nuclear debate at the political level was echoed
by the lack of popular awareness of, or interest in, the range of issues which the
emergent NPT raised for Australia. One strong indicator of this phenomenon is the lack
of evidence in Australia's only national broadsheet daily newspaper, The Australian, of
popular debate on nuclear issues during the final two months leading up to the
inception of the treaty. Few direct references to the treaty exist, either as letters to the
editor, news reports or feature

articles~

and then only in conjunction with the broader

issues of defence equipment procurement then current.
It is significant that no thorough analysis of non-proliferation issues relevant to

Australian nuclear policy appeared in the mass communication print media at a time
when the terms of the NPT were being debated in the General Assembly of the United
Nations. Only after the debate had concluded, and the terms of the NPT had been
endorsed by the international community at New Y ork/ 5 did recognition of its
implications become evident. 76
Similarly, academic and specialist interest in nuclear questions generally, and in
nuclear non-proliferation in particular, was muted. Measured by the extent of research
74
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papers, articles and longer works published in Australia on these issues prior to 1969,
the research effort can only be described as fragmented_ and sparse. 77
The academy's influence on nuclear decision-making within government (with
the possible exception of the public writings of Sir Philip Baxterf8 was
correspondingly low. With the notable exceptions of short, but authoritative, articles on
the implications of the NPT for Australia by Bu1179 and Titterton, 80 no thorough
analysis of the possible effects of the treaty existed in Australia, outside government,
prior to its opening for signature. As a result, government-based deliberations on the
NPT (and on wider nuclear questions) were unencumbered - and uninformed - by any
need to take external opinion, whether public, specialist or academic, seriously into
account.

The State Energy Authorities

A second issue beyond the internal government debate on the defence implications of
nuclear power involved the question of introducing nuclear power generating capacity
in Australia during a period of rapidly rising demand for electricity, and deep concern

over the long-term future of conventional fuel supplies. 81 Given the dual and indivisible
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nature of nuclear technology when applied to either power generation or nuclear
weapons, it was inevitable that the two questions woul~ become closely linked.
Accession by Australia to the NPT would mean that all nuclear installations,
including those ostensibly for use only for electrical power generation, would
immediately become subject to diversion safeguards monitoring by inspectors from the
International Atomic Energy Agency, as required by Article III. As a result, any
attempt to divert fissionable material from a power generation application to weapons
use was almost certain to be detected.
By 1968, all Australian state electricity generating authorities had addressed
nuclear power as a possible alternative to conventional energy sources. Their interest
had been stimulated by the seemingly inexorable rise in demand for electrical power
which, by 1968, had seen them "racing against time to install additional generating
plant capacity". 82
One representative example of the degree of interest in nuclear power among
the states, an interest which helped to generate its legitimacy at the federal level, could
be seen in Western Australia, which had experienced a rapid acceleration of demand
for electrical power, driven largely by industrial expansion and the cost pressures
associated with meeting that demand. 83 Since Western Australia then possessed less
than three per cent of Australia's total reserves of readily accessible fossil fuels, and
was experiencing per capita energy consumption some 15% greater than the national
average (with a 70% dependence on oil fuels) it is not surprising that it should look to
nuclear power for salvation. 84
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Early enthusiasm for nuclear power generation was, however, tempered in all
states by the economic realities involved. As it became clear to the various state energy
generating authorities, and their political masters, that nuclear energy was not, nor
likely to become, the promised source of cheap and

a~uridant

energy, interest began to

wane.
The state energy generating authorities maintained a watching brief for most of
the succeeding decade, hoping for new nuclear technologies promising more viable
economics. Nevertheless, in 1968 - arguably the zenith for any politically acceptable
national nuclear power generation policy - the unit cost of producing energy from
nuclear fuels in Australia simply could not compete with that of fossil fuels. 85 While
Australia possessed large reserves of uranium ore, its local enrichment to a form usable
in the newer, more technologically advanced fast breeder reactors, was still many years
away, forcing projected reliance on overseas fuel suppliers. Even up to 1975, the
technological characteristics of individual nuclear power plants precluded their use by
state energy authorities, since the smallest reactor with any chance of economic
viability was, at 600 - 700 MW output, rated at around twice the usable capacity of the
state electricity grids. 86
As a result, the prospective advantages which a nuclear non-proliferation treaty
promised for peaceful-use power generation in Australia were easily exaggerated. At
least in the short term, nuclear power generation throughout Australia appeared set to
remain at the preliminary planning stage, making concerns about international
inspection of nuclear facilities largely moot. While the ill-fated Jervis Bay 500 MW
nuclear power plant project began, in October 1969, as a combined AAEC and Gorton
initiative aimed at introducing commercial nuclear power generation into Australia, it is
unlikely that even the N.S.W. electricity grid, the largest in the country, could have

85

One of the most significant long-term costs of nuclear power generation, and one unique to it, is the
cost associated with the de-commissioning of generating plants. These costs, which form part of the total
costs of ownership of nuclear generation capacity, have been estimated to be at least US $100 million (in
1979 dollars). for each nuclear generating station in the United States. Robotham, F. P. (1979). The case
against. In E. W. Titterton & F. P. Robotham, Uranium: Energy source for the future? (pp. 112-194). At
p. 162.
86

This was certainly the case in Western Australia, whose State Electricity Commission initiated a
preliminary study of the feasibility of nuclear power generation. The Report concluded that a nuclear
power generation reactor unit would only be economically viable if around half its output of superheated, high pressure steam could be sold for immediate use in an adjacent manufacturing process.
Burmot Australia Pty Ltd. (1975). Preliminary feasibility study of nuclear power plant with process
steam generation). Sydney: Author. At pp. 2-3.

65

accommodated a single generating unit of that size. Thus, the aspirations of the Gorton
Government for a significant nuclear power

genera~ion

industry in Australia, while

creating tensions with at least one state Coalition government, 87 were never built on
solid ground. Any concerns which Prime Minister. Gorton, Minister for National
Development Fairbairn, or Minister for Defence Fairhall may have felt, during early
1968, over the impact of the NPT were, at least on this issue, unfounded.
Nevertheless, the states continued to monitor the development of nuclear power
generation technologies for several years. Only after 1979 did the State Energy
Commission of Western Australia appear to abandon its nuclear power generation
planning option. 88

The Uranium Mining Industry

A further factor to be considered in the domestic context of Australia's nuclear policy
debate, in the months leading up to the opening of the NPT, is the influence of the
uranium mining industry. The potential value of Australia's uranium deposits, both in
financial and political terms, is immense. With approximately 30 per cent of the world's
low-cost reserves, Australia is currently the third largest exporter of uranium ore
concentrates, having exported 5,989 tonnes of "yellowcake" (uranium oxide) in the
1998-1999 financial year. 89 Moreover, 339 of the 434 power reactors in operation
around the world in that year were operated by countries to which Australia supplied
uranium. These reactors produced 13 per cent of the world's total electricity output. 90
In the middle years of the nineteen sixties, however, the uranium exploration
and mining industries were at a low ebb, not helped by Minister for National
Development Fairbairn's 1967 export embargo. The early post-war boom in uranium
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exploration, stimulated by its apparent scarcity around the world, by burgeoning
markets in America and Britain, and by a perceived n_eed by Australian governments to
prove up and conserve reserves for future domestic use, had long since faded. The price
ofuranium, at around US $6 per pound by January 19.69, had been depressed since the
mid-1950s, and would remain so until the sudden quadrupling of the world crude oil
price in 1974. In addition, the United States' 1964 embargo on uranium imports, which
quarantined seventy per cent of world demand at that time, had effectively destroyed
the world uranium market. 91
Nevertheless, by the late 1960s, many other non-communist nations were
beginning. to expand their peaceful nuclear energy programmes at increasing rates,
which received a further boost from the 1974 "energy crisis". The result was a new
~.

exploration boom in Australia, now undertaken by large mining companies rather than
individual prospectors, and well under way by mid-1968. 92
The potential ability of the reviving uranium mining industry to make a
difference at the Cabinet table may have seemed significant to an uninformed observer.
In reality, however, the industry's options were limited by the firm grip of the Atomic
Energy Act (Cth.) 1953. Under Sections 17 and 18, the Australian Atomic Energy

Commission enjoyed wide and discretionary powers to control all phases of uranium
exploration, mining, milling and export activities. Through the Commission, the
Federal government exercised complete legislative control over the industry, reinforced
by its external affairs "head of power" under S. 51 (XXIX) of the Australian
Constitution.
As a result, the concerns of the uranium mining industry itself (in contrast to
those later imputed to it by the "bomb lobby" in regard, for example, to the potential for
industrial espionage by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors) were barely
discernible as the Australian government and bureaucracy grappled with the looming
NPT during 1967 and 1968. Indeed, no relevant policy development document,
whether from the nuclear advocates at the AAEC or the Defence establishment, or from
DEA itself, contains any direct reference to uranium industry representations or
concerns.
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Individual influence

Finally, the Australian nuclear policy debate must be understood in terms of the roles
played by individuals, both within and outside government, in its development. In
analysing Australia's nuclear history, we must take account of the effects of the actions
of influential individuals, although not to the exclusion of more institutional or
systemically-focused perspectives. In particular, the effect of the nuclear advocacy of
Sir Philip Baxter, Chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission from 1965
to 1973, on his Minister, David Fairbairn (Minister for National Development during
1968) and on Cabinet decision-making should not be discounted.
Nor should the individual contributions of M.R. Booker, Paul Hasluck or John
Gorton himself. Each brought his own aspirations, convictions and biases to bear on the
public or governmental debate over nuclear questions generally, and over the NPT in
particular. The fact that none enjoyed a decisive edge in the medium-to-long term does
not reduce the importance of their distinctive contributions, although, in Hasluck's case,
this was largely negative.
Much has been written about the influence of Sir Philip Baxter on Australia's
nuclear policy debate. 93 As the head of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission,
Baxter was in a position from which he could be expected to provide definitive
technical guidance to government on all nuclear matters, through his Minister, David
Fairbairn. Baxter was empowered by Sections 17 (3) and (4) (a) (i) of the Atomic
Energy Act 1953- 1973 (Cth.) to "make recommendations to the Minister in relation to

activities of the Commonwealth . . . for the purpose of ensuring the provision of ...
uranium or atomic energy for the defence ofthe Commonwealth."
However, Baxter's influence in fact extended well beyond what might
reasonably have been expected, given his position and authority. Aided and supported
by the forceful style of the Executive Member of the Commission, Maurice Timbs, the
Commission's Chairman regarded nuclear affairs almost as his own official fiefdom, to
be guarded and defended against all-comers. 94 Indeed, the strength and durability of
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Baxter's private influence over public policy can be seen in observations made from
both sides of the political fence. As Moyal reports, former Liberal Prime Minister
William McMahon recalled, in 1975, that it was Baxter who, within both Government
and Commission circles, "pressed strenuously for the production of nuclear
weapons. "95
But it was R.F.X. Connor who, from the Labor Opposition benches in the
House of Representatives, claimed in 1970 that behind the delay by the Coalition
Government in ratifying the NPT lay "the grey eminence, or evil genius . . . of this
Government and the Prime Minister, namely the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission. It has been implacably and consistently opposed to this Treaty. "96
In support of those views, and from a senior position within the foreign affairs

bureaucracy, M.R. Booker (First

Assi~tant

Secretary in Division II of the Department

of External Affairs) guided and shepherded the evolution of Australian government
policy towards the burgeoning NPT during the year leading up to its conclusion. An
overview of his efforts, made possible by the release into the public domain of
documentary evidence by the Australian Archives, leaves no room for doubt about the
strength of his commitment to the cause of nuclear self-denial for Australia and his
opposition to the "bomb lobby". It also illustrates the level of influence he was able to
bring to bear on various nuclear policy studies within his Department. 97
One example, from many, is Booker's Minute to Minister Hasluck, following a
meeting of the NPT Inter-Departmental Working Group on 23 July 1968. As agreed
between Prime Minister Gorton and Hasluck, the Group was to make recommendations
to Cabinet, through Hasluck, on whether Australia should immediately sign the Treaty.
In his Minute, Booker made plain to his Minister the corporate view of the Department

of External Affairs on the question; namely, that Australia's signature on the Treaty
would "fortify our own diplomatic efforts [on nuclear non-proliferation]". 98
Nevertheless, as a cautious and experienced bureaucratic servant of a Minister
well known for his suspicion of bureaucratic "capture", Booker was careful to set out
the arguments against signing the Treaty. To this end, he offered three points. First,
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signature would generate increasing political pressure to ratify, notwithstanding any
reservations the Government may assert. Second, early signature would weaken
Australia's ability to carry its own views on the interpretation of the Treaty, especially
with the nuclear weapon states, since it would be regarded as already committed to
ratification. Finally, Booker pointed out, Australia should wait to see whether "key
countries in our own area", as well as "the important near-nuclear countries" were
prepared to sign before doing so itself. 99
On each point, Booker laid out the counter-argument, thereby reinforcing the
Department's (and his own) view that Australia should immediately sign the NPT,
while he continued to appear faultlessly even-handed. Australia, Booker reminded his
Minister, had already committed itself to supporting an effective NPT. Again, Australia
could make ratification dependent on acceptance of its views on treaty interpretation,
while a co-ordinated approach to ratification (with states such as Japan, and Pakistan)
may dispel fears about future nuclear security. 100
It is evident that, in Booker, senior diplomats at DEA such as its Secretary, Sir
James Plimsoll and his Deputy, Sir Laurence Mcintyre - and other advocates of nuclear
non-proliferation - had a formidable ally. Well versed in the tactics and strategies of
high-level policy development, and furnished with comprehensive and timely
intelligence on NPT negotiations in Geneva, Booker was able to guide Australia's NPT
policy development towards rejection of the "bomb lobby"'s nuclear advocacy, and
towards the eventual total repudiation of all aggressive or deterrent nuclear ambitions.

Beyond the daily ebb and flow of nuclear policy considerations, however, stood the
enigmatic figures of Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck, and Prime Minister
John Gorton. In his own way, each made a lasting contribution to the development of
Australian nuclear policy, although sometimes in unexpected ways. Gorton (whose
"accidental" elevation to Prime Minister, following the disappearance ofHarold Holt in
the surf at Cheviot Beach, Victoria, on 17 December 1967, was a motif for much of his
I

leadership style) is perhaps Australia's most idiosyncratic, individualistic leader. 101 As a
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politician committed to centralism within the Australian federation, ill-disposed to bend
to the wishes of any group beyond Parliamentary Party and electorate, and with a
distinctly "presidential" approach to Cabinet government, Gorton could be expected to
prevail in important policy areas. 102 Not the least ofthe~e was the nuclear arena.
As a nationalist, Gorton had become greatly concerned about Australia's
security in the years between 1970 and 1990, and had concluded that long-term reliance
on the United States for protection under the ANZUS Treaty was too great a risk to
take. 103 The solution for Australia lay, in Gorton's view, in enhancing its industrial and
technological strength, backed up by strenuous efforts to retain American protection
guarantees for as long as possible.
In short, Australia should be able, through its own resources, to resist pressure even nuclear pressure - from any quarter. 104 In view of the nature of the terms of the
NPT- renunciation of a nuclear weapons programme for at least twenty-five years, its
inherent discriminatory nature (and the fact that near-nuclear states such as India, Israel
and Japan initially had no intention of signing it) - it is reasonable to see Gorton's
influence in Australia's reluctance to sign. As Trengrove has pointed out, he simply saw
no point in closing off, possibly permanently, Australia's nuclear deterrent options. 105
In this, he was successful during the term of his premiership.
Paul Hasluck's influence on nuclear matters is less clear. He had been beaten
(on the second ballot of a four-way contest) for the leadership of the Liberal Party and, thus, the office ofPrime Minister- by Gorton on 9 January 1968. 106 As Minister
for External Affairs from 24 April 1964 to 11 February 1969, he had directed
Australia's foreign policy during a difficult period, marked by the depths of the Cold
War and by involvement in the Vietnam War.
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Despite his belief that the prevention of armed aggression towards Australia
was essential to all other objectives, 107 there is no evidence that he regarded an
independent Australian nuclear deterrent as indispensable to that goal. Indeed, his deep
involvement in securing Australia's military involvemef!t in Vietnam, at the side of the
Americans, may well have reinforced his belief in the security guarantees they had
extended to Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. In the regional context, his consistent
focus was on the consequences for Australia of an expansionist and aggressive
Communist China. 108
Nevertheless, as noted earlier, Hasluck made no recorded contribution to the
nuclear policy debate emerging from his Department as the NPT grew to maturity.
Whatever the reason, Hasluck's demonstrated lack of interest in the question of
Australia's nuclear deterrent strategy in fact left the field open for other protagonists, on
both sides of the question.
Thus, the nuclear advocates at the Department of Defence and the Australian
Atomic Energy Commission, together with Gorton himself, did not have to reckon with
a Minister for External Affairs who endorsed and championed, in Cabinet and
elsewhere, the views of his senior bureaucrats. By the same token, the nuclear nonproliferation advocates within the academy, as well as in DEA, did not benefit from the
overt support of a senior Cabinet Minister with responsibility for foreign affairs.
In these ways, the two most senior figures in Australian public life with ultimate
decision-making responsibility in nuclear matters provided a perplexing contrast; one, a
idiosyncratic nuclear idealist, the other demonstrably uninterested in nuclear policy
development. To this extent, the degree of their influence, as individuals, on the
direction of Australian nuclear policy is difficult to judge.

Conclusion
This is the domestic and international context within which Australia developed its
response to the text of the draft Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They stand as guide
and explanation for the statements and actions of those in the federal bureaucracy, in
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political office, in academic life, and involved in the practical application of nuclear
technology, who negotiated and arbitrated Australia's nuclear future.
The beginnings of Australia's commitment and engagement in the cause of
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, a stance .which is now understood and
acknowledged around the world, can be traced to the dialogue on the draft NPT which
developed between officers within Australia's Department of External Affairs and the
United States' Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Dating from at least the early months of 1967, this relationship established the
foundations for the wider scope of non-proliferation co~operation (and recalcitrance) in
relations between America and Australia during a period when a significant group
within Australia continued to advocate the acquisition of an independent nuclear
deterrent. 109 It is to this developing relationship that the study now turns.
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CHAPTER THREE

TALKING TO AMERICA: THE DYNAMICS OF NUCLEAR
POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
In 1995 Michael Wilson, an Australian commentator on nuclear affairs, noted that

"[s]cepticism and mistrust characterise the attitudes of many Australians towards
nuclear energy" .1 Although Wilson was writing in the context of preparations for the
1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference/ his reading of national sentiment rings
true in respect of the range of nuclear questions which Australia had confronted almost
thirty years earlier.
The ambivalence and ambiguities evident within the Australian nuclear debate
in the years leading up to the inception of the NPT in 1968 have been discussed earlier.
One element of that debate was certainly a measure of scepticism and mistrust within
the broad community, although it was expressed publicly only in muted tones. More
directly evident, thirty years later, is the part played by nuclear scepticism within
government as a more coherent nuclear policy developed. 3

They underlie the future nuclear policy directions within government
bureaucracies, the Australian nuclear science community and other academic
commentators which were manifest in the NPT policy development process. 4 More
specifically, they served as an impetus behind the determination of senior officers
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within the. Department of External Affairs (arguably among the best equipped to do so)
to resist the nuclear advocacy ofthe "bomb lobby".
This chapter begins by examining the struggle for Australian nuclear policy
dominance - a struggle in which the interests, agendas; global perspectives and biases
of individuals and organisations, on both sides of the question, were evident in their
attempts to justify their policy positions through argument and intellectual rigour. In
doing so, it will provide a foundation for later analysis of the concerns which Australia
expressed to the United States over its difficulties with the terms of the Draft NPT. At
the same time, it will help to explain and clarify the. form and extent of Australia's
influence over early NPT interpretations.
Furthermore, the growing strength ofDEA's policy position will be discussed in
the context of the Department's close

~ntelligence

relationship with the United States

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on treaty negotiations. The
significance of that relationship should not be discounted, since it was this Agency of
the State Department of the United States Government which was charged with
responsibility for negotiating the terms of the NPT with their Soviet counterparts at
Geneva.
In Australia, the two agencies of government which are representative of the
wider scope of the nuclear policy debate were the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission and the Commonwealth Department of External Affairs (DEA). Each was
a central participant in the debate, and each generated comprehensive documentary
evidence, now released by the Australian Archives, of its attempts to gain nuclear
policy ascendancy.
That evidence will be used to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the
positions of each, in order to assess the coherence of their respective policy
assumptions and conclusions. The importance of such an analysis can be measured by
the enduring effect of the debate on Australia's nuclear policy agenda. As Walsh notes,
"In a four-year period from Prime Minister Gorton to Prime Minister Whitlam,

Australian nuclear policy had shifted from one of autonomy to one of renunciation. "5
The legacy of that change remains strong today.
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DEA and ACDA: A Strengthening Relationship
It is an axiom of international relations that allies talk to each other on matters of

mutual interest and concern. As de jure equal partners,. with New Zealand, in a Pacific
Region mutual defence alliance, 6 the United States and Australia may have been
expected to pursue a defence and security relationship marked by free exchange of all
information relevant to that alliance. As far as nuclear non-proliferation matters were
concerned, such a free exchange was not - at least initially - evident.
Australia had, for many years, played a double hand in its dealings with the US
on the question of nuclear diffusion. Thus, while maintaining a modest, safeguarded,
peaceful nuclear programme centred on university-based research efforts, and the two
Australian Atomic Energy Commission research reactors at Lucas Heights, Sydney/
Australia continued to keep one eye on the independent nuclear weapon prize. Whether
through procurement from the United Kingdom (between 1956 and 1963) or through
possible indigenous development (1964 to 1972), that option remained as a sub-text in
US I Australian non-proliferation discussions until the election of the Whitlam Labor
Government on 5 December 1972. 8
In a domestic sense, Australia's Department of External Affairs was, for a
number of reasons, a natural focus of attempts to engage Australia, unequivocally, in
international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. First, its
diplomatic function gave it an ability to build a dynamic sense of the focus, direction
and extent of political, economic and social change on a world scale, through analysis
and dissemination of its daily cable traffic with Australia's overseas diplomatic posts. 9
That proximity to world events, many of which involved war, the threat of war, or civil
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unrest, gave senior officers at DBA the intellectual authority (and a strong rationale) for
counselling caution in response to the nuclear warriors at the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission and the Department of Defence. They were, after all, in the business of
international diplomacy.
Second, being charged with the practical conduct of Australia's international
relations, DBA was well aware of the nature and strength of threats to national security.
Through its contacts with the foreign affairs bureaucracies and diplomatic corps of
other governments, it maintained a sophisticated corporate understanding of the
reciprocal perceptions of Australia's own intentions which were held by other states in
the region, and beyond. It was, therefore, well placed to weigh the need to deter
possible challenges to Australia's sovereignty and interests against the benefits of
diplomatic engagement and renunciation of deterrent arrangements, whether
conventional or nuclear. 10
On this count, however, a note of caution is necessary. The depth and accuracy
of Australian appreciation of regional threats, such as that perceived as emanating from
the People's Republic of China, is ultimately based on assessments of the intentions of
a state's political leadership. In a relatively opaque society and polity such as that of
mainland China, those assessments are potentially subject to significant inaccuracies. 11
Assessment of the response of the leaders of such states which are based on
assumptions of rationality or cultural imperatives (such as "saving face") may prove to
be wide of the mark, even when full diplomatic dialogue is in place.
A third factor evident in the non-proliferation stance of DBA was a level of
disquiet among its senior officers concerning the commitment of the United States to
10
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Australia's security under its ANZUS obligations. As noted earlier, this was frequently
expressed within the Department using the rhetoric_al question "Would the United
States ... risk San Francisco for Sydney?" 12 Unlike the independent deterrent
proponents of the "bomb lobby", who denied that the United States would do any such
thing, 13 DEA was increasingly answering its own question in terms of the arcane
reciprocal psychology which is inherent in mutual deterrence scenarios.
In other words, it is clear from the documentary record that senior DEA policy

planners, led by M.R. Booker, were convinced of the necessity and effectiveness of the
US Cold War strategy known as "mutually assured destruction". Since this perspective
forms the spring from which Australia's eventual nuclear renunciation flowed, the
reasoning behind it deserves to be recorded in greater detail:
Major nuclear powers are always going to behave with great caution in situations
involving risk of nuclear counter-action. The point is, therefore, not whether the United
States can be relied upon to act in a particular way but that the other side cannot
discount the possibility of United States action. Once nations enter the area of potential
nuclear conflict they know they are leaving the world of calculation and controlled
action and can lose control of their destinies with great suddeness [sic]. In Australia's
case, as a close ally of the United States we can make a reasonable assessment that it is
possible the United States would take risk [sic] to protect us. We do not have to be
certain of this, all that is necessary is uncertainty in the mind of our possible nuclear
14
opponent. (Emphases added)

It is not surprising, m v1ew of this strategic premise, that the Department of

External Affairs was laying the groundwork for the development of an increasingly
important relationship between itself and America's primary agency with responsibility
for non-proliferation matters, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA). 15 It was imperative that Australia reinforce the probability of US nuclear
protection by making plain to Washington its willingness to co-operate on the question
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of nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the relationship had been evolving for some
time prior to its most serious test - on the terms of the final Draft of the NPT - in April
1968. 16 It had been given a strong foundation through the willingness of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission to share with Austr<;tlia its understanding of the role
and importance of the new NPT.
The USAEC (America's nuclear regulatory body until its replacement in 1974) 17
had, in late 1967, provided Australia with an appreciation of the implications of the
developing draft non-proliferation treaty for existing nuclear material diversion
safeguards. In a document "passed over [to Australia] during negotiations" the USAEC
outlined its views on how the NPT safeguards requirements would complement and
extend those already in place under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy
. v·1enna. 1s
A gency m
The US agency's allusion to the scope of America's previously announced offer
to allow IAEA safeguards inspection of all its peaceful-use nuclear facilities was a
component of later Australia I United States negotiations. At this earlier stage, however,
it comprised just one facet of the body of information on American intentions and
interpretations concerning the proposed NPT, to which Australia (in reality, the DBA)
was gaining increasing access. Such intelligence would serve DBA well in its successful
resistance against the nuclear zeal of its foremost bomb lobby protagonist - the
Australian Atomic Energy Commission.
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Nuclear Warrior: The Australian Atomic Energy Commission
The growing strength of the non-proliferation advocates at DEA during 1967 and early
1968 was matched by the continuing intransigence of the bomb lobby's front line - the
Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC). 19 The predominance at the AAEC of
Sir Philip Baxter's views on the nuclear weapon option has been discussed in Chapter
Two, in relation to the domestic context of Australia's non-proliferation policy
development process. The extent of Baxter's influence on the substance of NPT policy
discussion papers emanating from the Commission is evident from the private
correspondence of one senior officer at DEA.
J. L. Allen, although not directly involved in nuclear matters/0 was sufficiently
alarmed by the strength of the Commission's obvious attachment to the nuclear option to
make informal approaches to colleagues with direct responsibility for prosecuting
DEA's nuclear policy development. 21 His comments are illuminating.
In a letter to Assistant Secretary (Defence Liaison Branch) Pritchett on 11 March
1968, Allen laid out a summary of the Commission's reaction to the prospect of
curtailment of any Australian nuclear weapons acquisition plans. Accusing it of
"exaggeration ... distortion ... fabrication . . . [and] sticking their nose into other
people's business (of foreign and defence policies) .... ", he made the following
observation:

So far Australia has retained its nuclear options. This retention spells Big Business for
the AAEC. Relinquishing these options means their losing all this extra business,
22
thereby greatly limiting their scope, importance, etc.

19

The Australian Atomic Energy Commission was constituted under the terms of Division 1, Part II of
the Atomic Energy Act 1953-1973 (Cth.).
20

Allen was a senior officer in the Economic Relations Branch ofDEA during early 1968. Document A
1838/346: 719110/6. Pt. 3. [168]. Canberra: Australian Archives.
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The Department of External Affairs received the Commission's first version of its objections to the
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In a second letter dated 3 Aprill968 to R.W. Furlonger, a diplomatic officer at
the Australian Embassy in Washington, he reiterated that assessment, adding a rider on
the predisposition of the bomb lobby's most senior individual member:

I am [also] afraid Gorton might be our main problem. With something of a "fortress

Australia" attitude, I have a hunch he is inclined to be impressed by the warnings from
23
[Minister for National Development] Fairbairn (alias AAEC).

Allen's alarm at the Commission's dedicated defence of its interests, apparently at any
expense, is confirmed by the many policy documents the AAEC produced in support of
its campaign against the NPT. The AAEC undertook a carefully targeted programme of
dissemination of its nuclear policy positions, whether or not they lay within its remit.
By doing so, it hoped to convince a range of decision-makers within the Gorton
Ministry (through relevant Departments) of both the inherent dangers of the NPT, and
the wisdom of retaining the nuclear weapon option. 24
The Commission's work in developing its policy positions resulted in an
analytically complex critique of the international security, international relations, and
technical premises underlying the Draft Treaty. Its importance lay in the depth and
breadth of its analysis. By examining the new treaty's elements in such a comprehensive
way, the Commission helped its opponents at DBA to crystallise their counterarguments in support of a non-proliferation treaty. For this reason, the policy work of
the Australian Atomic Energy Commission will be examined in some detail.

The Commission began its campaign early in February 1968 with a carefully argued
paper submitted to M.R. Booker, Deputy Secretary at the Department of External
Affairs? 5 In it, the Executive Member of the Commission, Maurice Timbs, laid out a
series of concerns and objections to the terms of Article III of the Draft NPT, as tabled

23
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simultaneously by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Eighteen Nations
Disarmament Committee at Geneva on 18 January 196.8. 26
The terms of Article III of the Draft NPT (which survived, intact, in the final text
of the Treaty) required all non-nuclear weapon States Parties to accept an enhanced
safeguards regime, which was to be imposed under the terms of the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. Its purpose would be to oversee and verify
adherence by those states to their obligations under the Treaty not to divert "nuclear
energy" from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. In addition,
Article III required all States Parties not to provide any "source or special fissionable
material", or associated equipment used for its production, processing or use, to any
non-nuclear weapon state unless that material was subject to such safeguards. 27
The terms of Article III further sought to avoid, through its operation, any denial
of the development of nuclear energy technologies for peaceful purposes. Finally, they
called for the conclusion of bilateral Safeguard Agreements between the IAEA and
individual states (or groups of states) in order to meet those objectives. While the
Commission's analysis of the implications of Article III for Australia is wide-ranging,
speculative and, to some extent, discursive, its thrust can be summarised as follows:

•

Australian accession to the NPT would mean that it would immediately be
bound by the terms of the Statute of the IAEA . Specifically, Article III A 5 of the
Statute would prevent Australia from "acquiring or manufacturing ... a defensive
nuclear weapons system, nuclear submarines (whether nuclear-armed or not),
nuclear-powered surface warships [and] ... merchant ships, [and] explosive nuclear
devices for peaceful purposes. "28

•

Any safeguards regime would immediately "affect" the production, use and
export of uranium and radioactive beach sand minerals. Inspections would involve

26

See Appendix II. International negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. (1969). Washington, DC: United .States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At p. 98.
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all of Australia's nuclear activities, such as the mining of uranium, the research work
of defence laboratories, the enrichment of

uraniu~,

and the operation of nuclear

reactors.Z 9

•

IAEA Safeguards Inspectors, with unfettered access to all nuclear sites, would
"present a threat to national and commercial security ... with Australia having [little
or no] right under the Statute to reject Inspectors nominated by the Agency". 30

•

Having signed the NPT, Australia would be bound by the terms of its preexisting bilateral Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which could be amended
unilaterally by the Agency's Board of Governors at any time, even against
Australia's opposition. 31 Furthermore, Australia would be powerless to prevent any

L

amendment sought by the United States or the Soviet Union, and equally powerless
to secure any amendments which were unacceptable to either superpower.

•

The cost of the enhanced safeguards regime would fall relatively more heavily
on Australia's shoulders than on most other states, since it would be subject to a
greater than average rate of inspection. Australia's nuclear-related activities (such as
the mining and milling of uranium ores) would therefore result in it being required
to contribute relatively more of the estimated $US150-200 million annual
programme cost than other non-nuclear weapon states which did not undertake
peaceful nuclear activities. 32

The AAEC's paper to Deputy Secretary Booker on the implications of Article III of the
Draft NPT was revised at least twice as the Commission refined its arguments against
the new Draft Treaty, although the general thrust of its arguments remained the same.
More significantly, the Commission also took the unusual step of moving beyond the
terms of its constituted authority by circulating within government a paper whose stated

29
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purpose was "to examine the implications and consequences to Australia of becoming a
party to the NPT." 33
It should be noted that nothing in Division 2, Section 17 of the Atomic Energy

Act 1953-1973: "Functions and Powers of the

Co~ission"

can be interpreted as

allowing the Commission licence to offer advice beyond that referred to in Section 17
(4) (a) (i):
The [various] functions of the Commission specified in sub-section ( 1) shall be
performed only ... for the purpose of ensuring the provision of ... uranium or atomic
energy for the defence of the Commonwealth.

In fact, the Commission's paper, dated 22 February 1968, went far beyond those limits

in its consideration of the foreign affairs, security and defence implications of
Australian signature of the NPT. Whatever the merits of its argument (to be considered
below) it must be described as an extraordinary attempt by a subordinate technical
agency of a Commonwealth Department to influence Cabinet-level decisions on a
matter of fundamental importance to national interests and security.
The second paper (also submitted to M.R. Booker by AAEC Executive Member
Timbs) made a forceful and more comprehensive case against the new Draft Treaty. It
consisted of a general review, followed by a detailed examination of each Article (again
to be considered below). The paper began with rejection of the two desiderata contained
in the NPT Preamble - namely the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and a treaty on
general and complete disarmament.
Describing the Preamble as "if not cynical, [then] idealistic to the point of
unreality", 34 the paper maintained that the goal of complete disarmament had
disappeared with the advent of nuclear weapons. Armaments, rather than being a
symptom of tension between states (as had been the case in the pre-nuclear era), had
themselves become a cause of that tension. Furthermore, with the rapid pace of
technological innovation (itself a source of political instability) "forces in being" rather
than industrial potential were now the primary force to be reckoned with. 35
33
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All this meant, the Commission argued, that the prime source of international
tension would be the nuclear powers, since "there is no problem for a nuclear-armed
nation in concealing preparations for nuclear war. "36 The catalyst for such a situation
would be the development of a credible nuclear weapons capability by Communist
China.
The paper completed its geo-political nuclear critique by emphasising that the
Soviet Union would continue to exacerbate international tensions, maintain its nuclear
forces indefinitely, and reject any efforts aimed at international arms control. Whatever
the Soviets' motives for concluding a nuclear non-proliferation pact, they were certainly
not to be equated with acceptance of control measures over their own armaments.
Furthermore, the paper effectively placed the United States, so far as these issues were
concerned, in the same category as the Soviet Union. 37 In these circumstances, the
implications for Australia, were it to sign the treaty, would involve a "voluntary
abnegation of sovereignty in the absence of any agreement for general and complete
disarmament ... and in circumstances where controls are to be applied only to the nonnuclear weapons states. "38

These two comprehensive policy papers were complemented by a third, prepared by
technical officers in the Commission in conjunction with their counterparts at the
Departments of Defence and Supply. Given the paper's conclusion, those who
contributed to it from within those Departments can be placed securely under the aegis
of the "bomb lobby". 39 Headed Technical Implications for Australia of the Draft Treaty
on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, its primary conclusion was that Australia

was being asked to ignore developments in nuclear technology which had brought
nuclear weapons production within the economic, industrial and technical capacity of
"the smaller advanced countries and some of the more advanced developing
countries. "40 The result for Australia was that, having denied itself a nuclear weapons
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option, it would become even more dependent on its defence alliances for security. The
present nuclear powers would simply grow in strength (and particularly so in the case of
China), as would new nuclear powers which ignored the treaty. The United States
would then become decreasingly likely to use its own nuclear capacity in defence of its
allies.
Furthermore, Australia would be subject to "industrial, defence and commercial
espionage" by highly-trained international inspectors "from both sides of the Iron
Curtain", operating with diplomatic immunity. Neither America nor the Soviet Union
would be required to do likewise. 41
Finally, Australia1s nuclear weapons technology would be frozen at a relatively
primitive stage, relative to other non-nuclear but technologically advanced countries.
This would result in a nuclear weapons. production lead-time of several years following
any withdrawal from the treaty. 42
In combination, the three policy position papers established a pattern of vigorous

and vehement opposition against the Draft NPT which, as discussed above, played a
central role in the consolidation and focus of Australia1s nuclear policies against the
option of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent force.

The initial reaction of senior officers at DEA to the Commission1s onslaught appears to
have been one of incredulity - in terms of the ferocity of the attack, the issues it
addressed, the arguments it presented and the precepts and assumptions underlying
them. As discussed earlier, and elaborated below, DEA (unlike the Australian Atomic
Energy Commission) was in possession of a growing body of intelligence from the US
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on the likely direction of the new treaty's
interpretation, and not merely on the structure of its text.
DEA's initial - though ad hoc - appraisal of the Commission1s first paper on the
implications of Article III of the Draft Treaty on safeguards arrangements was
consistently critical. For example, the Commission had asserted that any Safeguards
Agreements to which Australia was a Party would be interpreted by the United States,
pursuant to Article III A 5 of the Statute of the IAEA, as excluding Australia from any
nuclear-related research activities with both weapons and power generation
41

Ibid.
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applications. 43 As a DEA officer pointed out in marginal annotations, the Draft Treaty
did not prevent such research: since peaceful use and_weapons technology research are
ultimately indistinguishable, it simply could not do so.

44

Furthermore, the Commission argued, existing Safeguards Agreements,
including that between Australia and the IAEA, could be amended automatically to take
account of the requirements of the Draft Treaty. Non-nuclear weapon states such as
Australia would have no option but to accept any new obligations it imposed, however
onerous. 45 DEA's immediate annotated response was that no such arrangement had been
announced as a requirement of the Draft Treaty by the U.S. and Soviet negotiators in
Geneva.
Again, the Commission argued that Australia's signature on the NPT would
adversely affect its bilateral agreement with the United States on civil use nuclear
technology co-operation. Its assertion was that, since that agreement was already subject
to safeguards arrangements, Australia had nothing to gain from signing the NPT.
This was challenged by DEA as spurious. The Commission, it noted, appeared to
have taken the bilateral situation in isolation, without acknowledging any wider benefits
for Australia's national security of restricting nuclear weapons proliferation. 46
A fourth fallacious argument concerned the Commission's assertion that exports
of nuclear material (in Australia's case uranium) were necessarily restricted by its
Safeguards Agreement in place with the IAEA prior to NPT signature, and that their
extension under the NPT requirements would further restrict Australia's export
potential. 47 For this to be so, the Commission appeared to be assuming that Australia
would be prepared to export its uranium to states outside the ambit of the NPT - those
which had refused to be committed to renunciation of nuclear weapons. That was an
assumption which, in the view of DEA, it was not open for the Commission to make
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(notwithstanding the fact that such a decision was outside its sphere of responsibility).
Export of uranium for exclusively peaceful use, to a. state under the protection of its
Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA, would not be restricted as long as that state
abided by its promise not to divert nuclear material to weapons manufacture.
Finally, the Commission's estimate of the cost to Australia of enforcing the
safeguards provisions of the NPT was based on erroneous assumptions. It reported that
the IAEA Inspector-General, A.D. McKnight (an Australian) had forecast an immediate
need for 1,600 Inspectors to administer safeguards requirements. The Commission
considered this to be a conservative estimate. However,in a recorded conversation with
officers at DEA while in Australia, McKnight had stated his present Inspectorate
strength at 30 officers. An additional 410 would be needed if all non-nuclear weapon
states, together with the US and UK,. required safeguards inspections. 48 A four-fold
discrepancy between a cited estimate and direct communication was, DEA noted,
difficult to reconcile.
These kinds of insupportable assumptions and arguments (to be further
discussed below) were repeated throughout this document and the two complementary
papers referred to above. Nevertheless, the deficiencies and inaccuracies they contained
were sufficiently serious to signal to the Commission's senior opponents in the
Department of External Affairs the importance and urgency of their rebuttal in detail.
This was doubly so because the Commission, through Executive Member Timbs, had
provided its arguments against signing the NPT, in full, to the Departments of Defence,
and Prime Minister and Cabinet, both of which contained significant elements of the
"bomb lobby."
In a covering letter to E. White, First Assistant Secretary at the Department of
Defence, Timbs had sought White's support for the Commission's arguments, including
those contained in its internal Nuclear Weapons Policy Paper, prepared at the direction
of Minister for National Development Fairbairn. 49 Timbs was careful, however, to
emphasise that the information was for a restricted audience at the Defence Department,
limited to White and Permanent Secretary Sir Henry Bland.
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DEA as Devil's Advocate: Playing the AAEC Against Itself
For the champions of non-proliferation at DEA, the nuclear activism of the Australian
Atomic Energy Commission (driven as it was by Sir Philip Baxter) could be countered
in two distinct ways. First, they could point out to decision-makers (especially, in the
first instance, Minister for External Affairs Hasluck) the flaws in the Commission's
assumptions, arguments and conclusions, in the hope that, by doing so, they would be
convinced of the merits ofDEA's alternative position.
Second, and more powerfully, DEA could present those flawed components of
the Commission's policy positions in concert with its own position, thereby allowing
their mutual incompatibility to work in favour of the latter. By testing the Commission's
hypotheses, DEA could build a synthet~c and convincing justification for its anti-nuclear
=--=-

stance. In the event, it attempted both courses of action.
A DEA internal policy development document, prepared in reaction to AAEC's
paper objecting to the terms of Article III of the Draft NPT, 50 demonstrates the first
process at work. 51 The paper is an effective demolition of the assumptions underlying
the Commission's objections to an enhanced safeguards regime for Australia. Taking
those objections in the· order addressed above, DEA dealt with the assertion that
adherence to the NPT would prohibit the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines,
surface warships and merchant shipping, since they "further[ ed] a military purpose" in
terms of Article III A 5 of the IAEA Statute. 52
DEA pointed out that the United States had already acknowledged the fact that
Article III of the Statute only precluded the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other
explosive devices, as stated in Article II of the Draft Treaty. It would not, therefore,
preclude the use of nuclear propulsion in any kind of vessel, whether surface warship,
submarine or merchant vessel. 53
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Second, the "effect" on Australia1S production, use and export of uranium, and
on its other nuclear activities, of an enhanced safeguards regime requiring on-site
inspections of nuclear facilities, was "greatly overstated". The "excessive trouble,
expense, industrial espionage, etc." of visits by IAEA Inspectors which the Commission
spoke of "were not considered onerous" by nuclear facility operators in the United
States. 54
As the United States had also pointed out, the enhanced safeguards regime
would simply augment that already in place. The specific rights and obligations of both
parties under a bilateral Safeguards Agreement would be open to some flexibility,
provided always that the IAEA could satisfy itself that diversion of materials was not
taking place. Furthermore, uranium mining would not be subject to inspection until the
ore had been refined to the oxide concentrate stage. 55
Third, the Commission1s prediction that IAENs inspectors - whom Australia
supposedly could not reject - would present a threat to national and commercial
security, was dismissed by DEA. There was no reason to expect that one of the basic
principles of the current Safeguards System - that unacceptable inspectors could (and
had been) rejected- would be altered with the advent of the NPT. Such a proposition
was "far-fetched". 56
1

Fourth, DEA rejected the Commission s assertion of Australia s lack of influence
1

over the terms of a revised "model" Safeguards Agreement, to be developed for all nonnuclear weapons states which signed the NPT. The assumption that any amendment
would be to Australia s detriment was "unjustifiable", as was Australia s assumed lack
1

1

of influence. Australia "ha[ d] a voice, as well as friends, on the IAEA Board of
Governors, of which Australia [was] virtually a permanent member." 57 It pointed out,
again, that the United States had already indicated that any change to a bilateral
agreement of this kind would require the consent of both Parties, and would not be
automatic. 58
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Finally, as to the cost of an enhanced safeguards regime to Australia, DEA held
to its initial response. The Commission's long-term estimate of 5,000 inspectors needed
to oversee a global Safeguards System compared poorly with IAEA Inspector-General
McKnight's estimate of 440, and was "clearly excessiv~." 59

The critique which DEA had levelled at the Commission's negative assessment of the
implications of the Draft Treaty showed, in its sustained and supported rejection of
many of the assumption made, that senior DEA bureaucrats could reasonably expect a

'

fair hearing from decision-makers. It was reasonable to suppose, for example, that
~

Minister Hasluck would be prepared seriously to consider supporting the case for
Australia's signature of the NPT within Cabinet. It was also reasonable to assume that

'
L

~

support for the principles of the NPT would receive significant opposition from the
bomb lobby, both from its bureaucratic elements at the Departments of Prime Minister
and Cabinet, Defence, National Development and Supply, and from their Ministerial
masters.
In the latter circumstances, DEA needed a strategy which was potentially
stronger than that provided by the mere demonstration of the flaws in the arguments of
the nuclear advocates. It needed a positive exposition of the manner in which
acceptance of the NPT and its principles could work for Australia's national interests
while, at the same time, working to make the world a less dangerous place.
That exposition would have to take account of, and dismiss with authoritative
argument and evidence, the alternative view. It would then use the rejected elements of
policy as a starting point or foundation for its own policy positions. The strength of the
contrast between the two alternative policy vectors would then become a decisive.factor
determining the shape of DEA Cabinet Submissions on whether or not to reject the
"bomb" and its lobbyists.
This second strategy represented, for DEA, the practical application of the
maxim that an opponent is more easily defeated by using his own weapons against him.
Nevertheless, the task of constructing a compelling case, and one capable of convincing
Cabinet to support the NPT, would be far more complex and challenging than the purely
negative exercise of criticism. DEA would, ultimately, prove equal to the task.
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Building a Case: DEA as Policy Activist
The senior policy planners at the Department of External Affairs did not, of course,
approach the question of accession to a global nuclear non-proliferation treaty from first
principles. In June 1966, for example, Cabinet had approved the transfer of safeguards
administration in respect of Australia's nuclear facilities and activities from the United
States to the International Atomic Energy Agency. 60 As a result, DBA had already
gained some experience in dealing with the activities and inspection requirements of the
IAEA Inspectorate. Nevertheless, the anxieties of thol:le harbouring nuclear ambitions
were relieved, at that time, by the fact that access to nuclear facilities was only granted,
under the terms of Australia's original IAEA Safeguards Agreement, at its own
discretion. 61
Moreover, through Australia's permanent presence on the Board of Governors of
the IAEA since 1957, the Department had built a comprehensive long-term
understanding of the political, legal and technical aspects of the Agency's work, and
through them an appreciation of its future role within the terms of the Draft Treaty.
Policy plarmers also had the benefit of a range of contemporaneous material and
expertise from within the DBA bureaucracy, and elsewhere, on many of the issues and
concerns they would have to address in developing a coherent case for NPT signature.
One important intellectual contribution was a study by Richard Butler, then a
diplomat attached to the Australian Embassy in Vienna, to the Australian Ambassador
to Austria, A.M. Morris. 62 In a paper dated December 1967, entitled Safeguards Under

a Non-Proliferation Treaty, 63 Butler sketched the implications for Australia of a
comprehensive nuclear diversion safeguards regime. In doing so, he foreshadowed
many of the objections of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission on safeguards,
while taking a far more optimistic view.

° Cabinet Decision No. 280 of 1 June 1966. Document A 1838/275: 719/10/6, Pt. 2. [18]. Annexe:
"Safeguards", (7 December 1966). Economic Relations Branch, Department of External Affairs.
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Butler emphasised at the outset that the general character of the IAEA's
inspection, verification and reporting obligations under its Statute (principally expressed
in Articles III and XII) meant that the final shape of a bilateral NPT Safeguards
Agreement between Australia and the Agency would only emerge in the course of
negotiation. It could not, therefore, be anticipated. Noting that the IAEA Safeguards
System Document64 (defining the scope of its verification activities) was then being
extended to encompass the entire nuclear fuel cycle, Butler observed that the efficiency
of inspection techniques was increasing, while, simultaneously, the impact of
inspections on nuclear sites was shrinking. In fact, research in a number of countries including the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States - was underway on
developing measurement techniques which did not destroy materials, did not interfere
with legitimate operations, and respected industrial secrecy. 65
As to Australia's influence over decisions made by the Board of Governors of
the IAEA, Butler noted that "we may take some comfort from the knowledge that the
present Inspector-General is an Australian [McKnight]." 66 More important was his
confidence that Australia's continued presence on the Agency's Board of Governors was
"ensured" through its technical qualification as the "most advanced" member nation of
the Agency in the South East Asia and Pacific Region. 67 In Butler's view, Australia's
influence was enhanced significantly by the terms of Article V (2) of the Draft Treaty
on amendments to its terms. This article provided, in part, that:
Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the
parties to the treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon states party to this
treaty and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are
68
Members of the Board of Governors ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency.

Although, in reality, this did not mean - as Butler expected - that future NPT
negotiations would take place within the forum of the IAEA, he correctly signalled that
the "basic authority of action in the working of the Non-Proliferation Treaty" would rest
64
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with the Agency. Australia's de facto permanent presence on its Board of Governors
could therefore be expected to deliver some

measur~

of influence over the ways in

which the treaty regime developed. 69
Finally, Butler briefly addressed the question& of the acceptability of IAEA
inspectors to NPT States Parties - based on their nationality - and the cost to states of
safeguards implementation. He noted that the acceptability of individual inspectors on
the territory of states was a contentious issue which could, and did, have direct effects
on the Agency's efforts. Inspectors could be, and had been, rejected.
One element of the notion of state sovereignty (a concept which cannot be
precisely defined in international law) is the ability to admit and expel aliens from its
territory. The relevance of state sovereignty to the concerns of the Australian Atomic
Energy Agency over admission of individual safeguards inspectors will be discussed
later, in relation to the direct Australia I US Canberra negotiations of April 1968. In
Butler's view, this issue was still far from resolution, while the question of cost
allocation remained similarly unresolved. The Soviet preference for individual national
responsibility for the costs associated with safeguards was disputed by a "Western
position" - not elaborated by Butler - that they should be borne out of the Agency's
regular budget. 70
As an observer of the work of the IAEA at close hand in Vienna, Butler's study
paper deserved careful consideration. His appreciation of Australia's influence at the
Agency, of the changing technical nature of inspection/verification work, and of related
security and cost issues, told a story substantially at odds with that of the Australian
Atomic Energy Commission. Its real value lay in its contribution to DEA's resistance
against the Commission's arguments on safeguards implementation, an important
element of the Department's synthesis of arguments for and against the non-proliferation
option.

Of more immediate help to DBA in its formulation of policy on the Draft NPT
(especially in its understanding of what Washington may have been prepared to concede
on interpretation of its terms) was a United States Aide-Memoire of 25 March 1968. 71
69
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The Aide-Memoire was presented to DEA following the joint tabling, at the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee, of the final text of the Draft NPT on 11 March by the
United States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, it served a dual purpose.
First, it sought to explain to the Australian Government Washington's current views on
how the treaty would work to curb nuclear weapons proliferation. Secondly, it made a
case for the importance of Australia's immediate support for the treaty through a "public
announcement", to be made prior to the resumed session of the 22nd General Assembly
of the United Nations, which would debate the terms of the Draft Treaty from 24
April. 72
For DEA, the essential elements of the United States' diplomatic communication
constituted confirmation of its understanding of the broad thrust of Washington's
prospective interpretation of the

Dra~

Treaty. That understanding had been building

since at least December 1966, when Australia's diplomatic representatives, principally
in Washington, New York and Geneva, began receiving (largely) unattributable
progress reports from America's negotiators, diplomats and nuclear administrators on
US I Soviet NPT negotiations at Geneva. 73
In addition to following the course of the negotiations, a steady stream of

diplomatic cable traffic between Canberra and Australian diplomatic posts m
Washington, New York, London and Geneva attested to the intense and rigorous
attention which DEA was giving to their outcomes.
The US representatives at Geneva, and at the United Nations in New York, as
well as senior officers of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in
Washington, proved willing to share with Australian diplomats a wealth of detailed
intelligence on many aspects of their negotiations with the Soviet Union. That
intelligence was immediately transmitted to DEA in Canberra, often in considerable
detail, and usually on a "non-attributable" basis to protect its American sources. Thus,
Washington's Aide-Memoire of 25 March served merely to authenticate and reinforce,
on a government-to-government level, DEA's understanding of US I Soviet negotiations
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on the terms of the NPT, the substance of which Australia's diplomats had already
partially gathered. It formed the framework around which DEA began to construct a
nuclear non-proliferation policy for Australia which was capable both of repudiating the
AAEC's nuclear weapons option, and sustaining support in Cabinet.

The Australia/US NPT Intelligence Relationship
In late 1967, the development of a coherent Australian nuclear policy which combined
an independent nuclear deterrent with rejection of the formative NPT, remained a
possibility. One of the most important element of its successful repudiation by DEA
was the extraordinary level of intelligence co-operation it enjoyed with the United
States. In fact, the depth and comprehensiveness of NPT intelligence links between
DEA and US agencies (predominantly the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency)
far exceeded what could reasonably be expected in regard to on-going and finely-poised
negotiations on such a weighty and sensitive matter.
Not only was Australia kept informed of their progress on an almost daily basis,
but it was also apprised of American perceptions of the positions of its major allies
(such as the NATO states) and other important non-aligned states such as India and the
United Arab Republic - both present at the Geneva negotiations.
Through this process, senior officers at DEA had an enormous knowledge
advantage over its policy rivals on many aspects of the new treaty's mechanisms and
operation. By tracing the evolution of this relationship, the study will develop a
summary of that intelligence, and its significance for DEA's exposition of an Australian
nuclear non-proliferation policy.

Early Relationships.

Representative examples of the extent and depth of early intelligence on the Geneva
negotiations are contained in two diplomatic cables to DEA from the Australian
Embassy in Washington. The first, dated 3 March 1967 and attributed to a named
ACDA officer, contains an updated interim Draft Treaty text, including, for the first
time, a Preamble. It also provides the text of a definition of a "nuclear weapon state",
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newly inserted in the Draft text in Article V (3). 74 This definition is of obvious
significance for the operation of the Treaty (and Australia's participation in it) in that the
designation of "nuclear weapon state" status would bestow on a state privileges denied
to non-nuclear weapon states. The most important of these - for Australia - was,
arguably, immunity from safeguards verification of peaceful-use nuclear facilities by
the futemational Atomic Energy Agency under the terms of Article 3 (1) of the NPT.
The second diplomatic cable, dated 24 August 1967, contains the text of an
"ACDA Background Note" detailing the Draft Treaty text as tabled simultaneously at
Geneva by the United States and the Soviet Union on that date. 75 Its significance lies in
the fact that it is a contemporaneous attempt by the United States to explain the current
position of negotiations to an ally which it had not, to that point, consulted on its
terms. 76
The most valuable source of early information on the status of the Geneva
negotiations was one without attribution, but probably originating from within ACDA. 77
The document's value lay in its indication of the strength of support for the various
principles and operational practices outlined in the Draft Treaty from the United States
itself, and from its NATO allies during consultations. Such intelligence was welcomed
by DEA as an indicator of those non-proliferation principles and practicalities to which,
thus far, the US had shown only equivocal attachment. To senior officers at DEA, they

74

Document A 1838/275: 719/10/6, Pt. 1. [76]. Canberra: Australian Archives. Classified "Secret".
"Nuclear weapon state" was defined as " ... one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon
or other nuclear explosive device prior to January I, 1967". This definition was incorporated, unchanged,
into Article IX (3) of the Final Text.
75

Document A 1838/275: 719/10/6, Pt. 1 [91]. Canberra: Australian Archives.

76

A US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency account of the history of the evolution of the NPT
states that:
In August, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a draft treaty, except for the
safeguard Article, and completed their consultations with their allies. On August 24 the two
countries tabled identical texts of a draft treaty at Geneva.

International negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapon. (1969).
Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At p. 78.
77

Document A 1838/346: TS 919/10/5. Pt. 1. [12]: 18 April 1967. Canberra: Australian Archives.
Classified "Secret and Guard". The means by which this document came into the hands ofDEA is not
known. It detailed changes to the Draft NPT which had been suggested by NATO allies (whether or not
the US accepted them), those "proposed and recommended" by the US, and changes suggested by the
US, though "not particularly favoured by it".

97

represented points of possible future influence over interpretation, if not necessarily
over substance.
In this context, the document's most significant. contribution was to indicate

those parts of the negotiating text which had been· incorporated (with or without
endorsement and support) by the United States from suggestions made by its NATO
allies. Among them was a proposal for five-yearly Review Conferences of States
Parties, in order to review the operation of the treaty and its purposes, as laid out in the
Preamble. This proposal was accepted by the United States, and later became Article
VITI (3) in the Final Text. 78
One of those preambular purposes had also been instigated by NATO states: that
one of the treaty's intentions was to achieve the cessation "at the earliest possible date"
of "the nuclear arms race". At the time of its inclusion in the Geneva negotiating
process, that proposal had not been accepted by the United States, although it was later
included as part of Article VI, using the term "at an early date". 79
As far as DEA was concerned, these developments indicated that the United
States appeared willing to take the views of its major allies seriously into account on
issues they regarded as being of fundamental importance. The US had shown itself
ready to place those views before those of its Russian rival, even though it remain
unconvinced of their value. The lesson drawn by DEA was that, within the entire
nuclear non-proliferation arena, the US was, apparently, willing to compromise on
detail in order to secure the main goal of a workable, and generally acceptable,
multilateral non-proliferation treaty.

As shown by its reaction to proposals from its allies, the US had followed a flexible
approach to negotiating its position. For example, it proposed to include in the text of
the Preamble the statement that:
.... all parties are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific
information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the
80
further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
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As a quid pro quo offered to the non-nuclear weapon states in exchange for their
promise not to engage in weapons manufacture, such a concession was clear evidence of
America's pragmatism on this score. It was a price the United States was willing to pay
in the face of an urgent need to curb the diffusion of nudear weapons.
Furthermore, the depth and consistency with which the United States consulted
Australia's diplomatic representatives on NPT negotiations (addressed below) suggests
that the US saw particular advantage in ensuring that Australia was aware, as soon as
possible, of its negotiated position with the Soviet Union. The US appeared to take the
view that such a policy was likely to increase the certainty of Australia's immediate
accession to the new treaty. An ally which was treated as an ally could reasonably be
expected to behave like one.

From early to mid-1967, until the conclusion of the final text of the treaty in
negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, 81 the breadth, depth and
frequency of intelligence communication between DEA and the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency was sustained. In fact, it appears that the willingness of
Australia's diplomats in Washington and Canberra to protect their intelligence sources
(normally middle-ranking officers representing ACDA at the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee negotiations at Geneva, or in Washington) was instrumental in
the trust which those officers showed in the security of their briefings. 82 This was
reinforced by the fact that no "inside" briefings were then being given to the US press
on the progress of the draft NPT text. 83
The documentary record of the early development of the NPT intelligence
relationship reveals a series of milestones marking the evolution of DEA's growing
understanding of the United States' negotiating position. First, it had become clear to
DEA, as early as mid-April 1967, that US President Johnson was taking a personal
81
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interest in the progress of the Geneva negotiations, and that the White House had been
exerting considerable pressure on the US negotiators to make meaningful progress. 84 It
appeared that Johnson, facing an election in November 1968, was searching for the kind
of political kudos which had accrued to President Kennedy following the conclusion of
the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. 85
Furthermore, to Australia's Washington observers, it seemed likely that fresh and
substantial progress towards arms control was now a central plank of Johnson's reelection strategy. 86 This level of focus on a positive outcome in the Geneva
negotiations, from the highest political level in Washington, could only benefit DEA's
own anti-nuclear, anti-independent deterrent strategy for Australia.
A second revelation concerning Washington's negotiating strategy appeared
from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the same time (although from a
different internal source). This consisted of a broad overview of the status of America's
negotiations with its European and other allies, as well as with important non-aligned
nations, on the projected form and operation of the NPT. 87 Its main effect was to
indicate to DBA the level of support for the NPT around the world, both in terms of the
non-proliferation principles it embodied, and the conditions under which such a treaty
was likely to find substantial support (such as the promise of joint security assurances to
non-nuclear countries from the nuclear weapon states).
As DEA knew, general support for the treaty from major Western allies, nuclear
threshold states such as Japan and India, and a substantial number of non-nuclear states
would be a prerequisite for its final support by the Australian government. ACDA's
survey of world support in April 1967 indicated that the NPT was indeed likely to find
widespread backing. In Europe, Soviet suspicions concerning West Germany's nuclear
ambitions outside a pan-European non-proliferation regime (under the auspices of the
European Atomic Community - "Euratom") appeared to be the most significant
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stumbling block to wide future NPT accession. France, however, was unlikely to sign,
although it was possible that it would undertake to act in conformity with its terms. 88
In Asia, the primary concern of the crucial nuclear threshold states, India and
Japan, was with Communist China. The US approach had been to offer its own security
guarantee to both countries. While India was holding out for a joint US-Soviet security
guarantee, Japan's close security links with America meant that it would probably
accept an enhanced version of its existing nuclear guarantees from the United States. 89
In summary, it appeared that the NPT would find favour with a number of
important non-nuclear, non-aligned and nuclear threshold states. At that stage, however,
it remained to be seen whether the actual level of global support would be sufficient to
develop the momentum which a multilateral treaty needed in order to become universal.

Later Relationships

Towards the end of 1967, the nature ofUS intelligence briefings began to change as the
final form of the treaty text became clearer. NPT intelligence briefings to Australian
diplomats in Geneva and Washington became increasingly frequent and more detailed.
As a result, the text of the developing treaty, together with initial American
interpretations of the meaning and operation of specific Articles, was now becoming
evident to senior officers within DEA.
The ACDA "Background Note" referred to above90 had declared the US position
at 24 August 1967 on the content and interpretation of the Draft NPT tabled at Geneva
on that date. Its main points can be summarised as follows:
•

The central core of the Draft Text lay in Articles I and II, which would bind
nuclear weapon powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon
states, and the latter not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. The term "other nuclear explosive devices" referred
to any nuclear device which was not intended for use as a weapon, but whose
character and technology was indistinguishable from a nuclear weapon.
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•

The treaty dealt with what was prohibited, p.ot what was permitted (such as
nuclear planning which does not involve the transfer of nuclear weapons or
devices). This was an early indicator of a fundamental point of interpretation on
which the United States would later insist, not least in its bilateral negotiations with
Australia in Canberra, in April of the following year.

•

All signatory states would work for other measures to halt the nuclear arms race.

•

The questions of verification of compliance with the terms of the treaty, and of
safeguards against illicit transfer of weapons were not yet resolved. At this stage,
therefore, Article III was left

blan~<:.

However, the goal of the US was a system of

effective, mandatory safeguards administered on a world-wide basis.

•

Article IV provided that the treaty should not impede the development of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes. All parties would undertake to facilitate, and have the
right to participate in, the fullest possible co-operation in regard to the development
of such activity. A state's nuclear activities for peaceful purposes included research,
production and use, as well as information, equipment and materials.

•

Any amendments to the treaty would require a majority vote of all nuclear
weapon States Parties, and of those parties which were contemporaneous members
of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This would
allow a reasonable chance for the adoption of majority amendments, while
preventing the adoption of amendments lacking wide support among states with
advanced peaceful nuclear programmes.

•

The operation of the treaty would be reviewed by States Parties after five years,
but it would have an unlimited duration, in order to avoid a "countdown"
atmosphere leading to clandestine preparations for weapons acquisition as the treaty
expired.
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•

"Nuclear weapon states" were to be defined as those which possessed such
devices on 1 January 1967, in order to freeze the number at five by preventing other
states from achieving that status before signature.

•

The question of additional security assurances for some (unspecified) nonnuclear states remained unresolved. They would not, however, be resolved within

-

the terms of the treaty itself, but as separate considerations.

fu addition, several more general DEA concerns on the status of the Draft Text

(and its US interpretations) could now be answered, following informal discussions in
Washington between ACDA officers and Australian diplomats. First, the Soviet
[_

negotiators had agreed to remain at Geneva for as long as possible, in order to conclude
negotiations there, rather than in the less practical forum of the United Nations General
Assembly. Soviet commitment to a nuclear non-proliferation treaty could not, therefore,
be seriously doubted. 91
Second, and contrary to its recently tabled position, the United States was not
now opposed to a treaty of limited duration, although "anything less than 20 or 25 years
was out of the question" as potentially ineffective. 92 As far as DEA was concerned, a
temporally limited treaty would, ceteris paribus, be more acceptable to the Gorton
Cabinet than one which was open-ended.
On the question of amendments, ACDA assured Australian diplomats in
Washington that the amendment provisions made major changes virtually impossible. A
state which was not on the Board of Governors of the IAEA, not in agreement with a
majority of parties, and not itself a nuclear weapon power, was very unlikely to have
unwanted amendments forced upon it. 93 Again, ACDA asserted that the requirement for
the US, along with all other States Parties, to pursue an end to the vertical proliferation
of nuclear weapons "involved the most complex problems, and ... progress would take
a very long time". Given the current state of the world (in which a nuclear Communist
China was a new and credible threat) no American ally would seriously expect the US
91
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to start doing away with its nuclear weapons. 94 Such an assurance, although it stood in
direct contravention of Article VI of the new treaty, .would be vital in DEA's case for
renunciation of an independent Australian nuclear arsenal. It was also intelligence of the
highest sensitivity, and another potential point of leverage for DEA in discussions with
the United States over NPT interpretation.
Finally, the Soviet Union was now clearly committed to a workable treaty,
having retreated from its previous suspicion over the independent nuclear ambitions of
the Federal Republic ofGermany. 95

For DEA, the missing component of the NPT Draft Text- the Article III provisions on
nuclear diversion safeguards - became clear through a United States Aide Memoire of
13 November 1967. 96 The proposed s~feguards provisions would be of vital importance
in DEA's case for accession to the treaty, and later proved to be another major point of
leverage in DEA's discussions with ACDA over the treaty's interpretation.
The Aide Memoire set out the status of negotiations on Article III with the Soviet
Union, together with changes to its text which were the result of discussions with the
Euratom states. 97 While the views of those states were not directly relevant to US
interpretations of NPT safeguards provisions, 98 the ways in which the US sought to
accommodate their concerns on this score provided DEA with a clear indicator of
American understanding of this crucial issue.
Since the text of Article III survived intact in the final treaty text, early US
interpretations of their meaning and operation would be an invaluable tool in DEA's
rebuttal of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission's rejection of proposed NPT
safeguards procedures. Specifically, US reaction to the thrust of Euratom's "Five
94
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Principles" (on safeguards and verification) were illuminating. First, the US agreed that
the provision in an earlier draft which extended

s~feguards

procedures to nuclear

facilities, as well as to nuclear materials, should be deleted. 99 In practice, however, such
a compromise was redundant, since nuclear materials. would normally be found only
within a designated nuclear facility.
Second, Euratom's insistence that itbe permitted to apply internal safeguards
procedures on the basis of an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
was strongly endorsed by the US as fully mandated by the IAEA Statute. 100 The
significance of the American position on this point was that individual agreements
between states and the IAEA on safeguards procedures (such as the revised Safeguards
Agreement which Australia would have to negotiate, should it sign the NPT) were also
to be clearly tied to the Statute. This should give individual states - including Australia confidence that Safeguards Agreements would have the legal and institutional strength
needed for the duration of the treaty.
Third, Euratom asserted that procedures for implementation of safeguards
verification (for example, how, and by whom, inspection of nuclear facilities would be
carried out) should be contained within any Agreement with the IAEA. 101 The United
States commented in its Aide Memoire that Safeguards Agreements were for the
exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of obligations undertaken through the
treaty. By implication, therefore, the methods of fulfilment must be contained within
any Safeguards Agreement. 102 Here, then, was a strong legal foundation for DEA's
assertion of the benign nature of nuclear safeguards inspections, based on the regulation
of inspection activities under agreed conditions.
In dealing with the concerns of the Euratom states on this point, the United
States also set out a series of principles on the operation of safeguards which formed a
second basis for DEA's arguments in support of their strength. They can be summarised
as a requirement for effectiveness, combined with gains in efficiency from the
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appropriate use by the IAEA of existing records and safeguards procedures, to be
incorporated into the new NPT Safeguards Agreement_s.

.

The fourth principle concerned the ability of non-nuclear weapon states to
supply unsafeguarded nuclear materials or equipment to other non-nuclear weapon
states during the period from the treaty's opening for signature, up to its entry into
force. 103 Here, the US expressed no concern about the ability of the Euratom states to
take advantage of the inevitable delay in the NPT's entry into force. By implication, it
would not do so in Australia's case. In the event, Australia did not sign the treaty until
the last possible moment before its entry into force on 5 March 1970).
Finally, the fifth Euratom principle concerned the imposition of a limited time
period for signatory states, or groups of states, to conclude Safeguards Agreements with
the IAEA. The US position was that a time constraint was essential if global
implementation of safeguards was to be secured. 104
The final point of significance to DEA in the United States Aide Memoire was
its observation that the Article III text had been amended to add the word "control" in
paragraph 1. This meant that safeguards would be applicable to the peaceful nuclear
activities of a non-nuclear weapon state party regardless of whether it took place on its
own territory. As long as such a state exercised control over the processes involved, its
safeguards obligations must be observed. The effect was to widen still further the reach
of the IAEA safeguards regime, and thus the confidence of non-nuclear weapons states,
such as Australia, in its efficacy.

Conclusion
This chapter has traced the early course of the struggle for nuclear non-proliferation
policy dominance between the advocates of an independent nuclear-armed Australia and
the champions of the new NPT. Battle was joined, at this stage, largely through
competing policy development papers, the influence of scientific, bureaucratic and
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political individuals (for example, Baxter, Booker and Gorton) and the growing wealth
of relevant intelligence in the hands of the diplomats of the Department of External
Affairs. The Department's skill in rebutting the strident arguments of the Australian
Atomic Energy Commission (and its Chairman, Sir Ppilip Baxter) was clearly evident.
DEA succeeded in exposing the flaws in the Commissions premises and analysis of the
issues involved, and would ultimately prove equal to the task of steering Australia
towards renunciation of its nuclear ambitions.
Nevertheless, DEA still faced serious obstacles in its quest to develop a policy
position which was capable of sustaining support within the Gorton Cabinet. The
strategy it employed in reaching that goal would result, almost incidentally, in Australia
exerting a significant level of influence over the early interpretation of the terms of the
NPT.

In surprising the United States with its recalcitrance, Australia leveraged a
position of influence well in excess of what could reasonably be expected from an ally
of its relatively moderate means and significance. The scene of Australia's resistance,
which marked a milestone on its journey from secret nuclear warrior to disarmament
crusader, would be the April 1968 meeting between Australian government
representatives and their United States counterparts in Canberra. It is to the preparations
for this important event, and its international legal implications, that the study is now
directed.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TURNING THE SCREW: THE PARADOX OF INFLUENCE
THROUGH RESISTANCE
Introduction
In an internal paper prepared during early 1968 for Australian Government Ministers,

nuclear policy planners at the Department of External Affairs made the following
observation:

Not to sign [the NPT] would be no doubt regarded seriously by the United States and
by our Asian neighbours . . . . One of the general questions for decision would be
whether Australian relations with the United States would be served by opposition to
the United States (particularly in public) on a firm aspect of U.S. policy, particularly
having in mind that Australian security rests heavily on our alliances with the United
States. It may also call into question (without foundation) our exact intentions in the
nuclear weapons field. (emphasis added) 1

As 1968 began, it was becoming clear to all parties with an interest in Australian
nuclear affairs that a completed United Nations multilateral non-proliferation treaty was
likely to be opened for signature by states within months. Australia's diplomatic
observers at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee negotiations in Geneva had
reported to Canberra, on 18 January 1968, that significant progress on the final Draft
Text of the NPT was now being made. 2
Furthermore, the member states of the ENDC expected, by 15 March, to approve
a report and draft treaty text for immediate submission to the UN at New York. The
resumed session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly was
then expected to debate the terms of the NPT during late April. 3 Such rapid progress
served to focus the minds of all interested parties on the questions which Australia must
confront in order to present a clear, defensible and sustainable public national position
on the NPT to the United States, the Western Alliance, and the United Nations. Should
1
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Australia seek to lay out its policy on the NPT in the context of the UN debate, little
time remained in which that position could be finalised. The primary question to be
resolved by the Australian Government, without delay, was whether Australia should
immediately sign (and subsequently ratify) the new treaty upon its opening for
signature. The urgency of that requirement is underscored by the fact that Australia was
the only English-speaking member state of the Western Alliance that, by early in 1968,
continued to resist it.
This chapter will examine the process by which the internecine struggle for
policy supremacy between the diplomats at the Department of External Affairs and the
"bomb lobby" protagonists was resolved in light of the urgent necessity for an
Australian policy on nuclear proliferation. Australia would soon be called upon, in the

UN General Assembly, to support or reject the simple proposition that all nation-states
not already in possession of nuclear weapons should renounce, in international law,
their sovereign right to acquire them. The debate between the nuclear nationalists and
those who placed Australia's interests firmly in line with the objectives of the NPT,
would therefore be concluded in the context of Australia's alliance relationship with the
United States, and determinations about Australia's national interests. Put simply,
internal policy conflict had now to be replaced by external policy consensus.
Awareness and concern within the Prime Minister's Department- and in Cabinet
itself- on the need to confront the NPT was evident in the views of the newly appointed
Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Lennox Hewitt. In forceful
terms, Hewitt drew Prime Minister Gorton's attention to the need to confront
Washington over the value to Australia of the mutual defence terms of the ANZUS
Treaty, perhaps as a quid pro quo for Australia's participation in the prospective NPT. 4
This was especially important, in Hewitt's view, in light of Gorton's approaching visit to

4

The Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department, C.L. (Lennox) Hewitt, expressed his
reservations on the terms of the NPT, and its effects on Australia's alliance relationship with the United
States, in a Memorandum to Prime Minister Gorton on 28 April 1968, in preparation for Gorton's
forthcoming discussions in Washington with the U.S. Government. 1968 Cabinet documents- selected
imaged
documents.
Canberra:
Australian
Archives.
[51].
Available[Online]: WWW :http://www .naa.gov .au/COLLECT/cabpaper/Cabinet68/images/A5619C48 1.
htm . In addition, Gorton himself, in reply to Minister for National Development Fairbairn, suggested in
mid February 1968 that, to assist the decision-making process, each interested Department should
present its own objective submission to Cabinet on the accession to the forthcoming NPT. Document A
1838/346: TS 919/10/5, Pt. 6 (27]. Canberra: Australian Archives.
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Washington. 5 Faced with these imperatives, the competing interests of the nuclear
factions steadily coalesced into an "Australian position". It was this - apparently united position which confronted the team of United States negotiators when they met
Australian Government representatives in Canberra on.l8 and 19 April1968.
By the time the US Mission began discussions in Canberra with its Australian
counterparts (from all interested government departments and agencies) the process of
nuclear policy consolidation had, through necessity, reached a point from which the
Australian state could present its allies with a coherent set of national concerns over the
,_
'

terms of the new treaty. Those concerns, however, were still largely a reflection of the
factional battle between the bomb lobbyists and their opponents at DEA, whose tactical
"devil's advocacy" appeared, in view of the outcome of the talks, to be bearing fruit.
As the record of the negotiations reveals, many of the lines of enquiry and
negotiation between the Australian and American sides - such as the exact meaning of
the requirements of Article III of the NPT on diversion safeguards and the meaning of
the phrase "manufacture ... of nuclear weapons" in Article II - were generated by the
unresolved antipathy between those on either side of the Australian nuclear policy
divide. 6 Nevertheless, as discussed below, the US positions on interpretations of the
terms of the NPT and related security matters, disclosed during the negotiations in
Canberra, militated strongly against any need for an independent Australian nuclear
deterrent.

Policy Planning by Committee: Advising the Advisers
In order to bring together the positions of all interested government departments on
questions raised by Australia's signature of the NPT, a policy consolidation structure
was established which was designed to ensure that Cabinet was provided with
sufficient, and timely, information on which to make decisions concerning the new
5

Gorton visited Washington (for the first time since his elevation to the Prime Ministership in January
1968) from 25 May to 1 June 1968. He held talks with US President Johnson, and with senior members
of his Cabinet, including the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk and the Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford.
Gorton to get LBJ's jet for U.S. visit. (1968, May 7). The Australian, p.2. Gorton will meet all the top
men on U.S. visit. (1968, May 23). The Australian, p.l.
6

Summary Record: Meeting of officials of the United States and Australian Governments, Department
of External Affairs, Canberra, 18 1h - 19th April 1968. Document A 1838/346: 719110/6, Pt. 5 [158].
Canberra: Australian Archives. At p. 21 et seq.
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treaty. Initiated by DEA and ratified by the inter-departmental Defence Committee, the
organisational structure consisted of a 11 high level Working Group 11 of representatives
:from interested departments, reporting to the Defence Committee. The Working Group's
Report would eventually form the basis of a joint Cabinet Submission by the Ministers
for External Affairs (Hasluck) and Defence (Fairhall). 7
The Working Group comprised senior representatives of those departments most
directly concerned with the implications of signing the NPT, namely the Departments of
the Prime Minister, External Affairs, National Development and Defence, together with
the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (an agency of the Department of National
Development). 8
The Defence Committee itself was chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the
Department of Defence, Sir Henry Bland, who proved to be both an opponent of the
NPT and an advocate of a more strongly independent line with the United States. 9 In
view of AAEC Chairman Sir Philip Baxter's presence on the Committee, their alliance
against the treaty, at this stage of its progress through the bureaucracy, was probably the
final and most decisive chance for the bomb lobby to prevail.
Also present on the Defence Committee were General Officers from each of the
three Armed Service, and the Permanent Secretaries of the Departments of External
Affairs (Sir James Plimsoll), National Development (Boswell), Supply (A.S. Cooley)
and Treasury (Randall), together with Cabinet Secretary Sir John Bunting (later
replaced by Lennox Hewitt).
The nuclear nationalist alliance of Baxter and Bland ultimately failed to carry its
views in these fora. That failure also signalled the advent of the paradox of Australian
influence over the United States. Australia was to prove itself willing to deny America
the support of all its allies on the NPT (a consensus it keenly sought) through the
fulcrum of resistance; not the resistance of outright rejection, but of insistence on
interpretative clarity.

7

Document A 1838/346: TS919/10/5, Pt.6 [27]. (6 March 1968). Canberra: Australian Archives. At pp.
1, 2; Infra. At Note 9.

8
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9
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In rev1ewmg the deliberations of the Working Group, and the Defence

Committee to which it reported, several documents stand out as representing the central
process of nuclear policy consolidation. Each helps to clarify the interests, assumptions
and biases of the various participants in meetings whose outcomes were likely to have a
profound effect on Australia's future. As those taking part were well aware, the
foundations of Australia's strategic security were in the balance. It is important,
however, to note that behind the contributions made within the meetings of these groups
lay (especially in DEA's case) an intensive effort to understand the implications of the
NPT through diplomatic links with Washington, and internal departmental analyses of
its emerging text.
The first meeting, called by DBA on 9 February 1968 between itself and
representatives of the Departments of Prime Minister, Defence and National
Development (together with the AAEC) produced only a request for DBA to circulate to
its participants a commentary on the operative articles of the Draft Treaty text. As a
technical agency, the Australian Atomic Energy Commission was to provide a
complementary analysis of the implications of the terms of Article III on nuclear
material diversion safeguards. 10 This arrangement was a two-edged sword for AAEC.
While it left the Commission free to demonstrate the cogency of its own arguments on
the technical aspects of the safeguards implications for Australia, it allowed it no
opportunity- at this stage- to attack DEA's views on the wider significance of the treaty
and its interpretation.
The Commission was, to this extent, placed at a distinct disadvantage, especially
as the Defence Committee was to meet on 7 March to consider the entire question of a
nuclear non-proliferation treaty in light of the circulated views of interested parties. It
was further disadvantaged by the Defence Committee's decision, at that meeting, to
exclude representatives from the Departments of Prime Minister and National
Development from the composition of the Working Group. Their absence would be
acutely felt by the Commission, since both enjoyed (in Gorton and Fairbairn,
respectively) the political guidance of strong exponents of an independent Australian
nuclear capability.

10

Document A 1838/346: TS 919/10/5, Pt. 2 [24]. (9, 16 February 1968). Canberra: Australian Archives.
See also Note 25, Chapter Three.
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Strategic Chess Game: The Nuclear Defence
The Defence Committee Meeting of 7 March was the crucible which distilled the extent
of fundamental disagreement between DEA and the bomb lobby's champion, Sir Philip
Baxter. 11 The tenor of the meeting, and the course of its discussions, were (inevitably,
given the composition of the Defence Committee) notable for their concerted and strong
scepticism and criticism ofDEA's assumed acceptance of the need for the NPT.
For example, Sir Philip Baxter expressed the view that, contrary to DEA
assessments, the proposed NPT safeguards system was, on a number of counts,
unacceptable to AustraliaY It could, for example, be varied at will by the Board of
Governors of the IAEA, regardless of Australia's wishes. Furthermore, the new NPT
safeguard system would preclude the .development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses,
and would certainly result in an end to Australia's option of developing the ability to
manufacture nuclear weapons rapidly, should that become necessary. 13
On its own account, the Department of National Development, for the first time,
raised the issue of the interpretation to be placed on the term "manufacture ... of nuclear
weapons" contained in Articles I and II. Did this mean that signatories would be able to
do everything short of producing a nuclear explosion? Did the restriction apply at some
earlier stage? Much would depend on how this issue was resolved. 14
On this point, Baxter observed - disingenuously - that, smce the
projected nuclear power generating station at Jervis Bay, N.S.W., would have "full
manufacturing facilities", it would be subject to international inspections. As such, he
asserted, many Australian companies would refuse to co-operate in its construction for
fear of international and industrial espionage. It can be noted, however, that the
proposed facility would have been subject to IAEA diversion safeguards inspections as
a bona fide peaceful nuclear energy producer, and not on the basis - as Sir Philip was
11

Baxter was supported, in greater or lesser degree, by representatives from the armed forces, and the
Departments of Defence, National Development, Supply and Prime Minister. Document A 1838/346: TS
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hinting - as a producer of fissionable material for nuclear weapons manufacture. Thus, it
would be no more, or less, vulnerable to the

ri~k

of espionage than any other

safeguarded nuclear facility around the world. In addition, Sir Philip added, the uranium
and (radioactive) beach sands mining industries would be subject to the restraint of
inspection activities on all their activities. Costs involved in their compliance with
inspection requirements were likely to be considerable.
As a final point, he commented that AAEC was currently working on
manufacturing techniques for nuclear weapons which promised easier and cheaper
manufacturing costs. It could not be assumed, he said, that nuclear weapons could not
be made "easily and cheaply" within the next few years by countries that did not tie
themselves to the treaty. 15
A new defence of the nuclear weapons option came from the Permanent
Secretary of the Department of Supply (Cooley), who pointed to the possibility that
Australia, lacking information on the latest weapons technology, would be in danger of
signing the NPT on the basis of insufficient information. 16
Further, Sir Henry Bland, Permanent Secretary of the Department of Defence,
reinforced the bomb lobbyists' position by suggesting that Australia could state in the
General Assembly of the United Nations that, although it would not sign the treaty, it
had no intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons. 17
Finally, the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, Sir John
Bunting, brought some reality to the discussion by stating that the overriding
consideration within the whole debate was the effect a decision not to sign the treaty
would have on Australia's alliance with the United States. Before any final decision was
made, the Australian Government should discuss its ramifications with the Americans. 18

At this point, having endured a sustained attack on the notion of Australia's accession to
the NPT, the Permanent Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Sir James
Plimsoll, delivered his vision of a nuclear policy position which best expressed
Australia's national interest. This was a seminal point in the debate, since its eventual
15

Ibid. At pp. 3, 4.
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adoption and implementation would lend Australia early influence over interpretation of
the terms of the NPT, and would ultimately result in Australia's active involvement in
global nuclear disarmament over many years. 19
Sir James said the Defence Committee should indicate that it favoured
Australia's adherence to the treaty. It could also consider whether any amendments
should be sought, or whether any understandings should be expressed (by Australia) on
the meaning or execution of the treaty. Crucially, the matter for consideration would
then be precisely how far these clarifications should be pressed. He reminded his
listeners that the Australian Government had, for many years, indicated its belief that
nuclear weapons should be kept out of the hands of those not in possession of them.
This was a fundamental prerequisite of world peace. 20
With this in mind, Australia sQ.ould not look at the treaty solely in terms of the
restrictions it imposed, and the opportunities which would be foregone. Similar
restrictions would be imposed on other countries that adhered to it. If Australia declined
to sign, it would be saying, in effect, that West Germany, Indonesia, India and Japan
should not sign either. 21 Furthermore, and despite the attitude of the Australian Atomic
Energy Commission, there was a strong likelihood that the United States would cease
its co-operation with Australia in the nuclear energy field if it failed to sign the treaty.
Finally, although the inspection system outlined by Sir Philip Baxter sounded
onerous, it was no more demanding than what others would have to endure if a
meaningful treaty were to emerge. 22

This signal meeting ended with Chairman Bland's summation that there appeared to be
three alternatives for the Government:
•

19

sign the treaty as it stood, possibly with some statement of understandings;

Ibid. At p.4.
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•

sign the treaty but limit Australia's .accession to ten years, with the possibility of an
extension;

•

not sign the treaty at all. 23

Speaking for the Department of Defence, Bland favoured the second alternative, on the
basis that the NPT would not place great limitations on Australia over the following ten
years. It would be for the Working Group to develop a clear and comprehensive policy
paper which was capable of support within the Defence Committee. The paper would
also later serve as the basis of a Cabinet Submission by the Ministers for External
Affairs and Defence.

DEA Ascendant

DEA's commentary on the treaty's terms, which formed its contribution to the Working
Group discussions, was succinct and assertive. Addressing the Articles of the new treaty
consecutively, it laid out an effective starting point for further discussion by noting
those terms of the treaty which were, prima facie, capable of clear interpretation and
application. On the other hand, it also pointed to those terms which lacked clear
definition, or were open to alternative interpretations.
By way of introduction, it noted that the strict application of Articles I and II
could be regarded as "basic to the effective operation of the treaty" .Z4 Article I meant
that, whether or not Australia signed, it could no longer hope to acquire nuclear
weapons from nuclear-armed parties to the treaty, who were prohibited from
transferring nuclear weapons to any recipient whatsoever. Nevertheless, Article I would
not prevent the use by Australia's allies of nuclear weapons in its defence, nor their
placement in Australia under the exclusive control of a nuclear power.
Conversely, Article II meant that, should Australia sign, it would be prevented
from receiving nuclear weapons or devices, or control over such weapons or devices

23
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"from any transferor whatsoever". It .would also be prohibited from "manufacturing"
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 25
DEA gave the provisions of the important Article III on safeguards
arrangements a more comprehensive, though non-technical, treatment. In its assessment,
the Department pointed out that, following its accession to the NPT, Australia would be
required to conclude a separate Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic
-

Energy Agency. That agreement would be "in accordance with" the IAEA's statute and
existing safeguards system, and would be for "the exclusive purpose" of verifying the
fulfilment of obligations. 26 Furthermore, safeguards. were to apply to all source or
special fissionable material (whether or not it was within a principal nuclear facility) in
all peaceful nuclear activities.
As DEA readily acknowledgc;:d, these provisions demanded explanations from
the United States of the precise meaning of such phrases as "safeguards system",
"principal nuclear facility", "all source or special fissionable material" and "all peaceful
nuclear activities". Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article III provided that only nuclear material
and equipment subject to NPT safeguards could be supplied to a non-nuclear weapon
state, but that such safeguards should not act to hinder economic or technical
development and international co-operation related to nuclear energy used for peaceful
purposes. As DEA noted, this requirement did not apply to the declared nuclear weapon
states, although the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed to open their
peaceful-use nuclear facilities to safeguards procedures. The question for resolution
here, DEA suggested, was exactly how safeguards procedures could avoid hampering
peaceful nuclear developments - admittedly a question for those with relevant technical
expertise. 27
The final paragraph of Article III dealt with time limits for entry into force of
separate Safeguards Agreements between states and the IAEA. Their negotiation and
conclusion were to take no longer than two years and (as previously mentioned) did not
apply to the nuclear weapon states.
In DEA's view, Article III sought a balance between the competing claims of a
formula "broad enough to gain general support and one that is so precisely defined as to
25
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leave no possible loopholes". 28 The result was that much detailed work remained to be
completed between individual states and the IAEA jn negotiations over the terms of
individual Agreements. Although concerns had been expressed - particularly by the
Federal Republic of Germany - that the Article opened· the way for industrial espionage,
DEA asserted that the treaty text now met most of their (unspecified) concerns on this
score.

29

On Article N, which sought to protect the "inalienable right" of non-nuclear
states to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination, DEA allowed itself a measure of sympathy with the
views of India and Brazil. Both "threshold" nuclear states, they had alleged that this was
a hollow right, given the fact that the non-nuclear weapon State Parties would be unable
to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes on their own account. This, they
alleged, discriminated against non-nuclear powers in the use of nuclear devices for
peaceful purposes. 30
As DEA pointed out, however, this question was taken up in Article V, which
called on the declared nuclear states to help the non-nuclear parties with the "peaceful
applications of nuclear explosions" on a non-discriminatory basis through the provision
of a nuclear explosion "service". 31 Here, a crucial point was the reconciliation of this
"service" with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty/ 2 which banned, inter alia, nuclear
explosions in the atmosphere and under water.
Article VI mandated an obligation on each of the parties (not merely the
declared nuclear weapons states) to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating
to the cessation of the arms race "at an early date". It also called for the conclusion of a
treaty on "general and complete disarmament". 33 As DEA noted, such a requirement
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imposed no time limits on States Parties, and was not a particularly strong obligation. It
was essential, nevertheless, to the success of the NPT because few non-nuclear weapon

'

'

_,
~

states were likely to agree to renounce their future possession unless the five declared
nuclear weapon states made a commitment, however amorphous, to eliminate their own
arsenals.
Finally, Article VII maintained a right for parties to establish nuclear-free zones
though regional treaties (a non-controversial provision, in DEA's view).
These provisions represented the operative terms of the treaty, and were
supplemented by a number of procedural provisions relating to amendment of the terms
of the treaty and five-yearly Review Conferences (Article VIII), as well as signature,
ratification, entry into force, indefinite extension after twenty-five years, and conditions
for withdrawal (Article IX). 34
The DEA commentary ended with an assessment of the perceived attitudes to
the NPT text of the more significant nuclear threshold states, since their accession to the
treaty would be a central consideration for Cabinet when forming its views on
Australia's own position. Briefly, DEA found that West Germany had not yet decided
whether to sign, in view of its concerns over delays in concluding a Safeguards
Agreement between the IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community
("Euratom"). India was a doubtful potential signatory, given its stand against the treaty's
inherently discriminatory nature, while Brazil harboured doubts based on fears over
safeguards inspections which compromised its sovereignty. Furthermore, Sweden was
looking for more concrete pledges from the nuclear powers on nuclear disarmament,
while France saw the treaty as irrelevant to its own nuclear programmes. Finally, Japan
regarded the treaty as lacking any firm security guarantees from the declared nuclear
powers. 35 In short, the treaty- at this stage -lacked general support from many of the
nuclear threshold states whose possible nuclear ambitions were to be its most important
target.

34
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DEA's overview of the operative terms of the NPT were supplemented by its
own review of the strategic reasons behind the treaty!s global importance - the central
reason for its firm commitment to stemming nuclear diffusion through treaty-making. 36
The core of its reasoning can be seen when it examined why the United States and the

-'

Soviet Union had sought to conclude an agreement of such "historic significance" on
nuclear proliferation:
The devastating power and other effect [sic] of nuclear weapons are such that those
threatened by them can fear the substantial destruction of their society; the general use
of nuclear weapons could threaten the survival of the human race. There is therefore
universal agreement of [sic] the desirability of avoiding nuclear war. Restraint by
established nuclear powers and the avoidance of further proliferation of nuclear
weapons are obvious measures to reduce the risks. The Australian Government has
consistently recognised the dan?ers ofproliferation and called for measures to prevent
or control it. (emphasis added) 3

Such a clear and persuasive argument against any move within Australia to develop an
ability to build nuclear weapons, in defiance of the wishes of the United States, was not
weakened by its failure to acknowledge just such a desire among some influential
Australians.
In DEA's view, the multiplication of states fielding a credible nuclear threat

would have serious implications for the delicate balance of both Superpowers' nuclear
deterrence strategy, by introducing elements of uncertainty caused by imperfect
knowledge of the intentions of new nuclear powers or the risk of "accidental or
unauthorised action". As a result, DEA concluded, a systemically stable global balance
of mutually assured destruction could become seriously unstable. 38
In addition, should Australia decide to press ahead with plans to build its own

nuclear deterrent force, it would have to face the possibility, whether distinct or illdefined, that its defence alliance with the United States under the ANZUS Treaty would
be at an end. On the other hand, continued support by Australia for the stable nuclear
monopoly held by the "Great Powers", and- importantly- the continued frustration of
Communist China's assumed nuelear ambitions, was clearly in its national interest. 39
36
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DBA continued its devil's advocacy by introducing the variety of possible
factors weighing against Australian support for the J:WT. As it had done in its earlier
internal policy appraisals, it was able to dismiss most of these through clear and careful
argument. Its first concern focused on the treaty's prospects for support, noting the wary
attitudes of major non-nuclear weapons states such as West Germany, Italy, Japan and
India.
In DBA's opinion, Australian accession to the treaty should be predicated not
only on it attracting the minimum requirement of forty signatories - in addition to the
three depository states - called for in Article IX. It should also depend on those
signatory states comprising the bulk of those which were capable of the rapid
development of nuclear weapons. 40 Without this, the prospects for a successful treaty
were, it judged, remote. In any event, should Australia decide "at a fairly early stage"
that, on balance, the treaty commanded its support, it would be in its interest to declare
this, and then work for support among other nations. 41
DBA went on to enlist the support of the Joint Planning Committee of the
Department of Defence, whose study An Independent Australian Nuclear Capacity:
Strategic Considerations42 recommended that Australia should not seek to acquire

nuclear weapons. As DBA noted, that conclusion was, in part, based on the most recent
assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee on threats to Australian security over the
next decade. 43
The latter assessment had concluded that Communist China's growing nuclear
weapon programme was a significant, if indefinable, threat to Australia at some future
time. 44 As Australia's most credible nuclear threat, China could not be deterred by any
nuclear force which Australia could hope to establish. In fact, a credible deterrent force
would have to be substantially stronger than that of the United Kingdom or France,
40
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clearly (in its view) an impossible assignment. 45 Furthermore, the concentration of
Australia's population and industrial production in £!. few large cities guaranteed their
swift elimination in any nuclear conflict. 46 In these circumstances, Australia had no
choice but to rely on the United States to deter Communist China (and any other
potential aggressor) from contemplating a nuclear strike on its territory.
In the Joint Planning Committee's assessment, the growth of China's nuclear

capability required closer ties with the United States, rather than disengagement from
the American alliance. In simple terms, a workable Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
was Australia's best option to ensure its strategic security. 47

rc

AAEC Descendant

DEA's contribution to the policy consolidation process laid a strong foundation for the
Defence Committee's forthcoming consideration of NPT issues. Its hand was further
strengthened by the reply it had received from the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in response to queries on the major concerns expressed
by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission over safeguards requirements. On this
score, J.L. Allen (an officer in the Economic Relations Branch of DEA) again reveals
the personal perspective behind the official record:
Of course we realised that they wouldn't listen to us if we tried ourselves to shoot their
arguments down. So we [listed] the Commission's criticisms and [requested]
Washington's comments thereon. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
drafted its replies and then cleared their terms with the USAEC [United States Atomic
Energy Commission]. The result was Washington's telegram 694. Coming as they do
from such an authoritative source (ACDA plus USAEC), these replies can obviously be
taken as coming from the horse's mouth itself !48
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It was to DEA's advantage that America's principal agencies with responsibility for the
negotiation and entry into force of the NPT

large~y

agreed with its own earlier

repudiation of the Commission's objections to the treaty's terms. Those objections had
been set out in the Australian Atomic Energy Commission's complementary paper on
the implications for Australia of the projected terms of Article III (covering nuclear
material diversion safeguards) which was later included in the Working Group's
deliberations. Its major points have been examined in depth in Chapter Three. 49
DEA's response had been to seek immediate clarification from ACDA on the
most serious of the Commission's objections. 5° Apart from its effect in rebuffing many
of the Commission's less supportable claims, DEA's action in questioning the United
States on its interpretation of these aspects of the Draft Text was an early example of
Australia's resistance against mute acceptance of a new and immensely important arms
control measure.
In fact, it was the efforts of the advocates of an independent Australian nuclear
deterrent which, ironically, led instead to the weakening of their position. By pushing
for a more independent nuclear policy stance, the bomb lobby in fact reinforced
Australia's dependence on its nuclear relationship with America, while creating the
opportunity for Australia to show leadership in the interpretation of a treaty which they
considered unnecessary and dangerous. Through their efforts, the nuclear advocates
forced their opponents to demonstrate the flaws inherent in their proposals for an
independent nuclear deterrent strike force. For example (as mentioned earlier) Australia
could not hope to field a nuclear force sufficiently strong to present a credible deterrent
against a nuclear attack from China. Nor would any nuclear strike force deter acts of
aggression at the level of covert infiltration, or the like.
Notwithstanding the earlier interpretations on NPT safeguards provisions given
to Australia by the United States in its Aide-Memoire of 13 November 1967 51 (see
Chapter Three) ACDA's response effectively disposed of the most important objections
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made against them by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission. First, contrary to the
Commission's assertion, Australia would not be

bo~nd

by any amendments imposed

"from time to time" by the US or the Soviet Union. Any changes to an individual
Safeguards Agreement could be applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency
only with the consent of both parties to it. Provisions for any amendment would be set
out in the agreement, and would not be subject to ad hoc action by the Superpowers. 52
Second, the Commission had asserted that the presence of safeguards inspectors
from the Euratom and Comecon states (which would themselves be allowed, under the
terms of Article III (4) of the NPT, to restrict inspection of their peaceful nuclear
facilities to their own personnel) would be a serious industrial espionage threat to
Australia. 53 ACDA had replied that the IAEA was bound by its Statute to ensure that
industrial or commercial secrets were not disclosed through its activities. 54
On the general question of the acceptability to Australia of individual inspectors
(for example, individuals from the Soviet Union or its allies) and the Commission's
presumption that a right of rejection would be abolished, ACDA had stated that it
believed that right would remain. Any inspector who was unacceptable to Australia
could, therefore, still be replaced. 55 On the question of the costs associated with the
implementation of the NPT safeguards system, DEA stated that ACDA considered the
Commission's total costing for all states of $150-$200 million within a few years as
"excessive". 56
In regard to the extent of safeguards inspections, which the Commission

suggested would encompass all commercial, industrial and experimental uses of nuclear
materials, as well as the mining and milling of uranium and other ores, the American
agency had assumed that safeguards would apply only at the final point in the mining
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process. Since this was the oxide concentrate stage, ACDA assumed that uranium
mining operations would not be subject to safeguards inspections. 57
Finally, DEA observed that, contrary to the Commission's view, Australia was
unlikely to be required to open its defence establislunents to inspections. This would
include any future warships with nuclear propulsion which, the Commission had
argued, could be described as "equipment furthering a military purpose" under the terms
ofthe Statute ofthe I.A.E.A. 58
In summary, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with the
concurrence of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, had supported and
reinforced the negative assessment of the Department of External Affairs on the merits
of the objections raised by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission against the terms
of the NPT. By doing so, ACDA had contributed to the accelerating process of nuclear
policy consolidation within the Australian Government by lending authority to DEA's
active resistance against Australia's nuclear warriors. That process would find its
defining moment - though not its resolution - in the completion of a consolidated paper
by the Working Group for consideration in the Defence Committee. 59

Making the Nuclear Choice
The alternative courses of action open to Australia were clearly set out in the
consolidated Working Group paper. 60 Taking into consideration the range of strategic,
industrial, economic, technical and military concerns already expressed, they consisted
of appraisals of the three choices broadly suggested by Secretary Bland in the Defence
Committee meeting of 7 March 1968. As such, they represented a gauge of the limited
extent to which the NPT advocates at DEA, with little help from elsewhere within
government, had begun to prevail over the bomb lobby's nuclear warriors. The three
alternative courses of action were:
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•

Sign the treaty without reservations.

Immediate signature of the treaty following its opemng for signature was not
recommended by the Working Group. The meaning of the term "manufacture" in
Articles I and II was insufficiently understood, and could result in states being permitted
to move closer to a nuclear weapons capability than the treaty intended.
Furthermore, the system of safeguards to be established in terms of Article III
would not be known at the time of signature (a model Safeguards Agreement for use
between the International Atomic Energy Agency and individual states did not yet
exist). In addition, the Working Group Report expressed reservations over the difficulty
in obtaining amendments to the text of the treaty (as provided for in Article VIII).
Finally, doubts over the level of support for the treaty from near-nuclear capable
states, and others of special strategic interest to Australia, was another impediment to
immediate signature. 61

•

Decline to sign the treaty.

The primary consideration in a decision not to accede to the NPT would be its effect on
Australia's relations with the United States. The Report noted that:
.... [t]he United States can be expected to exert considerable pressure for signature of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty; it will certainly be looking for full support from its close
partners and those dependent upon its protection. 62

It added that a refusal to sign on security grounds, with a view to maintaining an

alternative, independent nuclear deterrent, would carry little weight in Washington. One
of the United States' main arguments was that the NPT would consolidate its
commitment to Asia, and hence to Australia's protection. Nor would a rejection of the
treaty on the grounds of diminished potential for peaceful nuclear development be seen
as legitimate, given the continued existence of the 1956 US/Australia Agreement for
Cooperation concerning Civil Uses ofAtomic Energy, although it would be necessary to

obtain clear assurances of future US technical assistance and support under the
61
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agreement. 63 The result of a refusal to accede to the NPT would, in all probability, be
the application of a range of pressures and sanctions. from Washington in a number of
fields, not the least being possible loss of assistance in nuclear technological
development and refusal of the sale of military equipment.
Inevitably, a refusal to sign would invite widespread assumptions around the
world that Australia intended to build nuclear weapons, while lending assistance to
those states that were looking for a reason to avoid the obligations of the treaty. In the
end, the choice lay between acceptance of the assurances of its closest friends and allies
(the United States and the United Kingdom), and a course of action that would bring
Australia into conflict with them. The Working Group Report concluded that such a
choice need not be made at this stage, given its third (favoured) option. 64

•

Indicate a willingness to sign the treaty subject to understandings, qualifications and
possible amendments.

The third option represented the most favourable consolidated policy position attainable
by DEA. The reservations it expressed were not entirely due to the sway of Baxter and
his supporters in government circles, since legitimate doubts existed on several fronts such as the prospects of attracting an adequate number of important signatory states.
Nevertheless, the Report saw this option as the most appropriate way in which to
resolve Australia's difficulties with the text of the treaty. A number of states,
particularly those with a potential nuclear capability, would, like Australia, be seeking a
range of clarifications of the treaty text, and may well press for qualifications or
amendments to it. To sign immediately and without reservations would therefore be
premature. This was especially so in view of the fact that its sponsors (the United States,
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) had "shown themselves responsive to
pressures for amendments from states finding difficulties in accepting the obligations of
the treaty". 65
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As far as the scope of Australia's anxieties was concerned, it was significant for
Australia's final decision on treaty accession that DBA was, as discussed above, already
in possession of United States Government views on several questions put to it by
Australian diplomats in Washington in late February 1968. 66 Of those, some anticipated
(as DBA knew they would) questions which a consolidated policy position paper,
incorporating the views of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, could not avoid.
The American interpretations would prove useful in the negotiations held
between Australian and US Government representatives in Canberra during the
following month. However, notwithstanding future negotiating tactics, policy
consolidation required that the Working Group acknowledge the principal legitimate
concerns ofboth the bomb lobby and its opponents at DBA. In this way, the list of those
concerns set the agenda of the bilateral talks, at least from Australia's point of view, and
were the fulcrum on which Australia exercised its unexpected leverage over the
surprised Americans.
Here, then, was a policy compromise; the protagonists agreed that a number of
issues required urgent clarification from the United States. The main areas of concern
could now be more clearly defined:

•

What, precisely, did the term "manufacture ... of nuclear weapons ... "in Articles I
and II prohibit signatory states from doing?

•

Would diversion safeguards be applied to Australia's mining and milling of uranium
and other radioactive minerals? What were the implications of safeguards
procedures for commercial and national espionage?

•

How would the IAEA's obligations under its Statute affect its application of the
safeguards provisions of Article III of the treaty?

•

Would the treaty attract sufficient support from appropriate (i.e., near-nuclear and
East Asian) states to warrant Australia's accession to it?

•

On what basis would the peaceful-use nuclear explosion service proposed in Article
V be provided to Australia, given the present stage of Australia's national
development?
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•

Would Australia, under the terms of the treaty, be able to acquire nuclear propulsion
plants for civil or military use in the future?

•

How could the rigid amendment process established by Article VIII (1) and (2) be
made more flexible?

•

What more appropriate period could be substituted for the present duration of the
treaty?

67

End Game: The Role of Cabinet
By March 1968, the approaching conclusion of long negotiations over the terms of the
NPT at Geneva, and the treaty's subsequent debate in the UN General Assembly, both
demanded that the Australian Cabinet begin urgently to formulate its responses to the
wide range of issues inherent in a multilateral nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Each
decision would bear upon a broader and more fundamental question. In the final
analysis, did Australia's national interests lay in signing and ratifying the NPT, as the
United States expected it to do? If not, what alternative courses of action were open to
Australia in the short and medium terms?
Cabinet decisions on these questions were enlightened and informed by a series
of extensive and complex Cabinet Submissions, the result of the distillation of internal
policy planning within government departments and agencies. 68 They initially
comprised two joint submissions - one by the Departments of Defence and External
Affairs, 69 and another from the Departments of Trade and Industry and National
Development. 70 In addition, and in response to Cabinet's request for further study and
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advice/ 1 the Defence Committee, now augmented by the Permanent Heads of the
Departments of National Development, Supply, and Trade and Industry, and the
Australian Atomic Energy Commission, produced a final.Report (in the form of a third
Cabinet Submission) on the brief to be given to the Australian Delegation at the
forthcoming UN General Assembly debate on the treaty. 72
The content and effects of the various Submissions and Cabinet Decisions will
be discussed below. However, before the final Defence Committee Report could be
considered by Cabinet, it was overtaken by events as DEA's opportunity to prevail
finally arrived.
The United States Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, visited Canberra during early
April 1968 for bilateral talks, the agenda for which included the Draft NPT text. The
result was that the United States

Gov~rnment

was now without any doubt, at the most

senior Cabinet level, about the depth of Australia's concern over its implications. This
was clearly reflected in Cabinet Decision 119 of 9 April 1968:
Mr Rusk left no doubt about the importance which the United States attaches to the
establishment of the Treaty, but at the same time it was made clear to him that although
the United States assessment of importance would be taken into close consideration, it
must in the end be Australia's own total assessment which would determine its
attitude. 73

Nevertheless, the Australian Cabinet was willing to take advantage of Secretary Rusk's
offer of more detailed negotiations. To that end, "[a]ppropriate senior United States
officials" would be made available to discuss with Australian officials those aspects of
the NPT which Australia "view[ ed] with concern". 74 Cabinet Decision 119 also called
for the augmented Defence Committee to ensure the full canvassing of all NPT issues at
the forthcoming talks, and to prepare a draft of instruction to be given to Australia's UN
71
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Delegation in New York. The need for Australia to state its position in the First
Committee of the Twenty-Second United Nations General Assembly, probably in midMay, now left little room for error or delay.
On 26 March 1968, while Cabinet awaited· the outcome of the talks and
subsequent advice from the Defence Committee on possible courses of action at the UN,
Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck addressed the House ofRepresentatives. 75 In
a wide-ranging speech on foreign policy issues and priorities, Hasluck made detailed
reference to the new NPT, thus bringing the Government's interim policy position into
the public domain. While specifically declining to define any settled position, Hasluck
reiterated the nature and scope of Australia's doubts over the treaty, emphasising in
general terms that:
.... the basic approach of the Australian Government is that we want an effective and
equitable treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, provided that it does not
endanger our future national security and hamper our development, and we therefore
want the nations of the world to arrive at a text of an effective treaty which we can
support and adhere to (emphasis added). 76

It should be re-emphasised here that the documentary evidence of the

development of policy on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by the Department
for External Affairs is almost completely devoid of contributions from its Minister. This
leads to doubt about the degree to which Hasluck, at least at this stage, had been
involved in the development of the national security strategy which his speech outlined.
As the responsible Minister, Hasluck was bound to state Government policy to the
Parliament. Nevertheless, the refusal of the Government actually to sign the treaty on its
opening for signature on 1 July 1968, even taking account of the interpretative clarity
and security assurances it then possessed, must lead to the conclusion that Hasluck's

words on 26 March were little more than extemporisation.
That judgment is reinforced by Hasluck's notation on a Minute from M.R.
Booker, First Assistant Secretary in Division II of DEA. Booker noted that the
programme planned for the visiting US Mission included an opportunity for Ministers
themselves to become involved in discussions. Hasluck's response to Booker on his
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intentions in this regard was an abrupt and emphatic "No". 17 At the same time, Hasluck
refused to allow DEA to issue a ministerial press statement designed to assuage
anticipated press speculation on the reason for the US Mission's visit. 78
Both actions lend substance to the conclusion ·of Hasluck's political biographer,
Robert Porter, that he failed, at times, to take adequate account of the advice he received
from his department, whose senior officers he preferred to keep at arm's length. 79 They
also reinforce Porter's conclusion that Hasluck's "strong and clear views on policy and
policy formulation", 80 and the fact that he tended to concentrate on the broad sweep of
international relations, led him to neglect the specific influences acting on a particular
situation. 81
It is not unlikely that stronger support and closer engagement by the Minister for

External Affairs in the questions raised by the NPT draft text would have resulted in
Australia's earlier accession. By the same token, however, Australia's ability to exercise
influence over the terms of the treaty would have been correspondingly reduced.
As will later become clear, the non-proliferation seeds planted by DEA during
the early months of 1968 - the exercise of influence over multilateral nuclear arms
control measures - did not finally flower until the election of the Whitlam Government
in December, 1972.

Resisting America: Diplomacy and the Politics of Leverage
The United States' four-man negotiating Mission, sent by Secretary of State Rusk to
convince Australia of the merits of the NPT, consisted of its leader, Herbert Scoville
(Assistant Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Bureau of Science and
Technology), George Bunn (General Counsel, ACDA), Howard C. Brown (Senior
77
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Assistant General Manager, United States Atomic Energy Agency) and Allan M.
Labowitz (Special Assistant for Disarmament, USAEC). 82
Secretary Rusk explained that Scoville, Brown and Labowitz had been key
members of a similar team sent to Japan in November 1967 for comparable discussions
with the Japanese Government. In addition, Brown had broad responsibilities within the
United States Atomic Energy Agency for peaceful nuclear programmes, while Bunn,
who was Deputy Chairman of the US Delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee negotiations in Geneva, had been a key drafter of the text of the Draft
NPT. 83 Rusk believed that the delegation "should be able to satisfy Australian concerns
at alllevels". 84

A further step along the road to nuclear policy consolidation was taken through the
production, by the Drafting Group of the Defence Committee, of a set of confidential
"Notes for use by Australian officers" incorporating a set of "suggested Australian
positions" in the forthcoming negotiations. 85 This document represents the first point at
which a consolidated Australian policy position on the NPT could be precisely defined.
Even so, it contained many concerns still harboured by the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission (especially on diversion safeguards arrangements), notwithstanding the
earlier detailed diplomatic responses of the United States Arms Control Agency.
Australia's nuclear warriors, at AAEC and elsewhere, were dying hard.
The Summary Record of the substantive negotiations between the US Mission
and Australian bureaucrats reveals the reaction of the Americans to Australia's
consolidated policy position. 86 Together with the Australian negotiating instructions, it
82
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establishes the exact course of negotiations, and pinpoints those areas of treaty
interpretation on which the US Mission was prepared to concede ground, accommodate
Australian anxieties, or add clarification. The Mission's willingness to do so is evident
from the record of negotiations, and is explicable, at least at this initial stage, by the real
sense of urgency which the Americans brought to the negotiating table. As its leader,
Scoville, noted at one point:
[t]he US [feels] very strongly that time [is] ... running out for the treaty.

87

Later, when discussing the possibility of states failing to declare all stocks of
materials subject to safeguards, immediately prior to concluding a Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA, Scoville commented that:
.... [it is] possible for states to prepare for the entry into force of the treaty by hiding
away material. This show[s] how important it [is] to get the treaty signed quickly. Few
countries [can] put material aside now; in four or five years more [will] be able to do
so. 88

Australia was the only English-speaking country in the Western Alliance which
remained to be convinced of the urgent necessity of bringing the NPT into force.
America's European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had each already
concurred, either at the Geneva negotiations or in bilateral discussions. 89
Nevertheless, a refusal by Australia to accede would, as Sir James Plimsoll had
pointed out to the Defence Committee, send a signal to non-aligned and non-NATO
near-nuclear states (such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Japan and South Africa) that
their failure to accede would be accepted (even if it was not acceptable) by the United
States and its NATO allies.
87
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A further pressure evident on the United States was its concern over the
forthcoming Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, to be held in Geneva from 29
August to 28 September 1968. Should the Conference decide that a quid pro quo (such
as a demand for strict guarantees from the declared nuclear weapon states against the
use of nuclear weapons) was necessary for the agreement of non-nuclear weapon states
to the NPT, the subsequent delays involved might mean a loss of momentum, and the
end of the treaty. 90
It was in this atmosphere of urgent need for full Western Allied consensus on the
acceptability of the treaty, at an early date, that the Canberra negotiations were
conducted. Its presence gave Australia's negotiators a powerful point of departure in its
internally-generated search for interpretative clarity from the United States.

The talks began with a review of the global pattern of support for the aims of the draft
treaty, and the projected course of the debate in the United Nations General Assembly
leading (as the US hoped) to its endorsement and opening for signature. 91 In terms of
prospects of support, it was significant for Australia that the US side regarded the
treaty's fate at the UN as revolving around the decisions of the near-nuclear states those countries with the ability to acquire nuclear weapons, should they decide to do so.
Many states had "no real chance of getting the bomb", 92 and did not want their
neighbours to have it. They would, in America's estimation, therefore support the treaty.
This left those which lay between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' who did not- or may
not - want to close their options. The United States was looking for immediate support
from these states, including Australia, in order to allow for the earliest possible entry
into force of the treaty. 93
It now fell to the US Mission to answer the questions posed by both sides of the
internal Australian policy debate, from which the Australian negotiating position
derived. For both the Australian and United States Governments, time was running out.
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A Fulcrum, a Lever, and a Place to Stand: The Australian Archimedes
The question which is central to Australia's role in the evolution of the 1968 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty can now be addressed directly. Precisely how did Australia

exercise disproportionate influence over its Superpower ally on an issue which loomed
so large for the United States, as well as for many other states with far greater
involvement in nuclear technology, and in its application?
As the UN debate approached, the Australian Cabinet decided to set aside the
question whether Australia should, or should not, sign the NPT - or indeed whether it
should, or should not, vote for any particular resolution. By doing so, it avoided a
commitment which would have precluded later flexibility on these questions. 94 Instead,
it decided that Australia's position in the General Assembly debate would be to:
.... declare support in principle for an effective treaty, but . . . also register in a
general way that the present draft raises a number of considerations for Australia
which she must take into account when considering her position. 95

In addition, the Australian delegation would not, either in debate in the Assembly, or in
discussions with other delegations:
.... appear to be opposed to a treaty or to be playing a leading part in opposing
sections of this Treaty, but at the same time, it would be careful not to allow any
suggestion which would lead to the impression that Australia is prepared
uncritically to accept the Treaty as it stands. 96

On this fundamental point, and in order to establish the structure of Australia's
Archimedian "place to stand", it is necessary to summarise each component of the
agreed position of the Australian bureaucracy, together (where appropriate) with the
relevant questions for resolution, and their negotiated outcome in talks with the US
Mission on 18 and 19 Aprill968. The decision of the Australian Cabinet, ten days later,
on instructions to be given to the Australian Delegation for use in the forthcoming UN
General Assembly debate on the text of the NPT, would, of course, be the final arbiter
of policy.
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The instructions it laid down in Cabinet Decision No. 165, with the exception of
minor last-minute changes agreed with the US deleg'!-tion in New York, can be taken as
the clearest expression of consolidated Australian Government policy on the treaty
itself, and on the future use by Australia of nuclear weapons for independent defence.
The final response of the United States Government to Australia's expressed
concerns and actions, as laid out, for example, in Aides-Memoires to the Australian
Government97 , and in the testimony of the United States Atomic Energy Commission
before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 98 can then be contrasted
with its original position following negotiations with the Soviet Union at Geneva.
Although some modification to Australia's consolidated position was, in fact, made in
discussions between Australian and United States representatives in New York, prior to
the United Nations General Assembly debate, 99 the substantive thrust of Australia's
arguments remained that which it set out in the Canberra discussions with the US
Mission.
This was confirmed by Cabinet Decision No. 165 of29 April1968, in which (as
discussed above) the Cabinet, having received the report of the Defence Committee on
the outcome of talks with the US Mission, directed the Australian Delegation on the line
to be taken on all facets of concern during discussions with other Delegations, and in the
debate itself. 100
Nevertheless, an opportunity existed, even at this late stage, for Prime Minister
Gorton to modify Australia's position on the treaty during his talks with senior US
Cabinet members in Washington from 24 to 30 May. However, there is no documentary
record of any direct effect flowing from Gorton's visit (which occurred during the latter
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stages of the debate in the First Committee of the Twenty Second General Assembly) on
Australia's national position. 101
Taken in the order addressed by the Defence Committee's Report of 26 April, 102 the
components of the final incarnation of Australian concerns - in which Cabinet concurred
in its Decision No. 165- were as follows:

•

Efficacy of the Treaty

Degree of Support

Australia needed assurance, before it would ratify the treaty, that the bulk of states
capable of early development of nuclear weapons themselves intended to sign and ratify
it. In Australia's region, these states included India, Pakistan, Japan and (importantly)
Indonesia- which might conceivably acquire nuclear weapons from Communist China.
Although this requirement did not preclude Australia's signature, the Cabinet agreed
that ratification was unlikely in its absence, notwithstanding the anxiety expressed by
the United States over the need for all nuclear "threshold" states to accede. 103
For their part, the US negotiators in Canberra had expressed confidence that
most near-nuclear states would sign and ratify, including the majority of Western
countries (with the exception of declared nuclear weapon state France). Japan was likely
to support the NPT, although India was uncertain, while the most critical countries were
Israel and the United Arab Republic. In summary, the US saw little difficulty in
obtaining a sufficient number of relevant signatory states, although it admitted a
concern for the possibility of states postponing signature unnecessarily. 104

101

Ramsey, A. (1968, May 23). Gorton will meet all the top men on U.S. visit. The Australian, p.l.
Gorton's Briefmg Notes in fact followed closely the positions taken by the Defence Committee in its
Report of26 April1968 (See Note 72).
102

Supra. At Note 72.

103

Ibid. Atpp. 4, 5. Supra. At Note 100, p.2.

104

Document A 1838/346: 719/10/6, Pt. 5 [158]. Summary record: Meeting of officials of the United
States and Australian Governments, Department of External Affairs, 18'h-19'h April, 1968. Canberra:
Australian Archives. At pp. 5-8.

138

Efficacy of Safeguards

Australia looked towards the establishment of a Safeguards system which offered
coverage adequate to ensure reasonable surveillance in most present situations, rather
than a guarantee of complete coverage of all possibilities for diversion of nuclear
materials to weapons manufacture. However, it was specifically concerned with the
possibility of diversion which was hidden behind the use of military nuclear propulsion,
which appeared not to be subject to safeguards under the treaty. 105
The question for resolution, therefore, was the status of nuclear propulsion units
in warships. This uncertainty highlighted inconsistencies between the NPT text, and the
Statute and existing safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
While the Statute guarded against the use of nuclear material for all military purposes,
the NPT text only prohibited their use in explosive devices. 106
The US Mission responded by pointing out that the IAEA had not yet
determined whether warship nuclear propulsion constituted a military purpose. It
believed the agency would not hold such use to be subject to safeguards inspection, but,
in any event, the NPT text did not prohibit the use of nuclear propulsion in warships. 107

Independent Interpretation

Australia noted that the treaty contained no provision for its independent interpretation,
such as a reliance on Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice, or a
special arbitral tribunal. In these circumstances, the interpretations placed on it by its
three sponsors, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, would
hold the greatest significance. 108 (Parenthetically, Australia's ability to influence the
substance of interpretations acceptable to the United States would therefore enhance its
influence over the interpretation of the treaty among other important non-nuclear states).
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The US Mission acknowledged the lack of any machinery to resolve differing
interpretations of the text. General Counsel Bunn offered the possibility of resolution
through the IAEA, although, ultimately, interpretation would be up to the States Parties
themselves - and eventually the UN Security Council. 109 Such a position did nothing to
restrict the aspirations of the Australian Cabinet in its search for an acceptable treaty
text.

•

Impact on Australia's Commercial Interests

Australia expressed concern over the potential impact of the safeguards requirements of
Article III on its expanding export_ markets for uranium and mineral sands. If Article III
(2) of the NPT subjected all "source or special fissionable material" to safeguards
inspection, states to whom Australia exported uranium and other safeguarded material
would have to be excluded from Australia's export markets unless they became party to
the treaty. Thus, Australia would be concerned to see that states such as Japan ratified
the treaty, in order to continue to import Australian uranium. 110 It was therefore
important to have a definition of "source or special fissionable material", in order to be
certain whether Australia's uranium exports would be subject to diversion safeguards,
both in Australia and at their destination.
On this score, the US Mission believed the definition contained in the IAEA
Statute was "generally acceptable". lll General Counsel Bunn asked Australian
representatives whether it would be satisfactory to Australia if this was resolved during
the United States' ratification process before Congress, rather than in the UN debate, as
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the US wished to avoid divisive debate of this sort on the floor of the General
Assembly. 112
As noted above, Cabinet had already agreed that the Australian Delegation to the
United Nations would avoid open opposition to the treaty in the General Assembly
debate. It remained to be seen to what degree

acquie~cence

in this respect would be to

Australia's advantage when the US Administration presented its interpretations of the
treaty during the ratification process before Congress.

•

Interpretation of"Manufacture" in Articles I and II

Australia sought to encourage and support the interpretation offered by the US Mission
on the interpretation to be placed on the term "manufacture ... [of] nuclear weapons or
other explosive nuclear devices" in Articles I and II. The interpretation of the term was,
in the Defence Committee's view, "of paramount importance" to Australia for two main
reasons: to maintain the maximum possible scope for the development of peaceful and
non-explosive military uses of nuclear energy, and for the development of nuclear
weapons, should that become necessary. 113 It was therefore vital for Australia to know

the point at which its nuclear activities would become prohibited by the terms of the
treaty.
The US Mission had, when pressed on the point, stated that "manufacture"
would not include any research, development, production or use for which there was a
conceivable peaceful intent, whether or not such activities advanced a state's capacity to
manufacture nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Articles I and II dealt only with what was
prohibited, not what was permitted. Thus, the treaty prohibited explosives manufacture,
but permitted all else (an interpretation which the US had agreed with the Soviet
Union). 114
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However, the US Mission had qualified these strong interpretations by adding
that there was a "grey area" surrounding preparations for the manufacture of nuclear
weapons, which it was not prepared to define, but which it would be for the IAEA to
establish over time through consideration of specific cases. 115 The United States
Government would establish its interpretation of the meaning of "manufacture" during
ratification proceedings before the United States Congress, which would thus become
binding for all US dealings under the treaty.
The Report of the Defence Committee, on which Cabinet Decision No. 165 was
based, advised that, on the basis of these US interpretations Australia could, without
breaching the NPT, reduce the lead time for nuclear weapons production to
approximately three years. 116 The Australian Cabinet (undoubtedly encouraged by the
nuclear nationalists in its ranks)

dire~ted

the UN Delegation to ensure that the US

interpretation was clearly understood in the UN, and especially by the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union. The Delegation should attempt to ensure that the US
interpretation was not opposed by any significant power in the General Assembly
debate, and to consult closely with Canberra on any developments which threatened
Australia's scope for work relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The "bomb
lobby", though weakened, was still well and truly alive.

•

Application of Safeguards Within Australia

Australia expressed its apprehension over a number of issues concerning the imposition
of a safeguards inspection regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency within
Australia.

Unequal Application

The treaty was unequal in its application, in view of the fact that the declared nuclear
weapon states were not required to submit their own nuclear activities to IAEA
safeguards inspections. This gave them advantages in respect of the commercial secrecy
115
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of their peaceful nuclear activities. 117 Although not required to do so under the terms of
Article III, the United States and the United Kingdom J:lad agreed to place their peaceful
use nuclear installations under IAEA inspection. Australia looked to the Soviet Union to
do likewise, and for all declared nuclear weapon states .to restrict their non-safeguarded
activities to the greatest extent possible.
The Australian Delegation, although it would not be encouraged to do so by the
United States, was instructed by Cabinet to urge the Soviet Union to consider this
course of action.

118

Industrial Espionage Risks

The danger of industrial espionage by IAEA inspectors was of significant concern. As a
major producer and exporter of "source material" (uranium in the form of "yellowcake")
Australia felt itself to be particularly vulnerable in this regard. 119
The primary question for Australia was whether its mines and processing facilities
(such as milling and ore concentration plants) would be subject to safeguards
inspections under Article III. Did such installations qualify as "principal nuclear
facilities", as described in sub-section (1)? Although the current safeguards system
largely excluded mines and ore processing plants, it was not clear whether this freedom
would remain, given that the NPT referred in Article III to "all source material"
(emphasis added). 120
The US Mission had taken a sangume vtew of the industrial esp10nage risk.
Inspectors would be unlikely to be exposed to commercially sensitive information and,
in any event, safeguards were directed towards materials, rather than the plants in which
they were found. In this case, the question of the definition of "principal nuclear
facility" was largely moot. In the Americans' view, it was not necessary or

desir~ble

to

have safeguards on mines or unprocessed ore. The exported ore would not itself be
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subject to safeguards, but the source or special fissionable material which was derived
from it, after export, undoubtedly would be. The

tim~

for safeguards to begin was, in

their view, the point at which concentrated material in a manageable form had been
produced. It was at that point (the "yellowcake" or uranium oxide stage) that diversion
had a practical meaning. 121
In summary, it seemed unlikely that Australian uranium or other mines and
processing plants would be subject to safeguards inspections, and thus to the risk of
industrial espionage.
The Cabinet regarded this as a satisfactory outcome which required no further
consideration, beyond the need to "assert and establish" (presumably at both the IAEA
and the United Nations) the right to continue to reject any particular IAEA Inspector.
Nevertheless, Cabinet held that the denial of a right of rejection might be sufficient to
result in Australia's refusal to support the treaty. It noted that the question of rejection of
IAEA inspectors also had relevance for questions of risks to national security, although
this was still being assessed by the Director General of Security within the Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation. 122

Other Commercial Effects of Safeguards

Australia was anxwus, as was Canada, (also a maJor uramum miner) to achieve
exclusion of ores, minerals, mines, and ore treatment and refining plants from
safeguards inspection for reasons other than commercial secrecy. 123 Although the US
Mission had, as noted above, discounted the need for inspection of mines and
unprocessed ores, this negotiated position required protection from amendment at the
United Nations. Cabinet believed that the costs and burdens involved in complying with
inspections requirement were (as had been admitted by the US Mission) unjustified by
their effectiveness, and should be avoided. 124
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Additional Safeguarded Material

The uncertainty created by Article XX (3) of the Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency was a cause for Australian Government concern. It states, inter alia,
that:
The term "source material" means ... such other material as the Board of Governors
shall from time to time determine". 125

Cabinet indicated that it would not necessarily accept any future extension of the
definition of source or special fissionable material by the IAEA, and directed the UN
Delegation to ascertain whether any early extension was under consideration.

Deposit ofExcess Material with the IAEA

The Cabinet expressed a high level of concern over the apparent conflict between the
requirements of Article XII (A) (5) of the IAEA Statute, and the position which the US
Mission had stated during negotiations. The Statute required states to deposit with the
agency any material surplus to its immediate requirements, in order to prevent
stockpiling of those materials. Prompt return of deposited material (as needed for
nuclear fuel replenishment) was, however, provided for in Article XII (A) (5). 126
This contrasted with the US assertion that Australia could stockpile any
safeguarded enriched uranium to any desired extent. The Mission had noted that the
Statute provision on deposit of material with the IAEA had never been used, and was
unlikely to be used in the future. Nevertheless, the Cabinet stated in Decision No. 165
that the outcome of this conflict may have a decisive effect on Australia's eventual
decision on signing the treaty. The UN Delegation should seek to confirm the US
position with all three sponsor states and other "significant countries". 127
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Inspection Costs Allocation

The allocation of the costs associated with safeguards inspections was a subject of some
concern to Australia, in view of its possible future mining and other nuclear activities. It
was necessary to avoid adoption of the Soviet Union's position that the costs of
safeguards inspections should be borne solely by those states to which the safeguards
were applied.
The US view was that the current arrangement should remain. Safeguards costs
should be shared amongst members states of the IAEA according to their assessed
budget contributions (which, in Australia's case, was 1.4% of the total budget). That
view was to be supported by the Australian Delegation in the UN debate. 128

Future Amendments to the IAEA Statute and/or Safeguards System

Several issues bore upon the possibility of future amendments to both the IAEA Statute
and the modified safeguards system to be applied by the Agency to the requirements of
the NPT. They were sufficiently serious, in the Australian Government's view, to be
capable of "entering critically" into Australia's final decision on signature. 129
First, Australia concurred with the US in that any suggestion for re-negotiation
of the Statute, in order to accommodate the requirements of the NPT, should be resisted
in the UN debate. 130 It nevertheless acknowledged that the Statute could be amended by
a two-thirds majority vote of member states in the IAEA General Conference. Further,
the US Mission had confirmed that any future amendments to the IAEA Statute and/or
safeguards system would be mandatory for States Parties to the treaty. Cabinet
specifically resisted such a proposition. Any changes were likely to impact on
Australia's interests, and should only occur through bilateral agreement between
individual states and the Board of Governors of the IAEA.
Since this was likely to result in variations in the obligations which states
undertook in safeguards agreements, it was desirable, for the sake of uniformity, to have
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a Model Safeguard Agreement drawn up, and approved, by the IAEA before individual
safeguards agreements were negotiated. 131

•

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

Australia noted the assurance given by the US Mission that the sponsors of the NPT
intended that the "appropriate international procedures" mentioned in Article V of the
NPT would prevent the withholding, by the United States or any other state, of a
peaceful use nuclear explosives service simply for political or economic reasons. Since
the US intended to have exclusive control over the service, such an interpretation was to
be endorsed and encouraged by the Australian Delegation through discussion with other
delegations, and in the UN debate. 132

•

Withdrawal from the Treaty

Article XI (1) expressed the right of a State Party, in exercising its national sovereignty,
to withdraw from the treaty:
.... if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty,
have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country.

Although the US Mission had indicated that this left the right to withdraw open to
interpretation by each party, it also believed that the intention of the term was to
severely limit the legitimate circumstances of withdrawal. For example, it was not
contemplated by the United States that withdrawal would be allowed in the face of a
purely conventional military threat. 133
Australia expected that criticism of the Article would come from states which
were anxious about their security in the face of a superior threat, and were unsupported
by a major nuclear power. This was unlikely to occur in Australia's case, since its
mutual defence alliance with the United States was likely to remain strong.
131
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Consequently, Australia would not raisG any questions concerning interpretation of the
right to withdraw, but did not want to see any tightening of the present text, or agreed
interpretation at the UN debate. 134

•

Proposed Security Council Resolutions

Cabinet noted the proposed tripartite security assurances announced by the United
States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on 7 March 1968. Given in order to
establish a promise of additional security for those non-nuclear states which viewed the
NPT text as insufficiently strong, they would take the form of a Security Council
Resolution, and would declare that any nuclear aggression would be "countered
effectively" by the permanent members of the Security Council (the nuclear weapon
states). 135
Since the threat or use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state
would create a "qualitatively new situation", the nuclear-armed permanent members of
the Security Council would be bound to take necessary counter-measures in accordance
with Chapter VII, Article 42, of the Charter. 136 By re-affirming the right of collective
self-defence established by Article 51 of the Charter, the United States was asserting a
discretionary right to go to the aid of a member of the United Nations without hindrance
from the veto power of the other permanent members of the Security Council.
In Cabinet's view, such assurances constituted a guarantee of security no greater

than that already afforded by Australia's adherence to the ANZUS Treaty with the
United States and New Zealand, which constituted the real protection it enjoyed in its
security relationship with the United States. 137
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•

Duration of the Treaty

The optimum duration of the treaty received a thorough analysis in the Defence
Committee submission which supported Cabinet Decision No. 165. 138 It appeared, from
the attitude of the US Mission, that any period shorter than 25 years was unlikely to be
acceptable to the United States, or to the Soviet Union. Provided, however, that the
ANZUS Treaty continued to have the meaning Australia attached to it, and that
Indonesia acceded to the NPT, the Committee foresaw no concern over the proposed 25
year term. 139
On this basis, Cabinet decided not to direct the UN Delegation to raise the issue
in the First Committee debate. The United States appeared to be very concerned that
any discussion on duration could develop into a "rallying point" for those states
opposing, or seeking to defer, a decision on the treaty. In view of the anticipated
strength of US reaction to Australian activism on the point, Cabinet deemed it prudent
for Australia to remain silent. If the duration of the treaty became a serious issue in the
General Assembly, a revision of the Australian position may then become necessary. 140

Conclusion
Here, then, was the nuclear policy position of the Australian Government on the eve of
the debate in the United Nations General Assembly on the endorsement of the text of
the new Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is clear from Cabinet Decision No. 165
that, while the goals of the treaty had received substantial support around the Cabinet
table, nuclear nationalist sentiments were still alive.
For example, Cabinet's express determination to have the US Mission's
definition of the meaning of the term "manufacture ... of nuclear weapons" endorsed by
all three sponsoring states (thus allowing a lead time for the production of a nuclear
weapon of around three years) is difficult to reconcile with any international legal
commitment to renounce their possession.
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Furthermore, it was at this pointthat Lennox Hewitt replaced Sir John Bunting
as Permanent Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister. Hewitt immediately
began to lobby Prime Minister Gorton on the need for a cautious approach to the value
to be ascribed to the proposed tripartite security assurances announced on 7 March. 141
Being, in addition, sceptical of the chances of the United States extending nuclear
security to Australia under the ANZUS Treaty, he exhorted Gorton to press US
President Johnson on the point in his forthcoming talks in Washington.
The strength of Hewitt's late contribution to the cause of the nuclear nationalists
in Cabinet, of which Gorton was one, is clear from his words to the Prime Minister:
In all this, I am not overlooking the benefits which we should obtain by the agreement

of other countries not to indulge in the building of nuclear weaponry. Nevertheless, as
signatories, they may cheat. And China will not be a signatory. Will the Americans
come to our aid, under ANZUS, with nuclear weapons in the event of a threat to
Australia by Chinese nuclear weapomy? This year; next year; in twenty-four years from
now? Will they??? 142

It remained to be seen whether the United States Government, urged on by a

President searching for a success on the world stage, and by an urgent desire to restrict
the widening distribution of nuclear weapons, would be prepared to bow to pressures
exerted by its Pacific ally - in the cause of Western consensus. It would thereby have to
deal with fundamental Australian concerns on a number of fronts, and in doing so
would have to re-assess, clarify and re-interpret the terms of the NPT text for which
Australia- driven by its own policy ambivalence - held misgivings.
The stage on which the final act would be played out was shifting to the United
Nations General Assembly in New York; to discussions there between delegations
involved in the debate on the treaty text, and to continuing negotiations between
Australia's diplomats in Washington and their interlocutors at the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. As discussed above, Australia was prepared to play
a tough political game in order to gain ground on the interpretation of this most
important of multilateral arms control treaties. It also knew, as indicated by its approach

141 Minute from Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister Hewitt to Prime Minister Gorton:
The nuclear treaty (28 April1968). Available [on-line] WWW:
http//www.naa.gov.au?COLLECT/cabpaper/Cabinet68/images/Al5619C48_1.htm [51].
142

Ibid. At p. 4.

150

on the question of treaty duration, that there were limits to recalcitrance beyond which it
would be dangerous to step.
These considerations formed the context in which Australia approached the
debate in the United Nations on a resolution to open the NPT for signature as a United
Nations Treaty. It remains to examine both the international legal implications of
Australia's nuclear policy, and the rewards of its labours.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MAKING A DIFFERENCE: A MIDDLE POWER IN ACTION
Introduction
On the 18 February 1970, Prime Minister John Gorton stated in a Press Release that the
Australian Cabinet had:
. . . . decided . . . that it would be in Australia's interests to sign [the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty] -but with reservations. Signature will enable us to join with other
like-minded signatories, such as West Germany and Japan to achieve those
interpretations, assurances, and qualifications which we regard as necessary. 1

As Gorton was aware, Australia was then in receipt of a wide range of comprehensive,
and politically and legally binding assurances and interpretations of the treaty's terms
from the United States (and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom). His own nuclear
nationalism, and Australia's reluctance to embrace the NPT during the early months of
1968, had ensured that outcome. Even so, he and his Cabinet felt compelled to make
clear, in this disingenuous way, its decision that Australia's signature in no way
indicated an intention to ratify the treaty. Ratification would occur only after Australia's
stated Reservations, made upon signing the treaty, had been satisfied.
The most important of those Reservations (many of which were canvassed in
Cabinet Decision No. 165) was one concerning the effect of the NPT on "nuclear
development", which should not be prohibited if it had a purpose other than the
manufacture of nuclear weapons. 2 Thus, Australia continued to prevaricate on its
support for the principle of combating the spread of nuclear weapons.
It was readily apparent that, although the long battle of the Australian nuclear
nationalists was drawing to a close, they still commanded sufficient strength at the
Cabinet table to insist on a decision which - even as the NPT entered into force - was a
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manifest compromise between themselves and their opponents. 3 Nevertheless, the
consolidation of Australia's nuclear policies had already done its work in focusing its
American ally on questions concerning the treaty's interpretation and operation which it
would have preferred to leave to later times and calmer councils.

As the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly prepared to debate
what was, arguably, the most important international treaty text to come before it,
discussions on its merits continued in New York between diplomats of the Australian
Delegation, and those of the United States and the United Kingdom. In this way,
Australia was able to maintain a close review of the evolving attitudes and positions of
its Western allies- and through them other states- in the shadow of the UN debate. By
doing so, the Australian Government was well placed to react swiftly to any
developments which promised to be to Australia's advantage. 4
Under the direction of the Australian Ambassador to the United Nations, Patrick
Shaw, and with the guidance of the Australian Cabinet, this process revealed issues in
the overall NPT debate on which Australia was, in fact, willing to support the United
States and Britain. One clear example was the question of exemption of uranium
mining operations from safeguards inspection - an outcome sought by both Australia
and the United States. By also agreeing to lend overall support to the United States in
the United Nations debate on "an effective treaty", and to vote in favour of a resolution
in the General Assembly endorsing its text, 5 Australia was able to leaven its previous
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resistance with a degree of co-operation sufficient to convince the United States that its
accommodations over the terms of the NPT would eventually prove worthwhile.
This chapter will review the course of Australia's actions within the context of
the General Assembly debate, and examine the final form of American compromises,
clarifications and amended interpretations of the terms of the treaty which were
proffered and made during negotiations with Australia in New York.
The extent of Australia's influence over the course of the treaty's endorsement
by member states of the United Nations was largely commensurate with its ability to
affect the stated positions of the United States. As the driving force behind multilateral
anti-proliferation efforts, the American superpower had gained approval for the terms
of the treaty from all but one of its allies, notwithstanding the early concerns of some.
Amendments to its terms which did no~ alter its operational effect in fundamental ways
were, therefore, likely to find general agreement or acquiescence - at least from US
allies - during the UN endorsement process.
In this way, the pronouncements of senior representatives of the US Mission to
the United Nations in New York, and of the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, together with assurances contained in US Government Aides-Memoires to the
Australian Government are each central to a definitive appraisal of the nature and
extent of Australian influence. Nevertheless, each of these indicators of United States
Government policy on the terms of the NPT is subordinate to its public statements in
the General Assembly First Committee debate, 6 and before Congress during the United
States ratification process. 7
The interventions of US Ambassador Arthur Goldberg in the UN debate were
delivered in the General Assembly on 26 April and 15 May, followed by a closing
statement on 31 May. The testimony of United States Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman Glenn Seaborg was given before ratification hearings of the United States
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 12 July 1968 (less than two weeks after the
treaty's opening for signature). Together with the report of Secretary of State Rusk,
6
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submitted by President Johnson to the Senate in support of ratification, they constituted
the final form of US Government views on the NPT at i!s inception. As such, they were
the acid test both of US interpretations, intentions and expectations, and the success of
Australia's nuclear policy transformation.

Australia at the United Nations: Policy on the Run.
The process of diplomatic exchange between Australia and the United States over the
terms of the treaty had been continuous since the latter months of 1966. On 20
December 1966, for example, the Australian Embassy in Washington had reported a
"run-down" provided to it by the head of the Political Affairs Division of the US Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) on informal discussions between the US
and the Soviet Union concerning a non-proliferation agreement. 8
Those discussions, between the chief negotiators of the two superpowers m
earlier formal non-proliferation negotiations (held from June to August 1966 at the
Tenth Session of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva) 9 were the
first bilateral talks to be reported to Australian diplomatic representatives, although
non-proliferation discussions at the ENDC had then been in progress in Geneva for
over a year. 10
This intelligence marked the beginning of the pattern of diplomatic consultation
on NPT negotiations between America and Australia, noted in Chapter Three, which
continued uninterrupted until the treaty's opening for signature on 1 July 1968. As a

8
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9
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Disarmament Agency. At p. 63.
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result of the importance which the United States attached to Australia's support,
bilateral discussions intensified at the diplomatic level in the period leading up to the
debate on the Draft NPT in the First Committee of the General Assembly.
The Twenty Second General Assembly re-convened on 24 April 1968 in
Special Session, and its First Committee immediately began to debate the Draft NPT
text, jointly tabled on 11 March 1968 by the United States and the Soviet Union at the
ENDC. 11 Australia would now have its chance, at some point during the debate, to
present its final position on the NPT to the member states of the United Nations. It was
therefore essential that Australia do everything it could, as soon as possible, to confirm
and reinforce the understandings and interpretations it had obtained less than a week
earlier in negotiations with the United States Mission in Canberra. 12

With that in mind, a wide-ranging discussion was held on 2 May between Australian
representatives in New York, led by Ambassador Shaw, and senior representatives
from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 13 The talks began with
the question which the nuclear nationalists in the Australian Cabinet were most anxious
to clarify: the definition of "manufacture" in respect of nuclear explosive devices. How
far, precisely, could a signatory state go in preparations useful to the production of
nuclear devices, and still remain in compliance with its NPT commitments?
In view of the central importance of this question to Australia's final policy

position on accession, it is useful here to reproduce the text of Articles I and II of the
NPT in full:
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in
any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

11

Supra .. At Note 9, p. 115.

12

See Chapter Four.
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Document A 1838/346: TS 719/10/5, Pt. 10 [109]. Cablegram No. UN 744 from the Australian
Mission to the United Nations, New York, to the Department of External Affairs, Canberra. (7 May
1968). Canberra: Australian Archives. The United States representatives were led by ACDA Deputy
Director Fisher and Assistant Director, Bureau oflntemational Relations, ACDA (De Palma).

-156

Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

For the US side, ACDA Deputy Director Fisher acknowledged that the definition
discussed earlier in Canberra had been proposed by Australia, although it had not
necessarily been accepted by the United States. The Australian proposition had been
that the word "manufacture", as used in Draft Articles I and II, should be taken to
exclude any research, development, production or use for which there was a
conceivable peaceful intent, whether or not such activities advanced a state's capacity
to manufacture nuclear weapons. 14
America's reservations on this score related to research and development
activities involving significant quantities of fissile material. Although the United States
had no objection to research work on, and production of, enriched fissionable material
(such as uranium enriched in its fissile isotope U-235) Australia would not be permitted
to divert this material to the production of weapons or other explosive devices. Nor
would it be permitted to perform research and development work, using significant
quantities of fissile material, on technological innovations which were directly related
to nuclear explosives. In any event, both activities would be subject to the safeguards
provisions of Article III of the Draft Treaty. 15
Finally, since the treaty dealt only with what was prohibited, Articles I and II
did not prevent the exchange of any information between States Parties which was not
directly concerned with the manufacture of nuclear explosives. On the whole, though,
Fisher believed that the United States would not find particular difficulty with the
Australian definition. The US had not yet worked out the terms of an interpretative
statement on "manufacture" which addressed Australia's concerns, but felt that one was
14

See Chapter Four, Note 114. The proposed definition was suggested by Malcolm Booker, First
Assistant Secretary, Division II, Department of External Affairs. It appeared to be an attempt to provoke
the United States into a definitive statement on the meaning of "manufacture". As a reaction against an
putative self-serving Australian attempt to circumvent the spirit of the NPT, Booker hoped to obtain a
strong US interpretation against the interests of the nuclear nationalists in the Australian "bomb lobby".
15
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possible "in the last analysis". He "fully recognised" that Australia had an interest in
"'not having people looking too closely over [its] shoulder"' .16
However, the United States Government held grave concerns about the
possibility of Australia raising issues surrounding the ·term "manufacture" in the UN
debate, and urged the Australian Delegation against it. The risk was that an attempt to
spell out the detail of a definition may result in greater support for more prohibitions
than Australia may consider desirable - a result, it noted, in opposition to what
Australia seemed to be seeking. In addition, such a debate could have "unfortunate
consequences" in relation to Arab concerns over Israel's nuclear intentions, and some
African states' concerns about South Africa. To approach the question in the General
Assembly debate could feed suspicions in these quarters that might never be put to
rest. 17
The Australian Delegation, in line with the instructions laid down for it in
Cabinet Decision No. 165, assured the US representatives that it had no intention of
making an early statement on "manufacture". This did not, they added, preclude a
public statement on the matter by a major nuclear power such as the United States,
which might be an important factor in Australia's decision to ratify the treaty. 18
Fisher undertook, at that stage, to return to the matter after taking instructions
from Washington, and pointed out that he expected to be involved in the forthcoming
United States Senate hearings concerning American ratification. He added that if the
Soviet Union attempted to expand the prohibitions contained in Articles I and II, "the
United States [will] defend [you]" .19
This was substantial progress towards Australia's goal of obtaining a precise
definition of the extent of flexibility in one of the most important terms of the Draft
Treaty. However, this progress had more than one dimension. First, from the
perspective of the NPT advocates at the Department of External Affairs - which
enjoyed senior representation in the UN Delegation in New York - the United States
16

Ibid. Both phrases used by Fisher were understood by the Australian Mission in New York as a
reference to a concession by the United States which amounted to an implied degree of flexibility on the
meaning of "manufacture" in Articles I and II which, while inchoate, exceeded a strict interpretation of
its terms.
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had made a strong and authoritative statement that substantial diversion of fissile
materials by Australia to non-peaceful purposes would nqt be tolerated under the treaty.
Australia's suggested definition of "manufacture" - in essence, that the possibility of
weapons applications should be ignored when an activity also had any peaceful
relevance - had been modified to allow only research and development activities with
weapons applications which did not involve "significant" quantities of fissile
material. 20 That outcome was a substantial setback for the nuclear warriors of the
Australian Atomic Energy Commission, as well as for the nuclear nationalists in
Cabinet (including Prime Minister Gorton and Minister for National Development
Fairbairn) and within the federal bureaucracy (notably, Cabinet Secretary Hewitt).
On the other hand, the United States had acknowledged Australia's desire not to
have the definition of "manufacture" to? closely defined, nor to endure too close a
scrutiny of its nuclear activities. It appeared, to some extent, that the United States was
prepared to allow tacit understandings to replace clear, explicit interpretations in the
cause of securing Australia's support for the treaty - a prima facie benefit for nuclear
nationalists advocating an independent Australian nuclear deterrent.
In a more general sense, each side of the Australian nuclear debate could take
some comfort from US commentary on the meaning of "manufacture" in relation to
nuclear weapons. While there appeared to be some room for manoeuvre with the
United States on the precision of a definition of "manufacture", activities which could
clearly result in the production of nuclear weapons would not be allowed.
Finally, while the matter remained to be concluded, Australia now had direct
evidence of its ability to exert meaningful influence over its American ally - a valuable
asset not to be squandered.

On the question of Australia's concerns over the terms of the Safeguards Agreement it
would be required to sign with the IAEA, the US side acknowledged that Australia
would have difficulty in ratifying the treaty without knowing, in advance, the
obligations it would be undertaking in regard to safeguards inspections. Other states
were likely to have similar concerns, and delays in ratification for this reason were both
understandable and inevitable. 21 The primary concern of the United States can therefore
20
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be construed as Australia's signature on the treaty. Australia's support for its text in the
General Assembly would be little more than window-dressing without an act of
commitment to the principles of non-proliferation which the NPT sought to establish in
international law.
While this placed a general imperative on Australia to support the Draft Text as
submitted to the General Assembly (and subsequently to sign and ratify the treaty), the
United States side moved on to review its interpretation of the application of safeguards
inspections to mining operations and unprocessed ores - a matter which, as previously
noted, had been of grave concern to the Australian Atomic Energy Commission.
On this score, the US representatives in New York were able to destroy one of
the pillars of the AAEC's arguments against signing the new treaty. They pointed out
that, since mineral ores were explicitly excluded from the definition of "source
material" in Article XX (3) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
they were currently excluded from safeguards inspections. 22 Under the system then in
place, safeguards came into effect only at the nuclear fuel fabrication stage, and there
was no intention to extend that application back to the mining, milling or initial
. of uranmm
.
processmg
ores. 23

More importantly for Australia's non-proliferation advocates at DEA, the
United States had raised the point with the Inspector-General of the IAEA. InspectorGeneral McKnight had agreed with the United States that, for the purposes of his
organisation, "source material" began at the ore concentrate (in Australia's case the
"yellow-cake") stage, which excluded the initial mining and milling of uranium ores. 24
With that understanding in mind, the Americans pointed out that Australia was not
alone in its desire to exclude uranium mining operations from safeguards inspections.

22
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Canada and South Africa had both expressed similar reservations, while the United
States itself had an interest even larger than Australia's own in that regard. It should
therefore be understood, they continued, that the United States supported the view that
the mining, milling and export of uranium ores would not be subject to IAEA
safeguards inspections.
Nevertheless, once again, the United States urged the Australian Delegation not
to raise complex matters of this kind in the First Committee debate, on the ground that
insistence on reservations and exclusions would only give rise, again, to suspicion
about US and Australian motives among representatives of states which were less
familiar with IAEA matters. 25
The final topic of immediate concern to Australia was the question of
amendments to the IAEA Statute and safeguards system. As noted in Chapter Four, the
Australian Cabinet viewed a failure to resolve such concerns, specifically in regard to
the mandatory imposition of changes to Australia's safeguards obligations, as being
capable ofprecluding Australia's signature on the NPT. 26 Here the Assistant Director,
Bureau of International Relations, ACDA (De Palma) insisted that this was a matter to
be "hammered out" in the IAEA (in which he noted Australia's influential position)
rather than during the UN debate. Again, Australia was not alone in its concern to see
its interests protected in respect of future amendments. 27

In the context of an initial, though high-level, negotiating process, Australia's
diplomatic representatives could be satisfied with the views advanced by well-informed
senior United States representatives who had been directly involved with the
negotiation of the terms of the NPT with US allies around the world, and in the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The tenor of the American
approach was conciliatory and accommodating, while remaining firm on those
25
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Australian concerns - such as its suggested definition of "manufacture . . . of nuclear
weapons" - on which too flexible an interpretation· could threaten the integrity and
purpose of the entire treaty.
Any interpretations of such a seminal component of the treaty text, which was
agreed between Australia and the United States, would eventually enter the
international public domain, either in US Senate ratification hearings, in the work of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, or in bilateral diplomacy. America's ability to
accommodate Australia's concerns in order to secure its signature was, ipso facto,
restricted by the probable reaction of its other allies, as well as those of the many nonaligned and uncommitted states. Nevertheless, as far as Australia's United Nations
representatives were concerned, these negotiations had struck a note of constructive
engagement with the United States· in which tough-minded resistance had been
successfully combined with measured co-operation.

While the Australian Cabinet awaited the results of its latest diplomatic encounter with
the United States, the UN Delegation continued to seek out support for the position of
the Australian Government with other non-nuclear weapons state delegations at New
York, though with limited success. Having been instructed by Cabinet not to indicate
either outright acceptance, or rejection, of any or all of the Draft Treaty text,28 it was,
nevertheless, able to test the strength of international opinion on the range of Australia's
objections during the early stages of the debate.
The Australian Delegation had noted very little attention, in the early stages of
the formal General Assembly debate, on the text of the treaty itself. Instead, states had
placed emphasis on broader disarmament and security issues. Apart from South Africa
and the Federal Republic of Germany, delegations approached by the Australians had
taken the view (previously emphasised by the United States) that the UN debate was no
place in which to raise the sort of questions which disturbed the Australian
Government. 29

28

Op. cit. At Note 4, p. 1. Such a negotiating strategy was the leitmotif for the continuing element of
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On 8 May Ambassador Shaw reported to DEA a summary of his Delegation's
informal discussions with other states' representatives at New York, and presented a
mixed picture. While the West Germans were "keen advocates of our speaking about
the treaty in great detail", they would not be doing so·themselves. 30 Again, the United
Kingdom had endorsed the American view that it would be "counter-productive" to
canvass questions such as the interpretation of "manufacture" in open debate. 31
Ambassador Shaw's suggested alternative was for Australia to secure written bilateral
assurances on the issue from the United States, and perhaps to establish an
"understanding" of its meaning in the Australian Parliament. 32 Nevertheless, he was
confident, from discussions with other delegations, that strong support for an
interpretation of "manufacture" satisfactory to Australia would eventually be
forthcoming.
On many other Australian concerns, over which the Cabinet (using the final
Defence Committee Report of 26 April) sought multilateral support, little evidence of
supportive trends was apparent. In fact, as Shaw noted, it was possible that overemphasis by Australia on points which many states saw as non-controversial would
invite suspicion over Australia's real intentions.
For example, the Defence Committee Report had argued that Article XII A 5 of
the IAEA Statute sought to prevent stockpiling of fissile material, while the United
States had asserted that the NPT text allowed such stockpiling under safeguards. The
Statute provision had never been implemented, and an attempt by Australia to have it
removed could invite curiosity from states as to its motives in doing so. 33
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Did Australia wish, for example, to remove all possible impediments to its
future abrogation of the treaty, to be followed by a rapid move into nuclear weapons
production? 34 The risk of assumptions of this kind from some states would accompany
this and other attempts to have the NPT text too finely interpreted in the General
Assembly debate.
In general terms, it seemed plausible to Ambassador Shaw that attempts by
Australia to garner support for its views, even during informal discussions with other
non-nuclear states at New York, was a dangerous strategy which was capable ofhaving
the opposite effect. As he pointed out, it may have been more productive to confine
discussions on areas of concern to its American and British allies.

Taking 'Yes' for an Answer (and Getting it in Writing)
The most important component of Australia's diplomatic dialogue with the United
States Government over the period of the NPT's evolution had been a series of AidesMemoires presented by the United States to the Australian Government. As formal

diplomatic communications between sovereign governments they comprised Australia's
primary documentary source of authoritative intelligence on the positions held by the
American Government (disregarding the products of national intelligence gathering).
More specifically, their value lay in their role as the diplomatic means by which
the United States sought to make its views and intentions known to the Australia
Government, or formally to clarify the results of negotiations in order to dispel
misunderstandings. As part of its developing dialogue with Australia over the emerging
NPT Draft Text, the United States had emphasised their importance from an early
stage. The weight which it also attached to keeping Australia formally apprised of its
negotiating position was evident as early as October 1967, when the Australian
Embassy in Washington received the text of a US Aide-Memoire already presented to
its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies. 35
34
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A comprehensive review of the progress and difficulties which the United
States was then encountering in negotiations with the Soviet Union at the Eighteen
Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, it provided the Australian Government
with several advantages. First, it constituted an assurance that the US intended to
consult extensively with Australia on the non-proliferation question. Second, it was
evidence of American willingness to include in its consultations (without any real need
to do so) the substance of its discussions with its NATO allies and the Euratom states.
Both points indicated to the Australian government the seriousness with which the
United States viewed Australia's support for the NPT. Finally, it established a firm
foundation on which Australia's advocates of the new treaty could build their support
for non-proliferation within Australia, over the objections of its opponents in the upper
levels of the Australian bureaucracy, and within Cabinet.
As the negotiations progressed in Geneva, further equally important US AidesMemoires were forthcoming. For example, the revised US Draft Text of the treaty of 2

November 1967, containing proposals for the terms of Article III on safeguards
provision, was the subject of a US Aide-Memoire of 13 November 1967 from the
United States to all its allies, including Australia. 36 However, the strongest evidence of
the strength of America's concern over Australia's resistance can be found in United
States Government Aides-Memoires provided after 14 March 1968, when the final
Draft Text was submitted by the ENDC to the United Nations General Assembly.
On 25 March 1968, the United States Embassy in Canberra delivered an AideMemoire to the Australian Government which presented the salient features of the

Draft Text, together with an appreciation of its purpose, operation and place within the
wider goals of nuclear arms control. 37 Intended as a formal request by the United States
Government to the Australian Government seeking its support for the treaty, the
document ended with a series of "verbal points" which leave no room for doubt that the
US confidently expected Australia to adhere to the treaty in its final draft form. In
summary, the United States Government:

36

Document A 1838/346: 719110/6, Pt. 3 [175]. (15 November 1967). Inward Cablegram No. 4694 from
Australian Embassy, Washington to Department of External Affairs, Canberra. Canberra: Australian
Archives. Classified Secret.
37

Document A 1838/346: TS 919/10/5, Pt. 6 [38]. (25 March 1968). Aide-Memoire of the Government
of the United States ofAmerica, United States Embassy, Canberra. 25 March 1968. Canberra: Australian
Archives.

165

... attach[ ed] great importance to the early conclusion of an NPT which will have the
widest possible acceptance; ... hope[ d) that the [Australian] Govermnent will support
endorsement of the draft NPT by the resumed session· of the 22nd General Assembly
[and would welcome] [Australia's] public announcement . . . in support of the draft
38
treaty, made prior to the resumed session and in open debate.

The United States was to be disappointed in its expectation of immediate
Australian accession to all its requests, as its negotiating strategy with Australia at New
York

(discussed

above)

illustrates.

Nevertheless,

determined

to

avoid

misunderstandings with the Australian Government, Washington resorted once again to
the formal expression of its position, following those negotiations.
In its final two Aides-Memoires to the Australian Government before US

Ambassador Goldberg's interventions in the First Committee debate, the United States
Government laid out its understanding and interpretation of each of the major concerns
of the Australian Government, thus marking a watershed in its discussions with
Canberra over the interpretation of the treaty's terms, and in the accommodations it was
prepared to make in order to bring Australia in line with the Western Alliance. 39
As such, each deserves close scrutiny. Had the continuous US/Australia
diplomatic dialogue on the evolving non-proliferation treaty, infused as it was with the
effects of the bitter internal struggle in Australia for nuclear policy supremacy, gained
America's attention? If so, exactly how far was the United States Government prepared
to go in order to placate its surprisingly dubious and resistant Western Pacific ally?
Furthermore, had Australia - the accidental recalcitrant - in fact made a real difference
in the development of the conventional international law of nuclear proliferation?

38
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Denouement
In its Aide-Memoire of 6 May, the United States Government - confirming the

substance of ACDA Assistant Director Fisher's position in negotiations four days
earlier - acknowledged Australia's need for authoritative interpretations of the meaning
of "manufacture" in Articles I and II, and the implementation of the safeguards
provisions of Article III.
The Note repeated Ambassador Fisher's assertion that Australia's suggested
definition of "manufacture" could not stand, since its assumption that Article II allowed
any research or manufacturing process relevant to nuclear explosive devices as long as
it served some other purpose was an "apparent misunderstanding". 40 Nevertheless, the
US would give further consideration both to that question, and to Australia's concerns
over safeguards implementation. It then clearly stated that many of Australia's concerns
would be met by its earlier statements to the ENDC in Geneva, and in its forthcoming
interpretations before the US Senate ratification hearings. 41
Finally, the Aide-Memoire offered a singular quid pro quo. If the Australian
side would refrain from raising complex and highly sensitive questions in the UN First
Committee debate on "manufacture" of nuclear weapons and the implementation of
safeguards, the United States would undertake to address Australia's need for flexibility
on Articles I and II. It made no mention of how this would be achieved.
Couched in diplomatic language, the United States offered Australia a bargain:
"refrain from airing your grievances in open debate (or with the Soviet Union) and the
US will accommodate your concerns." Specifically, in respect of the interpretation of
"manufacture", the United States hoped that the views it developed could:

... form the basis for any necessary discussion in the US Senate as well as in the
Australian Parliament in connection with ratification proceedings, but that issues would
not be raised publicly earlier than necessary for that purpose. (emphasis addedt 2

As a final balm, the State Department stressed that:
40
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.... in dealing with questions raised by the Australian Government, the United States
will take fully into account the Australian concern that it not be put in a
disadvantageous position vis-a-vis other non-nuclear countries in Asia. 43

The "further consideration" promised by the United States on "manufacture" and
safeguards implementation finally appeared in America's last Aide-Memoire to
Australia, dated 13 May 1968, on acceptable interpretations of the terms of the NPT. 44
Handed to Ambassador Shaw in New York by Ambassador Fisher, it contained an
expression of the full extent of flexibility in the interpretation of the treaty to which the
United States Government was prepared to agree in return for Australia's support. The
interpretations and clarifications it makes may be summarised as follows:

•

"manufacture" as used in Articles land II

A comprehensive definition was not currently possible. Any general definition or
interpretation, unrelated to specific factual situations, could not deal satisfactorily with
all possible scenarios. 45 Nevertheless, general observations could be made in respect of
specific activity. For example, the construction of an experimental or prototype nuclear
explosive device would be be covered by the term "manufacture", as would the
production of components [such as trigger mechanisms] which could only have
relevance to an explosive nuclear device. 46
Furthermore, activities which were under the scrutiny of safeguards would be
less likely than otherwise to attract suspicion as to their purpose. The US illustrated the
tenor of its position with examples of activities it did not consider to be violations of the
prohibitions in Article II. Neither enrichment nor stockpiling of fissionable material in
connection with a peaceful nuclear programme would violate Article II, so long as they
were placed under Article III safeguards. The development of both safeguarded power

43

Ibid. At p. 3.

44

Op. cit. At Note 39 (13 May 1968).

45

Ibid. At p. 1.

46

Ibid. At p. 2.

168

and research reactors fueled by plutonium, and of fast-breeder reactors, would clearly
also be permitted by the application of Article II. 47
Once again, the United States assured the Australian Government that it fully
understood Australian concerns about being placed at a disadvantageous position in
regard to other non-nuclear states in Asia. It would do all in its power to ensure that the
NPT had no such consequence, but did not elaborate on the means available to achieve
that result. 48

•

Safeguards arrangements and implementation

In regard to safeguards arrangements themselves, the US addressed the desirability of

implementing a "model agreement" for use by each State Party in its bilateral
Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Australia, it
noted, had expressed some concern that failure to do so would result in divergent rights
and responsibilities as between parties, since safeguards requirements would change
over time, and there appeared limited scope to amend bilateral agreement. In addition, it
seemed likely that states would be obliged to accept any changes to the safeguards
system (such as additions to the IAEA's definition of "source or special material") over
time, without a right ofrejection. 49
While re-stating its strong opposition to Australia raising in the First Committee
debate any matters in connection with a model safeguard agreement or additional
interpretations of Article III, the United States Aide-Memoire of 13 May made clear its
view that such matters should be resolved in the IAEA.
The United States would wish to consult closely, at a later date, with Australia
on a number of "highly detailed, technical considerations" both bilaterally, and in the
IAEA forum at Vienna. 5° It did not wish to upset the "delicate compromise" reached in
negotiations at Geneva over Article III safeguards - an outcome which could be inimical
to both Australian and United States interests.
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Nevertheless, the US was prepared to make a series of comments on specific
points of concern raised by the Australian Government. First, States Parties to the NPT
would retain the right, granted under Article 2 of the IAEA Inspectors Document, to
reject any IAEA Safeguards Inspector (such as those from states under Soviet
influence). 51
Second, mining operations and ore-processmg facilities were specifically
excluded from safeguards inspections. The new NPT bilateral Safeguards Agreements
between the IAEA and individual States Parties were expected to incorporate, by
reference, the relevant portions of the Agency's safeguards system documents. These
documents specifically excluded mines and ore-processing plants from their definition
of "principle nuclear facilties" (as defined in Article III (1) of the NPT). 52
Third, changes to a negotiated. Safeguards Agreement could only be made with
the consent ofboth parties to it, ideally in terms of a procedure agreed in advance. 53
Finally, the United States, after consultation with the IAEA, did not regard the
stockpiling provisions of Article XII (A) (5) of its Statute, on measures to prevent
stockpiling of fissionable material by states, as having any relevance to safeguards
arrangements. Stockpiling of fissionable material was not prohibited by the treaty, so
long as stockpiled material was subject to safeguards inspection to prevent its diversion
to weapons manufacture. 54

These interpretations of the terms of the new nob-proliferation treaty were authoritative,
definitive, and would be valuable to all uncommitted states at the United Nations First
Committee debate. America's request that their details remain unannounced at that stage
of the treaty's evolution (a position it rapidly reversed) does not detract from their
importance as a crucial step in the foundation of its operational life.
51
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Given the importance of this Aide-Memoire to other states in their decision
whether to support the Draft Text in the General Assembly, it is not surprising that its
existence, if not its content, was the subject of immediate speculation at the United
Nations in New York. Australian diplomats were approached on the following day by
their Belgian counterparts seeking details of the content of "the Aide-Memoire we had
received from the Americans". 55
Australia's representatives refused the Belgian request, and denied any
knowledge of the source of the leak, which by then was causing consternation within
the US Delegation. The Americans expressed concern that a position had arisen in
which other member states knew that the United States had given particular assurances
to another member state on a matter of common concern. 56 Since Belgium was (and
remains) a member state of both the European Atomic Energy Community ('Euratom')
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, its anxiety to know the content of the US
Note to Australia was an indicator both of wider Allied concern over the NPT, and of
Australia's standing at the United Nations. 57
Although Belgium was not represented on the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee in Geneva, as a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation it
had been included in the discussions held between the United States and its NATO
allies since the early stages of negotiations within the ENDC (during which serious
objections had been raised by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy). For example,
intensive negotiations had occurred between the US and each of its NATO allies
following the conclusion of the Twenty First Session of the UN General Assembly in
the latter months of 1966. 58 Thus, the depth and breadth of US consultations over the
proposed NPT, and its negotiations with the Soviet Union, makes the Belgian move on
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the leaked existence of the Aide-Memoir.e to Australia difficult to explain. Nevertheless,
this incident may have been a catalyst for the widespread dissemination of the United
States' interpretations contained in its Aide-Memoire to Australia of 13 May. Australian
Ambassador Shaw had stated to senior US Delegation members that Australia saw
advantages in having the widest possible acceptance among parties to the treaty of the
explanations and assurances which the Aide-Memoire contained.
He was rewarded three days later by the US Delegation's revelation that, in fact,
the United States Government had now distributed the text of the Aide-Memoire to all
member states of Euratom, together with all other NATO member state delegations in
New York, as well as those of Canada and Japan. It had already given a copy to the
United Kingdom. 59 Circulation of the Note, the US Mission agreed:
. . . might be considered as helping to consolidate the interpretations which [the
Australian Government] had itself sought. 60

The significance of this development cannot be easily over-stated. Australia had,
'

through its insistance on explanations and interpretations of the meaning of crucial
components of the newly negotiated treaty, demonstrated to the rest of the world a
number of important realities. It had shown, firstly, that the United States could be
influenced in the implementation of nuclear arms control measures by non-nuclear
middle powers whose support the US valued as a component ofthe Western Alliance.
Furthermore, Australia had demonstrated that, through its ability to focus
American attention on matters it preferred to gloss over or postpone, it could establish
some degree of guidance and direction in the nuclear decision-making of a second
nuclear weapon state (the United Kingdom) and other important near-nuclear states
(such as the Euratom states, Japan, Canada and South Africa).
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Finally, Australia's success had established a pattern for the operation of
multilateral arms control treaties within which it was possible to build an effective
treaty whose terms were (given their wide accession) very difficult to amend. By
establishing clear meanings and explanations of the political, as well as legal,
obligations undertaken by the treaty's adherents, the rigidities inherent in global
agreements of this kind could be tempered with operational flexibility.
Australia's developing role in this process would eventually give it a cachet and
legitimacy in international arms control activities well beyond what could reasonably be
expected of a state of its economic size, strategic importance and level of engagement in
nuclear and other international affairs.

The Public Face of Private Understandings
The understandings, accommodations and explanations which the United States and
Australia had agreed were implicit in the terms of the new treaty were not necessarily
readily apparent in the public statements of either. An analysis of the pronouncements
of both countries at the UN debate, and of United States Government representatives
before the US Senate, illustrates the ways in which they were tailored to take account of
the need (in America's case) to maximise support, or (in Australia's case) to
accommodate domestic sensitivities.
For example, following the advice which the United States had urged upon
Australia, its Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, made no mention, in
either of his interventions in the First Committee debate, of issues surrounding the
implementation of safeguards arrangements, or the precise meaning of the term
"manufacture" in Articles I and II. 61 Instead, he dealt in his first intervention of 26
March with the NPT's structure and goals, the balance of obligations and benefits which
it created between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, and with security
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assurances to non-nuclear weapon states combined with further disarmament measures,
as required by Article VI. 62
Even in his more detailed remarks of 15 May, Ambassador Goldberg made no
mention of either of Australia's major concerns, nor of issues surrounding them. Rather,
he focused on the strength of security assurances agreed between the United States, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. 63 While also pointing to a number of
amendments to the NPT text which had been accepted following suggestions from
several states (such as the need for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and fiveyearly review conferences) he again did not make reference to the two primary
Australian concerns. 64
As the United States had stressed in earlier discussions with the Australian
Mission in New York, it clearly did not consider the UN First Committee an appropriate
forum for debate on contentious issues which were capable of causing controversy and
dissent among states sufficient to threaten the adoption of the treaty.

Australia's Ambassador to the United Nations, Patrick Shaw, finally made Australia's
statement in the debate on 17 May. It is clear from the text of Shaw's remarks that the
delicate balance of influence over Cabinet decisions between the pragmatic "devil's
advocacy" of senior officers in the Department of External Affairs (led by Malcolm
Booker and endorsed by Secretary Plimsoll) and the nuclear nationalists, within and
outside Cabinet, was still finely poised.
As discussed earlier, DEA had been steadily directing the nuclear nationalists
towards the principles of anti-proliferation through its strategy of engagement with the
NPT on Australia's terms. For DEA, the primary goal remained the achievement of a
policy against nuclear proliferation which was capable of support within the Gorton
Cabinet. The tone and substance of Ambassador Shaw's speech indicates that DBA
62
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could not yet be certain of having reached that point. Certainly, the speech traced the
outlines of Booker's rationale behind his vision of Australia's role in the treaty's
establishment. It was his suggestion, expressed only in his official capacity, that, should
Australia's concerns not be met - with certainty - at the time of its opening for signature,
then Australia could sign, but subsequently refrain from ratification until all doubts had
been removed. 65 Such a solution was a compromise not only for Australia in its
negotiating stance with the United States over the strength of its support for the treaty,
but also in terms of the extreme positions of those on either side of the domestic
Australian nuclear debate.
Booker's even more prescient observation was that, by taking a questioning
attitude towards the Draft Text of the NPT, Australia would gain greater influence than
otherwise over its final form, and would be better able to persuade a sufficiently wide
group of non-nuclear (but nuclear threshold) countries to support it. 66
Nevertheless, Shaw's speech, which had been vetted in detail in Canberra, did
not reflect the nuances of an Australian nuclear policy still in transition, nor the views of
an Australian Government convinced by United States reassurances. Although he ended
by stating that Australia would support the General Assembly First Committee
resolution endorsing the treaty, his speech was a clear signal to the United States that it
should not, even at that stage, count on Australian support. In short, the screw was still
being turned.
While applauding the proposed security guarantees to be made by the three
Depository States, 67 Ambassador Shaw signalled Australia's discontent by laying out a
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set of primary conditions for the treaty's success which did not meet American requests
for full support, nor its request for Australia to avoid all controversial iss-qes. Shaw
pointed to the need for support for the NPT which extended well beyond the forty state
minimum accession level required to bring the treaty into effect. Given the ultimate
nuclear response of nuclear-capable states under serious threat, but without the alliancebased protection of a nuclear weapon state, the attitude of all such states would, he
~

stated, be a key determinant of Australia's faith in the effectiveness of the treaty. 68 In
doing so, he expressed the overriding concern of those in the Australian Government
who feared the result of an ineffective treaty:

Clearly, should relations between [the nuclear weapon States Parties to the treaty]
significantly deteriorate and their co-operation diminish, the prospects for our stable
management of international life, the·peaceful settlement of disputes and the effective
deterrence of aggression would also diminish. In such circumstances, it would be
unrealistic to expect nations exposed to threat, nuclear or conventional, to deny
themselves the most effective means of defence they could acquire, including nuclear
weapons. (emphasis added) 69

Furthermore, Shaw dealt at some length with Article III, on safeguards against
diversion of nuclear material, to the undoubted consternation of the US New York
Delegation, the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Reiterating such Australian anxieties as the inclusion of safeguards over mining and
processing activities, and the need for certainty in terms of safeguards obligations
undertaken, Shaw stated Australia's final position on the meaning of "manufacture" in
Articles I and II. This version was neither that which it had urged on the US negotiating
mission in Canberra during the previous month, nor that arrived at in negotiations with
US representatives in New York on 2 May:
The Australian Delegation, in relation to the provisions of Article III (3) and Article IV
of the treaty, states its understanding that, under the treaty, no nuclear activity in
research, development, production or use is prohibited, nor can the supply of
knowledge, materials or equipment be denied to non-nuclear weapon states, until it is
clearly established that such activity or supply will. be used for the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, or other nuclear explosive devices. (emphasis addedf0
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L

'
The newly proposed interpretation clearly conceded ground to the US rejection of
Australia's initial proposal that all nuclear activity should be permitted if it had a
conceivable peaceful purpose. On the other hand, Australia now sought to place the
burden of responsibility for showing that nuclear activities were for the purpose of
manufacturing nuclear weapons on the IAEA, but to an Australian standard of proof.
Shaw stressed that strict and scrupulous observance of Article III (together with
the peaceful-use provisions of Article IV) would be a basic condition for the successful
operation of the treaty.

The response of the United States Government to Australia's General Assembly
statement was muted. Its most promising avenue of protest was the co-incidental visit of
Prime Minister Gorton to Washington ·from 27 May to 1 June. 71 Gorton had certainly
been fully briefed on the non-proliferation question in preparation for his meetings with
President Johnson and members of his Administration. 72
In addition, as noted earlier, President Johnson had been taking a keen personal

interest in the Geneva negotiation of the draft NPT text. The level of the American
President's involvement had been emphasised, only two months previously, by the
Australian Ambassador to Washington, Sir Keith Waller, in a strongly worded warning
to the Australian Government. Referring to the consistent support which Australia had
expressed to the United States for the principles of nuclear non-proliferation,
Ambassador Waller pointed to possible severe repercussions should Australia fail to
accede to the treaty itself. 73
71

Ramsey, A. (1968, May 29). LBJ promises US will stay in ANZUS pact. The Australian, p. 1.
Ramsey, A. (1968, June 3). What Mr. Gorton really meant in Washington. The Australian, pp. 8, 9.
72

Document A 1838/346: TS 919/10/5, Pt. 16 [66]. (3 May 1968). Draft treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons: Notes for Prime Minister's brief for visit to Washington. Canberra: Australian
Archives. Classified Top Secret.
73

Document A 1838/346: 719/10/6, Pt. 3 [162]. (25 March 1968). Cablegram 1264 from the Australian
Ambassador to Washington to the Department of External Affairs, Canberra. Canberra: Australian
Archives. Classified Secret and Guard. The repercussions were expressed by Waller as concern at all
levels of the Johnson Administration, together with wider deleterious effects on press and public opinion,
perhaps resulting in "spill over" effects on the wider aspects of the Australia/ United States relationship.
Atp. 2.
Although President Johnson had announced his decision not to seek re-election on 31 March 1968, he
nevertheless continued to seek the completion of the ratification process in the Congress before the
presidential election campaign entered its final months (i.e. by July 1968). Maddock, S.J. (1997). The nth
country conundrum: The American and Soviet quest for nonproliferation, 1945 - 1970. Doctoral
dissertation, University of Connecticut. Dissertation Abstracts International, 58 - 06A, 2362. At p. 514.

177

It could be anticipated, therefore, that the question of Australia's fully-

committed support for the United States would be high on the agenda set for Gorton's
discussions with the United States Government. However, no documentary evidence
exists, whether from official archives, the popular press or elsewhere, indicating that the
fate of the Draft NPT treaty text in the UN General Assembly was discussed by Gorton
with his American hosts. Although the question of Australia's security in Asia,
guaranteed through the ANZUS Treaty, was certainly raised in Washington/4 its
implications for Australia's co-operation over the NPT were neither officially noted nor
publicly reported.
The second US response to the Australian statement appears to have been an
attempt to have Australia agree to co-sponsor the General Assembly First Committee
resolution endorsing the treaty text, thereby reinforcing its already promised favourable
vote. Although, by the end of May, twenty-eight states had agreed to act as co-sponsors
of the resolution, 75 an approach from De Palma of the US Delegation in New York
asking for Australia's co-sponsorship was met with a firm refusal. 76 Informal exchanges
between Australian, United States and Soviet representatives in New York at that time
unremarkably disclosed both the "surprise and disappointment" of the Soviet Union to
Australia's UN statement, and the less forcefully expressed consternation of the US
Mission?7

The Limits of Co-operation
However disappointed the United States or other co-sponsoring states may have been
over Australia's refusal, finally, to be persuaded of the unalloyed benefits of the new
regime of non-proliferation which the NPT sought to establish, the die was cast. The
74

Op. cit. At Note 71.

75

Document A 1838/346: 719/10/6, Pt. 5 [147]. (25 May 1968). Inward Cablegram UN 891 from the
Australian Mission in New York to the Department of External Affairs, Canberra. Canberra: Australian
Archives.
76

Document A 1838/346: 719/10/6, Pt. 5 [144]. (28 May 1968). Inward Cablegram UN 910 from the
Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York to the Department of External Affairs, Canberra.
Canberra: Australian Archives.
77

Ibid. At pp. 2,4.

178

United States had shown a remarkaole willingness to accommodate the concerns
expressed by its small but significant Pacific ally, and, in doing so, had itself gained a
greater understanding of the theoretical and operational shortcomings of its nuclear nonproliferation strategy, and of the treaty itself. On the other hand, Australia (and
especially senior strategists at the Department of External Affairs) had exercised a level
of influence over United States nuclear policy beyond what it had any right to expect.
In the end, however, accommodations and understandings had found their limit.
The United States had drawn a line under its efforts to persuade Australia on the merits
of its case, while the assurances and interpretations extracted from America had proved
insufficient to allow the Australian Cabinet to support immediate signature of the treaty.
Nevertheless, Australia had shown itself capable, when its political will and perceived
national interests were sufficiently strong, of impelling its superpower ally to take steps
which it would not otherwise have taken.

The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Goldberg, made a
closing statement to the General Assembly First Committee on 31 May 1968, following
the conclusion of its debate on the final treaty text. In it, he described amendments to
the treaty text which had resulted in a revised General Assembly resolution.
Changes to Article IV, which had been agreed upon at the last minute with the
Soviet Union, strengthened the provisions for the sharing of nuclear information and
material for peaceful purposes with developing countries. 78 In addition, Article V had
been amended to provide for the immediate institution of a peaceful nuclear explosive
service, under appropriate international supervision.
Finally, Article IX had been changed to provide for the treaty's entry into force
following the deposit of instruments of ratification by the three depository states, rather
than all five nuclear weapon states, and forty other signatories. This latter amendment
had been agreed to in order to preclude the possibility of delay in the entry into force of
the treaty through the refusal of either France of China to sign and ratify it. 79
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Since these changes had been called for by a number of states, the effect of
Australia's insistence on the importance of its access to nuclear technology (noted in
Cabinet Decision No. 165) and its interest in nationally controlled peaceful-use nuclear
explosions (noted by Ambassador Shaw in his First Committee speech) is impossible to
judge. More certain is Australia's influence in Ambassador Goldberg's express reference
to the exclusion from safeguards monitoring of uranium mining and initial processing,
in which he reiterated the United States• position that safeguards would continue to be
imposed only at the uranium concentrate stage. 80
In any event, the full extent of Australia's contribution to the evolution of the
treaty (as contained in the United States Aide-Memoire of 13 May) became clear from
the assurances received from both the United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and the US Delegation to the United Nations in New York that all the points of
substance in the Aide-Memoire had been incorporated in the written submission sent to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Johnson Administration. 81

United States Senate Ratification Hearings
The revised resolution, incorporating the revised (and final) draft NPT treaty text, was
adopted by the plenary General Assembly on 12 June 1968 by a vote of 95 to 4, with 21
abstentions. Among the abstaining nations were four near-nuclear or nuclear-capable
states (Argentina, Brazil, India and Spain) and one declared nuclear weapon state
(France). China voted in favour of the resolution. 82
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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was opened for signature in Washington,
London and Moscow on 1 July 1968. It was signed simultaneously on that day by the
three Depository Governments - the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union - and by 59 other nations. 83 Few NATO states (including Italy and West
Germany), and no near-nuclear or nuclear-capable states, including Australia, were
among the initial signatories. During the signing ceremony at the White House,
President Johnson described the treaty as:
. . . a reassuring and hopeful moment ... the most important international agreement
since the beginning ofthe nuclear age. 84

Expressing the hope that it would be accepted by virtually all nations, he said that the
treaty had three simple purposes:

•

to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation;

•

to assure to non-nuclear states "the full peaceful benefits of the atom";

•

to commit the nuclear powers "to move forward towards effective measures of arms
control and disarmament". 85

With the goal of securing immediate ratification of the treaty, United States
Secretary of State Rusk submitted a report on the negotiating history and provisions of
the treaty to President Johnson on the following day. One week later, the President
transmitted it to the United States Senate with a request for the treaty's immediate
ratification. 86
Secretary Rusk's report for consideration by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee dealt with the broad outline of the treaty text, together with a summary of its
eleven articles. His description and analysis of each article are valuable for their clarity
and simplicity of expression and exposition, which made the intent of the treaty - in
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United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (2001). Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons [on-line]. Available WWW: http://WWW.acda.gov/treaties/nptl.htrn. Op. cit. at Note
73 (Maddock). Atp. 518.
84
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both its individual components and as a whole - self-evident.

87

They also dispelled

many residual doubts over the approach taken by the Johnson Administration to many
of the points of concern still exercising the minds of the Australian nuclear policy
protagonists.
In addition to Secretary Rusk's report, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
received the testimony of Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, on the relationship of the new NPT to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
He included in his evidence the role of nuclear material diversion safeguards, as well as
the responsibility of nuclear powers to share with non-nuclear states the benefits of their
knowledge and expertise in nuclear technologies. 88
A direct comparison is therefore possible between the avowed concerns of the
Australian Government, as outlined in Cabinet Decision No. 165, and the degree to
which the United States Government had succeeded in answering them in open-forum
public

policy

statements

(rather

than

merely

m

private

assurances

and

accommodations). Thus, a review of Secretary Rusk's and Chairman Seaborg's analyses
ofthe relevant articles of the treaty in their report and testimony in the US Senate can be
contrasted critically with the decisive concerns of the Australian Government (discussed
in Chapter Four). 89
Explicit statements before the US Senate which add to the authority and clarity
of America's earlier bilateral assurances to Australia were limited to the Preamble, and
the most important elements of the treaty's operational articles (Articles I to IV
inclusive). Issues less central to US concerns (but nevertheless of concern in Australia)
such as the establishment ofregional nuclear-free zones (Article VII) and duration and
87

Op. cit. At Note 83, pp. 173-180. Rusk told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in oral testimony
on 11 July 1968, that:

Nuclear proliferation could add a new and dangerous dimension to historic ethnic and territorial
disputes between nations . . .. In short, nuclear weapons proliferation could stimulate a
preventive war.
Loewenheim, F.L. (1994). Dean Rusk: Diplomacy of principle. In G.A. Craig & F.L.Loewenheim (Eds.),
The diplomats - 1939- 1979 (pp. 495-536). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. At p. 522.
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Op. cit. At Note 7.

Supra. At Note 81. Although the United States Government had agreed to incorporate in its Senate
testimony the undertakings it had expressed in its Aide-Memoire of 13 May, in the event they were
dispersed throughout the US government's testimony before the United States Senate. Nevertheless, the
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency assured the Australian Embassy in Washington that "all
points of substance covered in the Aide-Memoire have been included in the written submission to the
Senate Committee by the Administration." See Appendix II for the full text of the NPT.
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withdrawal from the treaty (Article X) were not enlarged upon before the Senate
Hearings.

•

Preamble

The twelve preambular paragraphs, Rusk noted, expressed the consensus of the parties
on the purposes for which the NPT had been negotiated. 90 Thus, the Preamble was, for
Australia, a general assurance that the principles and projected mechanisms which the
treaty incorporated in its substantive articles would have the comprehensive support of
its adherents. More specifically, Australia's concern that the NPT should attract the
support of the bulk of nuclear-capable states (including India, Pakistan, Indonesia and
Japan) was based on the premise that, having signed and ratified the treaty instrument,
those states would be bound in international law to the general principles of nuclear
non-proliferation expressed in the Preamble. Only in such a way could the treaty be
assured of the efficacy which was of primary concern for the Australian Cabinet in its
Decision No. 165 of29 Aprill968. 91
Acceding states would be legally committed to preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons and supporting the development and implementation of diversion safeguards
on peaceful nuclear activities. They would also be committed in the same way to
sharing the technological benefits of nuclear explosives used in peaceful activities, and
the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy. Furthermore, they would be undertaking
commitments to encourage nuclear disarmament and cessation of the nuclear arms race,
together with a reaffirmation of the United Nations Charter principles against the threat
or use of force in international relations. 92
Although Australia had no direct influence over the final form of the Preamble,
it could draw confidence, from the comprehensive nature of its text, that those states
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International negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1969).
Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At pp. 174-180.
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Cabinet Minute: Decision No. 165 (29 April 1968) [52]. [on-line]: Available WWW:
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It is notable that Secretary Rusk used the expression "limitations on the nuclear arms race", rather than
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which did eventually accede to the NPT would be committed to non-proliferation rights
and obligations whose combined effect was to prevent .the spread of nuclear weapons to
states not already in possession of them.

•

Articles I and II

The crucial question for Australia of the meaning of the term "manufacture" in Articles
I and II was not dealt with in any expressly interpretative sense in Secretary Rusk's
report. Rather, he merely noted the existence, in Article II, of an obligation by nonnuclear weapon states not to receive the transfer of nuclear explosive devices of any
kind from any source whatsoever, and not to "manufacture or otherwise acquire" such
weapons. 93 As it had previously demonstrated in the General Assembly First Committee
debate, the United States Government was too wary of the possible consequences to
spell out its interpretation of the meaning and operation of terms vital to the central
proliferation question.
This omission had positive overtones for both sides of the Australian nuclear
policy debate. The nuclear nationalists could still assert that the terms of Articles I and
II left States Parties free to do all things towards the manufacture of nuclear weapons
short of actually fabricating them.
On the other hand, Australian advocates of the treaty could point to America's
carefully delineated position on the question of interpretation of the two articles,
provided to Australia in its Aide-Memoire of 13 May94 • The acquisition of nuclear
weapons, per se, would not be permitted, while the development of legitimate peaceful
use technologies would not be hampered by a strict or explicit interpretation of what
could and could not be attempted in the field of nuclear research. 95

93

Supra. At pp. 175, 176.
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Supra. At Note 48.
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•

Articles III and IV

The safeguards provisions of Article III, the implications of which had caused great
anxiety within the "bomb lobby" group in Australia, were addressed in greater detail in
both Secretary Rusk's Report and Chairman Seaborg's testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.
Seaborg's discursive treatment of the origins and development of safeguards
against the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to weapons
manufacture is an authoritative and effective indicator of the views of a technically and
politically literate exponent of American policy on this vital part of the NPT bargain. As
far as Australia was concerned, his most significant points were his insistence on the
efficient, effective and non-intrusive nature of IAEA safeguards arrangements, and their

-

continuing development in that direction. 96 Seaborg was careful to point out that the
United States considered fears held by some states (including Australia) that Agency
inspections of nuclear facilities would compromise their commercial secrets to be
groundless. 97
Seaborg based his assessment on the facts that inspectors were currently
precluded from interfering in plant operations, and did not normally require access to
commercially sensitive information. In any event, they were barred from transmitting
any information gained to unauthorised parties and, crucially for Australia, could be
rejected by a State Party to the treaty as unacceptable. This situation was not expected to
change. Thus, the Australian Cabinet's insistence that the right to reject any IAEA
inspector- such as individuals associated with Communist bloc states -be "established
and asserted" had been accomplished. 98
On the question of costs for the administration of NPT safeguards, Seaborg
again met the needs of the Australian Government by agreeing with its previously held
position, to the extent that treaty implementation costs should be kept to a minimum.
The overall cost effect of implementing the requirements of the treaty, Seaborg asserted,
would not amount to more than a small fraction of the overall projected value of
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electricity generated in safeguarded nuclear power plants. 99 Since the US had not varied
its view that assessment of a state's contribution to the total IAEA inspection budget
should be in proportion to its assessed pro rata contribution to the general budget,
Australia was assured of an equitable cost burden. The Russian view that each state
should bear the costs associated with inspections of its own facilities, a concern for
Australia in view of its potentially extensive uranium mining activities, had therefore
been avoided. 100
One of Australia's most strongly expressed anxieties - felt especially by the
Australian Atomic Energy Commission - had been the effect of adherence to the NPT
on Australia's access to American nuclear technology. The specific concern was for the
detrimental effect on the Australia - US. Agreement for Cooperation concerning the
Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, renewed in early 1967, which the Commission feared

could be abrogated or renounced as a result of Australia signing the new treaty. 101
Chairman Seaborg stressed in his testimony that the obligations which the
United States had previously undertaken in this regard (under its "Plowshare"
programme) would be enhanced, not restricted, by its new obligations under the NPT
(in Article IV (2) ). 102 Although Australia had thus been successful in important aspects
of the interpretation of Article III, one significant omission from the testimony of both
Rusk and Seaborg was the question ofiAEA safeguards application to mining activities.
Although this omission is probably attributable to the need to avoid such complexities
before the Senate Hearings, it nevertheless provided some comfort to those in Australia
(and especially senior officials at the AAEC) who continued to resist the treaty.
In many important ways, however, the concerns expressed in Cabinet Decision
No. 165 over safeguards arrangement and access to nuclear information and technology
had been met.
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Conclusion
In his message transmitting the NPT to the United States Senate on 9 July 1968,

President Johnson stated:
By 1985 the world's peaceful nuclear power stations will probably be turning out byproduct plutonium for the production of tens of nuclear bombs every day. This
capability must not be allowed to result in the further spread of nuclear weapons. The
consequences would be nuclear anarchy, and the energy designed to light the world
would plunge it into darkness. 103

Although Australia's conservative political leaders, its diplomats, nuclear bureaucrats
and uranium miners could not, in the end, deny that a comprehensive and effective
nuclear non-proliferation treaty was firmly in Australia's national interest, one of
America's principal Pacific allies . had been drawn only reluctantly towards the
conclusion that the NPT was sufficiently strong to protect its national security. Armed
with mutual security assurances expressed within the terms of the ANZUS Treaty
between itself, New Zealand and the United States, and with access to US nuclear
technology for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, Australia's reluctance to rely
on the long-term durability of its most important alliance relationship is perhaps
difficult to understand.
It must, however, be assessed in the context of the fierce internal debate between

those individuals and institutions, on both sides of the question, whose antipathy
generated much of the nuclear policy ambivalence which appears to have so perplexed
America's nuclear negotiators. At the centre of the storm, and often playing a carefully
balanced policy game against its interlocutors, stood the diplomats of the Department of
External Affairs, whose purpose was diplomacy, rather than preparations for warfare.
Although they had, to some extent, stepped back from the centre of Australia's nuclear
advocacy with the removal of the NPT debate to the UN General Assembly in New
York, DEA's senior nuclear thinkers had cause to be well pleased with their efforts.
Australia finally signed the NPT on 27 February 1970, shortly before it entered
into force. Although twenty months passed before Australia was ready to acknowledge
the inevitability of its inclusion within the NPT regime, 104 its insistence on certainty of
103
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interpretation on many aspects of this most important of global bargains gave it a point
of departure for much of its future nuclear policy activism. Embedded in that process is
a range of implications for the evolution of nuclear international law which will be
addressed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LIMITS OF INFLUENCE
Introduction
Much of Australia's achievement in gaining the attention of the United States over its
objection to the NPT had occurred as a result of a three-fold advantage. First, the
Johnson Administration was concerned about the possible consequences of allowing
the new treaty to lapse through widespread disagreement over detail. As a result, it had
shown its willingness to concede ground over the treaty's terms, as the price of eventual
success. Furthermore, the United States Government was convinced that the treaty was
unlikely to be effective without the full support of all member states of the Western
Alliance, rather than merely the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation. 1 Finally, Washington regarded prompt conclusion of the negotiations on
the treaty as necessary to forestall the danger of its rejection by non-nuclear weapon
states at the projected Conference of Non-Nuclear States, to be held in March or April
1968. 2

For these reasons, as this study has shown, the United States made determined
efforts to convince Australia of the treaty's value as a new, effective and durable
international legal barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons. Although only
1

It would not, of course, be fully effective until it approached near-universal adherence. Even so, the US
view that the NPT needed the comprehensive support of the Western Alliance probably had its genesis in
1963 at initial US/Soviet talks on a non-proliferation treaty, held in Moscow between US Ambassador
Averell Harriman and Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Kruschev on 25 July of that year.
On the American side, the notion of a non-proliferation treaty then included a vision of the two
superpowers each enforcing a non-proliferation fiat in their respective spheres of influence. President
Kennedy envisioned a non-proliferation quid pro quo with the Soviet Union, based on the ability of each
superpower effectively to halt the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of their respective allied (if
not non-aligned) states. Kostrzewa-Zorbas, G. (1998). American responses to the proliferation of actual,
virtual and potential nuclear weapons: France, Israel, Japan, and related cases, 1939- 1997: Lessons
for the multipolar future. Doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University. Dissertation Abstracts
International 59/05, 1765. At pp. 189, 190.
2

In the event, the Conference was postponed, and was eventually held after the conclusion of the UN
General Assembly debate, from 29 August to 28 September 1968 in Geneva. Its main purposes were to
address the problems involved in the implementation of the NPT, to discuss measures to ensure the
security of the non-nuclear states and prevent further proliferation, and, finally, to discuss co-operation in
the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Australia attended the Conference. Cabinet Submission No.
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by
Minister
for
External
Affairs
Paul
Hasluck.
278,
AvailableWWW :http://ww.naa. gov .au/COLLECT/cabpaper/Cabinet68/images/Submission 278 l.htm .
At p. 1 and Annexe 2.
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partially effective in that endeavour, America's response to Australia's objections to its
terms was strong evidence of the ability of its middle-power allies to bring influence to
bear on US interpretation of important multilateral conventional disarmament law.
As discussed in Chapter Five, several states with nuclear interests or capabilities
(including America's closest ally, the United Kingdom) had noted Australia's
achievement during the United Nations General Assembly debate on the treaty. Among
them were the member states of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, as well as Japan and South Africa, each of
which had received the text of the US Aide-Memoire of 13 May 1968 to Australia on
issues of treaty interpretation. 3
Although Australia was now coming under broad international notice through its
negotiations with the United States, it had already engaged several nuclear-capable
states, namely Italy, Sweden, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany, in bilateral
discussions on the content, purpose, and chances of success for the NPT. 4 In addition,
Australia maintained similarly focused bilateral diplomatic contacts with the treaty's
second and third Depository States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
In this way, Australia kept open a second avenue of diplomatic consultations

aimed at building a picture of the extent of global support for the new treaty. By not
relying solely on the US/Australia relationship to mediate its position on the NPT with
the rest of the world, Australia ensured for itself an independent means of assessing the
probable strength and durability of the treaty. Such an assessment, as the Gorton
Government had always insisted, would be a fundamental component of any decision
whether Australia would sign (and subsequently ratify) the NPT. 5 That process also had
3

See Chapter Five. The six member states of Euratom in 1968 were Belgium, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The sixteen NATO member states
comprised Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
4

Evidence in support of this claim will be presented in the form of a summary of cable reports from
Australian diplomatic posts around the world to the Department of External Affairs, Canberra, detailing
the responses of states to Australia's concerns over the NPT. It will also be taken from reports of
diplomatic consultations made to DEA by the Australian Mission to the United Nations in New York.
5

One example of its position is contained in Cabinet Decision 95 of 26 March 1968. Paragraph 3 states,
in part:
... Australia should not take an attitude towards signing without a complete examination
of national interests, including such aspects as our military defence and industrial interests.
Indeed, the Cabinet was inclined very much to doubt whether it would prove possible to
institute the Treaty, and if instituted, unless it were very widely signed, whether it would
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the secondary effect of reinforcing with important non-nuclear weapon states their
perception of Australia's increasingly independent e!Jgagement in global nuclear affairs.
This chapter will examine the degree to which Australia was able to bring
influence to bear on the legal interpretations attributed to the text of the NPT by
relevant states other than the United States. Such a discussion is essential to any
determination of Australia's ability, finally, to claim for itself a substantial role in the
formation of the shape and strength of contemporary nuclear international law. By
establishing the full extent of Australia's ability to modify the responses of nuclearinterested and capable states to the legal challenges posed by the NPT, the chapter will
describe the origin of Australia's transformation from a nuclear adjunct of the US, into
an overt and creative anti-nuclear activist within the context of the Western Alliance.
In fact, clear and convincing evidence in the Australian public record of
Australia's ability to guide or affect the response of states other than the United States
of America is limited to two other nuclear-capable states - the Federal Republic of
Germany and Canada. Some evidence of a similar nature exists in respect of two
declared nuclear weapon states - the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. However,
there is less evidence of the nature and effects of more peripheral diplomacy
concerning the NPT between Australia and Italy, Sweden and South Africa, also
nuclear-capable states.
The chapter begins by analysing the response of nuclear-capable states Canada
and the Federal Republic of Germany to Australian bilateral diplomacy in the period
from 21 February 1967 6 to 14 March 1968, during the latter stages of the NPT
negotiations held at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. Similar
analysis will focus on the second and third declared nuclear weapon member states of
the ENDC - the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The recorded international
legal positions of these members of the ENDC during the Geneva negotiations will be
contrasted, where possible, with their final stance in the resumed session of the Twenty
ward off proliferation.

Cabinet Minute, Canbena, 26 March 1986. Decision No. 95 [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.naa.au/COLLECT/cabpapers/Cabinet68/images/Decision 95 18.htm
6

This date has been identified as a suitable starting point because it is the re-convention date of the
ENDC early in 1967, and is the first point at which direct correlation is possible between the positions of
member states, developed in open forum at the ENDC, and available evidence of bilateral diplomacy
between those states and Australia. On 14 March 1968, the report of the ENDC on the NPT negotiations
was refened to the UN General Assembly and Disarmament Commission. ENDC/225: 14 March 1968.
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Second UN General Assembly First Committee debate, held from 24 April to 12 June
1968. Assessments will then be made of the effec~ of Australian diplomacy on their
modified positions. In addition, the value of Australia's informal discussions with
representatives of the governments of Italy, Sweden .and South Africa will be assessed
alongside similar discussions held with the International Atomic Energy Agency at
Vienna.
To these assessments will be added the imputable legal effect of the
dissemination of US responses to Australia in its Aide-Memoire discussed above. The
result will be a comprehensive evaluation of Australia's ability, in an international legal
sense, to modify or help develop multilateral interpretations of the terms of the NPT, in
order to clarify the treaty's intentions, enhance its effectiveness, ensure its survival and
allow it to evolve to meet future needs.
There is no doubt that the success of this seminally important multilateral arms
control instrument in restricting the spread of nuclear weapons placed under global
scrutiny two of the foremost challenges of international law: the legitimisation of
principles of law in the political decisions of a diverse community of states, and the
enforcement of universal rules of state conduct in the absence of a sovereign authority
or supranational enforcement mechanism. 7
Through the advent of the treaty, Australia had been required to develop,
declare, and then, in the open forum of the United Nations General Assembly, adhere to
a national policy on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Having done so - and thereby
essentially abandoned its lingering aspirations for an independent nuclear deterrent Australia could now build on its increasingly acknowledged middle-power status
(which it had already demonstrated at the United Nations in New York) through active
involvement in both the legal and political dimensions of global anti-proliferation
efforts.
Australia had been an influential member state, with a "designated seat", on the
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency since its inception in
1957. It would now prepare to go well beyond that vital but limited role in the thirty
years following the opening of the NPT for signature. It is no coincidence that
Australia's international anti-nuclear journey parallels, on a far wider scale, the

7

Ratner, S. (1998). International law: The trials of global norms. Foreign Policy, 110, pp. 65-80.
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evolution of its domestic nuclear policy from ambivalence and scepticism to
consolidation and coherence.

Australia and the Development of International Nuclear NonProliferation Law
The ability of economically advanced states, with broad scientific, technical and
industrial resources, to develop or acquire nuclear technology for energy production
was matched, in 1968, by the growing interest of sorile in the possibility of using their
accelerating energy requirements as a means of obtaining nuclear weapons. 8 The extent
of that interest can- be gauged by reference to a contemporaneous list of potential
nuclear weapon states, compiled by Fischer in 1971. It is divided between those states
which were then able to acquire nuclear weapons in the short to medium term,
following an acquisition decision, and those states for which nuclear acquisition would
be a feasible, if longer term, prospect.
Taken from the testimony of the United States Atomic Energy Commission
during the NPT ratification hearings before the US Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations in July, 1968, it is reproduced below as Table 1.

8

For a comprehensive analysis of the United States' policy on nuclear proliferation (from 1961 onwards)
and its characterisation as "the 'nth' country problem" during the Kennedy Administration, see: Maddock,
S. J. (1997). The nth country conundrum: The American and Soviet quest for nuclear nonproliferation,
1945 - 1970. Doctoral dissertation, University of Connecticut. Dissertation Abstracts International 5806A, 2362. At Chapter VIII: Fits and starts: JFK, the test ban, and the nth country problem, 1961-1962.

193

Table 1
Potential Nuclear Weapon States: 1968 9

Acquisition in 5 to 10 Years

Acquisition after more than 10 Years

Australia

Argentina

Netherlands

Canada*

Austria

Pakistan

Federal Republic of Germany*

Belgium

Poland*

India*

Brazil*

South Africa

Italy*

Chile

Spain*

Japan

Czechoslovakia

Switzerland

Sweden*

Hungary

U.A.R.*

Israel

Yugoslavia

I

*Denotes a member state of the ENDC.
I United Arab Republic (Arab Republic ofEgypt after 2 September 1971).
As indicated above, eight of these so-called "threshold states" 10 were present in the
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) during the four year negotiation
effort in Geneva aimed at concluding a non-proliferation treaty.
Held in six separate sessions between 21 January 1964 and 14 March 1968,
when the Committee referred the Draft NPT to the United Nations General Assembly

9

Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 10, 11, 12 and 17 July 1968, p.31.
Cited in: Fischer, G. (1971). The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (D. Willey, Trans.). London:
Europa. At p. 27
10

The term "threshold states" is used widely to denote those states with both the motivation and capacity
to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons in the short or medium terms. It does not, however,
distinguish between states in terms of the level of their motivation, nor their temporal distance from
acquisition, following a decision to acquire nuclear explosives. See, for example: Joint Committee of the
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia on Foreign Affairs and Defence. (1986). Disarmament
and arms control in the nuclear age. Canberra: AGPS. At Chapter 5, pp. 116- 150.
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for debate, the negotiations revealed the attitudes of a number of nuclear threshold
states to the legal, political and technical aspects ofthe treaty.

11

Table 2 lists the member states of the ENDC, divided between Western Alliance,
Soviet-influenced and Non-Aligned states.

Table 2
Member States of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: 1968

12

Western Alliance

Soviet-Influenced

Non-Aligned

United States

Soviet Union

fudia*

United Kingdom

Poland*

Sweden*

Canada*

Bulgaria

Brazil*

Federal Republic of Germany

Romania

Mexico

Italy*

Nigeria

Spain*

Ethiopia
Burma
U.A.R*

*Denotes a "threshold" nuclear weapon state in 1968.

Among the Committee's members were states with which Australia developed a
diplomatic dialogue during 1967 and 1968 on the legal, political and technical aspects
of nuclear anti-proliferation. Among these, in tum, were some states which made
pronouncements, initially during the ENDC negotiating process and later in the UN
General Assembly First Committee debate, on issues raised by the terms of the new
treaty. The record of those statements provides a starting point for consideration of the
11

International negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1969).

Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. At pp. 9, 115.
12

Ibid.
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degree to which any of them accepted or rejected Australia's assertions and concerns
over the treaty's legal and other deficiencies, potent~al effectiveness and prospects for
completion.
For example, how strictly or liberally could the term "manufacture" (of nuclear
devices) in Articles I and II be interpreted? Would a state's obligations under its
prospective Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA be subject to unilateral change
without consultation? Could a state reject individual IAEA inspectors, and would
uranium mining activities be exempt from safeguards inspection requirements? The
following survey is aimed at establishing broad conclusions on these and other
questions of concern to the Gorton Government over the terms of the NPT, and on
which it sought selective, though global, consultation.

Australia's Bilateral Negotiations
The United Kingdom

As America's closest ally, a member state of the ENDC, a permanent member - with
veto power- in the United Nations Security Council, a declared nuclear weapon state
under the terms of Article IX (3) of the NPT and a Depository State for the NPT, the
United Kingdom's preferred treaty interpretations are important from a global
perspective, especially to the extent that they differed from those of the United States.
Any divergence of views between Australia's two major Western allies over the
meanings to be attributed to such important multilateral nuclear international law was
(and remains) capable of destabilising the growing international consensus that the
NPT must be both practical and effective in its application.
The effect of a failure to attract broad global support for the treaty or its aims on
nuclear proliferation was incalculable, and therefore - given the increasing incidence
and depth of nuclear technical capability among threshold states during its negotiation potentially extremely dangerous. To that extent, any influence demonstrated by
Australia over the United Kingdom's interpretations of the treaty text was, at least
potentially, globally significant.
In fact, the United Kingdom exhibited some degree of independence from its

superpower ally by keeping Australia confidentially apprised, from at least early 1967,
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of progress being made at Geneva in private discussions between the US and the Soviet
Union, and being reported to it and the other NATO states by the United States.
Furthermore, it did so on the understanding that the US should not learn of this. 13
Nevertheless, as befitted its senior standing within. the Western Alliance, Britain's
adherence to American interpretations of the substantive Articles of the draft treaty text
was essentially complete. The United Kingdom had demonstrated that position from a
relatively early date.
On 21 March 1967, for example, the UK representative at the ENDC, Lord
Chalfont, had lent strong support to US assertions that the existing system of
safeguards against diversion of nuclear material to weapons production could be easily
modified t~ accommodate the broader requirements of the NPT. 14 Nevertheless, during
the latter stages of the UN General Assembly First Committee debate, the UK
Delegation, having been given a copy of the United States' Aide-Memoire to Australia
of 13 May 1968, 15 sought Australia's reactions to the Note, and asked whether it would
be seeking similar interpretations from them. 16
Notwithstanding the fact that the Australian and United Kingdom Delegations
had consulted over the same points as had the Australian and US Delegations during
the First Committee debate at New York, the UK Delegation's consternation stemmed
from the fact that it appeared to have no brief from its government on the line to be
taken on contentious aspects of the treaty, such as an acceptable interpretation of the
word "manufacture" in Articles I and II. However, the British Delegation did consult
immediately with the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister for

13

For example, on 3 April 1967 the Australian High Commission in London received a copy of the latest
US Draft NPT text, derived from US/Soviet negotiations at Geneva, and being currently circulated to
NATO states, on an informal and confidential basis. The Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department
of the UK Foreign Office stressed that "the Americans should not learn that [the UK] had supplied the
text to Australia." Document A 1838/275: 719/10/6, Pt. 1 [85). (14 April 1967). Canberra: Australian
Archives.
14

Supra. At Note 11, p. 71. One observer of the NPT negotiating process at Geneva noted, in 1973, that
the United Kingdom appeared determined to behave in exactly the same way as the United States and the
Soviet Union, on the assumption that its status as a nuclear-weapon state required it to do so. He added
that " .... if anything, British statements in favour of the treaty in Geneva were more doctrinaire than
those of the two superpowers." Quester, G. (1973). The politics of nuclear proliferation. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press. Atpp. 151, 152, 153-159.
15

16

At Chapter Five, Note 39.

Inward Cablegram UN. 808. Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York. Document A
1838/346: TS 919/10/5, Pt. 10. [111). (14 May 1968). Canberra: Australian Archives.
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Disarmament (Mr. Fred Mulley, then in New York for the First Committee debate). It
then confirmed to the Australians that the United Kingdom was indeed unwilling to
give assurances in public on the question of the meaning of the term 11manufacture 11 in
Articles I and II. It was not up to the British, they maintained, to 11 0pen up the treaty for
discussion again 11 • 17 It may be presumed, in the absence of an alternative explanation,
that this lack of clear interpretative policy direction was due, at least in part, to the fact
that the UK Government saw no need to diverge in any significant way from the views
of its superpower ally.
As the government of a declared nuclear weapon state, a strategic nuclear
partner of the United States, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and a
Depository State for the NPT, the Wilson Government's position is not surprising. As
far as the interpretation of the terms of the treaty are concerned, it had little choice but
to acquiesce· in America's strongly stated positions (on, for example, the voluntary
acceptance by the US and Britain ofiAEA safeguards over civil nuclear installations). 18
The effect on the British position of Australia's bilateral discussions with them
(such as they were) over the terms of the final NPT draft text is evident from the
statement by UK Minister for Disarmament Mulley in the General Assembly debate. 19
It was barely discernible. Mulley's only direct reference to Australia's concerns- on the

question of the application of safeguards to 11 Source materials 11 (Australia's mined,
milled and exported natural uranium in oxide concentrate form) follow the US line in
implying that IAEA safeguards were unlikely to be applied to the mining, milling and
initial processing of natural uranium ores. 20 This is the only example of direct
concurrence by the UK with the United States on matters of interpretative concern to
Australia.

17

Ibid. Document A 5882/2: CO. 32, Pt. 2 [53] (2 May 1968). Canberra: Australian Archives.

18

Article III of the NPT does not require the five declared nuclear weapon states to submit their civil
nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards against nuclear materials diversion. Nevertheless, both the US
and the UK eventually agreed to do so as a mark of goodwill, and to encourage the widest possible
adherence to the treaty. This decision, made as early as April 1967, was immediately conveyed to
Australia, India and Canada by the British Government. Inward Cablegram 4 725. Australian High
Commission, London. Document A 1838/275: 719/10/6, Pt. 1 [86]. (21 April 1967). Canberra:
Australian Archives.
19

Inward Cablegram UN.908. Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York. Document A
1838/346: 719/10/6, Pt. 5 [145]. (28 May 1968). Canberra: Australian Archives.
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Ibid. At pp. 3, 4.
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In summary, Australia exerted no meaningful influence or guidance over the
national policy of the United Kingdom in an arena ~hich defined the basis of Britain's
strategic security and fundamental alliance relationships. The record of Australia's
diplomatic contacts with the United Kingdom on . the new treaty is unsurprisingly
devoid of either.

Tlte Soviet Union
It may have seemed unlikely, to an independent observer, that the Soviet Union would

be willing to accommodate, or even acknowledge, any concerns which a resistant
Australia might exhibit towards the NPT. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union's eagerness to
have the treaty commended by the General Assembly did lead it to hold out to Australia
some hope of such an outcome.
The leader of the Soviet delegation at the ENDC, Ambassador Roshchin, had
been active at Geneva during 1967 and early 1968 in all aspects of the treaty's evolving
text, both in private bilateral consultations with the United States and in open forum
Committee discussions. Furthermore, the Soviet representative had been a strong
supporter of many aspects of the treaty which touched on concerns expressed by the
Australian Government in its Cabinet Decision No. 165 of 29 April 1968.

21

The

strength of his support for the principles of non-proliferation which were embedded in
the treaty (especially in its crucial Articles I and II) leave no room for doubt about the
Soviet Union's genuine and urgent desire to see the treaty brought to an immediate and
successful conclusion.
To this end, Ambassador Roshchin, from early 1967, expressed a clear Soviet
view that the treaty would not prevent non-nuclear states from using nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, nor from obtaining the benefits of internationally supervised
21

This Cabinet Decision focused on the general instructions and brief to be furnished to the Australian
Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, for use in the General Assembly First Committee
debate on the terms of the Draft NPT. Cabinet Minute, Canbena, 29 April 1968. Decision No. 165 [online].
Available
WWW:
http://www.naa.gov.au/COLLECT/cabpaper/Cabinet68/images/Submission 69 32.htrn.
Cabinet Decision No. 165 was made in response to Cabinet Submission No. 69 of 26 April 1968, which
comprised a Report of the Defence Committee (which had been augmented by the Permanent Secretaries
of the Departments of National Development, Supply, and Trade and Industry, together with Sir Philip
Baxter, Chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission). It canvassed only those issues of
concern for the brief to be given to the Australian Delegation at the UN General Assembly in New York
for use in the First Committee debate on the Draft NPT. Cabinet Submission No. 69,26 April1968 [online]. Available WWW: http://www.naa.gov.au/COLLECT/cabpaper68/images/Submission 69-l.htm.
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peaceful nuclear explosions (the subjects of Articles IV and V respectively).Z2
Furthermore, the Soviet Ambassador was adamant, 4uring the final ENDC negotiating
phase, that the safeguards arrangement against diversion of nuclear material, proposed
in Article III, would not in any way hinder the development of peaceful nuclear
applications by non-nuclear weapon states. In addition, he claimed, safeguards
inspection activities (by the IAEA) would not become an "interference" in the internal
affairs of states. 23
In more general terms, Ambassador Roshchin stressed that there were no
loopholes in the treaty's terms. Since the Soviet Union would abide strictly by the terms
of Article I (and thus not allow any transfer of its nuclear weapons or technology
whatsoever), supporters of the NPT could be assured, he implied, of its efficacy. 24
Roshchin also noted there that none of the twenty-seven states then subject to IAEA
nuclear materials diversion safeguards had complained about "any obstacles" to their
development of peaceful nuclear applications.
Each of these aspects of the NPT had been the subject of concern expressed in
Cabinet Submission No. 69, which comprised the Report of the augmented Defence
Committee, and had been endorsed by Cabinet in its Decision No. 165. 25 In view of the
tenor of Soviet support for the Draft treaty text, its underlying principles, and issues of
specific concern to Australia, the "surprise and disappointment", expressed in those
terms by the Soviet Union at Australia's statement of 17 May in the First Committee
debate, appears genuine. 26

22

Supra. At Note 11, pp. 67, 83.
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Ibid. At p. 102. The final negotiating phase was completed at the Thirteenth Session of the ENDC
from 18 January 1968 to 14 March 1968 (the final negotiating session to consider the terms of the Draft
NPT).
24

Ibid. Atp. 105.
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Supra. At Note 21.
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Report to Cabinet, Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Summary of
developments on 28- 29 May. Document A 5882/2: C032, Pt. 2 (53]. Canberra: Australian Archives. At
p. 4.
.
The full text of the statement to the General Assembly First Committee by Australian Ambassador Shaw
is contained in: Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968). Current Notes on
International Affairs, 39 (5), pp. 206-210.
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During subsequent private consultations at New York, 27 Ambassador Roshchin
sought Australia's support for the treaty, and its co-sponsorship of the revised First
Committee resolution of 28 May 1968. That resolution had strengthened the treaty's
preamble by emphasising the importance of co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities,
the right of Parties to engage in those activities, and the need to follow up the treaty
with nuclear disarmament measures.Z 8
In reply, the Australian Delegation observed that one of the factors influencing

a decision on Australian ratification of the treaty would be the Soviet attitude towards a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA covering its own civil nuclear programme. Others
included commercial concerns stemming from potential restrictions on uranium exports
to non-NPT states, and on peaceful nuclear research and development.
Having received a rebuff in his efforts to enlist Australia's support for the treaty,
Ambassador Roshchin stated that his country and the United States were considering
submitting to the First Committee "amendments" to the draft treaty text of Articles IV
and V, in order to make them more acceptable to states generally. 29 While this was, at
first sight, a promising development for Australia in that there appeared to be some
unexpected scope for bilateral influence with the Soviet Union, reality returned the
same day. Through its representative, De Palma, the US confirmed its discussion with
the Soviet Union over Articles IV and V, but described any changes as "cosmetic".
They would have no bearing on Australia's fundamental concerns. 30
The United States' characterisation of the amendments proved substantially
correct. The amended (and final) draft treaty text which emerged from these last-minute
US/Soviet negotiations on 31 May 1968 merely added a preambular exhortation on
"effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament", while amending Article
IV to acknowledge both the right of Parties to acquire nuclear materials and equipment
for peaceful purposes, and the energy needs of developing areas of the world. 31 Finally,
27

These consultations were held between Ambassador Roshchin and members of the Australian Mission
in New York. Inward Cablegram UN 910 (29 May 1968). Document A 1838/346: 719/10/6, Pt. 5 [144].
Canbena: Australian Archives.
28

Supra. At Note 11, p. 122.
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Supra. At Note 27, pp. 2, 3.
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Loc. cit. At Note 11, pp. 123, 124.
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Article V was amended merely to allow for explicit international supervision of the
provision of a peaceful nuclear explosive service to the non-nuclear weapon states. 32
Thus, Soviet efforts to achieve full and immediate Australian support for the treaty in
the General Assembly were essentially disingenuous, comprising little beyond
insubstantial promises of amendment proposals and diplomatic blandishments.
In the end, therefore, Australia could not point to significant matters of legal
interpretation of the terms of the NPT over which it had exerted any meaningful
bilateral influence with the Soviet Union. In contrast to the United States, the Soviet
Union would brook little or no interpolation by Western·allies such as Australia in what
it believed to be a universally supportable non-proliferation treaty.
Though it had as much to lose as the US if the NPT itself was lost, Moscow had
nevertheless drawn a line beyond which it would not step, thereby showing itself
unwilling to demonstrate any flexibility in pursuit of a goal as important as the NPT. 33

Canada

The primary focus of Australia's consultations with Canada over the terms of the NPT
was on the question of safeguards against diversion of nuclear material from peaceful
to military applications. The most important consideration for both Canada and
Australia was whether the safeguards arrangement, to be administered by the
International Atomic Energy Agency under the terms of Article III, would be applied to
the mining, milling and processing of natural uranium ores.
Canada, a major world producer and exporter of both natural uranium-based
nuclear power generation technology, and of uranium itself, was concerned to ensure
that its uranium mining industry would not be subject to IAEA safeguards
32

33

Ibid.

In a discursive survey of Soviet attitudes towards the NPT, Australian Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Rowland observed in February 1968 that the Soviet Union regarded the uncontrolled spread of nuclear
capability as dangerous " .... simply because i't would introduce more threats to peace". Having estimated
that twelve states could, in 1968, construct nuclear explosive devices, the Soviet Union would, in
Ambassador Rowland's opinion, " .... make a serious attempt to secure the widest possible membership
of an effective treaty and may, if they have to, pay some price to secure it." (emphasis added) As noted
earlier, that "price" appears to have been relatively low. Inward Cablegram 77 from the Australian
Embassy, Moscow (9 February 1968). Document A 1838/275: 719/10/6, Pt. 2 [100]. Canberra:
Australian Archives.
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inspections. 34 That had been the case in the years before the advent of the NPT,
although there appeared to be no assurance from the treaty text itself, nor from the
safeguards provisions of the Statute of the IAEA, that the implementation of the new
treaty would maintain that position.
Canada found an enthusiastic supporter m Australia, which had begun to
experience a resurgence of activity in its own uranium mining industry. The revival had
begun when Minister for National Development David Fairbairn announced in early
1967 that henceforth the level of uranium exports would be determined by reference to
the stock of proven reserves, rather than be restricted purely through govemmentfiat. 35
The change of policy meant that uranium mining companies could now exercise a right
to export a certain percentage of the processed uranium ores they produced. 36 The
result had been an immediate boom in uranium mining activity in Australia, in which
:-

large investments of foreign capital had seen more than sixty companies engaged in
exploration for uranium deposits by 30 June 1970. 37
With a potentially lucrative renaissance of its uranium export industry, and no
near-term domestic energy generating applications (apart from the planned but ill-fated
Jervis Bay nuclear power generating plant) it is not surprising that Australia saw its
national interests as threatened by the expense, disruption and possible commercial
risks associated with IAEA safeguards inspection arrangements imposed at the initial
. .

mmmg stages.

38
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The Canadian CANDU nuclear power generation technology uses natural (i.e. non-emiched) uranium
oxide (U02), with pressurised heavy water cooling. Titterton, E.W. (1979). The case for. In E.W.
Titterton & F. P. Rowbottom, Uranium: Energy source for the future? (p. 1 et seq.). West Melbourne:
Abacus. At p. 35.
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Carr, M. (1979). Australia and the nuclear question. A survey of government attitudes, 1945- 1975.
Unpublished Masters thesis, University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales. At pp. 179,
180. The wide powers of the responsible Commonwealth Minister of the Crown in respect of the control
of nuclear materials are set down in Part III, Sections 34 to 43 of the Atomic Energy Act 1953-1973
(Cth).
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Supra. At Note 35. Economically recoverable reserves ofU3 08 rapidly increased by more than 25,000
short tons, primarily in new deposits found at Narbarlek, Ranger and Koongarra, NT, and Lake Frome,
SA. Atp. 181.
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Op. cit. At Note 21, pp. 10-13. The Defence Committee Cabinet Submission No. 69 of 26 April1968
canvassed the possibility that Australia may refuse to sign the NPT if its concerns over industrial
espionage, cost burdens and disruption of production were not met.
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On these issues, Australia echoed Canada's own anxieties over the possibility of
having to extend its safeguards obligations to the mining process. During the 1967 and
1968 NPT negotiating sessions in the ENDC, Canada had not seen fit to address the
issue of safeguards on uranium mining activities, due possibly to a lack of support in
the Geneva Committee, combined with the dominant role there of its southern
neighbour and ally. 39
However, as the ENDC negotiations drew to a close, Canada sought urgent
consultations with Australia, a fellow major uranium producer, on the question of
safeguards on mining operations under the terms . of Article III. 40 Australia's
concurrence on the question of exemption of mining activities from an NPT safeguards
regime, expressed in a diplomatically forceful way by Ambassador Patrick Shaw in his
statement on 17 May in the First Committee debate, may well have encouraged Canada
to address the question in its own intervention one week later. 41 Ambassador Shaw had
stated:

As things stand, taking account not merely of the impediment to industrial activity that
would flow, the Australian Government would find much difficulty if safeguards were
to be applied to legitimate bona fide activities in the mining and early processing
stages. 42

In contrast to Australia's position, however, Canada took a negative line in the
debate. It merely noted, in its own intervention, that there had been no discussions in
the IAEA to the effect that uranium ores or unrefined ore concentrates should be

39

Op. cit. At Note 11, pp. 70-73; 101-103. During the Thirteenth (and final) ENDC Session on the NPT,
from 18 January to 14 March 1968, Canada's representative, General Burns, had confmed his remarks on
the application of safeguards to their discriminatory nature. At p. 101.
The second conclusion is supported by a report from Ambassador Shaw at the UN in New York
in which he noted Canada's professed lack of concern over mining safeguards, on the basis that they were
"specifically excluded from NATO understandings to which the USSR has not objected". Inward
Cablegram UN 762, Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York. Document A 1838/346:
719/10/6, Pt. 5 [140]. Classified Top Secret. Canberra: Australian Archives. At p. 3.
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Inward Cablegram 169, Australian High Commission, Ottawa (8 March 1968). Document A 1838/346:
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42
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subject to

s~feguards.

Canada saw no reason why Article III of the NPT should alter

this situation. 43
Since Australia shared Canada's concern over the implications of allowing
uranium mining operations to be brought under an NPT inspection regime, it was
natural that common concerns should create a complementary legal approach to the
question, in which the efforts of two major suppliers on the world uranium market were
aimed at ensuring the exemption of uranium mining from IAEA safeguards inspections.
From a legal perspective, the question concerned the application of the terms of the
Statute ofthe IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system ..
NPT Article III (1) requires non-nuclear weapon states, inter alia, to submit to
safeguards procedures in respect of all "source or special fissionable material". Those
safeguards procedures are to be set forth .in an agreement concluded between each nonnuclear weapon State Party to the treaty, and pursuant to the Agency's Statute and
safeguards system. 44
As discussed in Chapter Five in respect of Australia's negotiations with the
United States, Article XX (1) of the Agency's Statute defines "special fissionable
material" as including material containing plutonium-239, uranium-233 and uranium
enriched in its isotopes 235 or 233, thus excluding natural uranium ores in any form. 45
However, Article XX (3), defines "source material" as:
.... uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature , .. in the form of
metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; .. , (emphases added). 46

It can be argued, therefore, that on a literal interpretation of Article XX, both Australia's

and Canada's assertion of the exemption of mining activities from safeguards was on
unsafe legal ground, since they both exported natural uranium in a concentrate form.
Nevertheless, as both countries knew, that legal mandate had not been enforced. As
Canada argued, no valid reason existed for it to be implemented in respect of the NPT.
From Australia's point of view, its fear of significant burdens on its uranium
mining industry, while still justifiable, had been alleviated by the complementary legal
43

Supra. At Note 41.
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Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1957). [A.T.S. 1957 No. 11]. See Appendix III
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views of itself and its competitor. 47 By simultaneously presenting a clear and strong
position to the rest of the world on a matter which, not having been expressly addressed,
remained undecided, Australia and Canada together exerted considerable pressure to
ensure that their own interpretation of Article III prevailed.
In effect, they had sought the overruling of a de jure obligation to accept

safeguards through a de facto acceptance of the opposite conclusion. Australia's
diplomatic activity in this respect had played its part in securing, under the terms of
Article III of the NPT, a formerly insecure assumption about the application of
safeguards to uranium mining, milling and processing.

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)

Australia's contribution to the Federal Republic of Germany's approach to the questions
of accession to the NPT, and the interpretation of its terms, was made primarily through
assisting the FRG to develop its own position on the question of support for the NPT. It
did so through bilateral discussions on points of mutual concern.
As the treaty began to take shape in Geneva during early 1964, the Government
of the FRG faced strong opposition from the Soviet Union to a nuclear non-proliferation
treaty which allowed any kind of nuclear weapons sharing arrangement between itself
and a nuclear weapon state.

48

Any compact which allowed a successor of the West German state to succeed to
the joint possession of nuclear weapons as part of a politically united European state, or
permitted it to participate, with its allies, in the "multilateral nuclear force" (MLF) then
being promoted by the US, would by resisted as unacceptable by the Soviet Union. 49
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It should be noted that the de facto exemption of the initial stages of uranium mining and processing
did not (and does not) extend to uranium ores once they have been exported. They cannot be exported
unless the recipient state agrees to accept safeguards on any special fissionable material extracted from
them.
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Inward Cablegram 77, Australian Embassy, Moscow (9 February 1968). Document A 1838/275:
719/10/6, Pt. 2 [100]. Canberra: Australian Archives. Willrich discusses the effect of the NPT on such
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the territory of the FRG) rather than any potential control by the FRG over those warheads. Willrich, M.
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Loc. cit. At Note 7, Chapter IX, especially pp. 371-375. The American-inspired MLF concept called
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Later Soviet objections surrounded the. probability that the safeguards provisions of
Article III (4) of the NPT would allow a regional nuclear organisation such as Euratom,
of which the FRG was a member, to negotiate a common safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
The result, effectively, would be that the member states of Euratom, including
the FRG, would be able to verify their own adherence to the terms of the treaty, using
their own verification methods. The Soviet Union, while suspicious of such a selfpolicing arrangement, finally agreed to it during the Thirteenth Session of the ENDC, in
the cause of successfully negotiating the treaty. 50 Nevertheless, early Soviet opposition,
together with an initially strong current of popular resistance against the treaty from
within sections of the West German polity, served to complicate the development of
FRG policy on anti-nuclear proliferation,. 5 1
As late as February 1968, during the final ENDC negotiations in which it was a
participant, the FRG still admitted a significant degree of difficulty with its own
interpretation of the words of the treaty. This was confirmed by discussions held at that
time between .the Australian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany,
Ambassador Frederick Blakeney, and West German Disarmament Commissioner
Schnippenkoetter on the terms of the NPT. In wide-ranging talks, they addressed the
general difficulty caused by a lack of agreed interpretations by the Soviet and Western
sides. 52
The principle in international law which this question raised, according to the
Disarmament Commissioner, was the degree to which unilateral interpretations of
submarines, or a force of 25 missile-armed surface ships, either one acting as a nuclear deterrent force. It
was first studied in detail by the Kennedy Administration in 1962. Its rationale was that an arrangement
for de facto sharing of nuclear weapons capability among the NATO allies would appease the nuclear
ambitions of some, including the FRG and France, and ease fears within some NATO states of a
resurgent, nuclear-armed Germany.
50
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multilateral agreements were binding in law on the interpreting party itself, and on other
parties to the agreement. 53 What, for example, would be the position in international law
if, five years after the NPT had entered into force, the Soviet Union published a list of
interpretations of its terms which contradicted those ofthe United States? 54
In this case, Commissioner Schnippenkoetter was referring to a list of
interpretations of early versions of Articles I and II, given to all its NATO allies by the
United States in 1967. It appears, in its final form, as an addendum to the Report by US
Secretary of State to President Johnson on the Nonproliferation Treaty, which was

submitted to the United States Senate in support of a request from President Johnson for
the treaty's ratification. 55
A further complication arose because the US interpretations of Articles I and II
had been made prior to the institution, at the final ENDC negotiating session in January
1968, of Article IV on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Would the additional,
peaceful and positive provisions of Article IV thereby derogate from the specifically
military intent of Articles I and II?
The German view was that the history of the NPT's negotiation, and its
interpretative history, as revealed with the aid of the treaty's traveaux preparatoires
(preparatory work), were the best determinants of its legitimate interpretation. 56 This
view reflects a teleological or "aims and objects" approach to the customary law of
treaty interpretation which is incorporated into conventional international law in Article
31 ( 1) : "General Rule of Interpretation" of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. 57 Article 31 states:

A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of their object and purpose.
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It also takes account of the customary rule, expressed in Article 32 of the Convention,
that recourse may be had to the traveaux preparatoires as a supplementary or
confirmatory means of treaty interpretation. 5 8
There is no official archival record of Austraiian concurrence with the views
expressed by the representative of the FRG on these general principles in the customary
international law of treaties. Indeed, Australia's part in the formulation of those views
did not extend beyond a passive agency role, conducted in general diplomatic

F-

discussions.

•

The same may be said of the more specific discussions held between Australia
and the FRG on the various terms of the treaty. Rather than enlisting the support of the
FRG for its own points of view over the interpretation of the terms of the NPT,
Australia acted as a sounding board for the newly formulated or still inchoate policy
positions of a cautious and perplexed German disarmament bureaucracy.
In the Federal Republic's case, the geo-political and domestic contexts of its
accession to the NPT made it essential that it understand the full significance of all the
obligations it would be undertaking. Its place at the centre of Cold War European
tensions, and as the front line host of United States and allied nuclear forces in Europe,
underlines the contrast in the depth of legitimate concerns over the terms of the treaty
between the FRG and its Australian interlocutor.
Nevertheless, both Australia and the FRG were faced with opposition (from the
United States and the Soviet Union, respectively) to activities they regarded as falling
outside the meaning of "manufacture" as used in Article II of the NPT. United States
opposition to Australia's interpretation of the meaning of "manufacture" has been
discussed in Chapter Five. Soviet resistance against a wide or liberal interpretation of
the term was, as the FRG acknowledged, based on its desire to prevent any kind of
nuclear research or development in the Federal Republic. 59
As a result, and in a process similar to Australia's discussions with Canada over
the application of IAEA safeguards arrangements, a matter of mutual concern had
generated a complementary legal interpretation of an important term in this most
important of international nuclear control measures.
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The record of discussions between Australian Ambassador Blakeney and
Disarmament Commissioner Schnippenkoetter, illustrates this point. 60 One of the most
significant outcomes for Australia of its discussions with the FRG, was that they
supported Australia's general assertion that the term "manufacture . . . of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" in Article II should not be given a strict or
literal interpretation.
Both parties agreed that the term "weapon" - as used in the NPT - referred
specifically to nuclear bombs and other nuclear warheads, and that- as a purely legal
document - the treaty prohibited only the production of weapons so defined. It did not
prohibit research and development directed solely towards improving a capacity to
produce them. 61

Paradoxically, that conclusion yvas supported by the general United States
position, reiterated many times during the NPT negotiating process, that the treaty text
should not be interpreted permissively; that it prohibited only those things which it
addressed, and that it could not be interpreted as prohibiting anything else. 62
Nevertheless, as noted above, the FRG, on the basis of the teleological interpretative
approach to treaty interpretation discussed above, did not expect that such a
fundamental aspect of the NPT would be accorded a universal interpretation which, in
reality, would render the treaty useless.
In summary, Australia had played a peripheral but useful role in its discussions

with the FRG by engaging it in debate on matters which concerned both countries, even
though that concern came from different sources. Although its function had been more
that of a passive catalyst than an active participant, Australia's residual disquiet over its
prospective NPT obligations had found an echo in central Europe.
While not reflecting any legal interpretative influence on Australia's part, that
echo had, at the very least, resulted in a unity of approach between the two parties on
the central question of a state's obligation, under the terms of the treaty, to renounce
forever any aspirations to the means of acquiring nuclear weapons.
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Other States

Australia's bilateral diplomacy on NPT issues, conducted with other nuclear threshold
or otherwise important states, can be addressed in a co1lective way, since its shape and
outcomes are broadly similar in respect of several representative states.
In general terms, Australia's diplomacy took the form of informal discussions at
the United Nations Twenty Second General Assembly First Committee debate on the
treaty. 63 However, because of its character, there is no convincing archival evidence
suggesting that diplomacy of this sort conferred on Australia any specific interpretative
influence, beyond establishing with other threshold states an outline of its major
concerns.
For example, a report by the Australian Mission to the United Nations in New
York, dated 8 May 1968, reviewed the positions expressed to it informally by various
UN delegations at the NPT debate. 64 Ambassador Patrick Shaw noted in the report that
South Africa, a significant uranium producer, had expressed in private discussions the
concerns it shared with Australia over the possibility that Article III safeguards
arrangements might be applied to uranium mining activities. He went on to note the
probability that the strong views of the uranium producing but non-nuclear weapon
countries (notably Australia, Canada and South Africa) would act to forestall any move
within the IAEA to impose safeguards on mining activities. 65 In Australia's case,
Ambassador Shaw noted, such a prospect was reinforced by its presence on the Board
of Governors ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency.
This prospective unity of Australian and South African opposition to mining
safeguards was confirmed by the contribution of South Africa's representative in the
First Committee debate, Ambassador Botha, on 20 May. 66 In a speech sharply critical of
the text and general aims of the NPT, Ambassador Botha emphasised the threat to
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national sovereignty and commercial confidentiality inherent in a safeguards regime
which extended to cover the initial mining and milling of uranium ores. 67
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On this aspect, then, Australia could point to a degree of interpretative solidarity
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(although not influence) with a nuclear threshold state then on the periphery of world
events. The importance of whatever sway Australia held over South Africa's nuclear
policy direction nevertheless lay in the fact that the United States believed that the
South African Government should be persuaded to endorse the NPT in the General
Assembly, in order to avoid the risk of encouraging other African states to reject the
treaty. 68
ill this context, it appears that the United States believed that South Africa's

enemies in southern and eastern Africa, such as Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia, would
see South Africa's refusal to acquiesce in US demands as a sign that they, too, could
resist the treaty. 69 With no South African Government commitment not to acquire
nuclear weapons, its near neighbours could not be expected to do so themselves by
acceding to the NPT. Widespread desertion of the NPT ideal by African states - on this
or other grounds - was capable, the US believed, of threatening the viability of the
treaty.
There is some evidence of diplomatic contact between Australia and two other states,
Sweden and Italy, whose interest in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons made
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them significant (if essentially peripheral) participants in the NPT negotiation process. 70
They are representative of those states, both neutral and aligned with a superpower,
which were technically or economically_ capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, but were
prepared to renounce them by supporting the treaty. Iri contrast, other states with the
same nuclear potential had not confirmed any intention, prior to 1 July 1968, of making
a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.
For example, Brazil, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United
Arab Republic (Egypt) are all examples of states which were considered by the United
States Atomic Energy Commission to be legitim~te nuclear threshold states in 1968. 71
Of these states, only Poland signed the NPT on its opening for signature on 1 July
1968. 72 Others -notably Mexico and Nigeria- as active member states of the ENDC,
sought a workable treaty text in the interests of global nuclear security, and were not
then considered - at least by the USAEC - to be threshold states.
In both cases, any construction placed on specific provisions of the NPT text
which coincided with Australia's own preferred position was, with a few exceptions,
purely fortuitous. There is no convincing evidence to suggest that Australia's credentials
as a nuclear-interested but non-nuclear weapon country were sufficiently strong, in
1968, to give it serious diplomatic legitimacy in nuclear matters with similarly placed
states.
Nor is there evidence to suggest that Australia attempted to exercise any such
agency, although the Australian Delegation to the United Nations in New York found
"general support" among other delegations for Australia's proposition that states
intending to sign the NPT should conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA before
ratification (thus settling the nature of inspection obligations thereby undertaken). 73
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However, as noted in the Introduction to this Chapter, the Gorton Government
had made a determined attempt, early in 1968, to c·anvass the views of a number of
states on specific questions of concern. 74 The results of this informal survey, collated by
the Department of External Affairs (DEA), revealed the patterns of approach by nuclear
threshold states such as Italy and Sweden only to questions of specific concern to
Australia, rather than (necessarily) to those states themselves. 75
Nevertheless, together with the policy positions of Canada and the Federal
Republic of Germany (as reported by Australia's diplomatic representatives in those
countries, and discussed above) the results were a valuable tool in the hands of
Australia's diplomats at DEA, as they sought a coherent Australian response to the
emergent draft NPT text.
As noted previously, the primary goal of senior officers within DEA was to
develop a policy position on the treaty which was capable of support from the Gorton
Cabinet. To this end, Australia's diplomats in Rome, Stockholm and at the IAEA in
Vienna (as well as in Ottawa and Bonn) were directed to approach their counterparts on
an informal basis, with a view to gaining an understanding of their governments' current
difficulties with the NPT draft text. The depth of support around the world for a treaty
aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons would be a central issue for the Gorton
Cabinet in its final decision on support. The products of their quest were unsurprisingly
varied. For example, Australian enquiries as to whether non-nuclear states could expect
to retain control over the content of their safeguards agreements with the IAEA (should
the Agency's safeguards system change) received two directly conflicting replies. 76
Canada held that changes to the safeguards system would indeed affect a state's
obligations under Article III of the draft NPT, while diplomatic contacts at Vienna

74

Op. cit. At Note 4.

75

Summary of answers to the questions about the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons asked in cablegrams 627 and 803 to Washington and repeated to other posts. (1 March 1968).
Document A 1838/346: TS 919/10/5 [9]. Canberra: Australian Archives. Classified "Secret and Guard."
Sweden is an example of a neutral state which, having approached the nuclear "threshold", then
renounced nuclear weapons (in the late 1950s and early 1960s) after coming close to attaining the ability
to produce a small, plutonium-based nuclear arsenal. Albright, D., & O'Neill, K. (1995). Jury rigged, but
Bulletin
of
the
Atomic
Scientists
[on-line].
Available
WWW:
working.
http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/jf95/jf95Albright.html At p.2.
76

Ibid. At p. 3.

214

doubted that changes to the IAEA safeguards system could automatically affect an
international agreement between the Agency and sovereign states. 77
A more fundamental question for Australia was the attitude of other non-nuclear
states to nuclear research and development which had the sole aim of improving a
country's capacity to produce nuclear explosive devices, or which was capable of being
directed towards that goal. On these questions, Australia's diplomats received similarly
disparate views. An unnamed Italian informant was sceptical of the ability of nonnuclear states even to acquire access, from any source, to nuclear technology, while
adding that it was impossible to comment on whether Article II of the treaty forbade
nuclear research with both civilian and military applications. 78
Again, as noted above, the West German view was that, in strictly legal terms,
the treaty did not prohibit research and development with weapons potential.
Nevertheless, such an interpretation was unlikely to survive the treaty's implementation,
although dual-purpose research seemed permissible. 79
Finally, and in contrast, the view from Stockholm was that the strict legal
interpretation was capable of enduring, thus carrying the implication that all research
and development, whether for peaceful purposes or "other purposes" short of actually
assembling a nuclear bomb would be permitted. 80
Even the contemporaneous views expressed to Australian diplomats by sources
within the IAEA at Vienna on the effect of Agency safeguards on Australia's uranium
export industry were ambiguous. Being of a wholly technical nature, they were, it was
believed in Vienna, best answered by a state's own technically competent authorities - in
Australia's case the Australian Atomic Energy Commission. 81
There is no doubt that the various responses received from DEA's informal
survey were useful in its formulation of final policy recommendations on Australia's
response to the NPT. 82 However, the testing of the direction of world opinion in this
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way does not amount to an attempt to carry weight with states whose interest in nuclear
proliferation matters, and in the NPT itself, was diverse, varied in intensity and guided
by myriad local, regional and strategic considerations. It is true, for example, that
Brazil, India and Spain, among others, had complained in the Thirteenth Session of the
ENDC that the safeguards provisions of Article III were discriminatory, 83 and that the
Report of the augmented Defence Committee submitted to the Australian Cabinet on 26
April1968 pointed to that fact. 84 There is, however, no reason to conclude that Australia
played a part (with the exceptions outlined above) in convincing these or other ENDC
member states, or other independent non-nuclear states, of that position, nor of any
other important reservations which Australia harboured.
Australia's policy on other matters raised by the NPT text, such as possible
commercial espionage on uranium mining activities, access to peaceful-use nuclear
technology, the need for a model safeguards agreement, the cost of inspection activities,
and so on, were shared by many other states, and were voiced by them in the General
Assembly debate. It is not possible, however, to conclude that Australia, without a seat
at the ENDC table (notwithstanding its "designated" status at the International Atomic
Energy Agency) and as only a newly renascent supplier of uranium on world markets,
was capable of any more than incidental influence over many nuclear threshold or antiproliferation activist states.

Australia and NPT Interpretation: Conclusion
The full scope of Australia's demonstrable ability to have its voice heard, its concerns
accommodated and its interpretation of conventional international nuclear law
acknowledged (and implemented) in the international arena is a function of two separate
processes. On one hand, Australia had used its security alliance relationship with the
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United States as a lever with which to move its superpower ally on issues of treaty
interpretation which America would have preferred ·to leave - at least initially undefined, or to postpone until a more opportune time. By doing so, Australia had
focused Washington's attention on what it might have to concede, even to friendly
nuclear threshold states, in order to conclude a viable multilateral nuclear treaty.
Furthermore, and almost accidentally, Australia's forthright approach to its
international stance on nuclear weapons acquisition had led the US to use its response to
Australia as a guide and template for its reaction to the concerns of other allied and
neutral countries. 85 In this way, Australia became, by proxy, influential with the
member states of the European Atomic Energy Community, the North Atlantic Treaty
· Organisation, the United Kingdom, C~nada, Japan and South Africa. 86 Conversely,
Australia had also become active in discussing its difficulties over the prospect of an
irreversible legal renunciation of nuclear weapons with other states, both nuclear and
non-nuclear, allied and neutral, which held similar misgivings.
The summation of the results of each process provides the full measure of
Australia's nascent, but still inchoate, status as an active and legitimate participant in the
full range of international nuclear disarmament efforts. It also allows an assessment of
the practical result of Australia's NPT diplomacy, in terms of the future efficacy of the
treaty as it evolved to meet new challenges.

In addressing the first process, it must be acknowledged that, as far as the implications

of the draft Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were concerned, Australia's relationship
with the United States was unique when compared to all other states. The complex
matrix of strategic, political, economic, commercial, historical and cultural ties between
the two countries, underpinned by the ANZUS strategic defence alliance, ensured that
the US would regard Australia as an essential NPT supporter.
That relationship also led Australia to enlist its unforeseen leverage with its
superpower ally in pressing for an outcome in the field of nuclear weapons acquisition
which was superior to what its technical, industrial and military status might suggest it
could hope for. The full price for America of Australia's signature on the NPT was, as a
result, higher than the United States had anticipated, and, ultimately, higher than it was
85
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prepared to pay. 87 Nevertheless, to the extent that Australia was able to influence the
international legal interpretation of the terms of the NPT, it had largely done so either in
direct diplomacy with the United States, or indirectly (through the US) with threshold
and non-nuclear states allied to America, as well as the United Kingdom and Japan.
However, as far as Australia's ancillary bilateral diplomatic activity was
concerned, the outcome is less clear. Although, as discussed above, there is evidence
indicating some degree of bilateral engagement with, for example, the Soviet Union, the
Federal Republic of Germany and Canada on matters of mutual interest, it lacked the
depth and range necessary to establish for Australia a pattern of guidance or agency
with those states.
Australia's ability to make its voice heard on a bilateral basis was, in fact,
effectively limited to the latter two states. Australia's discussions with government
representatives in Bonn and Ottawa had served, at the very least, to focus the thinking
and strengthen the resolve of each government on two important interpretative
questions. In the case of the FRG, this amounted to the need to know, with clear
definition, exactly how restrictive the terms of Article II on manufacture of nuclear
devices would be. As far as Canada was concerned, the most important issue was the
threat posed by Article III through the imposition of IAEA safeguards over its uranium
mining activities.
Each matter was also of vital interest to the Gorton Government, and would be
pivotal in its final decision whether to sign, and then ratify, the NPT. It is not
unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that the discovery of significant similar concerns
within the governments of two important Western allies served only to strengthen
Australia's own resolve to engage the US over nuclear proliferation on its own terms.
The extent of its success has been discussed in Chapter Five. 88 In summary, it
comprised two sets of specifically expressed interpretations, noted in the United States
/

Government's Aide-Memoires of 6 and 13 May 1968. The first addressed the US
interpretation of the term "manufacture" of nuclear devices as used in Articles I and II
of the treaty, while the second was concerned with the implementation of the IAEA
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safeguards arrangements provided for ih Article Ill. 89 More specifically, the US had
made a clear statement that it intended to take a wide ·or inclusive view of activities it
regarded as constituting the "manufacture" of nuclear explosive devices. However, that
definition, while it covered the production of components necessary for the fabrication
of a nuclear device, was unlikely to extend to the enrichment, stockpiling or research
into the physical properties of fissile material (such as metallic plutonium) for peaceful
purposes under appropriate safeguards. 90
Furthermore, the US assured Australia that it would retain the right to reject
individual IAEA inspectors, would maintain control ·over the content of its own
Safeguards Agreement, and - most importantly for Australia - that its uranium mining
operations would not be subject to safeguards inspection. 91

The final assessment of Australia's ability to have its voice heard above the clamour of
many other states over the inherent deficiencies of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty must, however, acknowledge Australia's limitations. As a state with limited

economic, industrial and technical resources, and only a relatively primitive nuclear
research programme, Australia seemed poorly placed in 1968 to exert any lasting
influence on larger and more advanced countries. Nevertheless, as a significant Western
power in the Asian region, its superpower ally held it to be an essential signatory of the
new treaty. As this study has shown, the United States confirmed that view through both
its words and actions.
Perhaps Australia's greatest advantage, however, was its immense potential as a
reliable supplier of uranium on world markets. With a twenty-three fold increase in
known reserves of uranium ores between 1967 and 1974, and an estimated twenty-five
percent of total known global reserves of uranium by 1976, Australia had begun to fulfil
that potential. 92 Had Australia translated those actual and potential advantages into
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tangible outcomes for the new conventional international law of nuclear proliferation?
The answer must be that it had. Many important nuclear threshold states, including
Japan, South Africa, and the Euratom and NATO states were each now aware, through
America's adoption of Australia's suggested legal interpretations, of the probable legal
status, effects and scope of the new NPT safeguards system.
They were also equally aware, through the same process, of the intention, and
the degree of interpretative flexibility, behind a form of words - " ... manufacture ... of
nuclear weapons .... ", where meaning was open to a wide range of alternative
interpretations. Although these and other initial concerns would be resolved as the NPT
gained acceptance and operational experience, answers to such questions were by no
means settled or clear early in 1968, even to states then engaged in the treaty's
negotiation in Geneva.
America's response to Australia's refusal to accept, without question, the nuclear
weapons fait accompli presented to it, had helped to clarify - for a number of globally
significant states including the United States itself- the practical consequences of their
accession to the new nuclear bargain. That outcome could only enhance the NPT's
chances of survival through the confidence of states that the treaty could work against
their need to acquire nuclear weapons to counter perceived nuclear threats.
By the same token, it also improved the NPT's ability to evolve to meet
changing circumstances by demonstrating that a potentially universal multilateral treaty
could respond to change through flexibility in the accepted interpretation of its terms. It
was not essential, therefore, that modifications to the NPT should occur solely through
the potentially lengthy and difficult formal amendment procedure laid down in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VIII.
Interpretative clarity itself could be achieved only through growmg global
consensus between states. It was fortunate, therefore, that this process began well before
the NPT was opened for signature. Its early success in gaining adherents, its later
growth, and its survival for over thirty-three years must, at least in part, be ascribed to
its strong beginning.
As this study has shown, Australia played a significant role in the treaty's
institution as the world's most important multilateral nuclear convention. In addition, its
initial contribution to nuclear disarmament law was only the start of a continuing era of
nuclear activism. The combination of its place in the global security strategy of the
United States, its prominent status as a large-scale world uranium producer, and its
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willingness to use both assets in its search for a nuclear accommodation with America
and the rest of the world, ensured Australia's emergence as an active anti-nuclear
campaigner. The resolution of its own ambivalence over the nuclear weapons option
was the catalyst which propelled Australia, standing on American shoulders, into global
nuclear disarmament prominence.

I
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CHAPTER SEVEN

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Introduction
This study began by presenting, in its Introduction, a summary of its context, purpose,
structure, theoretical foundations and methodology, while .noting the deficiencies in the
literature which it addresses.
At a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were making determined
efforts to create a global legal barrier .against the acquisition by states of nuclear
weapons, Australia was expected - by both superpowers - to support such a move
wholeheartedly. It did not do so. Using documentary material recently released into the
public domain by the Australian Archives, the study has presented a chronicle of
Australia's resistance to the terms of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which
it regarded as inimical to its national interests.
In doing so, it has employed an inter-disciplinary theoretical framework for its
analysis which draws on both public international law and international relations
theory, while recognising the de~ciencies inherent in each.
The study began, in Chapter One, with a critique of the nature, aims,
deficiencies and potential for success which is evident both in the black letter law of the
NPT itself, and in the nuclear non-proliferation regime which surrounds it. It concluded
that the NPT remains the central pillar and brightest hope for global nuclear arms
control in the absence of a more effective instrument (such as a multilateral Nuclear
Weapons Treaty banning all such devices).
Chapter Two focused on the components of the domestic and international
context in which Australia developed its response to the new treaty, an urgent
requirement in view of its imminent conclusion and of America's expectation of
Australia's unqualified support. The chapter traced divisions over nuclear policy within
the Australian bureaucracy and political leadership which this need brought into sharp
focus. In doing so, it introduced the two pre-eminent institutional participants in the
policy debate, the Australian Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of
External Affairs.
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Chapter Three developed the theme of dynamic nuclear policy development by
examining the struggle for policy dominance between these two Australian government
bureaucracies, while introducing the relationship between the Department of External
Affairs and the US Arms Control and Disarmanient Agency. It presented that
relationship as a crucial element of DEA's ability to rebut the vehement, and often illfounded, resistance of AAEC to the proposition that Australia should permanently
renounce the nuclear weapons option. The chapter concluded that this policy debate
was the wellspring of Australia's private and public reluctance to acquiesce in
America's desire for a swift endorsement of the hard-fought NPT text. The debate was
also the catalyst which eventually led to Australia's disproportionate influence over the
interpretation of the treaty's terms.
Chapter Four traced the course of the debate on the NPT within the Australian
government, a process in which the "bomb lobby" and its champion, the AAEC, met
steadfast resistance from DEA, assisted by the presence in Canberra of a high-level
delegation from its American interlocutor, the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. The final decision of the Australian Cabinet on Australia's nuclear weapons
policy, spelt out in the United Nations General Assembly debate on the NPT in New
York, reflected elements of a continuing domestic policy debate in which both sides
retained hope of eventual success.
Chapter Five moved the focus of analysis to the UN debate in New York, and to
the process by which Australia exercised its new-found influence over the United
States in order to advance its own position on interpretations of the terms of the treaty.
The limit of America's willingness to shift ground on specific issues was made clear, as
was the process by which Australia's diplomatic manoeuvres in New York were
translated into guidance over NPT interpretation directed to many other US allies.
Chapter Six assessed this process, and the limited level ofbilateral diplomacy in
which Australia engaged a number of states with specific concerns over the NPT, in
order to draw final conclusions on the degree of influence Australia exhibited over the
interpretation of its terms. It concluded that the success of its US experience was not
matched by its direct bilateral diplomacy, in which Australia could claim only marginal
agency over important elements of the nuclear weapons bargain.
In addition, Chapter Six drew the general conclusion that Australia could claim
a significant role in the formation of the world's most important multilateral nuclear
convention, principally through its insistence on interpretative clarity.
I
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This chapter begins by addressing the period between 1 July 1968, when the
NPT was finally opened for signature, and 23 January 1973, when the newly elected
Whitlam Labor Government deposited Australia's instrument of ratification with the
three Depository Governments in accordance with Article IX (2) of the treaty. 1

On the Brink: Australia from Gorton to Whitlam
From 1 July 1968 until 27 February 1970, when the Gorton Government signed the
NPT, Australia remained poised between the need to avoid being seen by the United
States and others as a nuclear non-proliferation "spoiler", and the opposing residual
influence of its "bomb lobby" nuclear warriors within the Cabinet and elsewhere. In
other words, Australia's nuclear weapons policy was still in the balance. Gorton was
loathe to have Australia sign the treaty and saw no immediate need to do so, especially
since it was yet to demonstrate a potential for universal adherence. His own preeminence within the bomb lobby ensured that Australia's signature would be delayed
for as long as possible.
The position was summarised by the Secretary of the Department of External
Affairs, Sir James Plimsoll, in a personal note to his Minister, Paul Hasluck, in the
period leading up to the new treaty's commendation by the United Nations General
Assembly in June 1968.2 Noting the need for Australia to be careful not to appear to be
against the NPT, Plimsoll stated that it would be "disastrous" if the global perception
was that Australia had "killed off' the treaty, and that some governments would be
"only too glad to blame us". Crucially for Australia, the Americans would '1take it very
badly" if they saw Australia as being responsible for its demise. He ended by urging:

If it fails, let Australia not bear the principal responsibility for its collapse in the eyes
3
of the world and of Australian public opinion.

1

Signatories and parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons (1998).Washington,
DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.state.gov/www/globallarms/treaties/npt3.htrnl. See Appendix II.
2

Taylor, C. Historical Records Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra. Nonarchived records. No date.
3
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The treaty still awaited the deposition of instruments of ratification by the
required forty States Parties signatory to it, in addition to those of the three Depository
States, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, in order to enter
into force. 4 Until that time, Australia could continue t~ adhere to the policy defined by
the Gorton Cabinet in preparation for the UN debate in New York. This was
summarised in its Decision No. 95 of26 March 1968:

.... Australia welcomes in principle the objective of a non-proliferation treaty, hopes
that an effective way can be found of achieving it, but [must take account of] the
implications of [the proposed treaty] for Australia's national interest. 5

By early 1970, with over forty instruments of ratification having been deposited,
including that of the United

Kingdo~,

it was apparent that the United States and the

Soviet Union were preparing to deposit their own instruments of ratification, thereby
bringing the NPT into force. Australia had finally reached the point beyond which, if it
continued formally to resist the treaty, it could expect little sympathy from its strongest
ally, or from the growing number of states, both threshold and non-nuclear, that were
now acceding to it. The effect on the strength of Australia's security alliance with the
United States could be expected to be immediate and severe.
As a result, the Gorton Cabinet reluctantly moved to sign the treaty. In a press
statement issued on 18 February 1970, Gorton announced his Government's decision,
making plain his Cabinet's doubts over the potential effectiveness of the NPT, while
emphasising the fact that signature "is not to be taken in any way as a decision to ratify
the [t]reaty" .6 Furthermore, Gorton pointed out, Australia's signature would be
accompanied by a statement of Reservations, the satisfaction of which would be a
prerequisite for Australia's subsequent ratification. 7
Australia, still led by its distinctively nationalist and nuclear advocate Prime
Minister, had thereby given effect to the minimum level of acquiescence in the terms of
the treaty which both the United States and world opinion would accept. The list of its
4

Article IX (3) of the NPT. See Appendix II.

5

Cabinet
Decision
No.
95,
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March
1968.
[39]
Available
http://www.naa.gov.au/COLLECT/cabpaper/Cabinet68/images/Decision 95 18.htm. At p. 3.

6

WWW:

Document PM. No. 30/1970 [129]: Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. John Gorton, 18 February
1970: Signing ofNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canberra: Australian Archives.

7

Ibid. At p. 2.

225

Reservations, made pursuant to customary rules on the accessiOn by states to
international treaties and appended to Australia's signature on 27 February 1970, was
long and complex. 8
The weight of Australia's Reservations lay in two basic issues. The first was the
Gorton Government's continuing concern that the NPT should not in any way hinder, or
discriminate between, states in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
including the peaceful application of nuclear explosions. 9 The second issue was its need
to reaffirm its belief that the NPT did not affect continuing security commitments by the
United States under the ANZUS Treaty, nor Australiais right of individual or collective
self-defence contained in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. 10 In other
words, that Australia's nuclear security would remain unimpaired.
On 5 March 1970, six days after Australia signed the treaty, it entered into force
following the deposition of instruments of ratification by the United States and the
Soviet Union. 11

In the period of twenty months between the treaty's opening for signature on 1 July

1968 and the date of Australia's signature, during which Australia continued to hold the
NPT at arm's length, the treaty began to exert its influence as the emerging cornerstone
of a range of multilateral and bilateral nuclear arms control initiatives.
The most immediate result was the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States,
held at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968. The Conference provided the
first opportunity, following the opening of the NPT for signature, for Australia to
explain and defend its position in an international forum. 12 Its participants were to

8

Document M/15 [130]. (27 February 1970). Department ofExternal Affairs News Release: Signature of
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canberra: Australian Archives. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties did not enter into force until 27 January 1980, in accordance with its Article 84 (1). Supra. At
Note 27.
9

Ibid. At paragraphs 8-12.

10

Ibid. At paragraphs 5, 6. See Appendix I.

11

Both the United States and the Soviet Union had signed their respective instruments of ratification on
24 November 1969, following full US Senate approval on 13 March 1969. The Soviet Union did so as a
result of the decision of West Germany, on 28 November 1969, to sign the treaty. Maddock, S. J. (1997).
The nth country conundrum: The American quest for nuclear nonproliferation, 1945 - 1970. Doctoral
dissertation, University of Connecticut. Dissertation Abstracts International, 58 -06A, 2362. At p. 522.
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include nearly all of the threshold nuclear weapon states, including the four states
identified in Australian Cabinet Decision No. 165 of :29 April 1968 as significant for
Australia in the Asian region (Japan, Indonesia, India and Pakistan). As a result, it
seemed prudent and necessary that Australia should attend. 13
Australia's representatives would be able to defend the crucial interpretations of
the terms of the NPT which it had worked so assiduously to establish with the United
States. They would also be in a position to rebuff any efforts by non-nuclear weapons
states to undermine Western policy positions on nuclear disarmament, security
guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states, the use by nuclear weapon states of nuclear
weapons in defence of their allies, and technical assistance in the peaceful application of
nuclear energy. 14
Furthermore, Australia would have an opportunity to reinforce with the nonnuclear weapon states its position on the application of materials diversion safeguards,
and the exchange of nuclear information, equipment and materials for peaceful
purposes. 15 In short, Australia could not afford to ignore an international forum in which
its own nuclear policy positions could be elaborated, reinforced and defended. Its failure
to attend held the potential for Australia to be sidelined in the process by which the new
treaty would be transformed from black letter international law into a practical and
successful global bargain.
An Australian delegation led by Sir Laurence Mcintyre, Deputy Secretary of the

Department of External Affairs, and including representatives from the Department of
Defence and the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, attended the Conference. 16
While its attendance succeeded in avoiding the potential for international opprobrium,
Australia continued to insist that it would not ratify the treaty until its Reservations had
been satisfied.
The United States was, in any event, in no position by September 1968 to insist
that Australia do so, US Senate ratification having been stalled by the invasion of

13

Ibid. At p.4.

14

Ibid. Atpp. 3, 6, 7, 8.

15

Ibid.

16

Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States. (1968). Current Notes on International Affairs, 39 (8), pp.
346-347.
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Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces on 20 August 1968. However, newly installed United
States President Richard Nixon, after brief consideration, resubmitted the treaty for
ratification by the US Senate in February 1969. The Senate subsequently ratified it on
13 March 1969, enabling its entry into force by instrumental deposition one year later. 17
Nevertheless, the period between the NPT's opening for signature and its entry
into force had been one of growing scepticism within the United States Government that
it would eventually prove successful. The Czech crisis had dealt a significant blow to
the treaty's prospects, especially since it had weakened support for it among many
NATO states, who saw immediate accession as too conciliatory a gesture towards the
Soviet Union. 18
As a result, both West Germany and Italy decided against immediate signature.
The unstable security situation in Europe, combined with the imminent change of
government in Washington, marked the most critical point for the new global nuclear
agreement. In fact, its future now depended heavily on the resolution of a political
stalemate: unless Germany signed, the Soviet Union was unlikely to ratify, while few
Western states and US allies would sign or ratify while Soviet forces remained in
occupation in Czechoslovakia.

19

The effect of the situation for Australia was vindication, at least for the
supporters of an independent nuclear deterrent within Cabinet (and especially for Sir
Philip Baxter, Head of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission) of the wisdom of its
Reservations in respect of the security commitments made by the three Depository
States. 20 The security situation in Central Europe was, to them, cogent proof that a nonproliferation pact was indeed both dangerous and avoidable.

17

Supra. At Note 11, pp. 518, 522.

18

Ibid. At pp 520-521.

19

Ibid.

20

Supra. At Note 11. While those security commitments were of lesser significance to Australia than to
many states (in view of the extant ANZUS Treaty between itself, New Zealand and the United States) the
Gorton Cabinet had included in its Reservations (at paragraph 6) a reference to the "weight" which the
Government of Australia attached to the statements of the United States, the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union declaring their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide help to any
non-nuclear weapon state party to the treaty that was subject to aggression or the threat of aggression
with nuclear weapons. The statements had been made to the Security Council on 17 June 1968, and were
acknowledged by it in Security Council Resolution 255.
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For Australia, the period of transition: ended on 23 January 1973, when the newly
elected Australian Labor Government, led by Prime· Minister E.G. Whitlam, moved
swiftly to ratify Australia's signature on the NPT. This marked the final step in
Australia's journey from nuclear ambivalence to committed anti-nuclear activism. The
Australian Labor Party and its Leader had expressed strong support for the principle of
nuclear non-proliferation in Opposition, Whitlam having in 1969 accused his opponents
ofharming Australia's relations with the United States and risking the future of the NPT
through their refusal to sign.

21

Describing the Gorton Government's February 1970

signature as "accepting the inevitable in the most graceless and grudging manner
possible", Whitlam now lost little time in ratifying it. 22
The Australian "bomb lobby" nuclear advocates had finally reached the end of
the road. They could draw little comfort from the fact that the Gorton Government's
Reservations, made on signing the treaty, remained in force following Whitlam's
ratification, and were not removed until29 August 1985. 23 Although Australia had run a
serious risk of being labelled an NPT "spoiler" by the international community, the
initial reluctance of important states such as Italy and West Germany to embrace the
treaty in an international legal (as well as a political) sense had helped to ameliorate that
risk.
With the advent ofthe Nixon Presidency in January 1969, and its more moderate
concern - in comparison to the previous Administration - to see the NPT finally in force,
Australia could move towards full accession in a measured way, having demonstrated to
the world that its caution in abandoning the nuclear weapon option had been well
founded.

21

Tooth, G. (1987). Australia and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Unpublished
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22
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Australian Nuclear Influence
This study has followed the course of Australia's engagement in a matter of
considerable global importance. The creation of a multilateral treaty hindering the
spread of nuclear weapons around the world which was capable of attracting widespread
support among nuclear threshold states was a crucial turning point in twentieth century
international relations. Australia's initial reluctance to embrace the anti-proliferation
principle does not detract from its later enthusiasm. Since Australia possessed only
moderate economic, technical and military strength within a geographically isolated
region bounded by culturally and politically diverse neighbours, its reliance on an
American security agreement (the ANZUS Treaty) was inevitable. Nevertheless, the
uncertainties of nuclear security within a US alliance relationship, in an age of
increasingly widespread nuclear weaponry, could not be a realistic long-term alternative
to a successful non-proliferation treaty.
It was equally predictable that Australia's ability to make its voice heard on the
world stage on matters of concern to it in nuclear international law and politics would,
given the continuing strength of that alliance, largely be a function of its ability to
influence the government of the United States. In these circumstances, the study's most
surprising finding is the paradox revealed by the evidence it has presented.
There is no doubt that the Johnson Administration had placed the successful
conclusion of the NPT high on its list of priorities in government. 24 Its almost
continuous efforts to achieve that goal during negotiations at the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee from 1964 to 1968 attest to its sincerity. There is also no
doubt that the United States expected its Australian ally to accede, without demur, to the
terms of the NPT until shortly before its text was finalised in negotiations with the
Soviet Union and the sixteen other states at Geneva. 25 As a strong supporter of the
Western Alliance within its own region and globally, Australia appeared to possess little
room for manoeuvre on what it could and could not accept in terms of this most
important of multilateral treaties. Nevertheless, the agency which Australia exercised in

24
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Supra. At Note 11, p. 521.
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its own favour, and in the context of its security alliance with the United States and New
Zealand, was successful precisely because it refused to acquiesce in the terms of an
international legal obligation which it found unacceptable for domestic political reasons.
The result was that Australia exercised its surprising degree of influence with
the United States over the prospective interpretation of the terms of the new treaty by
taking a position contrary to the purpose and spirit of its US security alliance - while
that alliance remained firmly in place. Perhaps equally surprising is the fact that the
alliance proved capable of withstanding the test.
In a more general sense, it is reasonable to conchide that the story of Australia as

nuclear recalcitrant is a vivid example of its growing middle power status. The
universally acknowledged importance of international measures to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons around the world gave Australia an ideal global forum in which to
demonstrate its credentials as a "world citizen".
Widespread acceptance around the world, over the past three decades, of
Australia's self-appointed role as an activist in nuclear affairs is a powerful indicator of
the growing ability of moderately strong states to exercise significant agency both on
their own account and in concert with other states. The realignment of international
relationships following the end of the Cold War has served only to enhance and
magnify that trend.

Theoretical Conclusions

The primary focus of this study has been Australia's engagement in the negotiation of
the conventional international law of nuclear non-proliferation, an event of global
significance. It has traced the origins of Australia's transition from nuclear adjunct of
the United States, yet with residual independent nuclear ambitions, towards a stance of
overt, consistent and widely acknowledged anti-nuclear activism.
Furthermore, by using the negotiation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as the vehicle for its analysis, the study has developed the elements of a "middle

power" model for Australia's involvement in nuclear arms control and disarmament
measures during the following three decades. In doing so, it has demonstrated the
legitimacy and utility of an interdisciplinary theoretical approach to analysis of the
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nature of relations between states on the threat or use of force in international affairs.
The study has taken the view that, at least in this important arena of global endeavour,
the legal and political perspectives form two sides ofthesame coin; that, as SlaughterBurley has proposed:
In the end, law informed by politics is the best guarantee of politics informed by law. 26

In acknowledging this interdisciplinary reality, the study has prepared the ground for
further scholarship by showing that Australia's NPT story is relevant to:

•

the increasing acceptance of the interpretation of the terms of conventional
international law as a more flexible alternative to formal reservations and
amendments under customary principles of international law, as codified and
restated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties. 27

•

the relative strength of states' propensities to adhere to obligations in international
law in areas of perceived weaker and stronger national and international
importance. One example in this respect is the relative importance states ascribe to
environmental international law.

•

a liberal approach to interdisciplinary scholarship on the nature of international rules
binding states in their inter-relations. 28

The most important theoretical conclusion of this study is its support for the legitimacy
and utility of an interdisciplinary analytical approach to the use of international rules in
moderating the use of force in relations between states.
The central question for both international lawyers and theorists of the nature of
international relations between states is one which is also crucial for operational

26
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flexibility in the interpretation of the meamng of the terms of treaties: how can
sovereign states co-operate, while at the same time competing for ascendancy in a
situation of anarchy? 29
The clearest explanation is that they expect to derive significant benefits by
doing so. In the arena of the use of force by states, and especially the use of weapons of
mass destruction in war, it not surprising that states should seek out all available ways
of avoiding their annihilation by enhancing their individual understanding of the
collective obligations they have undertaken. It is less clear why states co-operate in
international affairs in which they hold no grave fears for their survival, such as
maritime or environmental international law. The fact is, nevertheless, that they almost
invariably do co-operate to achieve mutually acceptable goals, having determined that
their adherence to promised action is firmly in their long-term interest.
Mutual comprehension of the nature of the individual and collective promises
which states make in terms of unique and common concerns, and of the rules which
define and guide those undertakings, is an absolute prerequisite for the success of
bilateral and multilateral bargains. In the case of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, a serious failure of understanding had an obvious potential for global

catastrophe.
In these circumstances, states must assume that all states are willing to be bound
by international law to a degree which attenuates their absolute sovereign right of
action. Thus, states will undertake international legal obligations because they believe
that it is in their national interest to do so, and that the dangers inherent in ignoring the
strictures of the law are too great to risk. 30
International law and international politics have as their common goal the
enhancement of mutual understanding between nation-states. In other words, both
domains aim to bring about the most advantageous outcomes possible within a
community of states which lacks a supra-national coercive mechanism. The structures
which link these domains are exemplified by the matrix of institutions, agreements and
understandings which has been developed by states over more than thirty years to create
29

Hurrell, A. (1996). International society and the study of regimes: A reflective approach. In R.J. Beck,
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and maintain the effectiveness of the black-letter international law of the NPT - the
nuclear non-proliferation regime. 31
Both international law and international political relations are dependent on a
wide range of institutions, agreements, understandings, inter-governmental and nongovernmental organisations which regulate international affairs, and extend their reach
and operation far beyond the purely legal and closely delineated obligations contained
on the face of international treaties.
One reason for the durability of the NPT regime is that it incorporates both the
legal and political perspectives of international rules. Examples of this duality within
international law of arms control and disarmament efforts can be seen in a wide range of
multilateral United Nations treaties (such as the 1971 Sea-Bed Treaty), 32 which contrast
with many extra-legal institutions (such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, introduced in
1978 to restrict the export of sensitive nuclear technologies). 33 These are only two
examples, from many, of the components of the international nuclear non-proliferation
regime. 34
As in many other areas of international affairs, the procedures and rules of
international institutions and agreements in nuclear matters create structures of shared
information which lower the "transaction costs" - the costs of making and enforcing
agreements - to states of adhering to relevant international legal or extra-legal rules. 35
They do so by reinforcing the reciprocal practices which encourage governments to
keep their own promises, in order to ensure that others keep theirs. The resulting

31
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environment of transparency is, in tum, likely to enhance certainty for states about the
likely consequences of the obligations they undertake. 3 ~
Furthermore, within this process states establish and define the nature of
acceptable and legitimate principles, both within and beyond the boundaries of
international law, which are available to resolve conflicts that may arise between them,
and thereby help to establish states' expectations on any given issue. 37 For example, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, over many years, has developed operational
procedures and rules for the inspection of nuclear installations and materials in respect
of its safeguard and verification activities. Those procedures are widely known and
understood, and go far beyond the rights and responsibilities set forth in Article XII of
the Agency's 1957 Statute. 38
In the case of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the process of elaboration of
its core treaty law has been enhanced by the complexity of the amendment mechanism
in Articles VIII (1) and (2) of the NPT, which has resulted in the complete absence of
any amendments to its terms over its thirty-three years of existence. The only practical
alternative to formal amendments, now widely regarded as functionally impossible for a
treaty instrument with almost universal adherence, has been the evolution of the NPT
regime as a strategy for the interpretation and universal application of the terms of the
treaty. It was significant for Australia's future status as an anti-nuclear activist that it
took a leading role in seeking generally acceptable interpretations of the meaning of the
new treaty's provisions (such as the term "manufacture ... of nuclear weapons" m
Articles I and II) well before the treaty had been opened for signature.
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A Final Word
This study has demonstrated that the outcome of historically important questions is,
with hindsight and access to comprehensive evidence, far less certain or predictable
than the sweep and flow of events may suggest - even to observers closely aligned with
the circumstances they describe. Outcomes which once seemed plausible and soundly
based may tum out, on the basis of new knowledge, to have entirely different origins
and implications. So it is with the story of Australia's divisive, ambivalent and
potentially disastrous progress towards its ultimate conClusion that the threat or use of
nuclear weapons is illegal in international law, would constitute a crime against
humanity and must never happen.
The United States Government was surprised and perplexed to find, early in
1968, that Australia - a staunch ally for over twenty-five years - was not willing blindly
to follow the US by acceding without demur to the NPT, an international instrument
which promised to rein in the potential for widespread nuclear weapons diffusion.
The degree to which the Johnson Administration was aware of the domestic
origins of that reluctance is open to conjecture in the absence of evidence in the
Australian archival record. It is doubtful, for example, that those US representatives
involved in negotiations with Australia over the new treaty were fully aware of the
depth of antipathy which the Australian Atomic Energy Commission had displayed
towards the NPT within the confidential deliberations of the Australian bureaucracy.
Even the strength of influence exerted by individuals within Australia's political
leadership - notably Prime Minister John Gorton, Minister for National Development
David Fairbairn and Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck - over Australia's
position is difficult to gauge with accuracy from the available documentary evidence.
Prime Minister Gorton was fortified in his view that Australia would renounce
the nuclear weapons option at its peril by the support of his Minister for National
Development. Nevertheless, Gorton ultimately had little choice but to allow Australia's
accession to the NPT, albeit in a form which was hedged around with caveats and
reservations. For his part, Minister for External Affairs Hasluck, through his lack of
engagement with the nuclear question, echoed the wider ambivalence evident in
Australia's search for nuclear policy coherence.
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In the end, however, Australia's struggle to develop a clear position on nuclear
weapons - one which could accommodate such domestic concerns as national defence,
nuclear energy for industrial development and international trade in uranium - was
successful. During the course of that struggle, it is doubtful whether any dispassionate
observer could have predicted its outcome, much less the paradox of a middle-power
ally of the United States which advanced a position contrary to the spirit and purpose of
its alliance while remaining firmly within it.
It is therefore important to acknowledge that the outcome of international efforts

as crucial to global peace as the negotiation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty is often as dependent on the incidental convergence and interaction of disparate

influences and agency as it is on the measured advance of diplomacy and statesmanship.
As this study has shown, the assembly of coherence from the apparent chaos and
instability of daily events demonstrates clearly that, in relations between nation-states,
nothing should be taken for granted.
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at the Yale Law School

Charter of the United Nations; June 26, 1945

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
matilind, and to reaffinn faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties
and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom, AND FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and
live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to
maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and
the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement
of all peoples, HAVE RESOLED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH
THESE AIMS Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives. assembled
in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due

27/03/02 3:17PM
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project : United Nations Charter; June 26, 1945

0

nn, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an

nternational organization to be known as the United Nations.
:IIAPTERI

-URPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
rticle 1
he Purposes of the United Nations are:

;

~.

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
iibeasures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts
~f aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in
ponformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
rternational disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
'

t
~.

'

To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
fHghts and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen
~niversal peace;

~3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic,

~ocial, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for
lluman rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
:language, or religion; and .

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common
ends.
Article 2

-The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall
act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to a of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the
present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security, and. justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity,or political independence of any state, or in any other manner

project : United Nations Charter; June 26, 1945

wysiwyg://3/http://www. yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unchart. htm

inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act
in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
a: Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II

!MEMBERSHIP

1:

r-

~Article 3

t

t-The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in
Ethe United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having
tpreviously signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present
~Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

fArticle 4

i.__

f 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to a other peace-loving states which accept the

~ obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able
~-and willing to carry out these obligations.
i
'"-

~

•~

t 2. The admission of any such state to membership in the Nations will be effected by a decision

: of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

:-Article 5
A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been
taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges
of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6
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lY.LV~HLJer

of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in
present Charter may be' expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the
~comnaerwation of the Security Council.

III

There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a
·ty Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International
of Justice, and a Secretariat.
Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with
present Charter.

United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to
u .... ,,~ ....." in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary

IV

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.

2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers
Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the
present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the
present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the
Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or
. matters.
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The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the
rmu.nv.u .......... e of international peace and security, including the principles governing
m~tm1em and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to
principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.
. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of inter,........,u~· peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the
Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance
Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make
:ecc:>mm€mctattorts with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the
Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred
the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion .
. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are
y to endanger international peace and security.
The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general
-.~c,one of Article 10 .

. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions
~'"''"E, .."' .... to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any
with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so

. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General
'""'"''"......,.y at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and
ty which are being dealt with by the Security Council and similarly notify the General
~uu
_,ly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session,
.........

~.

The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:
a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive
development of international law and its codification;
b. promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health
fields, an assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General with respect to matters
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. entioned in paragraph ) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X .
. rticle 14
ubject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for
~ e peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair
. e general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a
wiolation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of
he United Nations.
rticle 15

1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the
. ecurity Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security
Council has decided upon or taken to main- tain international peace and security.
_ . The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the

rticle 16
he General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international
trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of
he trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.
Article 17

J. The Genera Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the
. General Assembly.

3. The Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with
specialize agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of
lsuch specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned .

l

._

~Voting
f

! Article 18

:

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

- 2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two- thirds
-majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations
with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the
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permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic
Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with
1 of Article 86, the admission of new Members to tl).e United Nations, the
vv~J...H~·u of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions
. . .~~·--~~n to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions .
. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of
uv~uv~~"' to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members

Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial
'butions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of
arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two
years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is
~o:~c:l .. ~.ued that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the of the Member.

General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as
aocca.s1on may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the
_.,.,,,,..,".,.of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for

Article 22

The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the
performance of its functions.

CHAPTERV

THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Composition
Article 23
1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic
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China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist , the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
orthern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the
Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations
be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the
in- stance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of
- national peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to
le geographical distribution.
The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two
. In the first election of the non- permanent members after the increase of the membership
the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be
"'H'"'''"'"'H for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate

. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

ctions and Powers
24

. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
· , and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council
on their behalf.
· . In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes
Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for
discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII .
. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the
Assembly for its consideration.
Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter.
Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with
the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security
Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the
United-Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.
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Voting
Article 27
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote
of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in
decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall
abstain from voting.

·Procedure
Article 28
1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each
member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at times at the seat of the
Organization.
2. The Security Council shall hold meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires,
be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated
representative.
3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the
Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29
The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the
performance of its functions.

Article 30
rl

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting
its President.

Article 31
i

l
l
f

r

i

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may
participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council
whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.
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Article 32
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state
which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration
by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, witho~t vote, in the discussion relating
to the dispute. The Security Council shall any down such conditions as it deems just for the
participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI

f PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

JArticle 33

l

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security, shall, first of a, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice .

Jl
~

•
~

f 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their

Ldispute by such means.
~

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to
c international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of
the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
:- security.
Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature
referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the
Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in
advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the
present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention
under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
Article 36
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1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or
of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the
dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the
International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the
means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take
. action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider
appropriate.

J

t

Article 38

[_Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the
[parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific
settlement of the dispute.
CHAPTER VII

f ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES
f OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
t-

~·

~

I

Article 39

~

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
l taken in accordance with Articles 4 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making
the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.
Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the
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parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such
provisional measures.

Article 41
· The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
. employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
-communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
>

Article 42

~ Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
f inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces
t as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
~· include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members
~.of the United Nations.
~

Article 43

~ 1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
t: international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its
- and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and
facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of
readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the
Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or
between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the
signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44
When Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not
represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under
Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the
Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

on Project : United Nations Charter; June 26, 1945

wysiwyg://3/http://www. yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unchart. htm

In order to enable the Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold
-immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement
action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined
action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements
referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military
. Committee.

Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the
assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security
Council on questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the
maintenance of international peace and security', the employment and command of forces
placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of
the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not
permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated
with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities re- quires the
participation of that Member its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic
direction of any armed forces paced at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating
to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the security Council and after
consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish sub-commit- tees.

Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by
some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and
through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out
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. the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

• Article 50

. If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any
· other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with
~special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right
· to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.
Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
. self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
, necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Chapter VIII

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 52
1. Nothing in the present Charter the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are
appropriate fur regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities
are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such
agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security
Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the
initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way the application of Articles 34 and 35.
Article 53
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangeme~ts or
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lagencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken
~ under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
~ Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of
this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against
~ renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization
Lmay, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for
preventing further aggression by such a state.

l
~

t
~

~ 2. The term enemy state as used in para- graph 1 of this Article applies to any state which
~during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.
~
~

~Article 54

.•

'

i The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in
~

r contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of

t

~.international

'

peace and security.

'
;cHAPTERIX

: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION
Article 55
~

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for
~ peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, fu employment, and conditions of economic and social progress
and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international
cultural and educational co- operation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 56
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
Article 57
1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement .and having
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. wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social,
cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the
United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.
2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter
referred to as specialized agencies.
Article 58

The Organization shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and
activities of the specialized agencies.
Article 59

The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for
the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes
set forth in Article 55.

l

,._

Article 60

l

Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter
[ shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in
[the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in
ChapterX.

f

l CHAPTERX

r

l

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
.

~

l

f Composition
~
~

· Article 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations
elected by the General Assembly.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, eighteen members of the Economic and Social
Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible
for immediate re-election.
3. At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social
Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four members, in addition to the members elected in place
of the nine members whose term of office expires at the end of that year, twenty-seven
additional members shall be elected. Of these twenty-seven additional members, the term of
office of nine members so elected shall expire at the end of one year, and of nine other
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!

r members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General
~

~

Assembly.

~

4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

( Functions and Powers
~

t

Article 62

t

[ 1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to
~· international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make
~ recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members
r' of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.
~ 2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of,
~· human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

t

l'
~

3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to
matters falling within its competence.

~

E.

"- 4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international
~ conferences on matters falling within its competence.

~· Article 63
1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies
referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought
into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the
- General Assembly.
- 2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and
recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and
to the Members of the United Nations.

Article 64
1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular re- ports
from the specialized agencies. may make arrangements with the Members of the United
Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to
its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence
made by the General Assembly.
2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.
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Article 65
The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall
assist the Security Council upon its request.
Article 66
1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its
competence in connexion with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General
Assembly.
2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of
Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.
3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as
may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

Voting
Article 67
1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members
present and voting.

Procedure
Article 68
The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and
for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may for the performance of
its functions.
Article 69
The Economic and Social Council shall invite any Member of the United Nations to
participate, without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that
Member.
Article 70
The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the
specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the
commissions established by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of
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the specialized agencies.
Article 71

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with
non-governmental organizations which are concerned with m~tters within its competence.
Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with
~ national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.
Article 72

1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the
method of selecting its President.
2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which
shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its
members.
CHAPTER XI

DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING
TERRITORIES
Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration
of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize
the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept
as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international
peace and security established by the present Charter, the well- being of the inhabitants of
these territories, and, to this end:
(

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political,
economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection
against abuses;
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples,
and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according
to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of
advancement;
c. to further international peace and security;
d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate
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[ with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a
L view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in
this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such
[ limitation as security and constitutional considerations may r~quire, statistical and other
~ information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the
territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which
• Chapters XII and XIII apply.

~

t

'

~

t Article 74

l

t

l,
~

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which
this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the
general principle of good-neigh-bourliness, due account being taken of the interests and
well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

~

CHAPTER XII

~

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
Article 75
_ The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for
the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by
subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust
territories.
Article 76
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United
Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:
a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants
of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or
independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its
peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by
the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all with- out : as to
race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence.ofthe
peoples of the world; and
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:-- d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of
; the United Nations and their , and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of
~ justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the
~ provisions of Article 80.
t

r-

t

~

Article 77

~

~ 1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be

l placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

'

a. territories now held under mandate;

• b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War;
•t and

t c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration .

•~

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing
~- categories will be brought under the trustee- ship system and upon what terms.

L

"-

~ Article 78

k

t The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the

r United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of
·-

L sovereign equality.

f
t

' Article 79
L

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including
. any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including
the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United
Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.
Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77,
79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have
been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner
the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international
instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or
postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other
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territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.
Article 81
The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory
will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the
trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or
more states or the Organization itself.
Article 82

. · There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may
include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any
special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.
Article 83
1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the
terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by
the Security Council.
2. he basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic
area.
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and
without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship
Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating
to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.
Article 84
It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its
part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering
authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in
carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the
administering authority, as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order
within the trust territory.
Article 85
1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not
designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and
of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.
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2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist
the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL
Composition
Article 86
1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:
a. those Members administering trust territories;
b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust
territories; and
c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be
necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally
divided between those Members of the United Nations which ad- minister trust territories and
those which do not.
2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to
represent it therein.

Functions and Powers
Article 87
The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their
functions, may:
a. consider reports submitted by the ad- ministering authority;
b.

acc~pt petitions

and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;

c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the
administering authority; and
d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88
The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and
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educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering
- authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an
annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

Voting
Article 89
1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.

- 2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present
and voting.
Procedure

Article 90
1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of
selecting its President.
2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall
include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Article 91
The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic
and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are
respectively concerned.

CHAPTER XIV

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Article 92
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It
shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

Article 93
1. All Members of the United Nations are facto parties to the Statute of the International Court
of Justice.
2. A state which is not of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the
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International Court of Justice on to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon
the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 94
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply_with the decision of the
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment
rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may,
if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give to
the judgment.

Article 95
Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting
the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence
or which may be concluded in the future.

Article 96
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of
Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so
authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal
questions arising within the scope of their activities.

CHAPTER XV

THE SECRETARIAT
Article 97
The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary- General and such staff as the Organization may
require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the
Organization.

Article 98
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of
the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and
shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The
Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the w~rk of the
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Organization.

Article 99
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in
his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100
1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or
receive instructions from any government or from any other authority externa to the
Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might on their position as international
officials responsible only to the Organization.
2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively inter- national
character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to
influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101
1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the
General Assembly.
2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the
Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall
form a part of the Secretariat.
3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the
conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency,
competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on
as wide a geographical basis as possible.

CHAPTER XVI

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Article 102
1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United
Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with
the Secretariat and published by it.
I

2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph I of this Article may invoke that treaty or
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agreement before any organ of the United Nations.
Article 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under
the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
Article 104

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may
be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.
Article 105

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment qf its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization
shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization.
3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details
of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the
Members of the United Nations for this purpose.
CHAPTER XVII

TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
Article 106

Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the
opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under
Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943,
and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration,
consult with one another ~nd as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations
with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the
purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
Article 107

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which
during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken
or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.
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CHAPTER XVIII

AMENDMENTS
Article 108
Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United
Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General
Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two
thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the
Security Council.

Article 109
1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing
the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the
members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council.
Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

~

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference
shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by
two thirds of the Members of the United Nations including the permanent members of the
Security Council.
3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General
Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a
conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the
conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote ofthe members of the General
Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

CHAPTER XIX

RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE
Article 110
1. The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.
2. The shall be deposited with the Government of the Unite States of America, which shall
notify a the signatory states of each deposit as well as the Secretary-General of the
Organization when he has been appointed.
3. The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit ofby the Republic ~fChina,
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France, the Union of Soviet Socialist, the United King- dom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the United States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states. A
protocol of the deposited shall thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States
of America which shall communicate copies thereof to all the signa- tory states.
4. The states signatory to the present Chartar which ratify it after it has come into force will
become original Members of the United Nations on the date of the deposit of their respective
ratifications.
Article 111
The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish texts are
equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of -the United
States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the
Governments of the other signatory states.
IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of'the Governments of the United Nations have
signed the present Charter.
DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred
and forty-five.
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APPENDIX II

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the
consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures
to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of
nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, devel9pment and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of
the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials
by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from
the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to
all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or
in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear
arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear
weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to
continue negotiations to this end,
Desiring to further th~ easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between
States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear
weapons and the means oftheir delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and
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security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and
economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:

Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or
induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other .nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or
receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.

Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy
Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
"Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for
the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear
facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied
on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable
material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use
or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful
purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards
required by this Article.
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to
comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological
development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the
Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually

3

or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the
original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification
or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not
later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than
eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall
also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate
international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be
as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate
representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence
as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.
Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed
amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all
Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to
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the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall
invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the
Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and
all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force
for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit
of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments
of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on
the date the amendment is circulated, are members ofthe Board of Governors ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon
the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty
shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a
view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being
realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may
obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening
of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede
to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification
and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of
which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty
and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclearweapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear
explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the
entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their
instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of
the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date ofreceipt of any requests for
convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of
the Charter of the United Nations.
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Article X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened
to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an
additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to
the Treaty.
Article XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July,
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

Entered into force: 5 March 1970. Source: U.N.T.S. No. 10485, val. 729,pp. 169-175.
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STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Article I
Establishment of the Agency

lhe Parties hereto establish an International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to
1s "the Agency") upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.
Article II
Objectives

"he Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace,
1ealth and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that
ssistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in
uch a way as to further any military purpose.
·
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Article III
Functions
A. The Agency is authorized:
1. To encourage and assist research on, and development arid practical application of, atomic
energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; and, if requested to do so, to act as an
intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of
materials, equipment, or facilities by one member of the Agency for another; and to perform
any operation or service useful in research on, or development or practical application of,
atomic energy for peaceful purposes;
2. To make provision, in accordance with this Statute, for materials, services, equipment, and
facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of,
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due
consideration for the needs of the under-developed areas of the world;
3. To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of atomic
energy;
4. To encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts in the field of peaceful
uses of atomic energy;
5. To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and
other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency
or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further
any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral
or multilateral arrangement, or, at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in
the field of atomic energy;
6. To establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in collaboration with the
competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies concerned,
standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property
(including such standards for labour conditions), and to provide for the application of these
standards to its own operations as well as to the operations making use of materials,
services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request
or under its control or supervision; and to provide for the application of these standards, at
the request of the parties, to operations under any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or,
at the request of a State,' to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy;
7. To acquire or establish any facilities, plant and equipment useful in carrying out its
authorized functions, whenever the facilities, plant, and equipment otherwise available to it in
the area concerned are inadequate or available only on terms it deems unsatisfactory.
B. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall:

1. Conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations
to promote peace and international cooperation, and in conformity with policies of the United
Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded world-wide disarmament and in
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conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies;
2. Establish control over the use of special fissionable materials received by the Agency, in
order to ensure that these materials are used only for peaceful purposes;
3. Allocate its resources in such a manner as to secure efficient utilization and the greatest
possible general benefit in all areas of the world, bearing in mihd the special needs of the
under-developed areas of the world;
·
4. Submit reports on its activities annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations,
and, when appropriate, to the Security Council: if in connexion with the activities of the
Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council,
the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, and may also take the measures open
to it under this Statute, including those provided in paragraph C of Article XII;
5. Submit reports to the Economic and Social Council and other organs of the United Nations
on matters within the competence of those organs.
C. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not make assistance to members subject to
any political, economic, military, or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of this
Statute.

D. Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms of agreements concluded
between a State or a group of States and the Agency which shall be in accordance with the
provisions of the Statute, the activities of the Agency shall be carried out with due
observance of the sovereign rights of States.
Article IV
Membership
A. The initial members of the Agency shall be those States Members of the United Nations or
of any of the specialized agencies which shall have signed this Statute within ninety days
after it is opened for signature and shall have deposited an instrument of ratification.
B. Other members of the Agency shall be those States, whether or not Members of the
United Nations or of any qf the specialized agencies, which deposit an instrument of
acceptance of this Statute after their membership has been approved by the General
Conference upon the recom(llendation of the Board of Governors. In recommending and
approving a State for membership, the Board of Governors and the General Conference shall
determine that the State is able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership in the
Agency, giving due consideration to its ability and willingness to act in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
C. The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members, and all
members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this
Statute.

Article V
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General Conference
A. A General Conference consisting of representatives of all members shall meet in regular
annual session and in such special sessions as shall be convened by the Director General at
the request of the Board of Governors or of a majority of members. The sessions shall take
place at the headquarters of the Agency unless otherwise d~termined by the General
Conference.
B. At such sessions, each member shall be represented by one delegate who may be
accompanied by alternates and by advisers. The cost of attendance of any delegation shall be
borne by the member concerned.
C. The General Conference shall elect a President and such other officers as may be required
at the beginning of each session. They shall hold office for the duration of the session. The
General Conference, subject to the provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules of
procedure. Each member shall have one vote. Decisions pursuant to paragraph H of Article
XIV, paragraph C of Article XVIII and paragraph B of Article XIX shall be made by a
two-thirds majority of the members present ~nd voting. Decisions on other questions,
including the determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be decided
by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting. A
majority of members shall constitute a quorum.

D. The General Conference may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of this
Statute or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in this Statute, and
may make recommendations to the membership of the Agency or to the Board of Governors
or to both on any such questions or matters.
E. The General Conference shall:

1. Elect members of the Board of Governors in accordance with Article VI;
2. Approve States for membership in accordance with Article IV;
3. Suspend a member from the privileges and rights of membership in accordance with
Article XIX;
4. Consider the annual report of the Board;
5. In accordance with Article XIV, approve the budget of the Agency recommended by the
Board or return it with recommendations as to its entirety or parts to the Board, for
resubmission to the General Conference;
6. Approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as required by the relationship
agreement between the Agency and the United Nations, except reports referred to in
paragraph C of Article XII, or return them to the Board with its recommendations;
7. Approve any agreement or agreements between the Agency and the United Nations and
other organizations as provided in Article XVI or return such agreements with its
recommendations to the Board, for resubmission to the General Conference;
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8. Approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise of borrowing powers by the Board, in
accordance with paragraph G of Article XIV; approve rules regarding the acceptance of
voluntary contributions to the Agency; and approve, in accordance with paragraph F of Article
XIV, the manner in which the general fund referred to in that paragraph may be used;
9. Approve amendments to this Statute in accordance with paragraph C of Article XVIII;
10. Approve the appointment of the Director General in accordance with paragraph A of
Article VII.
F. The General Conference shall have the authority:
1. To take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the General Conference for this
purpose by the Board;
2. To propose matters for consideration by the Board and request from the Board reports on
any matter relating to the functions of the Agency.
Arti.cle VI
Board of Governors

A. The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:
1. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the first Board, the Preparatory
Commission referred to in Annex I) shall designate for membership on the Board the five
members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of
source materials and the member most advanced in the technology of atomic energy
including the production of source materials in each of the following areas not represented by
the aforesaid five:
(1) North America
(2) Latin America
(3) Western Europe
(4) Eastern Europe
(5) Africa and the Middle East
(6) South Asia
(7) South East Asia and the Pacific
(8) Far East.
2. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the first Board, the Preparatory
Commission referred to in Annex I) shall designate for membership on the Board two
members from among the following other producers of source materials: Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Poland; and Portugal; and shall also designate for membership o'n the Board
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one other member as a supplier of technical assistance. No member in this category in any
one year will be eligible for redesignation in the same category for the following year.
3. The General Conference shall elect ten members to membership on the Board of
Governors, with due regard to equitable representation on the Board as a whole of the
members in the areas listed in sub-paragraph A-1 of this Article, so that the Board shall at all
times include in this category a representative of each of those areas except North America.
Except for the five members chosen for a term of one year in accordance with paragraph D
of this Article, no member in this category in any one term of office will be eligible for
re-election in the same category for the following term of office.
B. The designations provided for in sub-paragraphs A-1 and A-2 of this Article shall take place
not less than sixty days before each regular annual session of the General Conference. The
elections provided for in sub-paragraph A-3 of this Article shall take place at regular annual
sessions of the General Conference.
C. Members represented on the Board of Governors in accordance with sub-paragraphs A-1

and A-2 of this Article shall hold office from the end of the next regular annual session of the
General Conference after their designation until the end of the following regular annual
session of the General Conference.
D. Members represented on the Board of Governors in accordance with sub-paragraph A-3 of
this Article shall hold office from the end of the regular annual session of the General
Conference at which they are elected until the end of the second regular annual session of
the General Conference thereafter. In the election of these members for the first Board,
however, five shall be chosen for a term of one year.
E. Each member of the Board of Governors shall have one vote. Decisions on the amount of

the Agency's budget shall be made by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, as
provided in paragraph H of Article XIV. Decisions on other questions, including the
determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds
majority, shall be made by a majority of those present and voting. Two-thirds of all members
of the Board shall constitute a quorum.
F. The Board of Governors shall have authority to carry out the functions of the Agency in
accordance with this Statute, subject to its responsibilities to the General Conference as
provided in this Statute.
G. The Board of Governors shall meet at such times as it may determine. The meetings shall
take place at the headquarters of the Agency unless otherwise determined by the Board.
H. The Board of Governors shall elect a Chairman and other officers from among its members
and, subject to the provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
I. The Board of Governors may establish such committees as it deems advisable. The Board
may appoint persons to represent it in its relations with other organizations.

J. The Board of Governors shall prepare an annual report to the General Conference
concerning the affairs of the Agency and any projects approved by the Agency. The Board
shall also prepare for submission to the General Conference such reports as the Agency is or
may be required to make to the United Nations or to any other organization the work of
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which is related to that of the Agency. These reports, along with the annual reports, shall be
submitted to members of the Agency at least one month before the regular annual session of
the General Conference.
Article VII
Staff
A. The staff of the Agency shall be headed by a Director General. The Director General shall
be appointed by the Board of Governors with the approval of the General Conference for a
term of four years. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Agency.
B. The Director General shall be responsible for the appointment, organization, and
functioning of the staff and shall be under the authority of and subject to the control of the.
Board of Governors. He shall perform his duties in accordance with regulations adopted by
the Board.
C. The staff shall include such qualified scientific and technical and other personnel as may
be required to fulfil the objectives and functions of the Agency. The Agency shall be guided
by the principle that its permanent staff shall be kept to a minimum.

D. The paramount consideration in the recruitment and employment of the staff and in the
determination of the conditions of service shall be to secure employees of the highest
standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. Subject to this consideration,
due regard shall be paid to the contributions of members to the Agency and to the
importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
E. The terms and conditions on which the staff shall be appointed, remunerated, and
dismissed shall be in accordance with regulations made by the Board of Governors, subject to
the provisions of this Statute and to general rules approved by the General Conference on
the recommendation of the Board.
F. In the performance of their duties, the Director General and the staff shall not seek or
receive instructions from any source external to the Agency. They shall refrain from any
action which might reflect on their position as officials of the Agency; subject to their
responsibilities to the Agency, they shall not disclose any industrial secret or other
confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties for the
Agency. Each member undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities
of the Director General and the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of
their duties.
G. In this Article the term "staff" includes guards.
Article VIII
Exchange of information
A. Each member should make available such information as would, in the judgement of the

member, be helpful to the Agency.
B. Each member shall make available to the Agency all scientific information developed as a
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result of assistance extended by the Agency pursuant to Article XI.

c. The Agency shall assemble and make available in an accessible form the information made
available to it under paragraphs A and B of this Article. It shall take positive steps to
encourage the exchange among its members of information relating to the nature and
peaceful uses of atomic energy and shall serve as an intermediary among its members for
this purpose.
Article IX
Supplying of materials
A. Members may make available to the Agency such quantities of special fissionable materials
as they deem advisable and on such terms as shall be agreed with the Agency. The materials
made available to the Agency may, at the discretion of the member making them available,
be stored either by the member concerned or, with the agreement of the Agency, in the
Agency's depots.
B. Members may also make available to the Agency source materials as defined in Article XX
and other materials. The Board of Governors shall determine the quantities of such materials
which the Agency will accept under agreements provided for in Article XIII.
C. Each member shall notify the Agency of the quantities, form, and composition of special
fissionable materials, source materials, and other materials which that member is prepared,
in conformity with its laws, to make available immediately or during a period specified by the
Board of Governors.

D. On request of the Agency a member shall, from the materials which it has made available,
without delay deliver to another member or group of members such quantities of such
materials as the Agency may specify, and shall without delay deliver to the Agency itself such
quantities of such materials as are really necessary for operations and scientific research in
the facilities of the Agency.
E. The quantities, form and composition of materials made available by any member may be
changed at any time by the member with the approval of the Board of Governors.
F. An initial notification in accordance with paragraph C of this Article shall be made within
three months of the entry into force of this Statute with respect to the member concerned. In
the absence of a contrary decision of the Board of Governors, the materials initially made
available shall be for the period of the calendar year succeeding the year when this Statute
takes effect with respect to the member concerned. Subsequent notifications shall likewise, in
the absence of a contrary action by the Board, relate to the period of the calendar year
following the notification and shall be made no later than the first day of November of each
year.
G. The Agency shall specify the place and method of delivery and, where appropriate, the
form and composition, of materials which it has requested a member to deliver from the
amounts which that member has notified the Agency it is prepared to make available. The
Agency shall also verify the quantities of materials delivered and shall report those quantities
periodically to the members.
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H. The Agency shall be responsible for storing and protecting materials in its possession. The
Agency shall ensure that these materials shall be safeguarded against (1) hazards of the
weather, (2) unauthorized removal or diversion, (3) damage or destruction, including
sabotage, and (4) forcible seizure. In storing special fissionable materials in its possession,
the Agency shall ensure the geographical distribution of these materials in such a way as not
to allow concentration of large amounts of such materials in any one country or region of the
world.
I. The Agency shall as soon as practicable establish or acquire such of the following as may

be necessary:
1. Plant, equipment and facilities for the receipt, storage, and issue of materials;

2. Physical safeguards;
3. Adequate health and safety measures;
4. Control laboratories for the analysis and verification of materials received;
5. Housing and administrative facilities for any staff required for the foregoing.
J. The materials made available pursuant to this Article shall be used as determined by the
Board of Governors in accordance with the provisions of this Statute. No member shall have
the right to require that the materials it makes available to the Agency be kept separately by
the Agency or to designate the specific project in which they must be used.
Article X
Services, equipment and facilities
Members may make available to the Agency services, equipment, and facilities which may be
of assistance in fulfilling the Agency's objectives and functions.
Article XI

.'
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Agency projects
A. Any member or',group of members of the Agency desiring to set up any project for
research on, or development or practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes
may request the assistance of the Agency in securing special fissionable and other materials,
services, equipment, and facilities necessary for this purpose. Any such request shall be
accompanied by an explanation of the purpose and extent of the project and shall be
considered by the Board of Governors.
B. Upon request, the Agency may also assist any member or group of members to make
arrangements to secure necessary financing from outside sources to carry out such projects.
In extending this assistance, the Agency will not be required to provide any guarantees or to
assume any financial responsibility for the project.

C. The Agency may arrange for the supplying of any materials, services, equipment, and
facilities necessary for the project by one or more members or may itself undertake to
l

~9
t
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provide any or all of these directly, taking into consideration the wishes of the member or
. members making the request.
D. For the purpose of considering the request, the Agency may send into the territory of the
member or group of members making the request a person or persons qualified to examine
the project. For this purpose the Agency may, with the approval of the member or group of
members making the request, use members of its own staff Qr employ suitably qualified
nationals of any member.
E. Before approving a project under this Article, the Board of Governors shall give due
consideration to:

1. The usefulness of the project, including its scientific and technical feasibility;
2. The adequacy of plans, funds, and technical personnel to assure the effective execution of
the project;
3. The adequacy of proposed health and safety standards for handling and storing materials
and for operating facilities;
4. The inability of the member or group of members making the request to secure the
necessary finances, materials, facilities, equipment, and services;
5. The equitable distribution of materials and other resources available to the Agency;
6. The special needs of the under-developed areas of the world; and
7. Such other matters as may be relevant.
F. Upon approving a project, the Agency shall enter into an agreement with the member or
group of members submitting the project, which agreement shall:

1. Provide for allocation to the project of any required special fissionable or other materials;
2. Provide for transfer of special fissionable materials from their then place of custody,
whether the materials be in the custody of the Agency or of the member making them
available for use in Agency projects, to the member or group of members submitting the
project, under conditions vyhich ensure the safety of any shipment required and meet
applicable health and safety standards;
3. Set forth the terms and conditions, including charges, on which any materials, services,
equipment, and facilities are to be provided by the Agency itself, and, if any such materials,
services, equipment, and facilities are to be provided by a member, the terms and conditions
as arranged for by the member or group of members submitting the project and the
supplying member;
4. Include undertakings by the member or group of members submitting the project: (a) that
the assistance provided shall not be used in such a way as to further any military purpose;
and (b) that the project shall be subject to the safeguards provided for in Article XII, the
relevant safeguards being specified in the agreement;
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5. Make appropriate provision regarding the rights and interests of the Agency and the
member or members concerned in any inventions or discoveries, or any patents therein,
arising from the project;
6. Make appropriate provision regarding settlement of disputes;
7. Include such other provisions as may be appropriate.
G. The provisions of this Article shall also apply where appropriate to a request for materials,
services, facilities, or equipment in connexion with an existing project.
Article XII
Agency safeguards

A. With respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where the Agency is requested
by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the Agency shall have the following rights and
responsibilities to the extent relevant to the project or arrangement:
1. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities, including nuclear reactors,
and to approve it only from the viewpoint of assuring that it will not further any military
purpose, that it complies with applicable health and safety standards, and that it will permit
effective application of the safeguards provided for in this Article;
2. To require the observance of any health and safety measures prescribed by the Agency;
3. To require the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in ensuring
accountability for source and special fissionable materials used or produced in the project or
arrangement;
4. To call for and receive progress reports;
5. To approve the means to be used for the chemical processing of irradiated materials solely
to ensure that this chemical processing will not lend itself to diversion of materials for military
purposes and will comply with applicable health and safety standards; to require that special
fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product be used for peaceful purposes
under continuing Agency safeguards for research or in reactors, existing or under
construction, specified by the member or members concerned; and to require deposit with
the Agency of any exc~ss of any special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a
by-product over what is needed for the above-stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of
these materials, provided that thereafter at the request of the member or members
concerned special fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency shall be returned
promptly to the member or members concerned for use under the same provisions as stated
above;
6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors, designated by the
Agency after consultation with the State or States concerned, who shall have access at all
times to all places and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with
materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this Statute to be safeguarded, as
necessary to account for source and special fissionable materials supplied and fissionable
products and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in
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furtherance of any military purpose referred to in sub-paragraph F"4 of Article XI, with the
health and safety measures referred to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this Article, and with any
other conditions prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States
concerned. Inspectors designated by the Agency shall be accompanied by representatives of
the authorities of the State concerned, if that State so requests, provided that the inspectors
shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions;
7. In the event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient State or States to take
requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate assistance and
withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the Agency or a member in
furtherance of the project.
B. The Agency shall, as necessary, establish a staff of inspectors. The staff of inspectors shall
have the responsibility of examining all operations conducted by the Agency itself to
determine whether the Agency is complying with the health and safety measures prescribed
by it for application to projects subject to its approval, supervision or control, and whether
the Agency is taking adequate measures to prevent the source and special fissionable
materials in its c:ustody or used or produced in its own operations from being used in
furtherance of any military purpose. The Agency shall take remedial action forthwith to
correct any non-compliance or failure to take adequate measures.

C. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of obtaining and verifying the
accounting referred to in sub-paragraph A-6 of this Article and of determining whether there
is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub-paragraph F-4 of Article XI, with the
measures referred to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this Article, and with all other conditions of the
project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned.
The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon
transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or
States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board
shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General
Assembly of the United Nations. In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to take
fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may take one or both of the
following measures: direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the
Agency or by a member, and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to
the recipient member or group of members. The Agency may also, in accordance with Article
XIX, suspend any non-complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of
membership.
Article XIII
Reimbursement of members
Unless otherwise agreed upon between the Board of Governors and the member furnishing
to the Agency materials, services, equipment, or facilities, the Board shall enter into an
agreement with such member providing for reimbursement for the items furnished.
Article XIV
Finance
A. The Board of Governors shall submit to the General Conference the annual budget
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estimates for the expenses of the Agency. To facilitate the work of the Board in this regard,
the Director General shall initially prepare the budget estimates. If the General Conference
does not approve the estimates, it shall return them together with its recommendations to
the Board. The Board shall then submit further estimates to the General Conference for its
approval.
·
B. Expenditures of the Agency shall be classified under the following categories:
1. Administrative expenses: these shall include:

(a) Costs of the staff of the Agency other than the staff employed in connexion with
materials, services, equipment, and facilities referred to in sub-paragraph B-2 below; costs of
meetings; and expenditures required for the preparation of Agency projects and for the
distribution of information;
(b) Costs of implementing the safeguards referred to in Article XII in relation to agency
projects or, under sub-paragraph A-5 of Article III, in relation to any bilateral or multilateral
arrangement, together with the costs of handling and storage of special fissionable material
by the Agency other than the storage and handling charges referred to in paragraph E below;
2. Expenses, other than those included in sub-paragraph 1 of this paragraph, in connexion
with any materials, facilities, plant, and equipment acquired or established by the Agency in
carrying out its authorized functions, and the costs of materials, services, equipment, and
facilities provided by it under agreements with one or more members.
C. In fixing the expenditures under sub-paragraph B-1(b) above, the Board of Governors shall
deduct such amounts as are recoverable under agreements regarding the application of
safeguards between the Agency and parties to bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

D. The Board of Governors shall apportion the expenses referred to in sub-paragraph B-1
above, among members in accordance with a scale to be fixed by the General Conference. In
fixing the scale the General Conference shall be guided by the principles adopted by the
United Nations in assessing contributions of Member States to the regular budget of the
United Nations.
E. The Board of Governors shall establish periodically a scale of charges, including reasonable
uniform storage and handling charges, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities
furnished to members by the Agency. The scale shall be designed to produce revenues for
the Agency adequate to meet the expenses and costs referred to in sub-paragraph B-2
above, less any voluntary contributions which the Board of Governors may, in accordance
with paragraph F, apply for this purpose. The proceeds of such charges shall be placed in a
separate fund which shall be used to pay members for any materials, services, equipment, or
facilities furnished by them and to meet other expenses referred to in sub-paragraph B-2
above which may be incurred by the Agency itself.
F. Any excess of revenues referred to in paragraph E over the expenses and costs there
referred to, and any voluntary contributions to the Agency, shall be placed in a general fund
which may be used as the Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference,
may determine.
G. Subject to rules and limitations approved by the General Conference, the Board of
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Governors shall have the authority to exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the Agency
without, however, imposing on members of the Agency any liability in respect of loans
entered into pursuant to this authority, and to accept voluntary contributions made to the
Agency.
H. Decisions of the General Conference on financial questions and of the Board of Governors
on the amount of the Agency's budget shall require a two-th.irds majority of those present
and voting.
Article XV
Privileges and immunities
A. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each member such legal capacity and such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.
B. Delegates of members together with their alternates and advisers, Governors appointed to
the Board together with their alternates and advisers, and the Director General and the staff
of the Agency, shall enjoy such privileges and .immunities as are necessary in the
independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Agency.

C. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in
a separate agreement or agreements between the Agency, represented for this purpose by
the Director General acting under instructions of the Board of Governors, and the members.
Article XVI
Relationship with other organizations
A. The Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, is authorized to
enter into an agreement or agreements establishing an appropriate relationship between the
Agency and the United Nations and any other organizations the work of which is related to
that of the Agency.
B. The agreement or agreements establishing the relationship of the Agency and the United
Nations shall provide for:
1. Submission by the ~gency of reports as provided for in sub-paragraphs B-4 and B-5 of
Article III;
2. Consideration by the Agency of resolutions relating to it adopted by the General Assembly
or any of the Councils of the United Nations and the submission of reports, when requested,
to the appropriate organ of the United Nations on the action taken by the Agency or by its
members in accordance with this Statute as a result of such consideration.
Article XVII
Settlement of disputes
A. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Statute which is
not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice iri conformity

19

27/03/02 3:29PM

11ian Treaty Series 1957 No 11 ... y [IAEA] (New York, 26 October 1956)

http://www. austlii.edu. au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1957I 11. html

with the Statute of the Court, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of
settlement.
B. The General Conference and the Board of Governors are separately empowered, subject to
authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International
Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of
the Agency's activities.
Article XVIII
Amendments and withdrawals
A. Amendments to this Statute may be proposed by any member. Certified copies of the text
of any amendment proposed shall be prepared by the Director General and communicated by
him to all members' at least ninety days in advance of its consideration by the General
Conference.
B. At the fifth annual session of the General Conference following the coming into force of
this Statute, the question of a general review of the provisions of this Statute shall be placed
on the agenda of that session. On approval by a majority of the members present and voting,
the review will take place at the following General Conference. Thereafter, proposals on the
question of a general review of this Statute may be submitted for decision by the General
Conference under the same procedure.

C. Amendments shall come into force for all members when:
(i)Approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting
after consideration of observations submitted by the Board of Governors on each proposed
amendment, and
(ii) Accepted by two-thirds of all the members in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes. Acceptance by a member shall be effected by the deposit of an
instrument of acceptance with the depositary Government referred to in paragraph C of
Article XXI.
D. At any time after five years from the date when this Statute shall take effect in accordance
with paragraph E of Article XXI or whenever a member is unwilling to accept an amendment
to this Statute, it may withdraw from the Agency by notice in writing to that effect given to
the depositary Government referred to in paragraph C of Article XXI, which shall promptly
inform the Board of Governors and all members.
E. Withdrawal by a member from the Agency shall not affect its contractual obligations
entered into pursuant to Article XI or its budgetary obligations for the year in which it
withdraws.
Article XIX
Suspension of privileges
A. A member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to
the Agency shall have no vote in the Agency if the amount of its arrears equals or· exceeds
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the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two years. The General
Conference may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure
to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.
B. A member which has persistently violated the provisions of this Statute or of any
agreement entered into by it pursuant to this Statute may be suspended from the exercise of
the privileges and rights of membership by the General Conference acting by a two-thirds
majority of the members present and voting upon recommendation by the Board of
Governors.
Article XX
Definitions
As used in this Statute:

1. The term "special fissionable material" means plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium
enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing;
and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time
determine; but the term "special fissionable material" does not include source material.
2. The term "uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233" means uranium containing the
isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these
isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238
occurring in nature.
3. The term "source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring, in
nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of
metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more
of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time
determine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time
determine.
Article XXI
Signature, acceptance, and entry into force
A. This Statute shall be open for signature on 26 October 1956 by all States Members of the
United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies and shall remain open for signature by
those States for a period of ninety days.[l]
B. The signatory States shall become parties to this Statute by deposit of an instrument of
ratification.ill
·

C. Instruments of ratification by signatory States and instruments of acceptance by States
whose membership has been approved under paragraph B of Article IV of this Statute shall
be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as
depositary Government.
D. Ratification or acceptance of this Statute shall be effected by States in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes.
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E. This Statute, apart from the Annex, shall come into force when eighteen States have
deposited instruments of ratification in accordance with paragraph B of this Article, provided
that such eighteen States shall include at least three of the following States: Canada, France,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom ·of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the United States of America.QJ Instruments of ratification and instruments of
acceptance deposited thereafter shall take effect on the date of their receipt.
F. The depositary Government shall promptly inform all States signatory to this Statute of the
date of each deposit of ratification and the date of entry into force of the Statute. The
depositary Government shall promptly inform all signatories and members of the dates on
which States subsequently become parties thereto.
G. The Annex to this Statute shall come into force on the first day this Statute is open for
signature.
Article XXII
Registration with. the United Nations
A. This Statute shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of
the Charter of the United Nations.
B. Agreements between the Agency and any member or members, agreements between the
Agency and any other organization or organizations, and agreements between members
subject to approval of the Agency, shall be registered with the Agency. Such agreements
shall be registered by the Agency with the United Nations if registration is required under
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article XXIII
Authentic texts and certified copies
This Statute, done in the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each
being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary Government.
Duly certified copies of this Statute shall be transmitted by the depositary Government to the
Governments of the other signatory States and to the Governments of States admitted to
membership under paragraph B of Article IV.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Statute.
DONE at the Headquarters of the United Nations, this twenty-sixth day of October, one
thousand nine hundred and fifty-six.
[Signatures not reproduced here.]
ANNEX I
PREPARATORY COMMISSION
A. A Preparatory Commission shall come into existence on the first day this Statute is open
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for signature. It shall be composed of one representative each of Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States
of America, and one representative each of six other States to be chosen by the International
Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Preparatory
Commission shall remain in existence until this Statute comes into force and thereafter until
the General Conference has convened and a Board of Governors has been selected in
accordance with Article VI.
B. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met by a loan provided by the
United Nations and for this purpose the Preparatory Commission shall make the necessary
arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations, including arrangements
for repayment of the loan by the Agency. Should these funds be insufficient, the Preparatory
Commission may accept advances from Governments. Such advances may be set off against
the contributions of the Governments concerned to the Agency.

C. The Preparatory Commission shall:
1. Elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of. procedure, meet as often as necessary,
determine its own place of meeting and establish such committees as it deems necessary;
2. Appoint an executive secretary and staff as shall be necessary, who shall exercise such
powers and perform such duties as the Commission may determine;
3. Make arrangements for the first session of the General Conference, including the
preparation of a provisional agenda and draft rules of procedure, such session to be held as
soon as possible after the entry into force of this Statute;
4. Make designations for membership on the first Board of Governors in accordance with
sub-paragraphs A-1 and A-2 and paragraph B of Article VI;
5. Make studies, reports, and recommendations for the first session of the General
Conference and for the first meeting of the Board of Governors on subjects of concern to the
Agency requiring immediate attention, including (a) the financing of the Agency; (b) the
programmes and budget for the first year of the Agency; (c) technical problems relevant to
advance planning of Agency operations; (d) the establishment of a permanent Agency staff;
and (e) the location of the permanent headquarters of the Agency;
6. Make recommendations for the first meeting of the Board of Governors concerning the
provisions of a headquarters agreement defining the status of the Agency and the rights and
obligations which will exist in the relationship between the Agency and the host Government;
7. (a) Enter into negotiations with the United Nations with a view to the preparation of a draft
agreement in accordance with Article XVI of this Statute, such draft agreement to be
submitted to the first session of the General Conference and to the first meeting of the Board
of Governors; and
(b) make recommendations to the first session of the General Conference and to the first
meeting of the Board of Governors concerning the relationship of the Agency to other
international organizations as contemplated in Article XVI of this Statute.
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ill Signed for Australia 4 December 1956.
ill Instrument of ratification deposited for Australia

29 July·1957.

QJ The Statute entered into force for Australia and generally 29 July 1957.
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APPENDIX IV

AUSTRALIA, THE "MIDDLE POWER" PARADIGM, AND LIBERAL
INTERNATIONAL THEORY

The "interdisciplinary perspective" which links the international lawyer with the
international relations theorist through the notion of international rules (outlined in the
Introduction to the study) carries the prospect of further research in areas which are
not the primary concern of the present study.
The study has argued that

Aust~alia

played a significant part (previously

unacknowledged by scholars) in the initial process of negotiation between the United
States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies which led in 1968 to the opening
of the NPT for signature and accession by all states. In this way, Australia was
involved in the establishment of a multilateral international law instrument which it
regarded as critical to its own, and to world security as international law,
notwithstanding its initial reluctance to sign and ratify the treaty.
Australia subsequently became a committed and internationally acknowledged
champion of global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. With the NPT as their
foundation, those efforts have proved relatively successful, whether as legal, political
or diplomatic initiatives, in their goal of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus,
Australia's calculus of its national interest has involved, over time, a synthesis of
international law, its own acknowledged obligations under that law, and its relations
with other states. Th:at synthesis has been vitally important for the ways in which
Australia has sought to carry weight in the development of international law on
nuclear proliferation both before and after 1968.
Australia's national interest calculations have also been conditioned by its
domestic political and constitutional identity. The Australian state is founded on the
principles of liberal civil society and constitutional government. Its liberal ethos is
embedded within a structure of constitutionally guaranteed democratic rights which
comprise individual legal, political, social, economic and other rights.

2

Australia's liberal constitutional identity, in the context of its mms in the
sphere of nuclear proliferation, provides· an opportunity for future enquiry into the
role of liberal international theory in understanding the evolution of this sector of
public international law, and the growth of interdisciplinary scholarship.

1

In terms of the study's assertion of the potential for influence of the "middle
powers", the core assumption of a liberal perspective on international relations holds
the key to understanding the degree of influence which some middle-ranking states
have exhibited. This claim becomes clearer on consideration of the basic assumptions,
outlined in 1993 by Slaughter, which are embraced by all liberal theories:

•

That "[t]he fundamental actors in politics are members of domestic society,
understood as individuals and privately constituted groups seeking to promote
their independent interests. Under specified conditions, individual incentives may
promote social order and the progressive improvement of individual welfare".

•

That "[a]ll governments represent some segment of domestic society, whose
interests are reflected in state policy".

•

That "[t]he behaviour of states - and hence levels of international conflict and
cooperation - reflects the nature and configuration of state preferences". 2

Thus, social rather than systemic factors drive state policy and behaviour, those
factors are constituted by patterns of individual interest, and "what states do is
determined by what they want. "3 These paraineters underlie liberal international
theory (whose history stretches back to the Enlightenment, and to the laissez-faire
liberalism of Locke, and the democratic liberalism of Rousseau). 4 So also do the
fundamental precepts of the liberal ethos: its gradualism, reason, optimism,
egalitarianism, universalism and individualism.

1

Zaher, M. W. & Mattews, R. A. (1995). Liberal international theory: Common threads, divergent
strands. In C. W. Kegley (Jr.) (Ed.),Controversies in international relations theory: Realism and the
Neo-liberal Challenge (pp. 107- 150). New York: St. Martin's Press. Atpp. 117- 120.
2

Slaughter-Burley, A. (1993). International law and international relations: A dual agenda. 87 AJIL
205. At 227,228.
3

Ibid.

4

Supra. At Note 1, p. Ill.

3

If it is accepted that the liberal quest is for gradually enhanced levels of peace,
5

welfare and justice, realised through international cooperation it is reasonable to
suggest that Australia's stable liberal constitutionalism forms the basis on which it has
engaged with, and been engaged by, that world.
Australia has reflected in its international behaviour the influence exerted by,
and the goals sought by, individuals and groups - both private and governmental within it. Their aggregated preferences form a major component of the process by
which the Australian state's international preferences and policy are developed and
articulated, at home and abroad. However, this causal relationship does not exclude
consideration of systemic factors: the pre-existing or evolving matrix of structure,
institutions, organisations, issue regimes and understandings within which all states
must operate in the international domain. Rather, the influence which Australia
demonstrates in its international engagement must be understood as lying within and
therefore constrained by, entrenched global structures. These assumptions are valid
not only in respect of its relations with other Western liberal democracies, but also in
its dealings with the many non-liberal and proto-democratic states around the world.
Australia's decisions and actions in the NPT negotiation process have been
interpreted in the study within a frame of reference which takes account of both its
fundamentally liberal political nature and the structural limits of its international
relations policies and outcomes.
In doing so, the study has not discounted the role of international institutions

and organisations, whether formal or informal, legally or extra-legally constituted, in
international affairs. In fact, they remain, in the study, as vital components of the
international system, as do the ultimate political entities through which they work the nation-states.

RELATED THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS
A consequent, though subsidiary, conclusion of the study is that the success of the
community of knowledge and experience which surrounds, legitimises and
operationalises the NPT - its "regime" in the widest sense - suggests that there is an
opportunity to use the events under review as an early case study of the processes by
5

Ibid. Atp. 117.

4

which intemational law and intemational politics converge during a period of
accelerating change. Those individuals and institutions, both within and outside
government, who exercise skills in inspection and verification techniques, diplomacy,
intemational bureaucracy, intemational law, academic research and so on are less
likely to reject rival specialists as irrelevant in circumstances where a wide range of
skills are focused on a common set of objectives, such as those of global anti-nuclear
proliferation efforts.
The increasing transparency of national borders to the exchange of
information, as well as the ability of individuals and groups of individuals around the
world to confer at will, allow the possibility that those individuals, institutions and
understandings which constitute communities of knowledge in issue areas such as
anti-nuclear proliferation will increasingly free themselves from the oversight of the
nation-states. 6 That liberating effect may result in the accelerating convergence of
intemational law with the precepts of intemational relations theorists under the rubric
of intemational rules.
Finally, from the point of view of the individual, it may be that the experience
of liberal states, which have tended not to go to war with each other over the past
century, can be used as a template for a liberal interdisciplinary exploration of the
evolution ofintemational rules between states in the new century. The extension of the
intemal behaviour of liberal states - importantly, their acknowledgement of the rights
and interests of individual citizens - to the wider trans-national sphere may be
mirrored by the ways in which rules agreed by the increasingly attenuated nationstates are negotiated and interpreted.
In this way, the convergence of intemational law and intemational political

action may ultimately be completed through the cession of pre-eminence by the
classic "state" to smaller, more numerous and ultimately more functionally skilful
entities of many kinds, including the individual. 7
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